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TO

EDWARD HENRY, 15TH EARL OF DERBY,

THIS RECORD OF

A BRAVE AND HONOURABLE LIFE IS DEDICATED,

IN GRATEFUL TESTIMONY

OF THE RARE KINDNESS AND GENEROSITY DISPLAYED BY HIS ANCESTOR

TOWARDS THE ORPHAN

WHOSE CAREER IS TRACED IN ITS PAGES.

HAMPTON COURT PALACE,
1st January, 1873.

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LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

SIR JOHN BURGOYNE.

AMONGST the families which rose into note upon the ruins of the monastic establishments of England was that of Burgoyne of Sutton, in the county of Bedford. Robert Burgoyne, the founder of the existing branch of the family, was auditor of the Exchequer in the reign of Henry VIII., and one of the commissioners appointed to take the surrender of the monasteries into the King's hands. He received as his share of the spoil the lands of the nunnery of Wroxhall, in the county of Warwick, and his descendants subsequently succeeding to the estates of an elder branch in Bedfordshire, the family rapidly rose into the position of county magnates. The great grandson of Robert Burgoyne was elected member for Warwickshire, and created a baronet by Charles I. Sir John, the third baronet, had by his wife, Constance Lucy of Charlecote, a son Roger, who became the fourth baronet; and a second son, John, the father of John Burgoyne, the general and politician of the reign of George III.

The vicissitudes of fortune which marked the career

of General Burgoyne, and the part played by him in the military and political history of the reign of George III., would afford material for a narrative of considerable interest; but as they have little or no connection with the present work, it is sufficient to state that while at school at Westminster, he had formed a friendship with Lord Strange, the eldest son of Edward the eleventh Earl of Derby. This opened the way to his acquaintance with the Stanley family, and his subsequent elopement with Lady Charlotte, the youngest daughter of Lord Derby. Whatever may have been the feelings of Lady Charlotte's parents on the subject of the marriage of their daughter with a soldier of fortune, it caused no interruption in the friendship between General Burgoyne and his brother-in-law: a friendship which in after years so powerfully affected the fortunes of his children. Lady Charlotte Burgoyne died without issue in 1776. Some years after her death, General Burgoyne formed a connection with a professional singer of some repute, who lived with him during the remainder of his life, and by whom he had four children, of whom John, the eldest, was the late field marshal.

In General Burgoyne's will, made in Dublin, while he was commander-in-chief in Ireland, he acknowledges his children, and makes provision for their future, by leaving the interest of a sum of £4000 to their mother for her life, and at her death to be divided in equal proportions among the children. In the same will he recommends that his eldest son, John, should enter the naval service, stating his conviction that it was the most promising that a young man in his son's circumstances could choose, but adding an earnest desire that his inclinations might not be forced.

The eldest son was baptized in the parish church of

St. Anne's, Soho, on the 15th of August, 1782, under the names of John Fox Burgoyne; Charles James Fox, the celebrated statesman, and his father's intimate friend, acting as sponsor for him on the occasion.

General Burgoyne died in 1792. As the proceeds of his property barely sufficed to cover the debts he left behind him, his intentions in favour of his family proved unavailing, and their lot must have been one of penury, had it not been for the interposition of Lord Derby, who removed the children from the custody of the mother, and took upon himself their entire maintenance and education. Fortunately for humanity, a generous sympathy with weakness and misfortune is not an uncommon attribute of our nature; but few men would have the inclination or the means to take upon themselves the entire charge of the illegitimate offspring of a former friend. So rare and disinterested an act of generosity gives a high idea of the character of Edward twelfth Earl of Derby, who is chiefly known to posterity as a distinguished patron of the turf, and the founder of the two great races at Epsom, which bear respectively the names of his title and place of residence. It leaves also a vivid impression on the mind, of that peculiar power of attracting the firm and enduring friendship of other men, which seems to have been the special characteristic of General Burgoyne. After making every allowance for the fascination of his style, it is impossible to peruse the correspondence of this, the best abused man of his time, without experiencing feelings of regard for the writer. The warmth of imagination which occasionally led him into bombast in his public documents, is toned down in his private letters to a natural depth of feeling and simplicity of manner, which reveal the charm that captivated his contemporaries, and obtained

for him the lasting friendship of such men as Lord Derby and Charles James Fox.

The children were removed by Lord Derby to the Oaks, near Epsom, a place which had formerly belonged to their father, and had been sold by him to Lord Derby, after the loss of all his appointments in 1778.[1]

John, the eldest son, was sent to Cambridge, to be educated by a private tutor, the Rev. Mr. Maule, of King's College, where he remained until 1793,[2] and from whence he was removed to Eton, remaining there until October, 1796. Amongst his contemporaries at Eton at this period, was Hallam, the historian, to whom he was fag.

Of his childhood but few facts are known. He passed his holidays at the Oaks, or at the town house of his guardian, in Grosvenor Square. Lord Derby's first marriage had proved unhappy, and he was separated from his wife, a daughter of the Duke of Hamilton; he afterwards became deeply enamoured of Miss Farren, the celebrated actress, and Sir John Burgoyne used to relate how, when staying in Grosvenor Square during his vacations, he was always taken to the theatre whenever Miss Farren acted. At the end of the play he usually accompanied Lord Derby to the stage-door, the latter being in the habit of calling for Miss Farren and her mother, and taking them back to their house in his carriage. The first Lady Derby died in 1797. Six weeks after her death Lord Derby married Miss Farren, who carried with her into her new sphere, graces of mind

[1] A fête given by General Burgoyne at the Oaks on the occasion of the marriage of his friend Lord Stanley with Lady Betty Hamilton, was the origin of his drama of 'The Maid of the Oaks.'

[2] Among his schoolfellows at this time was a member of a French *émigré* family, whose father was guillotined while the son was at Mr. Maule's school.

and person fitted to adorn the highest rank of society. She proved a steadfast friend to the children of General Burgoyne, and to the last hour of his life Sir John Burgoyne spoke of her in terms of the warmest affection and respect.

But while nothing could exceed the kindness which he experienced from Lord Derby, there is reason to believe that his childhood was far from happy. In after years he spoke little of it, and events connected with this portion of his life appear to have left a painful impression on his mind. A poor dependent of a great house, from which the master was often absent, and the mistress permanently deposed, he must have been frequently exposed to the coarse familiarity of the subordinate followers of a great establishment. Even the pity felt for him by the compassionate, must have been galling to a proud and sensitive nature. While the circumstances of his birth and early training had the effect of impressing upon his character that gentleness of disposition and power of self-control which distinguished him in after years, its results were also visible in a certain timidity of manner and distrust of his own powers, which tended much to conceal from superficial observers the great qualities which lay underneath.

Better days at length dawned upon him. He entered the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich on the 19th of October, 1796, and was appointed assistant engineer 14th of July, 1798. The Black Book of the Academy has the following solitary crime recorded against him: "Overstaid the vacation one day. Excused. See Orders of 9th January, 1797."

His commission as second lieutenant of Royal Engineers is dated the 29th of August, 1798, and in the

following month he was ordered to Dover, where he was employed under the command of Colonel Twiss, R.E., upon the fortifications of the Western Heights. These works, which had just been commenced in the form of field works to meet a temporary emergency, he lived to complete as a permanent line of fortification, before his retirement from the War Office in 1868.

In March, 1800, he was ordered to prepare for active service. On being made acquainted with the fact, Lord Derby writes to him:

"Knowsley, March 17, 1800.

"My dear Burgoyne,

"I was hunting when your letter arrived, and am but just in time to write a line in answer to yours, and to say that, if your commanding officer gives you leave, I shall be happy to see you here whenever it best suits your convenience, when I shall likewise be happy to assist you in providing everything necessary for your equipment for foreign service.

"Yours most truly and affectionately,

"Derby."

On obtaining his commission in 1798 Lieutenant Burgoyne had firmly refused an annual allowance offered to him by his benefactor.

On the 11th of April, 1800, he received orders to embark at Woolwich in the *Asia* transport, with a detachment of Royal Military Artificers and Labourers, as part of the expedition under Sir Ralph Abercrombie, destined for Egypt. Some extracts from his private journal will give an idea of the difficulties attendant upon an expedition by sea before the days of steam. It will be perceived that five weeks after setting sail, they had proceeded no further than Spithead.

April 15th, 1800. Embarked at Woolwich.

—— *25th*. Came to anchor at Spithead at 8.30 P.M.

May 13*th*. Sailed from Spithead under convoy of the *Sea Horse* frigate, with Admiral Sir R. Bickerton, General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and other generals on board.

—— 16*th*. A very heavy gale of wind; lay to with close-reefed foresail.

—— 18*th*. At 5 A.M. weather moderated. At 11 A.M. fell in with *Sea Horse*, who had lost her main topmast and fore and mizen topgallant masts during the gale. The *Calcutta*, forty-four guns, lost her main topmast and other spars.

—— 19*th*. Having bore up, the fleet anchored in Portland Roads at 6 P.M.

—— 22*nd*. Anchored at Spithead at 9 P.M., and waited there for a convoy until

June 3*rd*. Sailed under convoy of the *Anson*.

—— 22*nd*. Ran foul of another transport. In the night, at 10 P.M., came to anchor off the New Mole at Gibraltar.

—— 29*th*. Got under way. Wind foul and light. Gun-boats came out and took two of our convoy. The rest returned.

—— 30*th*. Got under way at 9 A.M. with fair wind.

July 18*th*. Came to anchor in Port Mahon, in the island of Minorca, at 4 P.M.

—— 19*th*. Ordered to Malta in the *Chameleon* sloop of war.

—— 23*rd*. Landed in St. Paul's Bay, Island of Malta, at 5 P.M.

I have been unable to discover any reference to the blockade of La Valetta among Sir John Burgoyne's papers; but in 1864 he wrote the following letter to Mr. Zammit, a Maltese gentleman of influence, who had been in correspondence with him with a view of demonstrating that the Maltese had recovered the island mainly by their own exertions, and without material assistance from the British:

War Office, London,
July 25, 1864.

My dear Mr. Cachia Zammit,

In reply to your request for my opinion on the conduct of the Maltese at the blockade in 1800, I can only give you reminiscences, which, though of a general character, are vivid;

for I was very young—under twenty—when I was sent to join the blockading force, some six weeks or two months before the surrender of the place. Under oppression from French rule, the Maltese had revolted *en masse* long before. They were under the great disadvantage of being without organisation and without leaders, for the previous rule in the island had been exclusively in the hands of the Knights, in which no Maltese was allowed to participate except in the most humble station. The Knights, who had been in possession of the island for nearly three hundred years, were composed of an assemblage from the different European Catholic countries, but had sunk into insignificance, accelerated by the results of the French Revolution, and ignominiously surrendered the island to the French forces on the first summons by Napoleon Bonaparte on his way to Egypt. He left a garrison there of about four thousand men, against which the country population revolted, and, though unprovided with warlike implements and means, by their spirit forced the French garrison to confine their occupation to the city of Valetta and its immediate dependencies. It is true that the French troops could make sorties and penetrate into the country in any direction; but as in doing so they could only hold the precise spot on which they trod, and had nothing of much service to them to obtain by such enterprises, in which they suffered, moreover, considerable losses, they were virtually shut up on the land side by the energy of the population. On the first outbreak, however, French men-of-war from the harbour were enabled to interrupt the communication between the island and Sicily, from which it was supplied with provisions; and the consequence would have been, no doubt, the subjection of the revolting population, but for the arrival of a squadron under Captain Ball, R.N. (subsequently Sir Alexander Ball), which commenced the blockade of the French port, and relieved the rest of the island from its effects. Some British regiments of the line were subsequently landed with a general officer and staff, and the blockade of the fortress was more close, continuous, and systematic; the wild levies of the Maltese people, however, being still in force and active as ever. Finally the French garrison, without further struggle, yielded to a want of provisions, and surrendered to the

British forces. I do not quite understand the inference you would draw from the remark that "the Maltese are said to have lost twenty thousand souls during the siege, while the British had not one single soldier killed by the enemy." Without in the slightest degree detracting from the high courage of the Maltese, to which I would bear unreserved testimony, the twenty thousand loss, if assumed to be by the action of the enemy, must be a very great exaggeration; for the whole population, old and young, male and female, was only computed at one hundred thousand, and the actual contests could not have been many nor much prolonged. Regarding the small or no loss by the British, it was owing to the quiescent state of affairs during the later proceedings of the blockade, when only a shot or two was fired occasionally as a warning by either party; for assuredly, from the time of their landing, the British troops took the very front line in the operation of maintaining a very close blockade.

My dear Mr. Zammit,

Yours faithfully,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

La Valetta surrendered on the 5th of September, 1800. General Pigot, who had commanded the English force, was shortly afterwards relieved by General Fox, the brother of Charles James Fox the statesman. This circumstance was fortunate for Lieutenant Burgoyne, as he was appointed aide-de-camp to the general in 1802, and five years later was selected by him to be commanding engineer with the expedition to Egypt, under Major-General Frazer.

During the peace of 1802, Lieutenant Burgoyne obtained leave of absence, and made a tour through Egypt, Turkey, and Greece. A short time before the English army had evacuated Egypt in 1801, the Turkish pacha had requested Lord Cavan, the English general, to send him plans of an entrenched camp and barracks for the neighbourhood of Cairo. Lord Cavan was averse to

the construction of the proposed fortifications, which, in the existing political state of the Turkish empire, he considered might be detrimental to English interests; but wishing at the same time to be on good terms as long as possible with the Turkish authorities, it was arranged that Lieutenant Burgoyne should wait upon the pacha, and under the pretence of obtaining information requisite for drawing up the design, delay the execution of it as long as possible. His instructions were given to him in writing, and were peculiar, both in grammar and substance. Before landing in Egypt, he considered it prudent to cut off the last sentence.

"Mr. Burgoyne, when he presents the plan of Cairo to the Pacha, will be so good as to say, that Major Bryce[1] has not been able to comply with his wishes respecting a plan of the entrenched camp and a barrack, until he knows a few more particulars than were specified in the letter to Lord Cavan. That I therefore wish to be informed of the number of infantry, cavalry, and artillery (nearly), for which the camp is intended, and whether temporary or permanent, and the same of the barracks; when I will endeavour to do what he wishes in that respect; or, if you find that you can do anything for him on the spot, it will be still better.

"You may point out to him the entrenched camp already existing at Cairo, and marked on the plan; and with respect to barracks, say that some of the large square buildings with courtyards within (of which I dare say there are many at Cairo), are well adapted to that purpose. In short, say anything you like to keep him quiet, and delay the execution of the design.

"Alexander Bryce,
"Major, and Commanding Engineer."

Lieutenant Burgoyne executed this service with so much judgment, that the pacha presented him before

[1] The commanding engineer.

leaving, with a valuable Damascus scimetar and several pieces of oriental silk.

It was during this tour in Turkey and Egypt that he obtained some information respecting the intrigues of the French in the East, which the governor of Malta, Sir Alexander Ball, considered of sufficient importance to be communicated to Lord Hawkesbury, the secretary of state. Sir Alexander writes to him on the 24th of December:

"La Valette, December 24.

"SIR,

"The very interesting intelligence which you did me the honour to communicate this morning I conceive to be sufficiently important to send to his Majesty's ministers. I am therefore to request you will do me the favour to send me a note of what you were told of the French envoy Mr. Sebastiani's conduct when he was at Zante, and who is your author. If you know anything further of that gentleman's proceedings in the Morea or any other place pray relate it, that I may send it to Mr. Drummond, who will connect it with other corroborating intelligence.

"Can you inform me of the state of the government of Corfu? What part are the Russians acting there? and how far do they interfere with the civil affairs of the island?

"I have the honour to be, dear Sir,

"Your most faithful and obedient,

"ALEXANDER BALL."

"To Lieut. BURGOYNE."

At this period Lieutenant Burgoyne had just completed his twentieth year.

The next four years were passed by him tranquilly in garrison at Malta; it was the only interval of repose he was destined to enjoy until the general peace of 1815. Some letters from his friends form the sole record of his life during this period.

From Lieut. Boothby, R.E.,[1] *to* Capt. Burgoyne, *Malta.*

"Messina, July 19, 1806.

"Dear Burgoyne,

"I received your letter the day after the battle of Maida, of which you will by this time have heard. Although the circumstances would not permit the dresses to be of immediate use, I am nevertheless equally thankful for your assistance in this respect, and had not the expedition intervened it would have arrived in the nick of time, as the tragedy was proposed for the day on which was acted the French one at Maida, and of course would not have taken place until after some days' postponement. I am this moment arrived from the siege of Scilla, which is now likely to terminate in three days: the besieged consists of 100 men, commanded by a lieutenant-colonel of Engineers, inclosed in a castle on the celebrated point of Scilla, impenetrable to everything but heavy guns at breaching distance; it was some time before *everybody* would be convinced of this fact, and so we have been obliged to submit to a little play. The first steps taken towards the reduction of this castle were three summonses from the Knight of Acre and one from Colonel Oswald, commanding the British Brigade in march to Scilla; the engineer answered that he could not surrender until he should see the means by which he could be taken.

"Our artillery is all obliged to be dragged up a steep precipice, which of course throws upon the reduction of the place considerable difficulty. The column of infantry was accompanied only by two four-pounders, which, after a few shots, were found to be perfectly useless. Sir Sydney Smith dragged two twelves and a mortar up to a point at 700 yards distance, which was too far to be of great service; the gun-boats also were of little or no use, tending, by the wildness of their fire, to encourage rather than dismay. Two six-pounders were next

[1] One of Sir John Burgoyne's earliest and best friends. He lost a leg at Talavera, and fell into the hands of the French, by whom he was very kindly treated and sent to England. He subsequently left the military profession and took orders.—Ed.

got up, but were too light for the service; next, two howitzers and two twelve-pounders being ready, we ran up a breastwork in the night, within 250 yards of the castle. It fell to my lot to have this job, which was rather nervous, as, had we not by the strictest silence kept undiscovered, we must have lost half the party. What favoured us also was, that they were at work in the castle, every move of which we distinctly heard. At daylight, however, I had the satisfaction to find myself well covered from musketry, of which they began from the castle a very plentiful play, which continued for about an hour and a half, until at last they were completely silenced by Dyneley with the howitzers, who threw almost every shell exactly over the spot. We had only one man wounded. All yesterday the twelve-pounders played, and knocked away a gallery which had always been full of musketry, to our great annoyance. The next step that will be taken is four twenty-four-pounders within 160 yards of the castle, which certainly must bring it down. The man is extremely active and clever in his defence, and gives every proof that he is determined not to surrender until breached. Where the howitzers were placed, only musketry could annoy; a musketry parapet only was therefore constructed, and the howitzers played away in security; all of a sudden however, by knocking away the outer case, the enemy showed that he had so widened an embrasure as to bear upon them, and suddenly wheeling round the gun, with two shots he killed one artilleryman, wounded six others, and disabled one howitzer.

"Believe me, dear Burgoyne,

"Ever most faithfully yours,

"CHARLES BOOTHBY."

On the 30th of September, 1806, Captain Burgoyne sailed from Malta to join the English forces in Sicily, and landed at Messina on the 4th of October. On the 18th of February following, Captain Lefebvre[1] notified to him, that his Excellency General Fox had appointed him

[1] Commanding engineer in Sicily. Afterwards killed at Matagorda in Spain.

commanding engineer to the expedition destined for Egypt under Major-General Frazer.

The intrigues of the French had been successful in detaching the Turks from the Allies, and it had been decided by the English government to occupy Egypt by an expeditionary force organised from the English troops quartered in Sicily. The troops landed in the old harbour near Rosetta, on the 17th of March. Alexandria was stormed on the 20th, before batteries had been raised against it; but Major-General Frazer, in his despatch of the 28th, speaks of "the great zeal and alacrity on the part of Captain Burgoyne and the officers of Engineers employed."

He was afterwards present at the attack upon Rosetta, from the 7th to the 15th of April, on which date, an attack of ophthalmia incapacitated him from further active service, and he was taken on board the *Canopus* man-of-war. On the 22nd, the army was forced to retreat upon Alexandria, where they arrived with the loss of upwards of a thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. By a convention afterwards made with the Turks, the prisoners were given up, and the English army re-embarked at Alexandria for Sicily in the month of July. On the 24th of May, Captain Thackeray had arrived in Egypt, and superseded Burgoyne in the command of the Engineers.

From Captain LEFEBVRE *to* Captain BURGOYNE.

"Messina, May 15, 1807.

"DEAR BURGOYNE,

"Parker, with Captain Thackeray, are on the point of departure for Egypt; from them you will learn whatever is interesting about our affairs here and in England. I am extremely sorry you lose your command; however, by the time this reaches you, I am willing to hope that all your plans will

be in forwardness, and that the disasters will have produced consequences favourable to your interests and reputation which no change of circumstances can effect.[1]

"At the moment General Frazer's melancholy despatch arrived, the Commander of the Forces was at Catania, and Major Bryce had not made his appearance; and as it was not possible to guess the extent of your misfortunes, I considered it necessary to mention to General Moore that I did not desire to avail myself of my order to return to England, and would, if he pleased, hold myself in readiness for any contingency. At one time I had reason to suppose they would let me proceed to Egypt, upon the principle that if you had fallen, or met with any accident, my presence would be useful, but that if you were healthy and not disabled, I was to return. Thackeray's coming put all this out of the question, he being an officer who, from the earliest times of his existence, has enjoyed the patronage and countenance of General Fox, at least so I understand, and I believe it to be the fact.

"I have reason to believe that Sir John Stuart, in consequence of my representation, is taking some steps to repair the omission in his Calabrian despatches; when all the circumstances come to my knowledge, I shall communicate them to Hoste and Nicholas, and hope they will be considered for their labours and exertions during those interesting operations. Pray make my kindest remembrances to both my brother officers serving with you, and accept the good wishes of

"Your faithful friend,

"CHARLES LEFEBVRE."

Captain Burgoyne sailed from Alexandria on the 26th of July, in the *Moselle* sloop of war, commanded by Captain Gordon. On their arrival at Messina on the 9th of August, they were placed in quarantine for forty-five days, the plague having broken out in the army, while in Egypt. On the 14th of August, the detachment to which he belonged set sail for Malta, in the

[1] This was the case, for Captain Burgoyne's letters from Egypt having been shown to Sir John Moore, had so prepossessed that general in his favour, that he applied for his services as commanding Engineer of the expedition which left Messina for Portugal in the autumn of this year.—ED.

Windermere transport, in order to obtain pratique, and returned to Messina on the 20th of September; he had been less than a month on shore, when he received the following letter from Major Bryce, the commanding engineer with the troops in Sicily:

"Messina, October 15, 1807.

"DEAR SIR,

"An embarkation of troops has been ordered, and it is determined that you shall go as commanding engineer. You will therefore be pleased to repair hither with all convenient despatch, that you may be on the spot to make the necessary arrangements, which, however, I have ordered to proceed in the meanwhile. The troops take their heavy baggage, and you will be allowed a horse, I believe.

"In congratulating you on being nominated to the command of the detachment, which cannot but be very grateful to your feelings, you will feel doubly satisfied when I acquaint you that Sir John Moore, in addition to the very good opinion he has of your qualifications for this situation, was guided in some considerable degree by the circumstance of your having been superseded by Captain Thackeray at Alexandria, which he thought unnecessary, and probably unpleasant to your feelings, although he was convinced that General Fox was very far from intending anything of this kind, but had overlooked the circumstance. Sir John Moore goes himself, but this is not publicly announced yet, and therefore you will not mention it.

"Harding goes with you, and either McLeod or Mulcaster.

"I am, dear Sir, very truly yours,

"ALEXANDER BRYCE,

"Major, and Commanding Engineer."

"To Captain BURGOYNE."

The English government had decided to withdraw a portion of their force from the Mediterranean, to make an effort to prevent the occupation of Lisbon by the French. Sir John Moore was selected to command the expedition, which sailed from Messina on the 26th of October, 1807; but before they reached Gibraltar, Junot

had occupied Lisbon, and the royal family of Portugal had embarked for the Brazils. The expedition was therefore directed to proceed to England, and they anchored at St. Helens on the 29th of December, 1807.

From the Earl of DERBY *to* Captain BURGOYNE, *Portsmouth.*

"The Oaks, December 31, 1807.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"We are all delighted to hear of your safe arrival in England, and I lose not a moment in assuring you how happy all here will be to see you, as soon as your other avocations will allow you to give us that pleasure. Maria[1] is nearly wild with joy; it was only two days since that we got your letters of the 6th from Gibraltar, so that your arrival is as unexpected as it is pleasant; but I am all curiosity to learn the cause of the return of the troops to England; I have however no data on which to form a conjecture, and therefore must wait with patience for the explanation which time will give. Lady Derby desires her best regards, and I remain,

"My dear Burgoyne,

"Very sincerely and truly yours,

"DERBY."

On the 20th of April following Captain Burgoyne received orders for foreign service, Sir John Moore having applied for his services for the expedition then fitting out for the defence of Sweden against a combination of the Russian and French powers. That general writes to him on the 24th of February:

"York Street,[2] February 24, 1808.

"MY DEAR SIR,

"I am sorry I had not the pleasure of seeing you when you were so good as to call upon me, but this court-martial permits me to be but seldom at home.

[1] Captain Burgoyne's sister. Afterwards married to Admiral Sir Phipps Hornby, G.C.B., Rear-Admiral of England, and Lord of the Admiralty during Lord Derby's administration of 1852.

[2] The house in which Sir John Moore used to lodge, when he came to

"With respect to the wish expressed in your letter of serving with me, I can only assure you that should I be employed, it will give me great pleasure to have you with me, and you may depend upon having my best aid to bring it about, should you continue, as at present, to wish it.

"Believe me always

"Very faithfully yours,

"JOHN MOORE."

"To Captain BURGOYNE."

This expedition proved abortive, owing to the impracticable character of the King of Sweden, who wished to employ the English troops in recovering Holstein, instead of defending his northern frontier against the Russians. After a detention of six weeks in Gottenburg Harbour, during which the troops remained on board ship, the expedition sailed on its return to England on the 3rd of July, 1808, and anchored in the Downs on the 15th of the same month, when orders arrived for its employment in Spain.

Extracts from a journal kept by Captain Burgoyne during this expedition, and some notes made by him of a tour in Sweden, will be found of interest.

Account of the Expedition to Sweden.

Saturday, the 30th of April, embarked on board the *George* transport at Woolwich.

On Monday the 9th of May, 1808, the whole force was collected in Yarmouth Roads, consisting of about 160 sail of transports, two line-of-battle ships, and some sloops of war, having on board Lieut.-General Sir J. Moore, Lieut.-General Hope, Lieut.-General Frazer, Major-General Murray, Major-General Paget; Colonel Stewart, Adjutant-General; two com-

London, was the second house on the left in York Street, proceeding from St. James's Square into Jermyn Street. It has often been pointed out to me by Sir John Burgoyne.—ED.

panies British Artillery, with 300 horses; a detachment of Engineers; one battalion, 4th Regiment; one battalion, 28th Regiment; one battalion, 52nd; one battalion, 79th; one battalion, 92nd; detachment, 95th, or Riflemen; two companies of Hanoverian artillery; 600 Hanoverian cavalry; one brigade Hanoverian infantry; Captain Squire, Commanding Engineer. The whole comprising from ten to twelve thousand men.

The same day Colonel Murray, Quartermaster-General, was sent on to Gottenburg in a sloop of war; the violence of the wind prevented the sloop from sailing until the next morning, the 10th of May, when they made sail about 10 A.M., with a fine fair wind. Each of the line-of-battle ships had in tow two gunboats, lately built in the river, of a new construction.

Saturday the 14th, the fleet were off the mouth of the Cattegat, having had a fair wind the whole time, which continued, though with very thick fogs, nearly the whole of that day and the next. It cleared up however on Sunday about 5 P.M., and at 7 the fleet came to anchor about six miles south-west of the Scaw, the north-west point of Jutland, in ten fathom water and very good ground; three English vessels of another convoy had gone ashore near the Scaw during the fogs, and were afterwards destroyed by our cruisers. Several strange men-of-war communicated with the admiral; and Monday morning, at 10.30 A.M., again got under way with a light fair wind, which shifted and came contrary at 2 P.M.

On the morning of the 17th it blew hard on shore, and some of the ships bore up and anchored behind the rocks; the remainder got into Gottenburg; the other ships got in a few days afterwards.

On the 21st Colonel Murray returned from Stockholm, where he had been with despatches, and, after communicating with General Moore, sailed for England in a brig of war. General Moore, most of his staff, and a few officers, with his permission, resided on shore at Gottenburg, the staff officers having procured billets in the town, which, in my opinion, it would have been as well not to have done.

The troops remained embarked in the outer harbour, occasionally ordered to go on shore on a large rocky island, for six or eight hours, while the ships got cleaned out; they were

likewise occasionally exercised in the light-bottomed boats, as well as the artillery; they remained healthy, but some of the horses died.

On the 11th of June Colonel Murray arrived with despatches from England, and the next morning Sir J. Moore set off for Stockholm with him; and

On the 26th of June a messenger arrived from Stockholm and sailed immediately for England in an extra packet; and the next day another arrived with despatches for General Hope from General Moore, in consequence of which everybody was ordered to embark the same evening.

On Wednesday the 29th of June Sir J. Moore returned from Stockholm *incog.*, and immediately went on board the *Victory*, having *made his escape!* The following is all that we could learn of this affair. General Moore had seen the King of Sweden on Monday, and had told him that in consequence of the result of his negotiations, he was compelled by his instructions to return with his army to England. The king, who had endeavoured to persuade him to await the return of the next messenger, got furious, called him disrespectful, &c. Sir John Moore then said he would wait, and left him; but going home, and reverting to his orders, he found they were so positive that he did not dare to act contrary to them; he therefore wrote to the minister, to inform him that he was compelled to depart, soon after which the king's aide-de-camp waited on him, and told him that it was the king's order that he should not leave the capital without his permission. Sir J. Moore, looking upon this as an arrest, remonstrated, but receiving no answer, he went away privately, leaving his secretary, and making the best of his way to Gottenburg.

Sunday, the 3rd of July, the fleet sailed from Gottenburg for England; at the same time sailed the *Superb*, Admiral Keats, with a convoy for the Baltic, and having on board Lieutenant Boothby, Royal Engineers, sent by the general, at the request of Admirals Sir J. Saumarez and Keats, to examine the island of Sproe, in the Great Belt. This is described to be an island of about two thousand yards long, in the narrowest part of the Great Belt, with a small hill nearly in the centre, except which it is entirely low. When our men-of-war came to

cruise here on the opening of the navigation last spring, they found some huts built, and materials conveyed on the island, as if the enemy had had an idea of fortifying themselves on it; as this would be very prejudicial to our trade passing through, the admirals wished to ascertain whether it would be possible to put it in a state before winter, that a small body of men might hold it until spring, and thus forestal the enemy.

Colonel Murray had arrived with General Moore, and sailed the same evening in a packet for England.

A frigate sailed for England with despatches, a few hours after the army, and passed it the same day; the transports were convoyed by the *Audacious* (74) and a sloop of war.

Tuesday, the 12th of July, the commodore spoke a sloop of war, with two gunboats in tow, from England, which immediately afterwards made all sail towards Gottenburg. The rendezvous in all the instructions to the ships was altered from Yarmouth to the Downs.

Friday, the 15th of July, 1808, the fleet came to anchor in the Downs in the evening, and the next morning they were ordered to proceed to Portsmouth for another service.

Notes on Sweden in 1808.

The Swedish monarchy is most absolute and tyrannical, and will probably not last long under its present form;[1] for the better orders, who are well informed, must feel it much. The king is sovereign master, may make every subject in his dominions a soldier if he pleases, and calls forth conscriptions as despotically as Napoleon. He issues sumptuary edicts at pleasure, the only reason given being that it is the king's will. The press is most abjectly kept under, and many restrictions are made upon importing foreign books or papers. No French newspaper is allowed to be brought in, nor any English *opposition* papers; and since 1804, no Danish books are allowed, although the language is very nearly the same, and of course many valuable discoveries and works might be got from them. The king is his own minister, writes and receives despatches, and communicates with foreign ministers, &c. A melancholy

[1] The king was deposed the year after these remarks were written.—Ed.

instance of the bad effects of this occurred in the communications between him and our General, Sir J. Moore. His present Majesty wants temper and abilities to render him equal to this business.

The Swedish peasantry are undoubtedly an exceedingly fine race of people. The men are in general tall, robust, active, and good-looking; their bravery has never been doubted, and their honesty is so exemplary as to exceed, I should fancy, that of any other nation in Europe. A robbery in this country is scarcely ever heard of, and you may trust a common Swede with anything of the greatest value. They are civil, obedient, and contented; and the conscripts, drilling from six to eight hours a day, to be sent immediately to the frontiers, seem to treat it as an amusement. They rarely or never desert, and their qualities are such as to render them peculiarly adapted to form good soldiers. They never pass a gentleman without taking off their hats. Notwithstanding the despotic power with which they are ruled, they have independence enough not to allow themselves to be imposed upon except by proper authority, and many a traveller has been in danger of getting a thrashing, for resisting what the peasant conceived a just demand. They are the greatest lovers of their country, and of the credit of the nation. In disputes concerning money to be paid them, in which it has been afterwards found that the peasants were right, they have been known, on being told that they were not good Swedes but must be foreigners, not only to give up the sum in dispute, but even to refuse to receive what there was no doubt was their right. The Swedish peasants are extremely well clad, nearly all alike, in a straight-cut coat reaching below the knees, and breeches of a strong, coarse pepper-and-salt coloured cloth, a large black hat, worsted stockings, sometimes blue, red garters below the knee, and good strong shoes. They usually wear their hats very long before and behind, probably for the warmth it affords in the winter.

The women are robust and have fair complexions, but are not generally pretty. They work as the men—follow the plough, dig the ground, ride the horses like men, and occasionally follow travellers to bring home the horses. They carry goods to market, drive the carts, row boats and ferries, fish—in short do

everything but go to war, and follow the trades of blacksmiths, carpenters, or other artificers. Their dress, both of the lower and middling class, is unbecoming; but in their persons they are, as well as the men, extremely clean and neat. The women are the usual servants in a house, and at an inn you are seldom waited on but by them and young boys.

The Swedish women make no scruple of doing many things which would very much shock the delicacy of any other women. The maid-servants walk into a gentleman's room without ever thinking of knocking at the door, if there is anything she has to take in or do there, even though she knows he is dressing or undressing; she does not think of retiring because she finds him with only his shirt on, nor does she, by laughing or otherwise, show that she is sensible of the least indecorum. I have frequently seen them tying up their garters in the street, and other things of the same sort, which I presume custom has rendered perfectly correct conduct. Of all the peasants we saw, we remarked that, curiously enough, the *Goths* were the best behaved.

The higher classes of inhabitants have their good and bad qualities so much more concealed by education, and a more extensive communication with the world, that it is rarely that a good judgment can be formed of them, and its difficulty is such that few people are equal to it, even when they have had the opportunity of associating with them, and speaking their language; what then can be expected from a traveller without knowledge of the language, with only a six weeks' residence in the country, and without being so fortunate as to gain admittance into their society, except by accident at times for a few hours? They are polite and well educated, and many of them well informed, possessing a peculiar talent and desire for learning foreign languages. It is seldom you meet a gentleman who does not speak French, and many of them understand English and German.

They are hospitable and civil to strangers; at least, we repeatedly found them to be so—and even without introductions. They live well, but I saw very little pomp. Many of them are discontented with their present state of affairs and with the war, as well as probably with the government, which, if they have as much spirit as I suspect, they will soon attempt to

overthrow. I think, on looking back, that there have been more men of consequence in Sweden who have been traitors than in most other countries; the last six months have brought out two, viz., the governor of Sveaborg and the admiral at Malmoe. The nobility usually serve some years in the army, and occasionally afterwards wear the uniform, and there are few of them who do not bear the cross of some order. Although they have an idea of what they call "English gardens," which are very pretty, yet the *Gothic* taste will out at times in their grounds; as in wooden swans anchored in lakes, gaudily painted bridges, painted stone pillars, and little drawbridges over puddles you can step across.

The few houses that are of brick and stone are built as in other countries; but wood is the material that is cheapest and most in use, even for the largest houses, except at Gottenburg, and perhaps some other sea-ports.

Though I was more anxious to inquire into the nature of the military establishments in this country than into anything else, many circumstances prevented me from getting much information on the subject. Nearly the whole of their regular force was on the frontiers of Norway or in Finland; I could therefore see nothing. The officers who remained appeared shy, and jealous of the British, nor could we get acquainted with them.

Except the King's Guards, and a few other regiments who receive regular pay at all times, the army is supported by the farmers and landholders, and have, from the colonel to the private, proportions of land according to their rank, for their support. When they are called out for service, the king gives them provisions and a small pay, and their land remains to their wives and families, who retain it until they return, or for one year after they are killed. As the land is much more valuable in some parts than in others, a sergeant in one place may be richer than an officer in another. In peace times these soldiers were exercised so many times a month by companies, and so many times a year by regiments.

When embodied and called out against an enemy, the men appear to meet with universal approbation; but the officers seem to want abilities, and frequently loyalty, and the government foresight. Who could believe that the Swedish govern-

ment should ever—but particularly on this occasion, when they must have expected the war for at least six months—be entirely destitute of plans of the Norway frontier? But this has been so much the case, that the officers employed there have been at the greatest loss, and have not known at all more of the country than what they could reconnoitre; indeed, a Swedish officer of artillery at Gottenburg, when asked why the army did not advance in that quarter, declared that they found the gun-carriages they had taken there not serviceable in that country, and were delayed while they were altering them. If this was merely invented as an excuse, it was certainly not the way to advance the credit of his army.

Two Swedish battalions were cut off, and made prisoners in June, 1808, generally said to have been by the treachery of the commanding officer. Whether by that or want of ability, the very suspicion proves that such actions are expected, and it is impossible an army can act well, where the officers have not confidence in each other. A few of rank, with whom we were fortunate enough to get acquainted, appeared to think the war a hopeless one; and if that idea is general, it will be no wonder if many endeavour to make friends with the party they expect to be successful.

The soldiers are said to be badly subsisted when called out, but are well clothed in grey jackets and blue collars, a round hat with a yellow feather, and broad brass hat-band. The distinction of regiments is by a variation in a cross ornament worn in front of the hats. The dress of the officers perfectly resembles that of the men when in the field, except that they have long coats and small straps on the shoulders on which are stars, by the number of which on each shoulder, the ranks are distinguished. When not in the field, the officers wear a white handkerchief tied round the left arm above the elbow, since the last revolution, when the conspirators of the king's party wore such a mark, to be known; they also wear a very tall yellow feather, which the *landshofdinge* of Joukôping told me had come into fashion since the Duke of Gloucester and suite were in Sweden. At that time, the Swedish officers wore small feathers, and at first laughed at the swaggering feathers of his Highness's suite; but in a short time, they began to look upon

them more favourably, and at length adopted them. This circumstance he told us, on expressing surprise at seeing ours so very short, and hearing from us that the British army now all wore them so. I must say, for the credit of the Swedish officers, that at some places—as Joukôping and Orebro—they appeared to be extremely active and zealous in preparing the recruits for service. Troops who have land as above described, are called the *landsvern.* There are also regiments raised by officers of rank, called *varvad;* these last receive pay from the king.

Whenever the government has occâsion to transport anything from one part of the kingdom to another, an order is sent to each stage, to furnish all the carts that can be procured in the neighbourhood, at an hour specified; thus, as many stores as fifty or sixty carts can contain, may be conveyed each day at a rate of six miles an hour. This is a wonderful advantage in time of war, and enables them to have their depôts in places of great security.

In the month of June, even in Gottenburg, there could not be said to be any night, for at twelve o'clock, I could see to read any common book in my room; and the course of the sun is perfectly easily marked by the light on the horizon.

I could not learn much respecting the religion of the country; they have few churches, particularly in the country, where the peasants have frequently many miles to go to them. This in winter must be a great hardship, and at times it must be impossible for a whole family to go to church. At Wadstena, where we went into a large church, we observed some priest's dresses in present use, certainly more adapted to a Catholic clergyman than a Protestant one. Their sermons are very long, and when they begin, the church doors are locked, and no one suffered to go in or out. Plays are performed on Sunday evenings, but at an inn in a city (Wenersborg) we could get no wine, because, we were told, there was a law against selling it on Sundays.

Commerce of Sweden.

Sweden is a country whose commerce, under a good government, might be considerable, notwithstanding the rigour of its

winter, which, by shutting up many of the harbours, is the only circumstance naturally against it. Its staple commodities are wood and iron, which might be exported in prodigious quantities; but at present the trade and manufactures of the kingdom are in a rapid decline. The restrictions laid on the neutral trade last war by French and English, are the principal reason; but the present war, by making the Swedes enemies of all Europe, has effectually ruined their commerce. Their vessels in their ports are nearly all lying in ordinary and unrigged; few boats are seen on the Gotha and lakes, and they have now no markets for their wood and iron. Tuneld, an author of great accuracy, in his description of different places, gives long lists of the manufactures at Kongelf, Alingsâs, and various other places I had an opportunity of visiting, of which now there are not the least remains. The ports of Marstrand and Uddevalla, Lakes Wetern and Wenern, in all which he describes a brisk trade, lie now still as death. Stockholm, I fancy, still maintains some manufactures of glass, stuffs, silks, &c., for the consumption of the kingdom. White sugar is made, and cotton; but these only continue because foreigners are not allowed to import these commodities, otherwise, from the heavy duties laid on the native manufactures, they could easily be undersold. Linen, however, I was told, was extremely good and cheap; this, therefore, is the only good manufacture I heard of in the country. The herring fishery was formerly profitable, but now where will be their market? And at Marstrand they made very fine salt fish (cod), now very scarce, as they cannot go over to the Danish coast off the Scaw, the most productive fishery.

The Swedish language is said to have considerable force, and to be well worth cultivating—(the natives talk with particular rapture of their poetry). It is in many particulars extremely like the English, most of the verbs in most common use, as well as nouns, are almost precisely the same, and frequently the idiom of very extraordinary phrases is the same: as, they will tell you to "Go gently," by the word *Vackert*, which is literally "beautiful," "handsome." The English sailors say, "Pull handsomely," when they mean to say "gently." *En liten bit* is as common in Swedish as "A little bit" in English. They say very commonly, *Koñ, lât oss gâ*, which needs not a translation;

it is pronounced, "Come, late oss go." May, can, shall, will, would, &c., are nearly the same; as well as, to give, take, drink, eat, bring, &c., and substantives innumerable. Two remarkable similarities of the Swedish to the English tongue are, in the expressions of *So seldan*, "So seldom;" and for "Let the tea draw," they say literally the same: *Lât twet draga*. Talking of tea, I fancy they drink it more than any other nation, the English excepted.

Silverstolpe is said to have been a very indifferent writer until, having been introduced to Gustavus III., for some reason or other, he all of a sudden started up into eminence, and is now one of their best authors. Bellman was a great wit, and wrote short pieces of poetry; his countrymen are enthusiastic about him, but his works are out of print and very difficult to be got. The works of Gustavus III. are also very interesting.

For a minute account of Sweden there cannot be a more accurate or useful book than Tuneld's work in three octavo volumes. There are very few original plays in the Swedish language, most of those performed being translations from the French or German.

The expeditionary force intended for Portugal, made its way slowly down the Channel against contrary winds. On the 27th of July, whilst lying off Spithead, Major Fletcher joined it as commanding engineer. On the 17th of August, the date of the battle of Roliça, they were off Vigo. Here the commodore spoke the *Decade*, thirty-six guns, eight days from Spithead, which brought them the intelligence of the surrender of Dupont's army in Spain. In the meantime the portion of the expedition under Sir Arthur Wellesley, which had sailed from Cork, a more westerly station, on the 12th of July, had disembarked in Mondego Bay, on the 6th of August. The battles of Roliça and Vimiero were fought on the 17th and 21st of the same month, and the Convention of Cintra had been signed before Sir John Moore's division arrived on the scene of action.

On the 18th of August, when off Oporto, they heard a report that Junot had surrendered at Lisbon to Sir Arthur Wellesley. As the battle of Vimiero was not fought until the 21st of the same month, this report shows with what confidence the Portuguese looked forward to the destruction of Junot's army, whose retreat had been intercepted by the British, and explains their subsequent feelings of anger at the terms of the convention.

On Friday, the 19th of August, the flotilla was off the port of Aveiro, and by signals from the commodore, the ships were informed that they were to disembark in Mondego Bay.

This division subsequently joined the other English troops at Lisbon, and as all the generals engaged in the affair of the convention were recalled to England, the British army in Portugal was left under the command of Sir John Moore. It is unfortunate that Sir John Burgoyne has left behind no journal which throws any light on his personal movements during the remainder of this campaign, but the correspondence in the War Office shows he was sent on a mission to Madrid in November, under the following circumstances:

Sir John Moore had divided his forces, and sent his cavalry and artillery, with one brigade of infantry, under General Hope, round by Madrid, under the impression that the cross roads were not practicable for artillery. On the advance of the French, which threatened to prevent the junction of this detached column with the main body, Captain Burgoyne was sent by Sir John Moore to General Hope, to order the immediate concentration of the troops on Salamanca, and to conduct them through the Guadarrama mountains, by a route which he had previously reported to Sir John Moore to be practicable

for artillery and cavalry. He rode post night and day, and reached General Hope at Madrid, on the 21st of November. The latter at once placed him in communication with Colonel De Lancey, the staff officer of the division, to arrange the route of the columns to Salamanca, by the roads over the Guadarrama range, and he remained with this division of the army until the junction of the two forces..

On the 21st of December, Sir John Moore formed a junction at Toro with the troops under Sir David Baird, which had been landed at Corunna, and was advancing on Madrid, when he obtained information that Bonaparte, with superior forces, was moving on Benevente to intercept his retreat into Galicia, whilst another corps, advancing from the south, cut him off from Lisbon. The English general decided immediately on falling back as quickly as possible, upon Vigo. If Bonaparte had reached Benevente before him, the army was lost. Burgoyne was sent forward to mine the bridge on the Esla,[1] while the army was retreating with all possible rapidity. The different divisions were passed over the bridge, and collected at Benevente by the 26th of December. As it was necessary to delay the destruction of the bridge till the last moment, in order to permit the stragglers of the army to pass, the French cavalry reached the farther end of it before Burgoyne exploded the charge; but as the other extremity was held by our rear-guard, they were unable to pass it. During the night the French patrols came several times to their end of the bridge, to ascertain whether the English still held it, but on being challenged by our sentinels, retired. One French dragoon, more daring than the rest, advanced nearly up to the English

[1] Napier calls this bridge by the name of Castro Gonzalo. He states the destruction was so well accomplished, that twenty-four hours were required to repair it. See Napier, vol. i. p. 469.—Ed.

guard, and a sentry, of an Irish regiment, turning round to Captain Burgoyne, said to him, "Will I shoot that fellow?" "Certainly not," was the answer, and the French dragoon, hearing the voices, retired. Before the bridge was blown up, a large body of French staff officers with an escort of cavalry, were plainly descried on the hills on the opposite bank of the Esla, and Sir John Burgoyne always considered that the Emperor Napoleon formed one of the group watching their proceedings on this occasion.

The hardships endured by our troops during this retreat in mid-winter have been often described. Sir John Moore's original intention was to have re-embarked his army at Vigo, and Captain Burgoyne was sent forward to report upon the capabilities of that place for covering the embarkation of the troops. Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, the commanding engineer, was sent to Corunna upon a similar mission, and reported so favourably of the latter place that on the receipt of these accounts at Lugo, Sir John Moore determined to retreat upon Corunna in preference to Vigo. Burgoyne, therefore, embarked with the Light Division, which had been directed upon Vigo before the change of plans. He was thus spared the most calamitous portion of the retreat; but in a memorial addressed to the Duke of Wellington in 1817, when putting forward his claim for a good service pension, he mentioned that he had been rendered deaf for five years, from the consequence of exposure during this retreat. He also lost all his horses, and most of his baggage, but Lord Derby, who never missed an opportunity of proffering pecuniary assistance when he had reason to believe it would prove acceptable, supplied him with the means to make good his losses, as soon as he heard of the arrival of the army at Portsmouth.

From the Earl of DERBY *to* Captain BURGOYNE.

"The Oaks, Thursday night.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"Your letters of this day have made us all very happy, as I assure you the whole party began to be very fidgety at the length of time which had elapsed without hearing any news of your safety. We had indeed heard that you was safe at Vigo, but the weather has been so tempestuous, that my great apprehension was for the sea risk. As you say you shall be in town to-morrow, I write a line to beg you will let us see you here, as soon as ever your public avocations will permit us to have that pleasure; and in the meantime, as I fear the expenses and losses of the campaign will have been very heavy, allow me to enclose you a draft on Drummond, and to assure you that if you are further in want of cash, I shall hope that you will consider me as your banker, and apply to me without any scruple for what you may want.

"I remain, dear Burgoyne,

"Affectionately and truly yours,

"DERBY."

CAMPAIGN OF 1809.

Sir Arthur Wellesley lands at Lisbon on the 22nd of April, and assumes the command of all the troops in Portugal—Forces the passage of the Douro on the 12th of May, and obliges Soult to evacuate Portugal with the loss of all his artillery and baggage; then moves to the south, and advances by the valley of the Tagus in the direction of Madrid, forming a junction with the Spanish army under Cuesta at Oropesa—Is forced to halt, owing to the want of provisions, and on the 28th of July is attacked at Talavera by the combined forces of Victor and Sebastiani—The Allies gain a victory, but on the 2nd of August, news reached Lord Wellington that Soult had moved from the north by forced marches, had gained possession of his most important communication with Portugal, and threatened to cut him off entirely from his base of operations—By a rapid retrograde movement over cross roads, Lord Wellington escapes the snare prepared for him by the French marshals, and falls back into Portugal.

WEDNESDAY, *February 1st*, 1809. Arrived at Spithead, in the *Alfred*, 74, from Vigo, and landed at Portsmouth.

February 2nd. Left Portsmouth at 6 A.M. in the light coach, and did not arrive in London till 10 P.M.

—— *4th.* Dined with Squire[1] and Pasley[2] at the *Bedford*, and afterwards went to the opera with them, where the rascals would not admit me because I was in boots.

—— *6th.* Dined at General Morse's[3] with Major Fletcher,[4] Smith,[5] Fyers, and Hamilton,[6] all Engineers.

—— *7th.* Went down to the Oaks, and found there, besides

[1] Major Squire, of the Royal Engineers, died at Truxillo in Spain, in 1812.

[2] Afterwards Lieut.-General Sir Charles Pasley, K.C.B.

[3] General Morse was Inspector-General of Fortifications at this period.

[4] Afterwards Lieut.-Colonel Sir Richard Fletcher of the Royal Engineers. He was created a baronet for his services in command of the Engineers at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz; and was killed at the siege of St. Sebastian.

[5] Afterwards Lieut.-General Sir Charles Smith, K.C.B.

[6] Captain G. Hamilton, killed in Spain.

Lord Derby's and Lord Stanley's families, Geoffrey Hornby, Miss Byng (Mrs. G. H., that is to be), Fanny Hornby, Charles H., and my *bien aimée* sister Maria, all very well; not to forget my faithful dog Teddy, who acknowledged me immediately, after a twelvemonth's absence.

February 19*th.* Wrote to General Morse to request to be employed on any active service.

—— 22*nd.* Received an order to be in readiness to embark on the shortest notice. Squire received a similar one. Pasley, Boothby, and Mulcaster are also going.

—— 24*th.* Went to town with Lord Stanley. Drury Lane Theatre burnt; remained at the fire till past three in the morning.

March 3*rd.* Rode to Woolwich, seventeen miles, and returned to dinner; went on board the *Trident*, a small copper-bottomed ship, 237 tons, and marked No. 388. She has the same cargo on board she took to Spain, not having landed anything there, and is ready to sail, but has no orders. Colonel Howarth is to command the artillery.

—— 8*th.* Rode to London and back; heard the *Trident* had sailed from Woolwich, and that Squire and Pasley had, by their solicitations, been countermanded from the service; there is little doubt we are going to Lisbon, and our prospect is only that of remaining quiet in a dull quarter, and returning to England if the French approach.

—— 10*th.* Fletcher has been gazetted to the rank of lieut.-colonel in Portugal.

—— 14*th.* Heard from Mulcaster that a special convoy will be appointed for our ships, and the wind being fair, it is probable they will sail immediately. More than probable Boothby and I will lose our passage.

—— 15*th.* Went to Portsmouth with Boothby, much alarmed, and arrived too late to ascertain whether the ships have sailed.

—— 16*th.* The convoy detained by the wind changing, alone saved us. Embarked with Boothby, Mulcaster, and Hamilton, on board the *Trident.* Colonel Fletcher and General Howarth have been ordered a passage on board the *Champion*, which convoys us. Dropped down to St. Helens; had the satisfaction of

meeting Charles Parker by accident, and passed the morning with him. He expects to be appointed to a frigate at Woolwich. I never saw a person so little that I liked so much.

March 18*th.* Sailed in company with ten or twelve other transports, with a fair wind, and arrived at Lisbon on the 2nd of April.

April 3*rd.* Rumours of the army advancing. Oporto taken by 9000 French under Soult; 30,000 at Badajoz under Marshal Victor. Wrote to Lord Derby.

—— 4*th.* General Hill arrived with 4000 men from Cork. Went over the river to the position for securing Lisbon from bombardment on that side, and heard a Portuguese colonel of engineers utter many absurdities.

—— 6*th.* Got billeted at the house of Mr. Gould, an English merchant, No. 8, Rua da Emenda, and was very well quartered.

—— 8*th.* Took the English servant Goldfinch[1] left in Lisbon, and dismissed the Italian I had hired at eight dollars a month. Received orders to join General McKenzie's brigade. Visited the aqueduct with Boothby, where it crosses the valley of Alcantara; magnificent beyond measure; standing under the centre arch, where it is two hundred and sixty feet high, and looking up, makes you quite giddy. Though so high, and comparatively very narrow, this building received very little damage from the great earthquake in 1786.

—— 9*th.* Was to have started with Colonel De Lancey to join General McKenzie, who they said was at Castanheira, but he could not go till the next day. When I first got the billet at an Englishman's house I cannot say I expected much civility on intruding into his house in a way so contrary to his ideas. I was therefore most agreeably surprised to find myself most comfortably lodged, with everything I asked for supplied in an instant. Mr. G. lent me some late newspapers; extracts of General Moore's admirable letters from Spain to the ministers, gave me the greatest satisfaction. In the evening went to the Portuguese play in Rua dos Condes, the only one open; the play was miserable enough, but there was a tolerable ballet. The house very crowded.

[1] Captain Goldfinch of the Royal Engineers; he had been taken prisoner by the French.—Ed.

April 10th. Saw a Portuguese captain of artillery led through the town of Lisbon, bare-backed, and with a halter round his neck, being reputed a traitor, and said to have had some communication with the French. What was to be the sequel of the punishment I could not learn. A colonel of engineers was treated in the same way a few days before. Left Lisbon with Colonels De Lancey and Hinuber, and Captain Elliot. The Portuguese and Spaniards are astonished at our eating so much salt as we do. At breakfast at Alhandra, I asked for salt to eat with the eggs; the man said there was salt in the water in which they were boiled, which he said would penetrate the shells and probably give them as much flavour as we desired. Came by wrong road. General McKenzie at Soubral.

—— *11th.* To Soubral. Generals Sherbrook and McKenzie there, as well as a great number of troops, besides the 14th Light Dragoons and Artillery. Impossible to get a quarter in the place; therefore went out about a mile and a half, where, in the only house there was, I found three officers and a company of the 79th. These officers were fortunately very civil, and I ate and drank with them, and got one bed out of three in the same room—that is, mattresses—two of them lying down on the same bed. In the yard, some baggage-mule drivers gave me a most miserable account of their sufferings. They could not get away, having been pressed into the service, and a guard being constantly with them; nothing was given to them or their mules to eat, nor even money, which however would be of little use, for everything was constantly bought up by the troops long before their arrival; their beasts were usually kept in the open air all night, as well as themselves, if they had not the good fortune to get under the shelter of some porch of a door. Such was their account, and such I fear is too often the case; and mules, oxen, &c., when once pressed into the service of a British army, are frequently driven to death, and always very much ill-used.

—— *12th.* Called on General McKenzie, who received me civilly, and said the troops of his division marched this day to Merciana, and to-morrow to Villa Verde, where he would see me, having no orders this day to give me. I accordingly loaded my horses, and set off as soon as I could for Villa Verde,

a most miserable place. I should probably have fared very ill at this place—perhaps not had a place to sleep in or got anything to eat—had I not spoken a little of the language, been very mild and quiet, and offered to pay for everything I got, which induced the magistrate, himself only a labourer, to take me into his house. A detachment of the German cavalry were in the place as an advance to the column. From what I see and can understand, the Germans make no scruple in insisting to be provided with whatever a place will afford, at very small expense.

April 13th. General McKenzie, with troops, marched into Villa Verde about 10 A.M., and recommended me to get a good quarter in front. Got a billet at Bombarral with Don João Pedro, a rich farmer, who was civil. Near Villar took the saddle off the great mule to adjust the blanket under it, and forgetting to girth it tight, having only put the straps in the buckle to support the girths from the ground, I attempted to mount. The beast set off, the saddle turned round, my spur stuck in his side, he galloped on and kicked, and I came down like a sack, in front of a large party of men who were following me.

—— *14th.* Obidos—a beautifully situated town, in a hollow, with three churches. Quartered at the house of Pdre. Francisco Manuele, and admirably received by some old ladies, the Padre being sick. Went to an apothecary's for some medicine for my grey horse, who has a ringbone; he refused to take any money for it, saying he could not take anything from such good friends as the English were. Four more officers get billeted in the same house with me, for which reason I went to Jones's house, of the Engineers, who was attached to General Murray's division, and had a house to himself. By the general orders of the 11th, I and Boothby are attached to the right column, Williams,[1] &c., to the centre, and Hamilton and Jones[2] to the left. The town was too full for me to get a quarter; I accordingly searched the neighbourhood, and with some difficulty got a miller, on a hill above the town, to receive me in his house, which was clean, and had a good stable. The miller's

[1] Captain J. A. Williams, R.E., killed at Burgos.

[2] The late Lieut.-General Sir John Jones, Bart., K.C.B.

man asked whether the English horses are born with *short tails!* Williams, Stanway, Emmett,[1] and Fyers arrive at Caldes this evening, with a party of artificers and some entrenching tools, to join the centre column.

April 17th. Receive orders to join the right column at Rio Mayor, under Brigadier-General Campbell.

—— *19th.* Call with Boothby on General Campbell, who received us civilly. De Lancey, our quartermaster-general, leaves us for the headquarters, to my great regret. The right column ordered to march to Santarem on Friday.

—— *20th.* General Sherbrook arrived to command the right column, and the route changed to Leyria; generally supposed the change looks warlike.

—— *26th.* Sir A. Wellesley is arrived at Lisbon, and Sir J. Craddock takes leave of the army. "His Majesty's orders call him to Gibraltar; he bears testimony to the good conduct of the army, during an anxious period that he had the honour to command them in this country; he feels concerned to leave them at the present interesting moment, and though conscious of the great talents, &c., of Sir A. Wellesley, yet in zeal for the service and anxiety for the welfare of this army, he is assured no successor can surpass him." Sir J. Craddock and all heads of departments go to Lisbon.

—— *27th.* Report that the Portuguese general, Silveira, who had taken Chaves, and subdued the straggling French parties in the province of Traz-os-Montes, had been lately defeated by the French, after fighting them for two or three days with inferior numbers. In consequence of this defeat, it is said, his troops are deserting him fast. Colonel Patrick, an English officer, who had joined him from Spain with the Portuguese troops he commanded, covered the retreat of Silveira, and was severely wounded. A small Portuguese force is on the south side of the Vonga, and has destroyed the bridge over that river; Williams, of the Engineers, has been sent to examine it. The French have been from Oporto as far as Aveiro, but have left it again. Goldfinch is said by an officer who made his escape to be certainly taken, and well treated; he is allowed to go about, having a French soldier to accompany him. Mar-

[1] The late Major-General Emmett, R.E.

shal Beresford is at Thomar, seven leagues on our right, with the main body of the Portuguese army, said to be 15,000; several British officers are with him to discipline them.

April 28th. To Pombal. An order arrived from Sir A. Wellesley to move the troops on immediately, which order should have arrived yesterday; the army consequently began to march at twelve; General McKenzie's brigade alone, by way of Thomar, to Abrantes; Generals Campbell and Stewart for Pombal. Here we found four or five of the stragglers from the army during the last campaign, who entered into the French service, and then made their escape from them, and found their way across the country to this place, on their way to Lisbon; they were chiefly Scotch or Irish, and talked of their great feats and hairbreadth escapes. Our lodging was in a house where were two very pretty girls, who, with their mother, were so obliging as to sit conversing with us till eleven at night, while we were dying for sleep, and were to rise the next morning at three.

May 1st. (Coïmbra.) Went with Boothby to visit the convent of Santa Cruz, the richest in Portugal, and where I had been before entertained most sumptuously for two days, on my way to Spain the year before, with Sir John Moore. Sir A. Wellesley arrived this day, and entered the town, amidst showers of rose leaves and other flowers, and loud shoutings; he is very popular with the Portuguese, from his former actions in this country; they likewise in this place speak very highly of Colonel Trant, who arrived at the time they expected the French daily from Oporto, and who, by the order he established, prevented, as they think, the French from coming.

—— *3rd.* Marshal Beresford, commander of the Portuguese, arrived. Chapman and Emmett ordered to Lisbon, at Beresford's instigation, to their great annoyance; I should have been sent, if the general had not, fortunately for me, selected Chapman. Received letters from Goldfinch, by a flag of truce, which I forwarded to England by Chapman.

—— *4th.* (Coïmbra.) The whole army is assembled here, except General McKenzie's brigade, gone to Abrantes. Ordered to superintend a sketch of this place, to be done by Boothby, Williams, and Fyers; rode round it with Colonel Fletcher, and

afterwards dined with him in company with General Howarth. The army is brigaded in orders nearly as before, only that in three brigades a regiment of Portuguese is introduced, and the 60th Riflemen are dispersed through the whole. Some Portuguese regiments of infantry arrived.

May 6th. The army, except the 16th Dragoons, reviewed by Sir A. Wellesley; not so fine a one as I have been accustomed to see; except the Guards, 29th, and Germans, most of them very young soldiers. The Portuguese made a very bad figure indeed—cannot march, nor do they appear better than the youngest recruits; the men particularly small. The Portuguese cavalry were not out; but as they marched in yesterday, they appeared serviceable, and much better mounted than we expected.

—— *9th.* March to Anadia, a little to the right of the great road at Pedreira. Sir A. Wellesley left his headquarters about 4 P.M., and went to join the advance under General Murray, which marched at 10 P.M., to endeavour to surprise the French advanced post of cavalry at Albergaria Nova.

—— *10th.* The French were not surprised, but retired skirmishing to Oliveira, where they joined a body of infantry, and from thence were allowed to retire quietly, our men being much fatigued; very trifling loss on either side.

—— *11th.* Advanced about ten miles, and then found the enemy posted on some heights with much wood on them, in front of Grijo, which, after some sharp skirmishing, they were forced to abandon, and retire; our cavalry followed and overtook them in a lane, charged, and made many prisoners, losing only a few men and horses; the enemy were said to be from four thousand to six thousand strong, and lost a great many in killed, wounded, and prisoners; they were pursued as far as Carvalhos, where we took up a position for the night.

Passage of the Douro.

—— *12th.* The army advance at 7 A.M., and near Villa Nova turn to the right, and come by a road down to the Douro, where a few boats come over to them, and take over Lieut.-General Paget and three companies of the Buffs, who get up a high rock of two hundred or three hundred feet, by a road, and occupy a large unfinished house, called Seminario do Bispo, just above the road and out of the town, without resistance;

here they were attacked, but maintained their post, and General Paget, while encouraging them to advance from the house, was wounded in the arm, which was afterwards amputated. In the meantime, General Hill's brigade were coming over, and the French were gradually forced back through fields with stone walls, and our people occupied more ground, till after about two hours, just as General Stewart had got part of his troops over, the French retired hastily by the road leading to Amarante. On the first alarm, the sentries on the quay, where the floating bridge had stood, which they blew up during the last night, retired, and boats coming over, the Guards began to pass in that part. General Murray went up the river to A Vintes, and crossed it there with a squadron of dragoons, two guns, and one battalion; and coming across the road by which the French retired, had some skirmishing with them; the dragoons charged right into their infantry, took a great many prisoners, and lost between thirty and forty out of eighty-five men. Hamilton had been sent to place some riflemen, and on his return, met the dragoons charging down a lane; finding if he persevered he must be run over, he thought it better to turn round and charge with them, and got shot through both thighs. I had been sent to collect boats at A Vintes and Arnelas, which having done, I was returning when I heard the firing, and got over the water just after General Hill's brigade had landed. Three guns were taken in retiring, most of the horses being wounded. The French lost a great many men yesterday and to-day, and a great number of prisoners were made, all their sick, &c., left behind.

May 13*th*. Rainy day; prisoners appear from in and out of the town every minute. General Murray advances to Valongo two leagues after the enemy. Bridge over the river is finished at 8 P.M.

—— 14*th*. Proceed in consequence of orders to join General Murray, and find him at Valongo. Soon after I had been at his quarters, Goldfinch came in, having made his escape from the French by slipping into a house at Paredes unobserved, and allowing the French army to pass him. He says they are in the greatest confusion, and that there is a general alarm of our people, particularly the cavalry, who they declared had

charged through 2000, which was a *sottise*, and they got well cut up for it; they think they must have been drunk to do a thing so rash. Goldfinch took away John with, him, leaving me without a servant, and of course much distressed. Advanced with General Murray, as far as Paredes, where we find five French prisoners. It appears the French destroyed much ammunition and carriages, and we passed one French eight-pounder thrown down on the road; and it is said they have left several more a little further on.

May 15*th*. The French at this place, hearing General Beresford was at Amarante, turned to the left near Penafiel, and we followed their track. About five or six miles from Paredes we found several guns and howitzers, most of them mounted and spiked, and a great number of ammunition waggons, some blown up and others entire. A dragoon of the 14th, who had been taken during the charge on the 12th inst., made his escape; he says Soult paid him many compliments on the conduct of the small party of our cavalry that day (they consisted, officers and all, of 85 men, who charged through 2000 of the enemy, brought off about 400 prisoners, and had 33 killed and wounded, and 5 prisoners). Thirty rounds of ammunition were given to the French soldiers when they destroyed their waggons, making them throw away part of their necessaries; soon after many of them got rid of their additional ammunition also. At Pombeiro found a fine convent burnt by the French, as well as many houses; a few French were killed by the peasants in this part of the road. Halted at Guimaraens, a very beautiful town; this day's march long, and the road so bad over mountains, that, though the three-pounders with great difficulty got over it, the forge cart was left, and forced to be taken to pieces, about Pombeiro. The inhabitants desert their houses, villages, and even towns, as the French pass, who pillage them, and frequently burn them. Heavy rain.

—— 16*th*. From Guimaraens by Povoa. At Igreja Nova fell in with the column advancing from Braga, and followed the same road with them to Salamonde, where the French rear-guard was posted. The road here lies on the side of high steep mountains covered with wood, and winds round the ravines or

watercourses; at the foot of these mountains runs a river coming from Ruivaens. The village of Salamonde stands on an open projecting point from the hills; the French right was accordingly on the ridge of the hill, where it falls very steep down to the river, their centre on the village, and left at the foot of the higher part of the mountain. The Guards led the column, and Sir Arthur ordered their light infantry companies, and the company of the 60th attached to them, to turn the left flank of the enemy, and the column to push for the village. The French skirmished in the wood, but on their flank being turned, retired with precipitation; the Guards had only two men wounded. As it was dark, the general did not order the enemy to be pursued, who went off in such confusion, that coming to a small bridge about three miles from Salamonde, across the river, many men and horses were precipitated into it and destroyed, and many horses and mules and much baggage were left, affording no small plunder to the soldiers and peasants the next morning; a great deal of plate, and a general's full-dress coat, were picked up, among other things.

May 17th. The Guards and cavalry march to Ruivaens, a village about four miles higher up the same branch of the river, where the bridge of one arch was partly destroyed by the peasants, when the French came into the country, and repaired by us this day.

—— *18th.* March by the road the French took, and at about six miles, fall in with the same road the Guards and cavalry follow, and immediately after cross a bridge of one arch over another and larger branch of the river near a fall. The scenery here very beautiful and grand. The column following the French towards Montalegre now consist of the brigade of three-pounders, the cavalry, Guards, General Murray's and General Cameron's brigades; the remainder in the rear at Braga, &c. The road this day is bad; the country thinly inhabited, and the villages all pillaged by the French. Ten or twelve bodies of dead Frenchmen were found lying on the roadside, entirely stripped, probably not able to keep up, and murdered by the peasants; and a great number of horses and mules hamstrung, which were shot by our people. An officer and a few stragglers taken prisoners. The French are much

distressed for provisions, and we are far from being well off. The soldiers plunder plenty of cattle, but we are entirely without bread. Since joining General Murray's brigade, I accepted the invitation of living with Lawson's brigade of artillery, and share with them; otherwise in this country I should be badly off indeed.

May 19th. The army begins to return: it is said the French have gained Spain, and there is no further hope of getting at them, and that Victor is entering Portugal from Alcantara. Had we made the same exertions in following the enemy on this occasion, which we did last campaign in Spain to retreat from them, one would suppose more might have been done; but it is probable Sir Arthur knows best. Rain all day.

Notes on the Passage of the Douro, 1809.

On looking at a map of the Peninsula, and examining the relative situations of the several armies, as they are described to have been on the 9th of May, one cannot conceive how Soult's corps could possibly escape total destruction, except by commencing a rapid retreat before the combined movement could be made against him; but from want of information, or some other unaccountable reason, he blindly remained in Oporto until he ran the greatest risk of being entirely cut off; it was a sort of infatuation, as a French officer during the retreat described it: "Il me paraît que monsieur le maréchal a perdu la tête." There is no doubt, but a simple well-digested plan, executed with firmness and rapidity, would have reduced Soult to the most disgraceful dilemma for a soldier.

The first thing thing that strikes one in this business, is the little previous preparation. Why Beresford, whose object was evidently to impede the retreat of the enemy, take up his time, and divert him sufficiently to enable the main body to be close at his heels and attack him, was not allowed more time to seize upon important posts, destroy bridges, &c.; and why Romana was not acquainted in time with the operations about to be undertaken against Soult, when he would have been very happy to have lent a hand to so important an undertaking. And though his undisciplined troops may have been very unequal to

meet the French in the open field, no one will say they were not very adequate to a war of posts in broken wild country, and especially against these already harassed dispirited troops.

As regards the immediate mode of attacking Oporto, it has been shown that the general had information on the morning of the 12th, that a body of the enemy had left Oporto, and taken the road to Valongo very early that same morning; that the floating bridge at Oporto had been blown up in the night, but that at from four to eight miles above, there were plenty of boats, and every facility to pass the river. From these considerations it would appear the most military mode of proceeding would have been to have sent a small corps direct to Villa Nova, which is immediately opposite Oporto, to amuse the enemy, while the main body crossed the river at A Vintes. Had this been done, the French army would have been divided in two, the rear-guard left in the town easily cut off, and the retreat of the remainder consequently more difficult; but then the brilliant achievement of forcing the passage of a considerable river in the presence of an enemy, would have been lost.

There is another point open to criticism, viz., the want of celerity with which a flying dispirited enemy was pursued. It will have been observed that the French retreated by the road leading to Castile, and were afterwards under the necessity of changing it; by which they made a considerable detour, and had a wild country to pass, and then came into the same road by which Sir Arthur *marched direct;* who however, notwithstanding, arrived at the point of junction of these roads after them, although they went at least twelve miles round. This delay was principally caused by having to remain at Oporto, to supply the troops with provisions, the men having just finished, on the day of the action, the quantity previously given them. There is a passage in the King of Prussia's instructions to his generals, not inapplicable to this circumstance. He says, "C'est la faute du général en chef quand il manque des vivres. Lorsqu'il donne une bataille il a un dessein, et s'il a un dessein, il faut qu'il prépare tout ce qui est nécessaire pour l'exécution; par conséquent, on aura soin d'avoir du pain ou du biscuit pour huit à dix jours."

Journal resumed.

May 20th. Returned to Salamonde.

—— 21*st.* To Braga. The artillery and cavalry have been greatly distressed for horse-shoes; the forge carts could not follow them; the roads stony, and many of the cavalry, when they charged, threw away their spare shoes. The people at Braga appear ill-affected toward us.

—— 23*rd.* On arriving at Oporto, received an order to reconnoitre the Douro.

—— 25*th.* Sir A. Wellesley moves for Coïmbra, where the army, except General Tilson's division, will assemble. Sent Fyers by the great road to Lamego, through Penafiel and Amarante, and went myself by a boat up the Douro twelve miles to Pe de Moera, and slept at the house of a rich farmer. The Portuguese are extremely dirty and disgusting in their manners, particularly in eating and drinking; rooms unswept, furniture covered with dust, dirty linen. At dinner they never change the knives, forks, or spoons, but after using them, help themselves with the same out of the dish; at least, such are the habits of the lower and middling classes out of the great towns. The women seldom eat with the men, but usually cook and serve their husbands at table, and act very much like servants in the house; I have seen them even sitting on the ground, eating out of the dirty plates what the husband helped them to from the table, as he finished with each dish; but in other respects they give their opinion, and talk as freely as a mistress of the house should do. The great wooden bedsteads, with ornamented board heads, are very alarming, as usually producing more bedfellows than one wishes.

—— 27*th.* Most of the horses and mules are pressed for the service of the troops all over the country, which is an exceeding hardship upon the poor devils who happen to own a single one or two. They are taken by force from their homes and families, sometimes two hundred or three hundred miles; their beasts very ill-used, frequently so as to kill them, and for this they get no or very little pay, and are at the greatest difficulty to keep themselves and beasts from starving, so that they frequently run away, losing their beasts, which are always under a

guard. The bullock-carts and drivers are in the same condition. Owing to this, I found it very difficult to procure a mule to take me to Lamego, every one being afraid it would be pressed, till at length a gentleman lent me a very good one, on my promise that it should be sent back immediately. Upon this I crossed the mountains, and arrived at Lamego at 5 P.M., where I found Boothby, to my infinite satisfaction, and got into the same house with him, and we were sumptuously entertained by the Bailli Carvalho, a Knight of Malta, and a man of great politeness and perfect good manners. He and a Maltese servant seemed to take great pleasure in talking of Malta with us, who had seen it so much later than they. General Tilson's division having marched from Viseu with a corps of Portuguese under General Beresford, by Lamego, Amarante, Chaves, and beyond, in pursuit of the French, have returned, and this day marched on their return for Guarda. Boothby, who has been living with General Tilson, was remaining for two days to endeavour to recover a mule load of the general's baggage, which the muleteer had run off with.

May 28*th*. The sky is clearing over my stable. At Oporto I had three small horses, which I had bought at different periods, and none of them fit for my purpose. At the taking of Oporto I bought a French mare, with a saddle and bridle, for sixteen *cobs*, from a soldier who had just seized her, but she proved to be dead lame, having had something run into her foot some time before; and a very fine mule, which I had bought in Lisbon for thirty-six pounds, and was my only resource, was lost by the Marquis of Tweeddale, to whom I lent it to get a surgeon for General Paget. My French mare however has recovered; I sold one pony to Jones for sixty *cobs*, what I gave for it, and at Lamego I have changed another bad horse, which cost me sixty *cobs*, giving sixty *cobs* besides, for a very fine mule. The French met with some resistance about Amarante, and after taking that town, burnt it to the ground.

—— 10*th*. Arrived at Abrantes, where I find most of the army, increased with two regiments of heavy dragoons, Sir A. Wellesley, Colonel Fletcher, Boothby, Mulcaster, &c.

—— 12*th*. Received orders to proceed to reconnoitre the Minho and frontier of the province of Entre-Douro-e-Minho.

Hired an Italian for servant at eight dollars a month, and set out on the 14th, with Thompson of the Engineers, on this excursion.

June 16*th.* To Coïmbra. We are quartered at the convent of Sta. Cruz, the richest in Portugal, and are well entertained. This convent is at present a perfect inn to the British officers, who all (about twelve or thirteen) live there; find Lawson, of the Artillery, there, with a fever, but getting better.

—— 18*th.* Remained at Coïmbra, and visited the great convent of Sta. Clara, where some pretty nuns entertained us with sweetmeats and singing.

—— 19*th.* To Sardao, on the small river Agueda, seven leagues; met there Marquis of Tweeddale[1] and Stewart, aides-de-camp to General Paget, returning to Lisbon with the general's baggage, who is gone to England to recover from his wound. Dined with them; Lord Tweeddale gives me hopes of recovering my mule, which he lost on the 12th of May.

25*th July.* To Sta. Eufemia, a most miserable place, where even the clergyman has only a cabin of one room, divided by slight cane partitions into three, without a chimney. In Spain and Portugal, except in the towns, a glass window is seldom seen, and then only in the best houses. At Sta. Eufemia is the large house of a hidalgo, now dismantled; its master is with the Prince in the Brazils, and has not occupied this house these ten years.

—— 27*th.* (Almeida.) Saw Marshal Beresford, and gave him my report of the country I had examined. About 12,000 Portuguese infantry are assembled in this neighbourhood, and a few hundred cavalry, said to be intended to watch the motions of Ney, Soult, &c., who are at Zamora and Salamanca, with about 20,000 men.

—— 28*th.* Received £22 10*s.* of the Portuguese commissary, upon the warrant of Marshal Beresford and my receipt. Then proceed to Ciudad Rodrigo, six leagues. Fort Concepcion is on the rising ground immediately above the rivulet which divides the two countries. It is a good square fort, with bomb-proofs; in 1808, the French blew up and breached the two flanks and great part of the ravelin of the main front, and removed the

[1] The present general, Marquess of Tweeddale.

guns, &c., into Almeida, which have never been returned. Ciudad Rodrigo is a good town, situated on a hill on the east side of the river Agueda, over which there is here a good stone bridge. The weakest side of this place, and one affording much more advantage to attack from than any other, is from the north, where, at less than three hundred yards, is a small height opposite one angle of the place, from whence the escarps may be perfectly breached.[1] General Beresford having told us that he had information that the French had moved 9,000 men from Salamanca to Tamames, and therefore to inquire respecting a safe route to join the army, we waited on the Duque del Parque, governor-general of Castile, and procured a passport which directed us to go by Bejar to Talavera; he informed us only about 200 or 300 French had been at Tamames and had returned to Salamanca. At the entrance of this town are the quarters of some malefactor hanging on poles.

July 30th. Set out from Alberea to go to Bejar, seven leagues. At two leagues, near Miranda, meet a peasant, who was hastening to give information that the French are moving down towards Placencia, and have entered St. Estevan, one league and a half from Miranda on the road we were taking; we accordingly turn to the mountains on the right, and by a byroad get to Cepea, where we find the inhabitants in the greatest consternation, and flying their houses, having just got the same information of the enemy.[2] From Cepea we determined to make the best of our way to Placencia; we keep in the mountains, and hear the French have entered Colmenar, on the road parallel to

[1] This was the point afterwards attacked by us; and it will be seen that Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher obtained this information from Captain Burgoyne's notes. Shortly after this date, the place fell into the hands of the French.—Ed.

[2] Captain Burgoyne had in fact fallen in with Soult's army on its road from Salamanca to intercept Lord Wellington's line of retreat. In relating this incident in after years, he has informed me that the Spanish peasant stared very hard at them, and at length asked him if he was not English. On being answered in the affirmative, he informed them that the French had occupied a village one league and a half in advance of them on the same road, and that if they continued in the same direction for another half-hour, they must fall into their hands. On receiving this information, Capt. Burgoyne turned short off to the right into the mountains, as far as the village of Cepeda, where he obtained a guide who led them by mountain

us. Sleep at Abbadia, a small village six leagues from Cepea, and near the high road from Salamanca to Placencia. The French entered Bejar this morning early, having surprised a body of about 1000 Spaniards who were at that place, some of the fugitives of whom we fell in with.

July 31*st.* Set out an hour before daylight to get a good start of the enemy, as we now fell into the same road they would take. By a good road over level country, with mountains close on the left, three leagues to Villar, a small village. Meet there with Captain Macdonald, aide-de-camp to General Erskine, who is sick at Placencia. He had been sent by the general to observe the movements of the enemy in this direction; on the day before, he had been at the Puerto de Baños, a pass in the mountains four leagues on the Bejar side of this place, where, finding a Spanish regiment of militia, &c., he endeavoured to persuade them to take post and defend the pass, but without effect; the enemy were accordingly allowed to pass unmolested. From Villar, along the side of the mountain and constantly mounting it by a good road, at two leagues arrive on the summit, and then descend one league to Placencia, a large old city on the river; it is enclosed by an old wall of no service. The shops are shut up, and the inhabitants are quitting the town in great alarm: orders are given for those of the sick who are able, to be prepared to march at a moment's warning, the enemy being expected into the town hourly. Remain two hours to refresh and feed the horses, then proceed for Talavera; cross the river by a good stone bridge, and then go over a very high hill, and at five leagues stop at a small deserted village. Small parties passing in the night, and informing us the French had entered Placencia, we started at three o'clock.

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tracks parallel to the road Soult was following, and often in full view of the French army. After some miles travelling in this way, he was enabled to pass ahead of the French column, and rejoined the English head-quarters four days after the battle of Talavera; but he lost all his baggage, his servant and led horses being cut off and falling into the hands of the French. When in France in 1816, with the Army of Occupation, he met again this servant, who had married a Frenchwoman in the interim, and had settled down in the country as a naturalised Frenchman.—Ed.

August 1*st*. Stopped at a small village at three leagues for two hours to rest, and went on to La Calzada and slept there.

—— 2*nd*. Breakfasted at Oropeza, a small town on a hill two leagues from La Calzada; found there Fyers, with a bad fever and insane. Went on to Talavera de la Reina, a town on the Tagus, over which is a bridge; find poor Boothby had lost his leg at the battle, but is in a fair way for recovery.

The British and Spanish armies—the former of about 20,000 and the latter 30,000 or 40,000—having united, had taken the great road to Madrid, and by the 22nd July, had advanced as far along the Tagus as the river Alberche, one league in front of Talavera de la Reina, a considerable town, and twenty leagues from Madrid. Victor's corps of 20,000 men were then on the heights on the opposite side of the Alberche, and Sir Arthur Wellesley proposed to attack this corps immediately; but Cuesta making objections that the Spanish army would not be prepared until the next day, Sir Arthur did not choose to take it upon himself to act without their co-operation, and in the night the enemy marched off to join Sebastiani's and other corps. Having returned in force, apparently with the intention to attack the combined army, Sir Arthur determined to make a stand near Talavera, as the most favourable position that part of the country afforded.

Battle of Talavera.

The extent of the line taken up was about two miles; the right was on Talavera, which town is immediately on the Tagus, and the left on the steep heights of Madellin; beyond these heights is a valley of about half a mile wide, which separates them from a ridge of rugged mountains which runs nearly parallel to the river Tagus. In front of the heights of Madellin is a gully, through which passes in winter a small stream from the mountains, and beyond it the ground is elevated and plain, but considerably lower than the heights. Between Talavera and the heights the ground is low and flat, with a very small rising ground about midway between, and rather advanced, on which a redoubt was begun.

The British took the left of the line, having their right on the little rising ground; the Spaniards extended from thence to Talavera and the river. The heights and ground in front of them are entirely open, as well as that part of the flat on which

the troops were drawn up; but in front and rear of them, at a short distance, were vineyards and wood, not very thick. General Mackenzie's division of 3,000 or 4,000 men were in advance on the river Alberche, when the enemy came down on the 27th July, and, taking them by surprise, drove them in; they retired quickly, but in good order. In the evening, the French army were close in front of our troops, and during the night they made attempts to gain the heights of Madellin, in the first of which they had absolutely got on the summit before it was discovered they were the enemy; they maintained however but a momentary possession of them, being driven back by the 29th Regiment with the bayonet.

On the 28th, the first attempts of the enemy were directed to gain the heights by determined attacks in column from the valley, in all of which they were repulsed; they then made a general furious attack along the whole British line, which was likewise repelled. At the close of day the action ceased, and on the morning of the 29th, it was found they had retired beyond the Alberche to their original position, leaving twenty guns in the wood. The Spaniards were scarcely engaged at all, except a few immediately adjoining our right, and most of those behaved so ill, that General Cuesta had seventeen executed by lot.

The French force is stated to have been about 48,000, with near sixty pieces of cannon, which during the action were most of them posted on the commanding ground in front of the heights of Madellin; they were admirably served, and, from their situation, did great execution. Our loss was about 5,000 killed and wounded, that of the enemy is said to have been double. The British had thirty pieces of artillery, six of which were three-pounders, and six long six-pounders were the heaviest we possessed.

August 3rd. In consequence of Soult's movement, with a force said to be 30,000, to Placencia, the British army march to Oropeza, it is said, to attack him; and the Spaniards are left to guard Talavera, but leave it this evening.

—— *4th.* In consequence of the Spaniards quitting their post, it is thought necessary to cross the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo, two leagues from Oropeza. The Puente del

Arzobispo is a small neat town, having a fine stone bridge over the river. The town is on the north side of the Tagus, and the ground on the south favourable for opposing a passage across the bridge. Below this bridge are three others, viz., Almaraz, on the great road from Lisbon to Madrid, Puente de Cardenal, and Alcantara, each of which has had a principal arch destroyed during previous hostilities. The French enter Talavera.

August 24th. (Medallin.) The Spanish army, under Cuesta, were defeated near this place three months ago. Their position was between two mountains eight or ten miles asunder; the French approached, and were cannonaded some time, and then retired; the Spaniards, wishing to follow up the blow, moved into the plain after them; the French turned, the Spanish cavalry ran away, and their army was soon entirely defeated, with a loss of 7000 or 8000 men.

—— *27th.* (Merida.) Halt. Ross[1] arrives from Newfoundland, by way of Oporto and Almeida. The army said to consist of 15,000 effective and 9000 sick.

From Lieut.-Colonel FLETCHER, Commanding Engineer, *to* Captain BURGOYNE.

"Badajoz, September 8, 1809.

"DEAR BURGOYNE,

"You will oblige me by letting me have a memorandum of your route from Ciudad Rodrigo to Placencia. I recollect I gave you last year Boothby's report on the former place. You probably have not that, but as you were there some time, I will thank you for such observations generally on the defences as may occur to you.

"Yours ever,

"RICHARD FLETCHER.

"Flushing surrendered after two days' bombardment. The *Star* says Sir Arthur will be a peer, and all the other general officers who were in the action baronets."

[1] Captain Ross, R.E., afterwards killed at Ciudad Rodrigo.

From Captain BURGOYNE *to* Lieut.-Colonel FLETCHER.

Mondego, September 15, 1809.

SIR,

I received your letter dated the 8th instant only this evening at six o'clock, and answer it immediately.

It will not be in my power to give you much satisfaction on the points upon which you require information; I shall however send you what observations I can, not with the idea that they can be of much service, but in order to comply with your desire.

Respecting Captain Boothby's report on Ciudad Rodrigo, if I am not much mistaken, I returned it to you with my own observations on the place, by letter to Salamanca. If I did not, it was lost with my own papers, among my luggage, which was taken soon after.

Ciudad Rodrigo is inclosed by an earth rampart retained by a masonry escarp wall from twelve to twenty feet high, and a parapet of ten or twelve feet thick, flanked by square solid towers. A line of field works has been completed round this enceinte in the manner of a fausse-braye, flanked by redans, and having a small ditch, and very low counterscarp. The whole is in tolerably good repair. The rampart is narrow, and the interior of it retained by a perpendicular wall, and close upon the buildings of the town.

The weakest side of this place, and one affording much more advantages to attack from than any other, is the north, where, at less than 300 yards, is a small height, opposite one angle of the place, from whence the escarps may be perfectly breached. The rear of this height, and approach to it, are under cover, and at the back of it are others, from whence the defences may be destroyed. It did not appear that much could be done in a short time to improve this part; there is no room within the work to form a retrenchment, unless the cathedral church, which is immediately on this spot, were used as such; and the fall of the hill is such as not to allow of the escarp being covered under considerable time.

Upon the whole, Ciudad Rodrigo appears to be a trifling place, whose greatest strength consists in the quantity of ordnance and ammunition it contains.

These remarks are entirely from the recollection of the place as I saw it nearly a twelvemonth ago; when passing through it very lately, having entered the town late in the evening, and gone out early on the following morning, I had no time to examine it, but was informed that some work had been done to the fortifications, though I could not ascertain of what nature.

Respecting the route from Ciudad Rodrigo to Placencia, I did not come by the direct route, which I take to be by the Serra de Gato, but set out with the intention of going to Bejar, as the most direct road to Talavera. At ten leagues from Ciudad Rodrigo, near a town called Miranda, hearing that the enemy were between me and Bejar and only a league and a half distant, I turned into the mountains, and went by path-ways over them to Abbadia, six leagues from Placencia, and very near the high road from that place and Salamanca. From Ciudad Rodrigo towards Miranda, the first seven leagues are over a fine road and open country; from thence, one league of road, impracticable for any carriage, to Alberia, a large town; and from thence to Miranda, also impracticable for carriages. Great part of my route from Ciudad Rodrigo to Placencia was done during the night, with other precautions to avoid the enemy, which prevented the possibility of very particular observations.

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From Captain Mulcaster, R.E.

"Headquarters, Badajoz,
September 17, 1809.

"My dear Burgoyne,

"I had yesterday the felicity of receiving your witty epistle. I can't have the pleasure of witnessing the field sports of Montijo to-morrow; my cattle are in such low condition that I really had rather spare them the ten leagues this freak would occasion.

"A mail arrived some days ago from England, bringing papers and divers letters, but none for us. The batteries and Spanish troops of the line here quartered have scarcely finished their loud salvoes in honour of the surrender of Flushing to the

British arms. I am sorry that this agreeable news must be clouded. Our poor friend Pasley is badly wounded; he is however doing well. He had a musket ball through his body and a bayonet stab in the thigh. He was wounded leading the storming party which carried one of the advanced works, under Colonel Pack. He stuck one Frenchman, disarmed a second, stabbed a third, and was attacking a fourth, when he fell. What a desperate dog! Colonel Fyers is slightly wounded. Lord Chatham is very fair in his commendations of us, and loud in his praise of the sister corps. Our loss is from five to six hundred men; about seven hundred prisoners have been taken during the operation, and are all to go to England. Recruits are coming from England, from which I conceive hopes that we shall have another sight of the enemy before we leave this. What a dreadful disappointment it is not to have been at Talavera! How very fine the orders were to the army on that noble contest! The people in England are all mad about Talavera. They swear that Cressy, Poitiers, and Agincourt were nothing to it.

"'Viscount Wellington of Talavera and Baron Douro of Wellesley in Somersetshire!!!!!'

"'Sir John Coape Sherbrooke, K.B.!!!!'

"'Sir Rowland Hill, Bart.!!!'

"'Sir Alexander Campbell!!'

"'Sir Archibald Cameron!'

Rather a titled army we shall be than otherwise. The *Gazette* containing the first is out; but not having received an official communication from government, our chief is still Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B. I think

"'Sir Fox Burgoyne' and

"'Sir Robert Mulcaster,'

would neither of them sound much amiss.

"Senegal has been taken—a good station for a commanding engineer.

"There is a trip in reserve to reconnoitre the Sierra Morena; as it must be a good long job, it will most likely fall to your share. I had a narrow escape of examining the frontier from the Tagus to Almeida, but I hope and trust it has dropped. I killed my best horse in our last trip. We live here in hopes of

an advance. If I go to England, I must make a party for the King's Bench. I find I sink deeper and deeper. Adieu!

"Yours ever,

"EDWARD ROBERT MULCASTER.

"Fletcher got a letter from you yesterday. What was it about?"

Journal resumed.

October 24th. Mulcaster receives an order from Colonel Fletcher, who went to Lisbon with Lord Wellington, for himself and all the officers to join him,[1] except myself and Emmett, who are to remove to Badajoz.

November 21st. Lord Wellington goes to Villa Viçosa to hunt and shoot. The French have evacuated Talavera, Placencia, &c., and are said to be concentrating near Madrid. The Spanish army of La Mancha, of about 50,000, are near Aranjuez.

—— *22nd.* Heard from Mulcaster at Torres Vedras. The engineers are throwing up field works at that place and Soubral, and redoubts, &c., are to be made at Cabeça de Montachique and other parts; the object is to take up the strongest points in each of the principal roads leading to Lisbon, and strengthen them, viz., that by Castanheira and the Tagus, which present many very strong positions, as at Castanheira, Villa Franca, Alhandra, &c.; the next by Soubral and Bucellas; then that by the Cabeça de Montachique; and another by Torres Vedras and Mafra. The connection of heights between Alhandra and Soubral is extremely bold and strong.

Peculiar Customs in Spain. 1809.

With the exception of the upper classes, the men scarcely ever wear a coat; their dress consists of a close round jacket, over which they put on a cloak when they go out. The jacket of the common people is frequently of leather, and sometimes, as well as the breeches, of sheepskin with the wool outside; their jacket commonly comes below the waist, with slits in it, and often a broad leather belt with a buckle round the waist; the hats usually with a very broad rim; many, particularly in

[1] For employment on the lines of Torres Vedras.—ED.

Castile, have the seam under the armpits not sewn up, as well as the inside of the elbow joint; they are fond of gaudy attire, and use a quantity of metal buttons. A common costume is a brown jacket with a sort of diamond of scarlet on each elbow, which is fantastically bordered with white, &c. They wear stockings without feet, and frequently shoes which just go over the toes, and are kept on by coloured ribbons tied round the feet and ankles; sometimes a piece of skin rather larger than the sole of the foot, and tied on by strings fixed to holes made in it with a knife, answers for a shoe. If they have not a cloak, but only a sort of great-coat, they frequently hang it on their shoulders before them, the mouth being a part they appear to be very particular about covering in the cold. The boys of seven or eight years old dress like little men.

The women are little, have good figures, particularly good feet and ankles, walk uncommonly well, and are many of them pretty. Their walking-dress is very handsome—a black silk gown with a white neckerchief, long sleeves, and a long black gauze or black silk veil over the head, and hanging down in front of the arms, or crossed round the waist; the gowns have frequently three rows of black fringe all round, and reaching from the waist to the bottom of the skirt.

In most towns they have a *tertullia.* A lady gives out there is a *tertullia* at her house every night, and, without further invitation, any one of her own class in society who chooses, calls in after nine in the evening, and sits down without ceremony or even acknowledging the master or mistress of the house; there they talk politics, play at cards, sing, play, dance, tell stories or play at forfeits, &c. They break up about eleven or twelve. The owners of the house give nothing but candles and fire, but then there is no need of invitation, and every one comes and goes as he likes.

The indelicate stories and conversation which pass before the most respectable women, and even to them, would not be believed in England; the ladies do not appear at all shocked by it, but on the contrary constantly join in a hearty laugh. Their actions and manners are on the same free and easy system; a young man making love will light his cigar, and will accompany a pretty speech with a volume of smoke plump in

the face of his *innamorata*. They are passionately fond of smoking, and make cigars by rolling up tobacco in a small piece of white paper, which, when half smoked, they frequently give to their neighbour to finish.

They appear to detest foreigners, and their pride makes them affect to despise them. They will stand gaping and appear delighted at the sight of some miserable armed ragamuffins of their own nation, who, with their heads up in the air, are treading on each others' heels, while they will see a battalion of English Guards pass, without deigning to cast their eyes upon them.

The *olla* of the common people is made of beef, sausage, pork, garlic and pepper, and *caravanseries*, a large hard pea, boiled up together. I have seen soup made by them by frying a little fat pork, with garlic and a coarse kind of red pepper; into this a good deal of hot water is put, and then poured into a bowl, over bread cut into pieces. They usually have but one knife in the house, but every one has his spoon, and wooden or horn fork; the men frequently carry a small horn spoon with a very short handle, in their breeches pocket. They usually sit upon very low stools, round another which serves for table, and which is not above a foot from the ground; on this is a large bowl containing the meal of the family or party, and they all dip their spoons and forks into it. Soldiers form a circle, according to their numbers, and stand up; the dish is on the ground in the centre, and each as he requires it walks up to help himself, and returns to his place in the circle to eat it.

There is a much greater familiarity between the lower and upper classes than in England, even between servants and masters. All Spaniards, except in anger, &c., address each other in the third person, and a gentleman will always use *usted*, even to a beggar. In church, the women squat down on the ground along the centre of the church, like Turks, and the men stand or sit on benches outside them. The priests repeat their sermons with great rapidity, and like a schoolboy going through a lesson; they have no book or paper before them. Those who preach are usually monks.

The priests who are not monks generally have a good house near their church, and a female housekeeper, usually a relation,

or sometimes a poor widow with a family. In this way a pretty girl will often be an inmate in the house of a young priest, which with us would create scandal; they however do not appear at all aware of it.

Young or unmarried women, when they walk out, are attended by an old one, or servant-maid, who generally walks behind, or at a little distance on one side of them; this gives something of our idea of duennas, but I don't perceive they act as any restraint upon them; on the contrary, they must frequently be made a convenience. A fine young girl will, with the servant-maid, visit a rich young priest, without any scandal.

The Spanish equipages are abominable—great heavy, old-fashioned coaches, drawn by mules; when they travel, there are always immense trunks, beds, and articles of furniture tied on, and this mass—not much lighter than an English stage waggon—is drawn at a foot pace by six or eight large mules, with rope harness and traces. The coachman sits on a low coach-box, and can only reach the two wheel mules; the rest are managed by the voice, and by calling out their names, which they know perfectly, as "Carbonera," "Castañera," &c., and if they do not obey, which is very seldom the case, the coachman jumps off the box, and thrashes them well. As there is no means of changing animals, a family cannot well travel above thirty miles a day. A single man rides his mule or horse, with his cloak on and saddle-bags or portmanteau behind, and will get forty miles a day. A gentleman has a man on another mule behind him, who rides on a sort of pack-saddle without a tree, called an *albarda*. The Spaniards appear to prefer the sport of shooting rabbits to any other, and think you in joke if you say you prefer a hare to eat to a rabbit.

In many villages and small towns, a man goes round in the morning and collects the pigs from the different houses, and takes them out into the fields to feed; on returning in the evening, when close to the town, he lets them go, and you see them running like devils, and grunting all over the place, each to his own home.

They usually plough with bullocks, often with mules, and sometimes with asses. They appear to take very little pains,

and have not much science in farming; for in a large town, with gardens in the neighbourhood, they will not be at the trouble of taking away manure, if you will give it them.

The better sort of people in cold weather have a brazier, round which they sit, and manage better than I ever saw in any other country. They have for this purpose a peculiar kind of small charcoal called *picon;* this lights remarkably easily, burns clear, and without smell or inconvenience, and retains the heat a very long time. I have been told it is prepared by throwing cold water upon the fuel when sufficiently burned for charcoal, instead of letting it cool gradually. They think, like all other people in hot climates, that chimneys and coal fires are extremely unwholesome, and, indeed, have as bad an idea of them as we have of burning charcoal in the middle of a room.

The high roads in Spain, called *estrada real,* are uncommonly fine, of great width, and laid upon layers of immense stones; if they had been made with half the pains and of half the width, which would have been ample, and double the number had been constructed, the country would have been much benefited. In forming these roads, extensive causeways have been carried over flat grounds, and fine stone bridges over all streams, or even ditches. In crossing a ravine, the road seldom takes you above half down; the rest is passed over a lofty bridge.

Journal resumed.

November 25th. (Badajoz.) Emmett returns from his excursion down the Guadiana.

The Spanish army of about 50,000 under Ariezaga, have sustained a most signal defeat at Ocaña in La Mancha, near Aranjuez, on the 20th inst. It is said to have been almost instantaneous: the cavalry in front ran away and galloped over the infantry, and the whole dispersed. The generals retired to the mountains of the Sierra Morena, where they are to endeavour to collect as many of the stragglers as they can. Their loss is estimated at 5000 killed, 15,000 prisoners, and fifty-five pieces of cannon out of seventy. The French force is stated at between 20,000 and 30,000, under Soult.

—— *29th.* The army remains in cantonments in the neighbourhood of Badajoz, except a brigade of infantry at Abrantes,

and some cavalry in Portugal; it is said to consist of 32,000 on *paper*, and not more than 20,000 fit for duty. The sickness nearly as great as ever. The Duke of Albuquerque, who was about to attack Talavera, on hearing of the defeat of Areyzago, retired by the bridge of Arzobispo to the mountains on the south side of the Tagus, on the road to Truxillo.

December 6th. The Duque del Parque, who commanded about 90,000 Spaniards, has been defeated somewhere in the neighbourhood of Bejar, and retired towards Ciudad Rodrigo or Salamanca; it is also said that Blake has written word that Gerona cannot hold out another fortnight. Received an order from Colonel Fletcher to send Emmett to join Patten at Abrantes; Ross is to come in his place.

—— *9th.* Met Colonel Colburne, 66th; who returned a few days ago from Ariezaga's army. The battle was fought two leagues from Aranjuez, the left of the Spaniards was on the town of Ocaña: the right, where were 6000 cavalry, had no natural advantage—and along the front was a ravine. The French under Soult, about 25,000, attacked them, and turned their right; the front line were very sharply engaged for about two hours, when a considerable confusion took place, on which the general commanding left the field, and ordered the second line to retire; the first, finding themselves unsupported, also retired, and this retreat very soon became a determined flight. The plan was, to have endeavoured to gain Madrid, if possible, by gaining a march on the French; or otherwise, there to have raised the people, and entrenched themselves.

—— *11th.* A letter from Lord Wellington to the Junta of Badajoz is published in the Badajoz paper, thanking them for the ready attention they have paid to his demands respecting providing this army with provisions, and informing them that he has given orders that every debt should be paid immediately, and that he leaves a person charged with settling the accounts which may come in from other parts of the province, particularly Placencia. He says circumstances require his removal to the north of the Tagus, but that it will ever give him pleasure to hear of the success and prosperity of Badajoz and the province of Estremadura, and he trusts his present movement will be of service to them. Their answer is very polite—that

the sentiments of gratitude he expresses towards them oblige them to the earnest desire of serving him for ever, &c.

December 14*th*. The Duke of Albuquerque, with the army of Estremadura, is about to move from the banks of the Tagus near Almaraz, &c., to Medellin and its neighbourhood on the Guadiana, as he says, not to avoid the enemy, but to get his troops under shelter during the bad season, and to get them supplied with shoes, great coats, and other things they are much in want of, and which are in store, but want means of conveyance. Posts are to be left on the Tagus.

—— 20*th*. (Badajoz.) Sent off some Merino sheep, consigned to Goldfinch at Lisbon, four of them belonging to me.

—— 23*rd*. Headquarters march on Monday.

—— 24*th*. The reserve of artillery, staff corps, and 27th Regiment, as well as headquarters, leave Badajoz, being the last of the British troops out of Spain.

CAMPAIGN OF 1810.

In this year Napoleon made his great effort to effect the complete subjugation of the Peninsula—Marshal Massena having been sent from France, and placed in supreme command of the French armies for that purpose. Wellington appears to have foreseen the storm, and during the winter had entrenched a very powerful position at Torres Vedras, in advance of Lisbon, where he had formed a line of works extending from the Tagus to the coast, which entirely covered the capital of Portugal and his base of operations—At the outset of the campaign, the English Headquarters were at Celorico, and we possessed garrisons in Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, which it was determined to defend—A third fortified post on the frontier, called Fort Concepcion, had also been prepared in the first instance for defence, but Lord Wellington subsequently determined to destroy it on the advance of the enemy.

The French open the campaign by the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo on the 11th of June—This town capitulates on the 10th of July, and a few days afterwards, Massena crosses the frontier, with a view of conquering Portugal, and driving the English into the sea—Advancing by the right bank of the Mondego, he is checked by Lord Wellington on the Heights of Busaco, on the 27th of September—The French Marshal turns this position by its left flank, and Lord Wellington retires slowly within the Lines of Torres Vedras.

From Captain MULCASTER, R.E., *to* Captain BURGOYNE.

"Torres Vedras, January 2, 1810.

"I TRUST, my dear Burgoyne, you will believe me sincere, when I wish you many *many* happy returns of this (I think) vile season. I have a note from Goldfinch. He tells me that we are on the eve of a war with America. *Viva!* What you call 'properly in for it'—diving as hard as we can. Ministers at all events seem determined that the nation (at least the military part of it) shall not pine in inactivity.

"The Emperor is about to cross once more the Pyrenees, to restore *tranquillity* and *happiness* in the Peninsula. I suspect

we shall be sent or driven home soon enough to embark on some American expedition. Goldfinch tells me that some still speculate on peace; for my part, I think they are devilish deep ones. At all events we must be licked out of this before we can listen to any proposals that he will make. But then you may say that two or three months will settle that concern, and we may set forth in our preamble to the treaty, that his Majesty having, notwithstanding his lavish exertions to support the cause, seen his armies shamefully expelled from the Peninsula, and those of his allies annihilated, has at length opened his eyes, and seen that it is not in his power to do more for those exalted characters, the Spaniards and Portuguese, and therefore he is constrained to leave them to their fate, and make the best bargain for his own exhausted state. I should like of all things if this bargain were to turn up, merely that we might have time and power to deal heavily with the Yankees.

"My entrenchments are getting on, but not so rapidly as I had hoped, for I have met with a large proportion of rock and hard gravel, and have a month's work in store to finish completely and give myself a week over. I wish you could see my entrenchments. Unlucky dogs that ever have to attack them!

"There are so many redoubts in store, that I fear the army will retire upon us before we can advance to it. I however sincerely hope that you will come in for all the good things going; only think occasionally of your less fortunate friends. Adieu.

"Yours ever,

"E. R. MULCASTER."

Journal resumed.

January 5th. (Coïmbra.) Lord Wellington reviewed the brigade of Portuguese at Coïmbra; these are reckoned to be in the best order of all the brigades. The Portuguese army are very much improved; they are clean and uniform in their dress, regular and obedient in their behaviour, and exercise and manœuvre very well.

—— *14th.* Received an order to proceed to reconnoitre and report upon the river Dão.

Memorandum from Lord WELLINGTON *to reconnoitre some country between Viseu and Coïmbra, given to me by* Colonel MURRAY, Quartermaster-General.[1]

"I WISH that an officer of the Department was employed as soon as possible to survey the course of the Cris, and to ascertain its course, by how many bridges and fords it is crossed, where the roads crossing it lead to, whether it fills in winter, and how long it remains full, and whether the destruction of the bridge between Mortagoa and Santa Combadão, and the destruction of the road leading from the bridge on the right of the river, would be a serious impediment to the use of the road from Viseu to Coïmbra by Mortagoa and Mealhada.

"Let him calculate the means of destroying that bridge and road.

"I should wish the same information regarding the Dão, which joins the Cris immediately below Santa Combadão.

"Also the same respecting the river about a league or a league and a half from Viseu.[2]

"WELLINGTON."

February 15th. (Viseu.) An aide-de-camp of Sir J. Sherbrook's was sent off in the middle of the night, a few nights ago, with a despatch to Lord Wellington; and it is now said the army will be on the move immediately. Lord Wellington left Lisbon on the 10th inst., and is expected here to-morrow. The works near Lisbon continue.

—— *16th.* (Viseu.) By a letter from Ross[3] of the Horse Artillery, at Pinhel, it appears that Ney invested Ciudad Rodrigo; some of his cavalry having passed over to this side of

[1] In consequence of this mission, the journal is entirely occupied with topographical details from this date till the 15th of February, and has been omitted.—ED.

[2] These orders of Lord Wellington are interesting, as showing how early in 1810 he considered it probable that the French would advance by the Viseu road into Portugal. The bridges on the rivers Dão and Cris were blown up by the Engineer officers attached to General Pack's brigade, during the retreat into the lines of Lisbon.—ED.

[3] The late Field Marshal Sir Hew Ross, Lieut.-General of the Ordnance in 1854, and afterwards Lieut.-Governor of Chelsea Hospital, where he died in 1869.—ED.

the River Agueda, in consequence of which, our posts beyond the River Coa had been drawn to this side of that river, and General Crawfurd had concentrated his division in the neighbourhood of Pinhel. Ross expresses great concern at the bad state of his horses, fears there will be a great scarcity of forage, if any active operations take place in that part of the country, his horses being now supplied with rye and rye straw, the worst species of forage, especially for English horses, who do not thrive, even upon the best forage these countries afford.

In the event of acting offensively against Ney, we shall want cavalry very much, the country beyond the River Coa being quite plain and open for an immense extent. At this point commence the great plains of Old Castile, which extend to the Asturias to the north, to Burgos on the east, and to Avila and the Sierra de Gata on the south. The 14th and 16th Light Dragoons and 1st Regiment of the King's German hussars are the only cavalry we had in front; they are very weak, and their horses in very bad condition, from the last twelvemonth's hard work. The Heavy Brigade are in the same condition, or worse, and in the rear towards Thomar. It is now reported that Ney has quitted the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, and Lord Wellington is said to be coming to this place by way of Pinhel. There can be little doubt but that our intended move was for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The inhabitants have shown particular animosity to the French, from which there is reason to hope they will show spirit in its defence. The Duke of Berwick speaks of it in his 'Memoirs' as a paltry place, and gives great credit to the commander he put in it for defending it for a fortnight; it has probably, however, been somewhat improved since that time. They say Ney bombarded the town for six hours. A Spanish officer has come in, but what for, or where from, I cannot make out.

February 17th. (Viseu.) Sebastiani's corps from Seville are in the neighbourhood of Badajoz, and have entered Olivença, a town four leagues south of that place. General Hill's division were to march from Abrantes on the 14th inst. for Portalegre; they consist of about 5000 men; perhaps some Portuguese regiments will join him.

Lord Wellington, in his visit to Lisbon, has expressed his perfect satisfaction at the exertions of the Engineers there. As the Engineers have occupied a house in Lisbon (33 Rua do Aleirim) for a year and a half, as mess-house, office and officers' quarters, during which time some mischief has been done, and considering the civility of the owner in providing them with whatever they required, it has been agreed to subscribe £50, £30 of which has been laid out in a gold snuff-box, and presented to him, and the remainder is to repair damages.

Lord Wellington arrived this evening. He has ordered the road from Ponte de Murcella to Thomar, by Espinhal, to be repaired by the inhabitants for artillery. It is now said the French have opened trenches before Badajoz; they are besieging it, probably, with the guns and means they found at Seville.

February 18*th.* (Viseu.) The country about Viseu abounds in cattle, but bread and forage are difficult to be procured for the troops; the ration of straw has been reduced lately.

—— 20*th.* (Viseu.) Reported that 15,000 men under Junot or Loison are in Traz-os-Montes about Bragança. Loison, from the violent acts he is said to have committed during the revolution against the French in 1808 and 1809, has frightened the Portuguese so that his name is as good as an army; he has lost one hand. A French party has been plundering within a league of Almeida, and a party of the Light Brigade were sent after them, but did not come up with them.

March 14*th.* By a letter from Ross, horse artillery, we hear that the French crossed the River Agueda some days ago at San Felices, with about 1500 infantry and 150 cavalry, and drove our outpost of hussars nearly to Almeida, killing a man and a horse. General Crawfurd ordered a detachment from Pinhel to be posted on the bridge over the Coa, near that place; but hearing that the enemy had again retired, they were countermanded. The object of the French appears to have been provisions and forage. The hussars have been reinforced. A detachment of the 95th is at Barba del Puerco, a village on that frontier. Some deserters have come over, said to have belonged to Ney's body-guard; they report nothing new, but say they were greatly distressed for forage.

—— 23*rd.* The French, it appears, crossed the Agueda again

a few days since, and fell into an ambush laid for them by four companies of the 95th; they were driven back again to San Felices; the 95th had twelve men killed in the skirmish.

My stupid man, in exercising the horses and jackass, has let the latter stray, and lost him; which, independent of his being the best Neddy ever seen, and who served me faithfully near a year without ever giving a moment's trouble, leaves the great bulk of my baggage without conveyance; and just at the moment there are strong rumours of a move very shortly. Lord Wellington always inquired most kindly after this jackass, from having come up with him one day on a long march, and not being able to pass him with all his efforts, the little beast, as often as he attempted it, setting off in a gallop, though with a very heavy load; and his Lordship had the pleasure of driving him for a considerable time, until I happened to come up, and ordered him to be stopped.

The weather continues bad. In the skirmish mentioned above, the 95th had Lieutenant Mercer and six men killed, two very dangerously wounded, and three missing; the loss of the French, it is supposed, must have been much more considerable, as it is said they retired across a very narrow bridge under the fire of the 95th.

Eight dollars reward set every one at Viseu at work, and reproduced my jackass.

The French, in the skirmish with the 95th, came expressly against that party with the whole force from San Felices, supposed to be 1400, headed by the general; they had two officers and, it is thought, thirty men, killed, and were completely repulsed. The 95th took seven prisoners; Colonel Beckworth, who commanded them, had a shot through his cap, close to his head.

Half of the Merino sheep sent from Badajoz have been shipped by Goldfinch, in a transport conveying Mr. Villiers', the late ambassador's, horses to England, and sailed on the 13th inst. They are under charge of Dundas's groom, he having sent a horse home; the whole flock consisted of twenty, belonging in equal lots to Major Dundas, staff corps, Goldfinch, Mulcaster, and myself, Engineers; and Pickering, ordnance commissary. They are all yet living, though they contracted

some disorder on their way from Badajoz to Lisbon. Their original cost, 4½ dollars, or £1 0*s.* 3*d.* each.

April 3rd. (Viseu.) Captains Squire and Holloway, and Lieutenants Meineke, Dickenson, Trench, Piper, Tapp, Reid, and Hulme, of the Engineers, arrived at Lisbon from England on the 28th ult., as well as Lefebvre's troop of horse artillery, the 13th Dragoons, and the 1st or Royals (cavalry), and 9th Foot, who are all landed. Lefebvre of the Engineers, with the rank of major, and Birch, Nicholas, Wells, &c., are gone to Cadiz.

Sir J. Sherbrook thinks the enemy have sadly mismanaged lately in the Peninsula; they have spread their forces all over Spain, and now find it necessary to concentrate. It does not appear that they have received very many reinforcements, and there has been great sickness among their newest conscripts. Some German deserters have lately come in, and Lord Wellington has given them the option of enlisting in our service, or being sent round by sea to their own country; he has taken measures and great pains to cause this to be spread among the French army in Spain, of whom a great number are Germans; and he has hopes it will be attended with effect. About 900 English were enlisted from the prisons in France, and marched into Spain, where they had not been long before they all escaped. It is thought the enemy are in want of men; certainly Spain requires a great force to keep it, and their annual loss in that country must be considerable. They are now in constant motion, and Lord Wellington states that if we had attempted to make counter-movements, there would have been no end to it, and indeed that we could not have done it.

—— 14*th.* Headquarters move to Cea, a small town on the foot of the Sierra d'Estrella. The place is so small that many attached to headquarters get quarters in the neighbourhood—myself and the artillery at St. Romão, a village two miles higher up the mountain.

—— 17*th.* (St. Romão.) Order for headquarters to return to-morrow to Viseu.

—— 18*th.* The move of headquarters to Cea, and, after remaining three days, returning to Viseu, appeared very extraordinary. Many absurd reasons are assigned for this: one

states that Lord Wellington, having heard of a fine house there, occupied by a nobleman's family, the lady of which was very engaging, and the daughters handsome, musical, and entertaining, determined to remove there; but finding in the house not so good accommodation as he expected, owing to twenty-one children who were in it—the lady, from having had no less than twenty-five children, something the worse for wear, and the young ladies much secluded, in the old Portuguese style—his Lordship got immediately disgusted, and returned to Viseu.

April 28*th.* (Celorico.) The French have not exerted themselves, as Lord Wellington had been taught to believe or expect; the Portuguese say however that they are before Ciudad Rodrigo, and that for three days there has been a good deal of firing there.

May 2*nd.* (Celorico.) The French are said to have about 30,000 men in our front, that is, about Salamanca.

—— 3*rd.* (Celorico.) Ross's troop of horse artillery (four guns only) are at Gallegos, three leagues from Almeida, on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo—his horses in very fine order. Colonel O'Lawlor (Spanish) returns from Ciudad Rodrigo; he says the French have from 6000 to 8000 men near that place, and the Spaniards have 4000 or 5000 people within it. General Crawfurd visited it for the first time while Colonel O'Lawlor was there, and in going round the environs, a Spanish partisan who was in the place, accompanied him with some of his mounted men, and had a skirmish with the enemy, killing sixteen and taking some horses. General Loison commands the corps at Salamanca, and the prisoners at Ciudad Rodrigo report that they were taught to expect reinforcements to that corps.

—— 6*th.* (Celorico.) Very bad weather continues. A number of horses belonging to the hussars passed through, and went out towards Barraçal, half of them led and with sore backs; also thirty or forty horses for Thompson's brigade, good looking strong beasts and in good condition, but most of them with sore backs, from having to carry corn without saddles.

—— 7*th.* (Celorico). Of ten Merino sheep (*vide* 20th December) sent to England, all died on the passage or immediately after, except one, which was delivered to Lord Dundas,

who has written to his son that, though in a miserable condition, it promises well, and is of a very good wool; of the remaining ten near Lisbon, some have died, and only four are said to look healthy and well.

May 9th. (Celorico.) A general order given out for officers of the cavalry to be attentive in preventing the men selling their forage (the soldiers will frequently do so if not watched very closely); the artillery drivers in particular are, I believe, very bad for cheating their horses, but the officers of artillery take the greatest pains to prevent it. The Germans certainly treat their horses the best, and keep them in much better condition than the English do. It is said they feed and water them when they please, but if a horse that is known to be of a good constitution falls off in condition, they punish the man. These people are great plunderers, but with respect to their horses, they steal for them, and not from them, and take great pains to provide them with some sort of litter to lie down in—a thing of consequence to the English horses.

—— 10*th.* (Celorico.) Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford went to Guarda to see the troops there (General Cole's division), and since then 3000 Portuguese who were there have been ordered back to Coïmbra; Heisse, of the German artillery, says, from their state and appearance, they could be expected to do nothing but consume provisions.

—— 11*th.* (Celorico.) By a letter from Ross, it sppears the enemy have about 4000 infantry and 2000 cavalry in two separate camps, one league from Ciudad Rodrigo. General Crawfurd, with the whole light division, is on the frontiers. Twenty-one deserters from the French, some in scarlet and some in white jackets, came in here.

—— 12*th.* (Celorico.) The French are again close round Ciudad Rodrigo, and their force is increasing there. The deserters all agree in stating that they intend crossing the Agueda, and driving our light corps back as soon as the rains cease, and the fords become practicable. There is a report there that Massena is on his way to supersede Ney at Salamanca, who is to return to France.

—— 14*th.* (Celorico.) Lefebvre's troop of horse artillery, which came out the 3rd of April, is to relieve Ross's, the latter

having lost so many men and horses from sickness and hard work in Spain, as only to be enabled hardly to man and complete four guns. One ship, containing Captain Whinyates, and about forty horses, &c., was missing, and after supposing them lost at sea, we just hear they arrived safe in Bantry Bay in Ireland. Ross's remaining part of the troop being now immediately on the frontier, and in high order, as well as in a manner seasoned to the climate, it is thought better to draft Lefebvre's into Ross's and Bull's, and send his home a skeleton, than draft Ross's, as originally intended. The horses of all the artillery and cavalry, except the heavy cavalry, are now in fine order, from the grass and green corn they get, and it is hoped, from having been one season in this country, they will not suffer so much during the next.

May 17th. (Celorico.) Ney has summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and received an impertinent answer back. Mulcaster writes that he does not think there is any chance of any of them (the Engineers) coming up to the army. "Orders upon orders for new works come down from headquarters." A French corps of 25,000 men have recently entered Spain, and are, it is said, moving to Salamanca. Ney had there before and in the neighbourhood about 35,000; Junot has near Bragança 12,000 or 15,000. In the new corps is said to be an Irish brigade. Some dragoons from near Ciudad Rodrigo recently deserted to us with their horses, chiefly Germans; there would be much more desertion from the enemy all over the Peninsula, from the horror the French have of this kind of warfare, but that they are afraid of the peasants, who frequently fire at and murder them when attempting to desert.

—— *18th.* (Celorico.) By a note from Nicholas at Cadiz, it appears they have not yet done much (the Engineers); there is so much ceremony and form with the Spaniards, who do not show a great desire to assist them. Poor Lefebvre was the last man in Fort Matagorda, and was in the act of preparing the mine, to blow up what remained of it, when a cannon shot struck his chest.

Regnier has lately moved his headquarters to Almendralejo;

[1] Captain Nicholas, R.E., subsequently killed at the siege of Badajoz in 1812.

he has about 18,000 men, but it is not expected he will invest Badajoz until reinforced by part of Mortier's corps from the south side of the Sierra Morena. Romana and his ragged troops were never in higher spirits; they renewed the sacred oath on the 2nd of May, to perish or save the country. An English officer went on duty the other day to Badajoz, and was hissed and abused by the rabble of that place, on the public walk.

May 20th. (Celorico.) Some more deserters have come in to the outposts, and among them an officer, member of the Legion of Honour.

—— 23*rd.* (Celorico.) The French officer who has deserted says that he is of a violent temper, and having been very ill used by his commanding officer, he was rash enough to draw his sword upon him. His life was consequently forfeited, and he had no chance of saving it but by deserting, which he accordingly effected. By his account, Massena is already in orders to take the command, and the enemy are to invade Portugal with 60,000 men in three corps, one from the north, one in this direction, and the third in Alemtejo. Goldfinch, on the 19th inst., received an order from Colonel Fletcher, who was at Peniche, to proceed, as soon as an officer of the navy, who is to accompany him, calls upon him, to examine and report upon the Bayonne Islands, which are at the entrance of Vigo Bay. It seems extraordinary that, as soon as we had the opportunity, the whole coast of the Peninsula was not examined; this would always be interesting intelligence, whichever way its affairs end.

Colonel Fletcher has been ordered to examine Peniche, with a view of reporting upon the power of maintaining it as a station after we leave the rest of Portugal. Peniche is a small peninsula about thirty miles to the north of the Tagus, and precisely opposite the Burlings. It is enclosed on the land side by a bad line of masonry, to which "we are now adding a partial glacis of sand; it is secure against a *coup de main*, but to render it able to resist a formidable attack would require three years' labour and half a million of money. After all it has no port, is no naval station, and its rocky coast could not be approached by our shipping, except in very fine weather,

without great danger." I conclude, therefore, the Colonel will not give much encouragement to this idea.

May 25th. (Celorico.) Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford went yesterday to Almeida, and are to return to-morrow. It is said Sir Brent Spencer has arrived, to be second in command. Massena is declared King of Portugal; his army for the conquest, according to the French papers, is to consist of Ney Duke of Elchingen's, Junot Duke of Abrantes', and Regnier's corps.

—— *26th.* (Celorico.) Called on Lord Wellington,[1] and requested leave to go to Almeida, when he said it was the very thing he wished; that he meant to occupy Fort Concepcion, and in consequence, had directed Brigadier-General Cox, the governor of Almeida, to set about getting the breaches repaired which were made by the French in 1808, when they evacuated the fort, and drew all the stores, guns, &c., into Almeida, on the revolution breaking out in Spain and Portugal; the repairs to be executed with rough masonry, and stockaded. His Lordship therefore wished me to go and see how they were getting on, and report to him. I set out in the evening and went to Barraçal, one league, or about five miles; the road, after crossing the Mondego, to which is a steep descent and paved road, is good. It is reported that Fort Concepcion is to be garrisoned by four companies of British and one regiment of Portuguese. The Portuguese troops have begun to move forward.

—— *31st.* (Almeida.) Rode to Fort Concepcion with General Cox. The breach has been built up by the Spaniards in a very rough manner, all except about half of one of the flanks, at which a few men are now employed. General Cox received a letter a day or two ago from Salamanca, dated the 26th inst., which stated that Ney's corps were to march, with artillery, heavy and light, on the 28th; and last night he heard from Ciudad Rodrigo, that on the 28th, they did march from Salamanca. Yesterday their advance attempted to cross the Agueda, but the river was too high; we expect them over however very soon. This morning, advice comes from Alcanisas, in Galicia, that the French corps which was about

[1] Captain Burgoyne at this time was senior officer of Engineers at the headquarters of the army.

Astorga, of about 11,000, are marching towards Salamanca, all except about 3000 left at the bridge of Benevente. The first of this corps went through Zamora on the 25th inst.; four companies of the 45th, the 9th Portuguese regiment, and a Portuguese brigade of six-pounders, march into Fort Concepcion, in all about 1200 men. The enemy are close to Ciudad Rodrigo, on the right bank of the Agueda; on the left, if an officer appears to go into the place, some of their dragoons ford the river near the convent above a mile and a half above the town, and endeavour to intercept him. This night, General Crawfurd retires a little.

June 1*st.* (Almeida.) Till this day, only a few (sixteen or eighteen) Spanish peasants have been collected for repairing the breach in Fort Conception; this morning, however, a hundred men from the Portuguese regiment commence in different parts of the fort, with ten carpenters and eight masons.

—— 2*nd.* (Almeida.) Found the foundation by mid-day in the fort, and built a little up in the evening; fixed thirty palisades of the stockade round the foot of it; brought the palisades from round the covert-way to the outworks; brought into the fort stones from a tambour communication to the ruined ravelin, which impeded the fire of the flanks; began a barbette parapet retired, to the breached flank, and also a barbette parapet on the opposite flank, which had also been breached, but in a trifling way, and has been in part clumsily stopped up by the garrison; built up with stones some doors of the detached redoubts, and cleared the drawbridges and oiled the hinges, &c.; made them fit for service. The ten days' provision has been sent from Almeida, and a quantity of wood brought in by the peasants. The 9th Portuguese regiment and company of Portuguese artillery are gone in; the four companies of the 45th remain in Val de la Mula, to come in immediately an alarm is given. A beacon is established at the fort, and another near Val de la Mula, to give notice to Almeida when the enemy cross the Agueda, and General Cox will immediately send a courier to Lord Wellington. His Lordship writes to General Cox that, if the enemy intend to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo and attack us at the same time, they must be in great strength, and then it may be necessary to

evacuate Concepcion; in that case it will be of consequence to Almeida to have it as completely destroyed as possible. He begs him, therefore, to consult his engineer upon this point. Accordingly, I have agreed with the governor to prepare a mine in the face of the bastion opposed to the breached flank, which will be commenced to-morrow by sinking a shaft in the rear of the banquette. General Crawfurd went to Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday, and says the *heavy guns* the good people saw coming down, he believes were materials for a bridge to be thrown across the Agueda, near the convent a mile and a half above Ciudad Rodrigo. General Cox says that till lately, when the enemy got reinforcements, they were in constant alarm at Salamanca since Lord Wellington came to the north; that wood was placed among the barrels of corn or flour, supposed to burn it if necessary. Twenty-four deserters came in to-day; they deserted from Palencia. The French are in want of provisions. Our hussars, as one of them described to me, have very hard duty. He said he came off duty this morning, came with the prisoners from Gallegos, three leagues, and got to Almeida about 7 P.M.; must return to Gallegos again to-night, because he goes on duty again to-morrow. The 16th Light Dragoons marched into Minocal, half a league in front of Celorico, yesterday; their horses in good condition.

June 3rd. (Almeida.) Continue the above works at the fort, and commence sinking a shaft for a mine; find masonry, and begin at another place; besides the soldiers, eight or ten Spanish peasants are employed. Four more deserters have come in, one of them orderly sergeant to Loison. Massena is gone to Madrid to consult with King Joseph; more troops expected from France; now or never is our time to attempt something against them. The disposable force in Galicia consists of about 3000 men armed, but otherwise little worth. Silveira has 6000 or 7000 militia at Bragança. The favourable offers of Lord Wellington to deserters, of leave to enter our service with the bounty of the King's German Legion, and serve for seven years, or till six months after the war, have been printed in Italian, and stuck upon the churches of many towns in Spain, and apparently with effect; it is said they are determined not to trust a German regiment near us. We have certainly lost a

fine opportunity; we might have cleared the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, raised the siege of Astorga, and destroyed the depôt of the enemy at Salamanca, by moving towards the latter place a short time back. The defence of Astorga was brilliant: Junot had 18,000 men, and expected to find its garrison of 8000, when only 2000 marched out of a place enclosed by a simple wall, without ditch, &c., after I know not how many days of open trenches. The enemy lost some thousands of men before Astorga; they are now fortifying it, and leave a garrison of conscripts. The enemy have completed a bridge over the Agueda above Ciudad Rodrigo, opposite or near a convent, and established a battery for its protection; it is expected they will soon occupy the strong heights on this side of the bridge. Don Julian, a famous partisan, is in Ciudad Rodrigo, and has occasional skirmishes with the enemy. The general orders of the 31st ult. desire the troops to be ready to move at the shortest notice.

June 5th. (Almeida.) Three mounted deserters come in. They say the French have about 22,000 infantry before Ciudad Rodrigo, and about 4000 or 5000 cavalry; that Massena was there, but has returned to Salamanca. Continued the above works at Fort Concepcion; fastened and repaired gates; commenced stockade at the foot of opposite flank to great breach.

—— *5th.* (Almeida.) Continued works as above; finished stockade at the foot of the other flank. Three deserters came in. The enemy have established themselves in houses and gardens nearer the works of Ciudad Rodrigo. They have begun another bridge of trestles, a little below the town, which it is expected will be completed to-morrow. Their force before Ciudad Rodrigo is large; accounts of it vary from 18,000 to 30,000. The governor and junta of that place write every day to General Cox, who forwards their intelligence to Lord Wellington; to-day they sent to beg for musket-balls, having expended nearly all they had, and a convoy was sent off in the evening. They expend great quantities of ammunition, and with very little or no effect.

—— *7th.* (Almeida.) The breach of nine or ten feet high. The well-hole for the mine was sunk five feet, and stopped for want of the frames and plank, which came in the morning, and

work recommenced after mid-day; opening to search for countermines, of which there is an appearance. I expect the enemy to cross in force, and take up a strong position on this side the Agueda, taking the bend of the river and heights opposite Ciudad Rodrigo, from whence to watch the end of the siege.

June 9th. (Almeida.) The enemy have pushed some troops over to this side the Agueda, and the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo is thereby closed. They have thirty-five guns at San Muñoz, half way between Salamanca and Rodrigo, supposed to be their light artillery, which cannot get on from the present bad state of the roads; their heavy guns are reported to be stopped by the same cause between Salamanca and Tamames, said to be a better road. There are indications of Regnier's corps of 18,000 men, from near Badajoz and Merida, moving this way; they are preparing boats for passing the Tagus, and making inquiries concerning the roads over Sierra de Gata.

—— *10th.* (Almeida.) The breach at Fort Concepcion up to twenty feet high, and stopped; began to pull down the bad wall made by the Spaniards for stopping up the opposite breach, which is smaller. The well-hole fourteen feet deep, and lined with plank. Lord Wellington suggests to General Crawfurd to consider how far it would be practicable to destroy the French bridges, by floating timber down upon them, or otherwise.

—— *11th.* (Almeida.) Finished pulling down the old wall of the new breach to be stopped. Cannot go on with the mine for want of frames to line it with, which are all made in the arsenal at Almeida, where they are slow and stupid. Governor Cox is stingy, and naturally so, wishing to keep as much in his own place as possible. Filling in at the back of the great and original breach.

—— *12th.* (Almeida.) Locks fixed on the gates, &c., at Fort Concepcion; a few frames and planks arrive by the evening to commence a gallery. Captain Ross, horse artillery, writes from Gallegos, dated this day, that "last night, two hussars of the King's German Legion deserted. A flag of truce, by a colonel, has just come in to Carpio (in front of Gallegos); he delivered letters for Lord Wellington, and gave in Marshal

Ney's compliments to General Crawfurd, hoping he is well; also a message to Captain Kraüchenberg, of the hussars, saying his dog is safe, and shall be returned by the first opportunity. This dog followed a party of the French, when skirmishing with Kraüchenberg some days back." An officer has been observed sketching the ground in front of the Azana, and they are constructing redoubts on the heights on this side the Agueda, to protect their bridges. By a gentleman who left Celorico this morning, it appears the troops remained, and headquarters as before.

June 13*th.* (Almeida.) The gallery of the mine eight feet in from the bottom of the shaft; this gallery is about five feet high, and two and a half feet wide, the frames two feet asunder from centre to centre, the roof planked, but not the sides; the soil light, and the frames three feet asunder would answer well. Two more Merino sheep in good condition sailed in the packet from Lisbon on the 3rd inst., one of them for me. Almeida is very little improved since I remember it near two years ago, though many people are employed daily on the works and have been for a long time. Governor Cox has too much to do with correspondence to Lord Wellington, and procuring information of the enemy's movements, &c., to attend much to the place. His regiment, however, the 24th, is in very good order. There is only one British officer in it—a major.

—— 14*th.* (Almeida.)

Present State of the War in this Country.

The enemy have possession of the two Castiles (except Ciudad Rodrigo), of the kingdom of Leon, and of Spanish Estremadura, and threaten to invade Portugal, for which attempt, they have in front of Ciudad Rodrigo an army under Marshal Ney, which, with the detachments at Salamanca and in the neighbourhood, is supposed to consist of 40,000 men. In Astorga they have a small garrison, who are strengthening the place with works. At Benevente there is a detachment to secure the passage over the Esla, and at Zamora and other considerable towns, they have probably other detachments to keep the country in subjection and secure provisions; these may be exclusive of the 40,000, which we may then suppose to be the utmost.

To act against this force, Lord Wellington has in cantonments in Belmonte, Guarda, Celorico, Pinhel, and other places, 16,000 British troops, of which 3,000 are cavalry. A brigade of six nine-pounders, two troops of horse artillery, six six-pounders each, and two brigades of foot artillery six-pounders. Also about 14,000 Portuguese infantry, recently organised by British officers, and in very good order, with two brigades of Portuguese artillery, one of nine-pounders and the other six-pounders, also in very good order and extremely well appointed. In Almeida are about 4,000 men, including two regiments of militia, all Portuguese.

In Spanish Estremadura, the French General, Regnier, has about 18,000 men in the neighbourhood of Merida and Badajoz. Against this force is Romana's army of about 10,000 ragged undisciplined Spaniards, in and near Badajoz, a miserable fortress, but extensive and well provided with ordnance and ammunition. Also General Hill at Portalegre with 5,000 British, with one brigade of six-pounders, and about 7000 Portuguese, including some regiments of Portuguese cavalry and some artillery. At Lisbon are the Royals (3rd battalion), 9th, 38th, and 83rd British Regiments, the three former very complete fine regiments, the latter weak. The Portuguese militia is dispersed in different parts, but they are in a wretched state, and not much can be expected from them; General Silveira has six or seven thousand of them at Bragança in Traz-os-Montes.

The Portuguese have twenty-four regiments of the line, who are very strong, seldom less than eleven or twelve thousand. Our Government has agreed to take 30,000 into pay; their officers and soldiers have had their pay nearly doubled, and are made in every respect infinitely more respectable than they were before; most of the old men have been induced to retire and make way for young ones, who can be moulded to something decent with greater facility. Lord Wellington has the entire resources of Portugal in his hands, and his word is law. Almeida is in a respectable state of defence, and a depôt is collected there for the army, with provisions for it for ten days. During, the last three months the weather has been exceedingly inclement, violent and unceasing rain; the last few days appear to bring a commencement of settled fine but hot weather. Not-

withstanding the unfavourable weather, the enemy some time since moved down five or six thousand men from Salamanca to before Ciudad Rodrigo, and from thence they had other posts along the Agueda to the Douro, particularly a strong one of 1500 men at the town of San Felices, where is the only bridge over the Agueda below Ciudad Rodrigo. This river, about the latter place, runs through a low plain, but a few miles below it enters a bold ravine which continues to the Douro; like all the rivers in these countries, it has fords in dry weather, but after and during rains, it is deep and rapid. The bridges of the two towns are of stone, and good. For the last three weeks or month, the French have been gradually increasing the force before Ciudad Rodrigo from Salamanca, and they have now round it a considerable army, but as yet no heavy guns, which are said to be detained between Salamanca and Tamames by the badness of the road, from the constant wet weather. At first they only occupied the other side of the river Agueda, but as their force increased, they began to cross bodies of cavalry by a ford near a convent two miles above the place, to endeavour to intercept anything they perceived entering the town; but this had no great effect, and the communication was considered perfectly open; but about a week ago, they have established two bridges of trestles, one above the town near the convent, and the other about as far below it, where is an island in the river. These bridges must be very good ones, for since their establishment we have had very violent rains, which have caused the rivers to rise considerably. Having now a free communication, they have pushed a body of three or four thousand infantry and cavalry to the left bank, and thus completed the investment. The river at Ciudad Rodrigo makes a bend, the concavity on this side, and within it some bold commanding heights overlooking the plain around. These heights the enemy are entrenching. The relief of Ciudad Rodrigo will therefore become most difficult, if not impossible. During the winter, a force under Junot of from ten to eighteen thousand men, now joined to Ney's, was occupied in taking Astorga, which, though only enclosed by a simple wall, made a gallant defence. This was a fine opportunity for Lord Wellington, whose force was entire and at hand, to have pushed to Salamanca, and destroyed or taken the depôt forming there;

and there is every reason to believe the enemy expected such an undertaking, and were prepared to destroy it themselves. Our army, however, remained inactive, and has done so to this day. Brigadier-General Crawfurd only, with the Light Division, consisting of the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th Regiments, and 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion, with a troop of horse artillery, has been on the frontiers, occasionally having trifling affairs with the enemy's advance, they, however, being always the aggressors.

Ciudad Rodrigo is a very poor fortress, but well supplied with artillery and ammunition. Its wall and main line may be breached from a height of not more than three hundred yards distance, at the back of which is great cover, and consequently, an enemy may break ground at once by this breaching battery; a very short time may therefore be expected to see the fall of this place, after the arrival of the French heavy ordnance. Why it is thus deserted to its fate, after solemn promises being given to relieve it, appears extraordinary; it will be a great acquisition to the enemy in their future operations against this country, and is the only rivet now wanted to the chains which the French have thrown round Old Castile. If we are not able to attempt some effort in favour of this devoted place now, I fear we cannot expect much success in our operations, when all the arrangements and combinations of the enemy are made. Marshal Massena commands in chief the army in Portugal, and is gone to Madrid, it is supposed to arrange with King Joseph the system of operation for the whole campaign of the Peninsula. We expect from Great Britain reinforcements; they may amount perhaps to 10,000 men. The enemy also expect reinforcements from France, which will probably not be less than 100,000.

The French in the winter occupied Andalusia, and fifteen or twenty thousand are now before Cadiz, where is a British force of four or five thousand under General Graham, and a large Spanish one under General Blake. They occupy the Isle of Leon and ground in front of it; the enemy are in possession of all the rest of the coast of the bay. Of General Crawfurd's division one regiment, the 52nd, and a troop of horse artillery, as well as the hussars, are at Gallegos, one regiment, the 43rd, at Alameda. The former place is called three leagues from

Almeida. The 95th are to the right. A convoy of twenty odd mules, with musket balls for Ciudad Rodrigo, was a few nights since taken by the enemy, attempting to enter. At Fort Concepcion the work gets on very well; one large breach is stopped up, and only wants the parapet; the other is in hand.

June 15th. (Almeida.) The shaft for a mine to destroy the face of one of the bastions in Fort Concepcion, is sunk 17½ feet, and a gallery conducted from it 14½ feet towards the escarp, all in loose earth and lined with plank; at that distance we find masonry, and excavate slowly. The second breach rises fast, and stuff is bringing from the ditch to fill in the back of both. The main drawbridge is broke, and repairing. Birch lies very ill of the Walcheren fever at Cadiz. Landmann is also laid up there. Nicholas is consequently the senior engineer there officiating. The most advanced of our batteries there is 1600 yards on the road to Seville, beyond the bridge over the Rio de San Pedro. The Engineers are employed in forming a chain of redoubts to cover La Isla. The main body of General Crawfurd's picket is on a small river of bold rocky banks, between Gallegos and Ciudad Rodrigo, near the bridge, where is also a gun from the horse artillery. On the 12th inst. three Frenchmen and eleven Germans deserted to us; and on the 14th, eight Frenchmen, five of them artillerymen. They have no heavy artillery come down yet. A great deal of firing heard this night from Ciudad Rodrigo—very heavy guns.

—— *16th.* This evening, complete the repair of the second breach; commence the parapet of the first. In the gallery towards the face of the bastion, find the masonry very strong; commence a small gallery to the left to ascertain whether we have got into a counter fort. General Crawfurd has made a requisition for 200 bullock cars from the villages round him, which not having been complied with, he has sent to imprison the *alcaldes* (magistrates) of these villages, and ordered a party of cavalry to collect the cars, as well as all the tools they can find fit for entrenching or hutting.

—— *18th.* The governor of Ciudad Rodrigo writes that he has not much provisions or ammunition, but husbands both, and will retain the place to the last. Wrote to inform Lord Wellington that the breaches in the flanks of Fort Concepcion

were closed up, and their parapets nearly finished; that the body of the fort was therefore perfectly out of danger of assault, and that mines were preparing to ruin this front worse than ever, should it be necessary.

June 19*th.* Late in the evening, receive the following answer from Lord Wellington:

"Celorico, June 19, 1810

"DEAR SIR,

"I have received your letter of yesterday. It would be desirable if possible, to destroy all the bastions and the detached work at Concepcion, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will suggest arrangements accordingly. We see from what we have ourselves done, that the destruction of the works before destroyed is not of much consequence, and it is desirable that if there is time to make the preparations, the remainder of the works should be destroyed also.

"Ever, dear Sir, yours most faithfully,

"WELLINGTON."

—— 20*th.* In consequence of the above, ordered the gallery for the face of the bastion B to be continued in all haste, and fortunately found a vein of earth under the masonry; continued the shafts for the left flank of A bastion, and right flank of B. The detached works being full of casemates and quite hollow, it was thought best to sink shafts, four under the larger and further one, and three to the middle and smaller one, in order to lay twenty barrels of powder (Portuguese, of 64 lbs. each,) under the foundation of the angles. In excavating the shafts to these detached works, came very soon to hard rock, but in the middle one, the floor of the casemate being lower than the ground outside, I made the workmen commence close to the angles, and within the work. Set two men also to make a hole in the wall of a small casemate in the right flank of the bastion C, to lodge powder in ten feet from the escarp wall. Wrote in the evening to Lord Wellington, as follows:

Almeida, June 20, 1810.

MY LORD,

In obedience to your Lordship's directions of yesterday, all possible means have been applied to forward the preparation

of mines in various parts of Fort Concepcion. I am sorry to find, the detached works being built on solid rock, and being full of casemates, the arrangements for their destruction become more tedious, and especially with inexperienced workmen. Every possible exertion however shall be made to get them on, as well as others in the body of the fort, where is also some strong masonry to pierce. In the meantime, not knowing how soon the mines may be required to be used, I shall recommend to Brigadier-General Cox, to send the powder calculated for this purpose immediately to the fort, and to Lieut.-Colonel Sutton, to distribute it among a few of the closest casemates, whereby, upon the emergency of the fort's being evacuated before the regular mines are prepared, the exploding this powder will, I have no doubt, effect large breaches in each of the detached works, as well as in every flank of the body of the fort; this will leave it certainly in a very dismantled state, though not in such complete ruins as if the mines were completed. The repairs to the fort are continuing as before.

I have the honour to be, &c.

June 22*nd.* (Almeida.) In the fort, General Crawfurd ordered two or three shots to be fired at some French cavalry from a six-pounder, on which an alarm was given, all their beacons fired, and some time after, four or five thousand cavalry and large bodies of infantry drove in our pickets—General Crawfurd drawing up his division at the back of some heights in front of Gallegos. A French officer of rank, and several other officers were seen looking out with their glasses, and after remaining some hours, the whole retired, and our pickets resumed their ground. This appears to have been a false alarm, and they must have expected Lord Wellington. Their information is supposed to be very bad.

—— 23*rd.* (Almeida.) Sixty barrels are lodged in the casemate—a saucisson fixed to it. Don Julian made his escape in the night out of Ciudad Rodrigo with his cavalry.

—— 24*th.* (Almeida.) Accidents frequently happen in the galleries, from the inexperience of the people employed, who are not miners; the loose earth often falls in such quantities as takes a considerable time to clear to the old place, some-

times a whole day. In the rock and masonry they can scarcely pierce at all, and unfortunately, that is found in situations where we least expect it. Fort Concepcion is evidently built on the ruins of some considerable ancient building, as is evident from the large irregular masses of masonry we frequently come upon. Occasionally we find the face of a wall, having no sort of connection with the work, and large square stones are in the escarps, with small round nobs in them, such as are frequently seen in ancient buildings.

June 25th. (Val de la Mula.) The preparations in the fort now requiring more constant attendance, I moved from Almeida one league, or about four miles, to Val de la Mula, a village in Portugal, half a mile from the fort. About 8 A.M. a tremendous explosion heard, and column of smoke seen from the side of Ciudad Rodrigo, and after it, a sharp fire of artillery till 11 A.M., during which was another explosion, and at 12, some time after the firing ceased, a third; the two latter without noise. Lord Wellington writes to Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton that the fort is to be evacuated and destroyed, on notice from General Crawfurd that he is retiring; if he cannot retire upon Concepcion, he is to send word to evacuate; and accordingly, thinking matters might be pressing, a working party was employed all night, getting the mines forward. Lord Wellington and the military part of headquarters come to Almeida. The French opened their batteries at daylight this morning against Ciudad Rodrigo.

—— *26th.* (Val de la Mula.) Lord Wellington and Lieut.-General Sir B. Spencer (second in command) visit the fort for a few minutes, and then go on to Gallegos, and return to Almeida in the evening. Much firing from the side of Ciudad Rodrigo heard. The explosions yesterday said to be in the French lines. The enemy have had their battering train up some days, and promised to open their batteries on the 24th, which they effected either that day or the next.

—— *27th.* (Val de la Mula.) Loaded and primed mines in six of the flanks and one face.

—— *28th.* (Val de la Mula.) Loaded a seventh flank. In the outer detached redoubt, ninety barrels of powder (of 64 lbs. each) have been piled in the two small casemates, and trains

laid, and in the middle fort, sixty piled in a casemate, in case the mines of the latter should not be complete in time, these being in very hard rock. Ciudad Rodrigo is certainly breached. Loaded the last flank. The great explosion heard a few days since was in a French battery, every one in it (about 100 men), according to a deserter, was killed, and the battery so ruined that another was forced to be made in its rear. Much firing is heard daily. The breaches are in the north side, and the enemy are supposed to have about twenty guns playing on the place, while the fire of artillery from the attacked side of the place is said to be reduced to a very trifling amount.

June 29th. (Val de la Mula.) The 14th Dragoons come up, and are most of them cantoned in the villages in our front. Firing heard from about Ciudad Rodrigo daily.

—— *30th.* (Val de la Mula.) General Cox sends for me to Almeida, to consult with him on a project of Lord Wellington's, for maintaining a part of the garrison in a position outside the place, for the purpose of preserving a communication with the bridge of the Coa; the left of this position to be on a windmill about 900 yards in front of the place, which is built extremely strong, and is to be made use of as a tower, with a gun mounted on it. The right descends towards the Coa, and is to be on a convent, also to be entrenched and have two guns; this convent is also about 900 yards from the place, and about 1500 from the mill. A small hill in front of the convent commanding the bridge is to be made into a post, and one or two guns to be placed there. The ground is broken, steep, and rocky, and the plan appears to me to be dangerous and impracticable,[1] particularly considering the nature of the garrison, consisting of one Portuguese regiment of the line (the 24th) and three miserable militia regiments, without discipline or subordination. General Crawfurd removes to Almeida and a little in front of it; his pickets, however, still remain at Gallegos, about three miles in front of Alameda, which is a very open country; in rear of Alameda it becomes woody. This move took place last night. This evening at dusk, he returned

[1] General Crawfurd afterwards fought the action of the Coa on this position—the river being in his rear. The bravery of his troops alone saved him from a total rout.—Ed.

in a column at double distance, to make the enemy believe he was strongly reinforced, the tail of the column passing the top of the hill seen by the enemy after dark. The headquarters of the army move to Alverca, a large village five leagues from Almeida, on the road to Celorico. Don Julian, with his partisans, called guerillas, surprised 100 French dragoons foraging a few nights ago, and destroyed about eighty. The French promise to hang him, and he in return gives them no quarter.

July 1*st.* (Val de la Mula.) An officer of General Crawfurd's staff, informs Lieut.-Colonel Sutton that it is that general's intention to retire from Gallegos at midnight; everything is therefore to be got ready to evacuate the fort on his arrival, and to blow it up; but that it is not quite certain that he will not advance again. In consequence, the 9th Regiment (Portuguese) were under arms nearly the whole of the night, and we worked with a few people to put the mines in as complete a state for service as possible. All the powder remaining was put into two ravelins in casemates in each face, and saucissons brought from them to one point, to which, as in the others, two portfires were tied together and fixed to the end. Reported that some of the 16th Dragoons have been surprised on picket last night, and taken prisoners.

—— 3*rd.* (Val de la Mula.) General Crawfurd has arranged that the lighting one beacon above Alameda signifies the advance of the enemy from that side; and lighting another, that he is about to retire by a different road than the one to Fort Concepcion; and that then Lieut.-Colonel Sutton is to follow his instructions about its evacuation and destruction. The firing at Ciudad Rodrigo is not kept up so briskly by the enemy as before, and it is supposed they are getting short of ammunition; the breach they at first effected, they could not make practicable. Large parts of the encampment lately occupied by the enemy appear to be evacuated, their pickets are very strong in front of Gallegos. A Spanish lieut.-colonel, commandant of artillery to Carrara's army, visited the fort this morning, and was very angry at not being allowed to examine it. He says they make signals to Ciudad Rodrigo with rockets, and that men have lately been in and out; that they are in

want of provisions, the place breached, and they expect to be assaulted; that they have put sand-bags, &c., into the breach; that the enemy have begun to mine, but at a great distance and near their own batteries.

July 4th. (Fort Concepcion.) At daylight columns of cavalry, amounting to twelve squadrons, advanced by Gallegos, where were three squadrons of hussars and one of the 16th Light Dragoons, with two guns of the horse artillery. They (the French) were supported by infantry; our people retired skirmishing, the artillery got several shots at them; part of the hussars under Captain Kraüchenberg, charged the enemy as they were crossing a small bridge, killed and wounded several, brought off one prisoner, and retired. Our infantry, and the remaining guns of the troop, were at Alameda. These, owing to General Crawfurd's being in front, were not posted in the best manner; the enemy's cavalry however, advancing rapidly, part of the 95th and of Colonel Elder's corps of Portuguese light infantry had an opportunity of firing in among them; the other guns also got some shots. From thence our division retired on Fort Concepcion, and took post on the left bank of the Toiroens rivulet, on rising ground; the advance of the infantry being at the fort. The whole business was rather confused on our side, otherwise the enemy might have been made to suffer more. They are supposed to have lost forty or fifty men; as we were only exposed to the fire of their cavalry skirmishing, we had only a very few men wounded. The hussars behaved remarkably well, and are said not to have been so well supported by the 16th as they might have been. Everything was prepared at the fort for evacuation, and in the evening the 9th Portuguese Regiment and the Portuguese brigade of six-pounders marched for their division at Pinhel under General Picton. The four companies of the 45th marched for the same place to join the remainder of the regiment. The enemy keep Gallegos and the ground immediately in front; our pickets of cavalry are on the rivulet of Duas Casas, about two miles in our front.

—— *5th.* (Fort Concepcion.) Heavy firing at Ciudad Rodrigo this morning. It is said five French regiments of infantry marched into Gallegos, and a deserter this day says it is the

enemy's intention to attack us to-morrow. The pickets in the fort are posted in the salient angles of the covert-way, merely for cover, and on the look-out. By the orders this evening, one squadron of the 14th Dragoons, two squadrons 16th, and Captain Kraüchenberg's of the German hussars, are to protect the right flank; and three squadrons of the 14th, and Captain Gruben's of the hussars, the left.

July 6th. (Fort Concepcion.) Much firing this morning and during the night, over at Ciudad Rodrigo. General Carrara retired yesterday with Crawfurd, and is now somewhere on our right. The French cavalry were occasionally taken for Spaniards yesterday. Fifteen or sixteen deserters came in, most of them infantry. General Crawfurd, in his division orders, says: "He has not failed expressing in strong terms to Lord Wellington, in his account of the affair of yesterday, the gallantry displayed by Captain Kraüchenberg, of the 1st Hussars, K. G. L., in charging with part of his squadron three times the number of the enemy, who were also supported by strong columns. The Brigadier-General, in common with every one present, witnessed his conduct with admiration," &c.

—— *7th.* (Fort Concepcion.) Seven or eight more deserters come in. Employed in laying down a sketch of the fort. A copy is to be sent to Lieut.-General Sir Brent Spencer, according to an order received a few days ago.

—— *11th.* (Fort Concepcion.) General Crawfurd attempted to cut off a French picket placed during the day in the villages of Villa Porca and Barquilla, about four miles in front of this fort. The enemy push about 200 infantry into Villa Porca, and thirty or forty cavalry into Barquilla. To surprise these, all our cavalry, amounting to about two regiments, in the night took up convenient situations behind hills and in woods near the villages, and the French party was observed to enter as usual; our cavalry then galloped round to their rear. The cavalry (about thirty) at Barquilla were all taken; but the infantry formed a square, and received a charge with a volley, and got off. Lieut.-Colonel Talbot, commanding 14th Light Dragoons, was killed, and a few men and horses killed and wounded. A party of the 95th (riflemen) were in the rear of the heights near Barquilla, and two or three companies with two

guns of the horse artillery were in Castellejo, about half way between the fort and the scene of action; two more guns were in Aldea do Bispo, a village at the foot of the fort. The plan was good, for the enemy were surprised, but it appears ill-judged to risk the loss of dragoons so valuable to us, in a charge on so small a body of infantry. Had one gun been up, or some of the 95th, this body must have fallen with little opposition; and some think, that had even the cavalry been divided, so as to attack in different points, the affair might have been successful. The country is a fine plain, with moderate hills and occasional woods. The enemy entered the villages about half-past 5 A.M. No firing has been heard from Ciudad Rodrigo since yesterday morning. The prisoners taken by us this morning amount to two officers and twenty-nine men. Our loss is, Colonel Talbot and eleven men of the 14th killed, and nine wounded, and about twenty of the hussars and 16th (chiefly the former) killed and wounded, with a number of horses. The wounds almost all very bad. According to the French officers, a message was sent in to Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday evening at six o'clock, that the place being breached in two places, the French would storm it immediately, unless it surrendered; the governor returned for answer that he had done everything possible, and surrendered at discretion.

July 12th. (Fort Concepcion.) The three companies of *caçadores* on picket at the fort, are withdrawn at dark this evening, and ten dragoons from the picket at Aldea do Bispo, sent to give one sentinel at the gate, for the protection of the mines. Two deserters come in in the evening, from the Irish Brigade; they state the enemy's force in the front to be very large (86,000), that their subsistence is difficult, and strong corps have moved to Salamanca. They say also, that Ciudad Rodrigo made a capitulation—a certain sum of money paid, and the town not plundered.

—— *14th.* (Fort Concepcion.) More deserters come in. The following signals are to be made by the vedettes: if the enemy are seen moving in small bodies, one vedette is to ride round in a circle; if they are moving in large bodies, both the vedettes will ride round; and if in great force, they will both ride round, but in different directions.

From Colonel FLETCHER.

"July 17, 1810.

"SIR,

"I have this morning received your letter dated yesterday. I have mentioned the contents of it to the commander-in-chief, who desires that you will retire with the cavalry, having previously destroyed Fort Concepcion and its outworks, as far as may be in your power. His Lordship does not think it necessary to complete any more mines than you have already prepared.

"To Captain BURGOYNE,
"Royal Engineers."

Journal resumed.

July 19th. (Fort Concepcion.) Our pickets of cavalry are along the small river Duas Casas, and in some parts in front of it. Since the late skirmish, we have had vedettes on the commanding heights above Barquilla during the day, but withdrawn to near Castillejo, a mile in front of the fort, during the night. This morning, this picket of one subaltern and twenty dragoons, went out as usual, and the non-commissioned officer went forward to plant the vedettes on the summit of the height, where are three stone crosses on the road, when he saw a Frenchman rise up in the corn a little in front of him; he snapped off his carbine, which missed fire, and about two companies of infantry rose up and fired; the vedettes galloped back to the picket, but the French infantry retiring, the vedettes were placed as usual at the crosses. A large body of the enemy's cavalry were then seen, who foraged, and a man of the infantry, who had purposely hid himself in the corn, gave himself up as a deserter; he says their intention was to surprise the picket, and drive us farther back, that Massena was come from Ciudad Rodrigo to this neighbourhood, and we might depend on being attacked very soon.

Destruction of Fort Concepcion.

—— 21*st.* A short time after daylight, as the picket of 14th Dragoons proceeded to the crosses near Barquilla, they hit upon

a body of the enemy just beyond Castillejo; the alarm being given, the remainder of the squadron of the 14th, who were in Aldea do Bispo, joined them, and the whole retired, the enemy being about two or three regiments of cavalry, supported by infantry. Immediately it was ascertained that the French were in sufficient force to push our people back, the mines were lighted in the fort.[1] Captain Mulcaster, of the Engineers, went up to warn me to light them, but it was already done; the dragoons I sent down to give every one they met notice, neglected to tell him, and he was going up the ramparts to look for me, when, smelling powder strong, he looked into one of the passages and saw the portfire burning. Of course he made off as fast as he could, and went down to the cavalry, who were skirmishing near Aldea do Bispo; when he got down there, the mines exploded, and he observed that those on that side took the desired effect. From Val de la Mula I could see that another side was also attended with success, as well as those in the outworks and detached redoubts. At the end of the saucisson three portfires were attached at lengths, the ends being cut off slanting and then tied together; it was calculated these would give half an hour's law after being lighted, which they all did, or very near it; the one lighted last, however, exploded first, by some minutes. There were from 90 to 100 barrels of powder (Portuguese, of 64 lbs. each only,) in each ravelin, divided in the two casemates between the flank and face, and they destroyed each ravelin, all but a very small bit at the salient angle. In the outer redoubt, which was large and high, the powder, 100 Portuguese barrels, was lodged in two small casemates, one at each angle of the front, and destroyed the whole front and part of the sides. In the middle small quadrangular fort, sixty Portuguese barrels were placed in one angle on the wooden floor dividing the casemate, and apparently cut the fort diagonally in two, throwing down the half where the powder was lodged. In the flanks were moderate breaches, and in the face the wall opened, and the top tumbled down, making a

[1] Captain Burgoyne's instructions were, not to be deceived by a feint, but to explode the mines when the enemy moved forward in force; the object being to conceal as long as possible Lord Wellington's intention of retiring.—Ed.

good breach. The enemy skirmished on, advancing cautiously, and drove us across the small river called Das Alvercas, about two miles in front of Almeida. In the night they retired to Turon.

July 22*nd.* Almeida to Alverca. Proceeded to headquarters at Alverca, five leagues from Almeida towards Celorico, and received an order there to join the 3rd Division of the army (General Picton's). Goldfinch and Thompson go to the first (Sir Brent Spencer's), Ross to General Leith's at Thomar, Mulcaster to the fourth (General Coles), and Squire is already with General Hill.

—— 23*rd.* Alverca to Pinhel. Join the 3rd Division at Pinhel, and received most politely by General Picton, who invites me to live with him.

—— 24*th.* The French advance soon after daylight, and drive General Crawfurd across the Coa; they consisted, it is supposed, of about sixteen squadrons and eight battalions, with artillery, and advanced with fury against our inferior numbers. The action was sharp, and we have several officers and men killed and wounded, as well as some prisoners. General Picton,[1] who rode out towards the spot, lost his way, and found a great many people of the Portuguese regiments of *caçadores*, officers as well as men, dispersed among the rocks at a distance from the field. By this advance Almeida is invested, the communication being entirely cut off. The enemy advanced with great caution, till they found how weak General Crawfurd was; they then rushed in, but did not immediately follow down the ravine, otherwise our loss would have been even more considerable. Our troops took post on the left bank of the Coa, to defend the passage of the bridge. The enemy made several attempts to pass, without success; they also attempted the ford a little above the bridge, but the rain made it impassable. Our loss at this time was very considerable, from there being no cover on our side of the hill, whereby the troops were much exposed to the fire from the other side, which was much more favourable; there was only

[1] Napier makes an accusation against General Picton, that he met General Crawfurd on this occasion, and refused to move forward his division to assist him. The Light Division to which Captain Napier's regiment was attached, were angry at being so maltreated by the French on the Coa, and Sir William Napier blames everybody indiscriminately.—Ed.

one breastwork or wall on our side, near the bridge, which, being lined with the 95th, did much execution, and was the principal means of preventing the enemy passing. Our loss is about 500, killed, wounded, and prisoners; among the former Lieut.-Colonel Hull, commanding the 43rd, who only joined the regiment the day before. The enemy are supposed to have lost about two or three hundred. General Crawfurd at night retired to Carvalhal on the Pinhel river. The *caçadores* who stood behaved very well.

July 25th. (Pinhel.) Rode down to the bridge over the Coa, where we have a picket of eighty men, infantry; the enemy have a small body of cavalry in the villages above this bridge. The people are running away and deserting their houses.

—— *26th.* In consequence of orders which arrived from Lord Wellington last night, the division retreated at 3 A.M. for Cerijal, about two miles north of Alverca, and the enemy had a small party of dragoons in Pinhel at 6 A.M. Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton has cavalry on our left, that is, north of us, and during the march a message came in from the pickets, that the enemy were observed moving about a squadron of cavalry, with a column of infantry, in a parallel line to us on our left, that is, on our right as we retreated. In the late skirmish our loss was about 400. The greater part of Colonel Elder's regiment of *caçadores* (the 3rd) behaved remarkably well, according to the accounts of persons hitherto prejudiced against them. After the attempt of the enemy to cross the bridge, where a number of men fell, Major Stewart (95th) took advantage of a lull in the firing, to call to the Frenchmen that they might take off their wounded, who were observed endeavouring to crawl off. They took advantage of the offer, and then the conversation began; they said Fort Concepcion was completely mined, but that if it was an object, they could re-establish it in a month.

—— *27th.* (Cerijal.) The 1st Division are on the left of Alverca, in a wood on the heights above the river; the 3rd about a mile on the left, and to the right of Cerijal; the 4th at and about Guarda; the Light Division at Freixedas, and the 2nd at Atalaya. Almeida has been summoned by General Loison without effect. An order arrives at 11 P.M. for me to

be at Alverca at 3 A.M. to-morrow, previous to proceeding to prepare some bridges for being blown up.

From Lieut.-Colonel FLETCHER, R.E.

"July 27, 1810.

"DEAR SIR,

"As Lord Wellington has decided to have some roads and bridges blown up, I think you will be the most proper person to do it.[1] I request therefore you will have the goodness to come to me at half-past three to-morrow morning, when I will explain the whole to you.

"Yours truly,

"RICHARD FLETCHER.

"You will of course mention this order of Lord Wellington's to General Picton."

July 28th. Ordered to prepare the bridges of Ponte de Murcella, Val des Pinos on the Alva, Foz d'Aronce, and Espinhal, for destruction, if they will cause an impediment to the enemy, and proceeded with Thompson to Pinhancos, eight leagues from Alverca. An order is also sent to the clerk of stores at Coïmbra, to send the necessary tools, powder, saucissons, &c., to Ponte de Murcella immediately.

—— *29th.* From Pinhanços proceed to Ponte de Murcella, nine leagues good road from Alverca, mountainous country, and good defensive positions. The Serra d'Estrella on the left, and Mondego River on right.

July 30th. (Ponte de Murcella.) The destruction of this bridge would not be any serious impediment, but nevertheless took measures to undertake it, to be on the safe side. Rode to Val des Pinos, and find that would be an impediment. The country about both mountainous; river Alva through very deep ravine. The stores from Coïmbra arrive at 10 P.M.

—— *31st.* (Ponte de Murcella.) With great difficulty pro-

[1] The mines formed by him at this period were not used by the English army, as the French advance took place on the right bank of the Mondego, but in retreating out of Portugal the following year, the French army took this road, and exploded the mines made by Captain Burgoyne on this occasion. The bridges were rendered impassable in every case.—ED.

cured four men (peasants) at 3 P.M. to work; find the arch covered with strong rough masonry, and do very little. Thompson goes to Val des Pinos, and gets five feet into the wall, going horizontally in from spring of the arch, and 3½ feet from arch stone.

August 1st. (Ponte de Murcella.) Loaded the mines in the bridge of Val des Pinos with two barrels of powder (English) in four wooden boxes. The bridge there is of one arch, about thirty feet span, and semicircular; the piers extend sloping from the top of the arch to the rocky hills on each side of the ravine. At the bottom of one pier, and very little above the spring of the arch, a small gallery was made to the centre, and then a return towards the arch, and the boxes of powder lodged at the extremity of this return, about two and a half feet from the arch stones, which were eighteen inches or two feet long; the piers of loose stone and rubbish, the bridge about fourteen feet wide, a regular saucisson, auget, and portfire were fixed.

—— *5th.* Return from Miranda do Corvo, four leagues to Ponte de Murcella. The army not moved; the enemy have not yet broke ground before Almeida. Hole in the bridge about seven feet deep; masonry very hard. Find the thirty soldiers of the line (Portuguese) so long expected; ten of them march in the evening for Val des Pinos, to give a sentry over the mine.

—— *6th.* (Ponte de Murcella.) The mine in the bridge of Val des Pinos apparently not touched, from observations made on the stones of the exterior wall, therefore did not think it worth the risk of unloading and reloading it, which I had been inclined to do, thinking it probable the people of the country might have opened it to steal powder; the only guard over it being *ordenança*—the peasants, armed with pikes, rusty muskets, &c. In a letter from Foz d'Aronce, I had reported the river Ceira to be fordable nearly throughout, and immediately close to the two bridges of Serpino and Foz d'Aronce; that it therefore appeared unnecessary to prepare it for destruction. This day receive a letter from Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, saying that Lord Wellington thinks it is worth while mining them. The thirty men will therefore be divided into four parts, seven at each place, and the officers and odd ones at Ponte de Murcella, to draw provisions, &c.; those belonging to Val des Pinos are in

Rodas, one mile from the bridge on the left bank of the river. At Ponte de Murcella, opening a hole under the pavement of the centre, of the width of the bridge and towards the arch, to lodge the powder. Provisions for the whole army, 25,000 men and 8000 horses, are stored along the road, for two days at this place, two days at Espinhal, &c. Yesterday provisions were ordered up towards the army. General Picton is at Linhares.

August 7th. Went to Foz d'Aronce, and pointed out in the evening to the workmen what they were to begin upon the next morning, viz., open a small gallery in the pier of the largest arch, about three feet distance from just above the lower row of arch stones; five men employed with crowbar and pick.

—— *8th.* (Foz d'Aronce.) The powder, &c., arrived with the twelve soldiers and two corporals; rode over to Serpino, and set four men to work, similar to the manner in Foz d'Aronce bridge; they began at 2 P.M. The river by Espinhal very small, with two wooden bridges, one of them for cars.

—— *9th.* (Foz d'Aronce.) Finished opening the bridge for the powder at Ponte de Murcella at 10 A.M. Total, nine days nearly employed, the masonry being very hard to pierce from the top. A hole was sunk more than seven feet to the haunch, and then a large return under the centre, and a small channel to let the auget through to the side.

—— *10th.* (Foz d'Aronce.) Finished opening the hole in the bridge of this place by mid-day, from the side of the pier a very little above the springing of the arch, about seven feet to centre of width of bridge, and then a return of about three feet to very near the arch stones. In the evening, loaded it with four cases, or two barrels, of powder.

From Lieut.-Colonel FLETCHER *to* Captain BURGOYNE.

"Celorico, August 10, 1810.

"MY DEAR SIR,

"I have just received your letter of the 9th. I had not time (to save the post) to take a copy of my letter to you relative to the bridges of Coja and Goes. I thought I had said that on further inquiry, I found the former need *not* be mined, as its destruction would not prove any impediment. The bridge of Goes was said to be of more importance, and I there-

fore mentioned that for explosion. The bridges of Foz d'Aronce and Serpino were finally decided on by Lord Wellington. As you will now have only one more mine in hand, you will be able to make your present detachment do. I will speak to Lord Wellington about the river beyond Espinhal.

"I have not myself any doubt of your being repaid what you expend by a contingent account. Should there be any difficulty, I would willingly take the risk of repaying you myself.

"As to putting a barrel of powder *under* a bridge, I had understood that the idea was to support it by a stancheon, in which case it would probably do. I should like much to see some such experiment tried. General Twiss, I am told, thinks a barrel of powder placed *upon* a bridge and merely exploded would destroy it. So do not I think. However, the late French experiments do give some extraordinary facts to prove how far the increase of quantity does away the necessity of *bourrage* in mines. My quantity of time to save the post is quite out.

"Lord Wellington is satisfied about the bridge of Espinhal, and Colonel Bathurst says there will be no difficulty about your contingent account.

"Yours very truly,

"Richard Fletcher."

August 11*th*. (Foz d'Aronce.) Went over and loaded the bridge of Ponte de Murcella with four cases, or two barrels, of powder; two cases perpendicular to the arch, one on the other and in the centre of it, and two more along it and on one side.

—— 13*th*. Rode to Espinhal, four leagues on the road to Thomar and Lisbon. At two leagues, Miranda do Corvo, a small town half a mile on right of road, where the opening in the mountains through which the road runs is narrow, and makes a fine position all the way to Espinhal, the mountains being bold, and between them short abrupt hills covered with much wood.

—— 16*th*. Went over from Foz d'Aronce to Serpino yesterday, and slept there. This morning, loaded the bridge with four cases, or two barrels, ends towards the arch stone under centre of road; two cases alongside of one another, and two on

them, placed under the solid, the hole down to the fourneau being on one side, to the pavement about seven feet, and about the same to each side. The cases lay horizontally, and one end within a foot of the arch stones; the soil, earth and stones; the side of the pier being hard masonry, sunk a shaft from the top. All the arches only one stone thick of about one and a half or two feet, and semicircular. The saucisson in its auget, after coming up the shaft, carried along a gutter one foot deep to outside the pier, and there to be lighted.

In the evening, rode over to Goes by a very bad road entirely among the mountains, one long league. Goes is a small village or town of about 300 houses, on the Ceira, here running through a bold ravine, but now very fordable. Bridge of stone, lofty, with three semicircular arches, centre one large, but similar to former ones. No stone bridges on this river above Goes. Thompson sets off for St. Jago to-morrow, sick.

August 17th. (Goes.) Opened and loaded the large centre arch of the bridge similar to that of Serpino, it being loose earth only. Ordered the lance corporal of the Portuguese party to send off three large cases of powder, or two barrels, a bit of saucisson of about eight feet long, two augets of seven feet each, and three portfires, to Ponte de Murcella, to be put with the other stores, consisting of two or three cases and some pickaxes and shovels, saw, &c., the whole under the charge of the officer of the Portuguese detachment.

It is said the enemy have moved down a division towards Trancoso, and that Lord Wellington has marched in that direction with nine Portuguese battalions. The Portuguese cavalry (a troop of them) have been engaged in front of Castello Branco and behaved very well, taking twelve prisoners, &c. From Traz-os-Montes (Bragança) a squadron was sent on by General Silveira, to observe a party of French of one squadron and 400 infantry. The French cavalry attacked them, but were well received and beaten off; the infantry threw themselves into a village, and Silveira, hearing of their situation, came out and surrounded it, compelling them after a little time to surrender. Two thousand of the enemy were sent to their relief, but arrived too late to save them.

—— *23rd.* (Povoa de Concelho.) The enemy have, it is

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said, about 5000 on this side the Coa from Pinhel to the southward under Loison; they send in flags of truce nearly daily for very trifling purposes, supposed for getting information. They have 15,000 round Almeida; we cannot hear where the remainder of the army is, probably between that and Ciudad Rodrigo, as Massena's headquarters are said to be at Fort Concepcion. Deserters continue to come in, five or six and more of a day; they say more would come, but for fear of the peasants, as they suppose in the French army, that our troops are ten or twelve leagues distant; that they are very sickly and ill-fed, having raw rye given to the men, who are forced to pound and make the best of it; that they lose many men before Almeida in their trenches, as the soil is very shallow, and under it hard solid rock; they say Fort Concepcion is in ruins, but that hospitals are made of several of the casemates which remain.

A good deal of firing is heard daily from Almeida, and seen from some heights in our front, it appears in general very well directed. The enemy opened trenches before it on the 15th inst., being the Emperor's birthday. A day or two ago, they had made a parallel from the windmill a little left of the road up from Coa, and were working at batteries on the unfortunate knoll on the left, about 500 yards from the place. Cox, the governor, has fired at them a great deal since the opening of the trenches, particularly in the first ten hours; he communicates daily with Lord Wellington by the telegraph at Almeida and Freixedas, and gives universally great commendation to the conduct of his garrison. Loison sent him some time since a summons to surrender, couched in insolent terms, inviting him "to throw off the British yoke, as it was plain that our object was to make Portugal only a province of Great Britain," &c.; to which Cox returned some very short verbal answer, "That such a message would receive no answer," or something of that sort. The peasants of Portugal desert their habitations on the approach of the enemy, and some have taken up arms. José Ribeira has assembled about 100 on the frontier near Villa Mayor, and put small bodies of French to flight, killing and wounding some, and taking some horses and mules. Captain Cox, of the 16th Light Dragoons, has been sent up the Coa to

destroy mills. He saw only small bodies of the enemy, who fled from him. It is said the enemy have seventy pieces of ordnance in the park of artillery before Almeida.

August 27th. (Povoa de Concelho.) A very heavy firing heard from the direction of Almeida all day yesterday, and this morning till mid-day. The town is sadly battered, the telegraph down; and it is strongly suspected in the evening that the place is taken. An order arrives at midnight for the division to retreat at daybreak. This order is countermanded at 2 A.M. on the 28th inst.

—— *28th.* Retreat. At 9 A.M. again receive the order to march immediately for Minocal. Almeida, it appears, has certainly fallen, after thirty-five days', or five weeks', complete investment, twelve days of open trenches, and two days of the enemy's batteries open. The particulars of how it fell we are entirely ignorant of, as well as of the precise time. In the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, the enemy took up ground before it on the 26th of April, invested it completely on the 11th of June (forty-six days), opened batteries on the 24th of June (thirteen days), and took it, when completely breached and about to be assaulted, on the 10th of July (fourteen days). But the means used to take Ciudad Rodrigo were much less, being only eighteen or twenty pieces of ordnance, and, as is supposed, a scarcity of ammunition. The cavalry had some skirmishing this morning with a body of the enemy who were reconnoitring. We took seven or eight prisoners, from their advancing incautiously in small numbers not supported. Captain Lygon, of the 16th Light Dragoons, was badly wounded. In Almeida, it appears, the grand, and indeed only magazine in the place, blew up some time before it was taken; this accident probably accelerating its fall.[1]

—— *29th.* Retreat. Marched at daylight for Mello, a small town a little up the side of the mountains of Estrella. The cavalry remain in front, and Lord Wellington, with Sir Brent Spencer, go out to them very early. Bull's troop of horse artillery remain in front with the cavalry. By telegraph from

[1] A Portuguese officer gave information to the French, that the garrison were entirely without ammunition after the loss of this magazine. He was afterwards tried by court-martial and shot.—ED.

Guarda, they say, the peasants have brought in there prisoners a French colonel and two or three men; a lieutenant-colonel having been killed by the same.

August 31*st.* To Quinta de Biche. A French colonel, a prisoner, passes this day. He lost his way a few nights ago during the storm in the neighbourhood of Val de la Mula, in company with a lieutenant-colonel and two *gendarmes*, and meeting a peasant, they desired him to lead them to their camp; he however led them a different way, into one of the Portuguese villages, and said he had himself lost his way, but recommended them to put up there for the night, and he would get them some wine, &c., for which they gave him two dollars; instead of the refreshment, however, he returned with twenty or thirty peasants, who knocked the colonel down, and the lieutenant-colonel, drawing his sword, was killed, the others taken prisoners, and conducted to Guarda to General Cole.

September 1*st.* (Quinta de Biche.) A number of the militiamen of the garrison of Almeida pass by. It appears by their account, that the French opened their batteries on Sunday morning, the 26th of August, previous to which they had fired nothing but musketry, and that in the place they had lost scarce any men at all; that on Sunday evening, about eight o'clock, the grand magazine blew up from some of the enemy's shells; and that it did great mischief, destroyed a great number of houses, and killed many people. Nearly the whole of the artillery in the place, officers and men, were destroyed. That on the next day, a French officer came in to summon the place, which the governor offered to give up, on the garrison being allowed to go away free; this was refused, and it was surrendered, the garrison being prisoners of war. Cox, the governor, had been indefatigable during the siege, and they seem all convinced that but for the accident, he would have maintained the place well. He had some time before caused all the horses and other animals to be killed. There was little or no ammunition left after the magazine was destroyed. Two hours after the terms had been agreed on, the garrison marched out, and laid down their arms on the glacis. They retained their baggage, and were marched under a strong escort to the frontier, near Fort Concepcion, where the militia were all given their liberty,

officers and all, to return to their homes, bearing a paper, signed by the Marquis d'Alorna, "*Obrigado. de não servir.*" This marquis is a Portuguese and a general officer of great repute among them; but having been ill-treated, and given some disgust to that government, he threw himself into the hands of the French and is now using his influence in their favour. The militiamen talk of him as having saved them from a French prison. The French very politicly treated them well, and told them they were not come to fight the Portuguese, but the British. They seem to say that the 24th Regiment of the line was strongly invited to join the French, but they unanimously preferred remaining prisoners. Other reports state this regiment has entered the French service. Six hundred of the militia were detained to make roads, &c.

September 6th. (Lourosa.) General Cole is at Pinhanços. The cavalry still quiet at Freixedas; only a picket of twelve dragoons at Guarda. More intercepted French correspondence has been sent by General Mahi to Lord Wellington; among it is a letter from Mortier to Napoleon, asking permission to return to France, and stating that Soult is ruining his (Mortier's) corps in Andalusia by dispersing them over the whole province, &c. Also a letter from the commandant of artillery of Massena's army, stating the wants of his department for a campaign. He calculates the army as of 62,000 men, including Regnier's corps.

—— *9th.* (Lourosa.) The 79th and 83rd, from Lisbon, have received a route to Thomar. An order has been published by Marshal Beresford, for the Portuguese inhabitants to quit their houses and towns on the approach of the enemy. A resident of St. João de Pesquiera (Manoel Paes) was in his house when a French party entered that place, who, after being feasted at his expense, plundered his house, and on his going after them to demand his property, abused and beat him. He is now taken up by the Portuguese government, and marched prisoner to Lisbon, to take his trial for not abandoning his house.

—— *10th.* Go on a visit by invitation to General Cole and Mulcaster, at Sta. Marinha, near Pinhanços. General Cole's headquarters are in the same place. This division is about

6500 strong, including 2500 Portuguese; they are healthy and perfectly fit for service; the Portuguese brigade in good order, as well as the artillery, horses, &c. The Light Division is between Pinhanços and Celorico. At the latter place the cavalry, whose advance is at Alverdas; they patrol to Freixedas without seeing the enemy. Captain Cocks has twenty dragoons at Guarda, which was entered however by the enemy with sixty dragoons a day or two ago, who afterwards retired. Six mules with entrenching tools are just now attached to the 4th Division, being the *only* engineer stores with the army. It appears that, by the terms of the capitulation of Almeida, Cox demanded "that the militia, *being few in number*, should be allowed to return to their homes," which was granted; instead, therefore, of its being an act of grace, they have broken the capitulation by retaining 600 to work at the repairs of the garrison. Cox states in his letter to Beresford, that after the accident of the explosion, he had left only a few rounds of ammunition, besides thirty barrels; scarce any artillerymen, the batteries choked with rubbish, and carriages broken, &c. A French surgeon has been taken by the peasants, and brought in. The French army sickly, and in a bad state for entering a campaign, particularly the artillery, who want horses, harness, &c. Don Julian is at Belmonte, four leagues from Guarda; he gets money from Lord Wellington, and draws rations from the country at our expense, and acts in concert with the Portuguese guerillas. General Hill is still at Sarzedas.

September 12th. To Lourosa. The 23rd Regiment (Portuguese) all, or nearly all, entered the French service at the solicitation of the Marquis d'Alorna, but nearly the whole have since made their escape and come in, officers and men. Three officers of Engineers, who would not enter the French service but have made their escape from them, have been promoted each one step. The Regency have offered $6000 for the Marquis d'Alorna, dead or alive.

Lord Wellington says in his despatch that General Crawfurd retired to Almeida, "and Fort Concepcion was destroyed." The French account in the *Moniteur* says that mines had been prepared, and the fort was abandoned on the approach of the reconnoitring party. "The explosion was not general, only

two bastions were damaged, and it can easily be repaired and occupied by the Imperial troops."

September 16th. (Lourosa.) At 3 P.M. arrived an order for the 3rd Division to march immediately for Venda da Valle and neighbouring villages.

—— *17th.* To Mouronha. The 1st Division remain in the neighbourhood of Moita; it would appear therefore that we are closing up in the neighbourhood of the extensive position above Venda da Serra, which consists of a long commanding bare ridge between the Alva and the Mondego,[1] a distance of about six miles, each flank falling steep to the deep ravines of those rivers. The roads up to the position, except the great one, bad; the approach open and discovered; the ridge, however, is narrow at the top, and falls at the back into ravines, whereby the retreat from it is bad, except by the high road. Received an order in the evening from Colonel Fletcher, dated Lourosa, 17th September, to examine the Serra de Moita as a position fronting either way, with its communication with Arganil, and also the ridge extending from above Ponte Murcella to the Mondego, and meet him to-morrow evening at Ponte de Murcella.

—— *18th.* To Ponte Murcella. Examine the Serra de Moita and the left of that above Ponte de Murcella, and meet Colonel Fletcher at the latter place. He thinks the former position, of course by the present movements, of no use. It is reported that a conspiracy has been discovered at Lisbon of some of the principal inhabitants, who formed a junta privately, and under the plea that the country could not be defended, and that it was better to give up quietly to the enemy, maintained

[1] Captain Burgoyne here describes the position on which Lord Wellington intended to have given battle, if the French had advanced by the left bank of the Mondego. To intercept the enemy on the other bank, he had the equally strong position of Busaco. It is worth remarking how thoroughly Captain Burgoyne appreciates the combinations of Lord Wellington in this campaign. At the period it was written, many general officers of the army were, according to Napier, writing to England in the most desponding terms, and a letter addressed by a field officer of the Guards to a friend in Oporto, having been incautiously published, caused so great a panic in that town, that the inhabitants began to leave their houses. Lord Wellington, in a general order, animadverted strongly upon the practice of writing such letters.—ED.

a correspondence with Massena. It is said that one of their designs was to burn the fleet of transports in the Tagus.

September 19th. To Friume. Headquarters were to have moved to Lourvão, a large convent on the opposite side of the Mondego, and about two leagues above Coïmbra, and the baggage was absolutely on the road, when it was ordered back to Cortica, where Lord Wellington remains to-day.[1] It is said that Regnier's corps is moving down from Celorico, and that General Hill is coming up to the army from round by Abrantes, and that the great body of the French army is moving to Viseu. Brigadier-General Pack is ordered across the Mondego to Santa Combadão with his Portuguese brigade. Captain Mulcaster is ordered to accompany him with powder and tools to destroy the bridges of Santa Combadão and Cruz, the latter on the road from Viseu to Coïmbra. At eleven at night, an order comes for me to proceed *immediately* to Coïmbra, and report whether destroying the bridge there would cause much impediment to the enemy's artillery, having done which, I am to remain at Coïmbra for further orders. A letter is enclosed for me to deliver to Sir B. Spencer, containing an order for the 1st Division to march to Malhada, three leagues on the Oporto road, and where the Viseu road separates from it.

—— *20th.* To Coïmbra. Rainy night. Ford the Mondego under Pena Cova; mount the height, and by bad steep road over the mountains to Coïmbra, three leagues from Pena Cova. Arrive at 7.30 A.M., and deliver the order to Sir B. Spencer. The 1st Division marched immediately to Malhada. General Cole crosses the Mondego to-day to Pena Cova; General Crawfurd also passes that river, and is to be to-morrow at Martigão. The brigade of artillery of the 1st Division marches also to Malhada. Headquarters to Lourvão.

Write by the post to Colonel Fletcher, that I had myself seen a bullock car pass the river with ease, close above the bridge; that the tracks of wheels were perceived in other places, and every one informed me that they could pass in nearly all parts during this time of year, both above and below the bridge, and that the banks were of very easy access.

[1] Lord Wellington had received information that Massena was advancing by the right bank of the Mondego. —Ed.

September 21*st.* (Coïmbra.) General Picton's division passes to Pena Cova. Headquarters to the convent at Busaco, one league from Malhada, on the summit of the mountain, and on the Viseu road. Write again by the post, and to the same effect; and also another letter, which Captain Cook, D.A. Adjutant-General to General Cole, takes for me. General Hill's division is coming up, Regnier having joined Massena, and, as it is said, the whole coming down by the Viseu road to the amount of seventy or eighty thousand; our force of British about 28,000. Mortier, it is said, is coming along the Tagus with about 10,000 men.

—— 22*nd.* (Coïmbra.) Wrote again to Colonel Fletcher, and sent it by Dumaresq, who goes to join the 1st Division. Report that an action has taken place in the front of the army, and also that the enemy appear to be retiring.

—— 23*rd.* (Coïmbra.) Trant and his militia from Oporto are, it is said, at Moimenta da Beira, a town four leagues in front of Lamego, and consequently on the flank of the French army. At mid-day receive an order to report upon the course and banks of the Mondego from Coïmbra down to its mouth, its fords, &c. Procured a boat from the commissary-general, and set out at 4 P.M. in one of the long flat-boats of the river, punted by two men. The accounts to-day are that the enemy was advancing rapidly towards Coïmbra, but halted on finding our movement in front of it, which apparently they did not expect. Their force is stated to be about the same as ours, and the French about as numerous as our English; their Germans, Italians, &c., equal to our Portuguese. Lord Wellington has taken up a position in the mountains across the Viseu road, the left being near Busaco, and the right on the Mondego at Pena Cova; his headquarters at Busaco, and Marshal Beresford's at Betão. General Hill is said to be at Pena Cova. General Leith has also joined the army. The Light Division in front of the river Criz. They are erecting redoubts, &c., on this strong position, and 100 peasants with their tools went to-day from Pereira to Busaco. There are rumours of the French moving a few thousand men by Ponte de Murcella. Wrote a *fifth* letter to Colonel Fletcher, giving the substance of the former, and acknowledging the receipt of his order of the

22nd inst. to reconnoitre the Mondego, and left it with Major Marston to be forwarded.

The whole militia force of the north is collected at Moimenta da Beira, and commanded by Silveira, Trant acting under him.

September 26th. (To Busaco.) Learn there had been skirmishing this morning near Busaco, and that the 1st Division had been ordered up from Malhada to Busaco. Proceeded on from Coïmbra to Betão, and at four leagues' distance reached Busaco, at 9 P.M. The position of our army is along the summit of an uninterrupted range of mountain, extending from the Mondego at Pena Cova, where it falls very steep to that river, to Busaco, a convent on nearly the highest part of the range, about seven miles from Pena Cova, and from thence by a projection to the front, about two and a half miles along the same ridge, to where it falls again very steep and strong, forming the left flank, Busaco being in the front of a re-entering angle. These heights are very steep throughout, crowned at top in parts with rock, and have no wood or shelter near the summit; except round the convent, where there is a thick wild wood surrounded by a wall. From Busaco to the left there is a double ridge; the front one, and that most strongly occupied, is in an indented line, very favourable for obtaining a flanking fire of artillery. From Busaco to the right at Pena Cova is in one sweep, affording few favourable points for defence by guns. Along the foot of the heights, and on the opposite lower but still bold heights, is a good deal of wood. The principal road traversing the mountains is the direct route from Coïmbra to Viseu, which goes through Betão, and crosses the mountain at a dip in it called St. Antonio de Cantaro, then at the foot turns rather to the left, and joins the other and better, but longer, road, by Malhada, close to the convent of Busaco. From Busaco to St. Antonio de Cantaro, on the right, is about two and a half miles. The wood of Busaco is on a steep rise to a table height of about a mile, from whence it falls again steep to the dip of St. Antonio de Cantaro. General Cole had the left of all; General Crawfurd between that and the convent, the German Legion the second line to this part. The 1st Division had the above-mentioned table-land, with the nine-pounders. General Picton had the opening of about a mile and a half, in which was the

road of St. Antonio de Cantaro; General Leith on his right, and General Hill on the right of all. Headquarters were at the convent. In front of the convent the high road to Viseu, after crossing the deep valley, passes along a bold range of heights much lower than ours, and nearly at right angles with it. Along this range the great body of the French army was posted, in columns, apparently, of regiments; along another range, and opposite St. Antonio de Cantaro, was Regnier's corps, apparently of about 15,000 men, similarly posted to the great body, large corps of cavalry apparently in the rear of each. These two ranges were commanding; the first the most so, but both much lower than our position. The whole French force was estimated at about 50,000, under Massena, Prince of Essling.

A road of communication was opened all along the rear of our position, openings were made in the wall of the convent wood, and an abbatis was laid in front of the principal openings which faced the enemy; loopholes and a banquette made to the right and left of it in the wall.

September 27th. (Action of Busaco.) On the 25th and 26th instant, the enemy had driven in our pickets to the foot of the heights, and had taken up their ground just out of cannon-shot, Massena himself reconnoitring the position as well as he could. The mornings hitherto had brought a thick fog for several hours after daylight on the summit of the heights only, and it was expected the enemy would take advantage of this to gain ground near the summit undiscovered, and thus deprive us of the great advantage of our position, which was particularly favourable to our artillery and the contrary to theirs. This morning however was perfectly clear, and the enemy were seen at daylight marching down to the attack, which was to be carried on in two parts, quite distinct from each other. The first was towards the dip of St. Antonio de Cantaro. Major-General Picton had his post on this part, with the 3rd (the weakest) Division of the army, which covered an extent of ground of about a mile and a half. Conceiving their attack would be directed principally up the most accessible part, where the road crossed, the guns (Arentschild's)—six Portuguese six-pounders and six Portuguese nine-pounders—were placed in

the best situations about the gap. One regiment of Portuguese, the 9th, was placed on its right, and the other Portuguese regiment, the 21st, on the other side, both about 1000 strong each. The 74th (British) was in rear of the guns, the 45th on its right, and the 88th on its left. General Lightburne's brigade, which General Picton meant to occupy the other part of this great dip, had been called up on the commanding height, where was the 1st Division, by Lord Wellington's order, probably under the idea, that if he could keep the great commanding heights, the enemy's gaining the dips in a narrow-edged mountain would not do him much good.[1]

Two French columns were seen crossing the ravine, and were then lost sight of in the round fall of the hill, which did not in this part give flanking positions, and strong detached bodies drove in the pickets and kept up a heavy fire. Fourteen guns were dotted about below the hill, and fired at our artillery, which, being pretty close together, were consequently a good mark. These guns likewise directed their fire upon the three regiments above named, which they could also discover from below. When the two columns (of two or three thousand men each) were perceived above, it was found they were pushing up in the part uncovered by troops, and having nothing to oppose them but the dispersed pickets, they easily found their way to the summit, to which part however the 88th, part of the 46th, and the grenadier companies of the Portuguese regiments were instantly pushed, as well as the 8th Portuguese regiment, which also came from the right to our support. General Picton riding on, rallied the dispersed pickets, formed them under Major Smith of the 45th, and charged the enemy's column, which had been turned in their direction by two guns under Captain Lane, posted under the great height, who received them with some rounds of grape; this charge, though of a handful of men, checked them, and the 8th Portuguese regiment were, with a little trouble, persuaded to push on also. Major Smith was killed, and poor little Ousely, quite a boy, in the 45th Regiment, being sent out to cover the formation of the pickets with two sections, got between the two French columns and was killed. The 88th

[1] This fact appears to have been unknown to Napier, as he leaves it to be inferred that Picton had left his right wing exposed.—Ed.

and part of the 45th then came up and charged, supported by the 8th Portuguese regiment; and the enemy were completely repulsed, but made another attempt, which was met by the 9th British regiment, which now came up fresh with General Leith, and were followed half down the hill. A short time after, they made another attempt more to the right, towards the road by St. Antonio de Cantaro, but were effectually resisted by the 74th British, and 9th and 24th Portuguese regiments, supported by the Portuguese artillery. In this instance they were kept off by fire, and never made any further attempt on this part, but retired to their old ground.[1]

It was after the commencement of this attack on General Picton, that General Crawfurd was attacked under the convent by heavy columns, which were suffered to come up to the edge of the hill, when the 52nd and 43rd rushed upon them from behind it, and drove them completely off with the bayonet. Lieut.-Colonel Barclay, commanding a brigade of the 52nd Regiment of Portuguese *caçadores* and part of the 25th, was badly wounded, as well as Major Napier of the 50th, a volunteer. Our loss in this point was trifling; the guns had great effect. In the course of this day the 1st Portuguese regiment of the line distinguished itself by advancing down the hill in line, and driving a strong body of the enemy from the road, and the 4th Regiment of *caçadores* behaved also with great spirit, and were handled with great skill. In short, in all parts where they had an opportunity, the Portuguese regiments of the line and artillery behaved very well. Our loss was 600 and odd British and as many Portuguese killed and wounded, whereof about one-half were in front of General Picton's part of the line; we lost a few, taken prisoners in the skirmishing of the pickets. The most moderate calculation estimates the loss of the French at three times ours, from the number of bodies seen lying on the field. General Simon was wounded in the face, and taken by our Light Infantry Division, and in the other attack a colonel was taken, besides some captains and subalterns, and

[1] It will be perceived that this account of the action differs materially from Napier's. The description of the battle by that writer led to considerable controversy, which will be found at the commencement of the fifth volume of his history.—Ed.

about 100 men. The whole was over by mid-day, but skirmishing below continued all day. We had hopes that they would persevere, and renew their attacks on this strong position, but they did not. General Hill in the morning moved close to our right. It will be perceived that only a small part of our army was engaged—the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Divisions not coming at all into action, except some of their skirmishers in front.

September 28th. (Busaco.) We prepared for a renewal of the attack, but in the course of the day, great part of the French cavalry, which were in the rear, and a division of infantry, were observed from our commanding ground to be moving round our left. Lord Wellington had previously reconnoitred the left, and found that it could not be turned except by a route of six leagues of bad road. Our cavalry was one league in the rear at Mealhada in the low country on the Oporto road and three leagues in front of Coïmbra, except a part in front of Ponte de Murcella, which was now called to join the rest. General Lecors (a Portuguese), a clever fellow and good officer, was at Ponte de Murcella, with a few thousand Portuguese, consisting chiefly of militia.

—— *29th.* To Eiras. (Retreat.) Before 1 A.M. General Picton received an order to march his division at 2 A.M. for Casa do Canonigo Paes, close in front of Coïmbra. It was a rainy night, the road was very bad, and we found much confusion in General Leith's part of the line—baggage and camp kettles left in the rear, artillery (Portuguese) and cars also, some regimental pickets not called in, &c., so that if the enemy had remained on his ground, and had followed us at daylight, we should certainly have lost much credit, and perhaps men, baggage, and artillery. Our pickets, which were to have retired in a body at daylight, finding this confusion, did not march off till eight o'clock. They destroyed thirty-six barrels of ammunition which they found in the rear of General Leith's ground, and recommended a Portuguese regiment of militia, which was on the heights, *and had received no orders*, to retire. The guns, with great difficulty, and by assistance of men and mending occasionally the roads, got to Eiras, three leagues. According to an order received on the road, the division halted there.

—— *30th.* To Condeixa. (Retreat.) At night received an

order to march at daylight to the heights above Coïmbra beyond the Mondego, and afterwards ordered on to Condeixa, two leagues farther on the Lisbon road. Left the Light Division on the road on the other side of Coïmbra, and the 4th Division (General Coles') on this side the bridge. The nine-pounders (British) were ordered to look for a situation to defend the bridge, but at night they also came in to Condexa. Observed in passing some of the 1st Division crossing the Mondego lower down. There are reports that Victor has broken up from before Cadiz, and is marching towards Lisbon; he is supposed to have about 20,000 men with him. In the recent action of Romana's, his cavalry was completely beat, but the Portuguese six squadrons under Colonel Madden, covered them by charging gallantly the victorious enemy. Headquarters move to Coïmbra.

Lord Wellington thanks the army for their conduct in the action of the 27th. He says everyone must rejoice with him at the spirit and good conduct manifested by the Portuguese troops; and though projects of the enemy oblige him to make a retrograde movement from a position it was out of the power of the enemy to force, he trusts by the valour and discipline of his army to defeat all their base designs on this country. The gallant 50th and some other regiments from England are said to have arrived at Lisbon.

October 2nd. To Leyria. (Retreat.) According to orders, continue this day the retreat to Leyria, where headquarters also move to. The cavalry have had some skirmishing, and lost some people from the fire of infantry in fording the Mondego, as the front of that part is perfectly plain; this infantry were perhaps voltigeurs or *chasseurs à cheval.* Poor Kraüchenberg, of the 1st German Hussars, is badly wounded. The people of the country are quitting their houses by order of the government, and are on the roads in all directions, most of them without means of subsistence; they say the penalty of not obeying this order is death.

—— *3rd.* To Alcobaça. (Retreat.) The 3rd Division marches to Aljubarrota, a good village, near which the famous battle was fought, in commemoration of which the convent of Batalha was founded. At the latter place is a very large and

rich convent of monks; the whole British regiments of this division were quartered in it easily, as well as the generals and many other officers. Several divisions of the British army had at various times passed through this place, and some remained for several days, during all which time a dinner was prepared at the convent for the whole of the officers. On this day it was done for the last time, at least for the present, for the greater part of the friars had already left the convent, and the remainder quitted it this evening; they had had a ship prepared at St. Martinho for some time before, to take them off, with their plate and most valuable effects. They leave a quantity of hay, straw, vegetables, &c., which they beg the general to distribute, as, if not, the French will have it. And a message comes from a *quinta*, half a league off, to say the family are about to leave it, according to the orders, and to acquaint the general that they leave there a large quantity of wine, corn, and oil. The town is deserted, and the soldiers commence plundering, which however is put a stop to by General Picton immediately he perceives it; much however will be taken where there are no inhabitants. This order appears to be ill-judged; the people will flock to Lisbon, and there will be in the greatest distress, besides the ill effects it will have on our reputation, for the men will plunder where it is so easy to be done with impunity. Lieut.-Colonels Fletcher and Chapman go post to Rio Mayor, I fancy to examine if any good position can be found for the army on the heights in front of that place.

October 5th. Headquarters remove to Alcobaça, and the 3rd Division are suddenly ordered to march in the evening to Alfelzerão, two and a half leagues. The villages all deserted, the people having left their effects to the mercy of the soldiers; the doors are mostly left open, and what are not so are forced; the soldiers will of course help themselves in spite of anything, a severe general order however is given out on the subject; and General Picton will not allow the men to be quartered in the houses, but puts them in the fields in consequence of their irregularities. It was dark before the column came to the spot where they should have turned off the great road, and there being intervals in the line of baggage, part of it came right, and the remainder with the troops went on along the great

road, but after some time, finding they were wrong, Colonel McKinnon halted at the first water, and lay there for the night. There should be always some one stationed where troops are to turn into a byroad, to show every one the way; on this occasion the circumstance was of no consequence.

October 6th. To Roliça. (Retreat.) A small village at the foot of the bold heights so well gained (though unnecessarily) by the British troops under Sir Arthur Wellesley, a few days previous to the battle of Vimiera in 1808.

—— *8th.* (Torres Vedras.) Orders arrive for General Sontag, who is appointed to command in this district. Mulcaster is the regulating officer, whose duty, as is laid down in his instructions from Lord Wellington, is to make all the arrangements, in the district of troops, &c., and on the arrival of the general officer of the district, to assist him in making his arrangements as one of his staff, for the defence of his post. As General Sontag had not arrived, nor Mulcaster, nor the militia, &c., appointed to this district, I assisted General Picton in making a temporary arrangement with the Portuguese troops of the line. Besides General Picton's division, General Campbell's and General Colman's brigades of Portuguese arrive here, and Colonel De Grey's brigade of heavy cavalry are in front, who report our pickets having been driven in near Caldas. For the defence of the district of Torres Vedras, the 58th Regiment (British) of 300 men, a Portuguese regiment of the line, 140 artillery (Portuguese) regulars, four *ordenança* artillery per gun, and three regiments of militia are allotted, and if this part is threatened, another regiment of British and another of the line (Portuguese) will be added. Mulcaster and Thompson arrive. Heavy rain last night and this day. At 8 P.M. receive an order from Lord Wellington, appointing me regulating officer of the Bucellas district, No. 4, similar to Mulcaster's. This district extends from the Pass of Bucellas to the banks of the Tagus in rear of Alverca, and extends along the ridge of the Serra de Serves, then to the right, across the mouth of the Valley of Cabo to the Tagus. It contains 16 redoubts and batteries, on which are mounted 37 twelve-pounders and 22 nine-pounders, and the works are calculated to require 2660 infantry. At

present, 1100 militia infantry, 500 *ordenança* artillery, and 8 Portuguese artillery of the line are allotted to it; the artillery to be assembled at headquarters (Bucellas) immediately.

October 9th. To Bucellas. Find Stanway there. There is one Portuguese artilleryman of the line in each fort and battery only; the 500 *ordenança* artillery arrive, but the militia infantry do not appear.

—— 10*th.* (Bucellas.) The 500 *ordenança* artillery are distributed among the works. A commissariat officer is appointed to the district; he expects stores immediately, which I recommend to be placed in depôt at Cabo, as the most central spot, in the rear of the position. At 4 P.M., on return from riding to the right, receive an order from Lord Wellington, through Colonel Fletcher, to detach 200 of the *ordenança* artillery immediately to Alverca with a letter to General Hill there.

—— 13*th.* (Bucellas.) The enemy entered the village of Soubral yesterday evening, and are said to have 14,000 or 15,000 men in that neighbourhood.

—— 14*th.* (Villa del Rey.) Yesterday the enemy endeavoured to drive in General Cole's advanced parties in front of Duas Casas, on the road from Torres Vedras to Soubral, and were charged by a Portuguese regiment under Colonel Harvey, and repulsed. Colonel Harvey is wounded slightly. This evening they attempt the same at Soubral; the 71st Regiment (British) receive them in the same way, and repulse them. They have also made lately an attempt to occupy the town of Alhandra, which is in front of our position there, but were also repulsed.

—— 15*th.* (Villa de Rey.) The enemy, who were in force at Soubral, which town they had possession of, move to their right; headquarters and General Spencer's (the 1st) and the Light Division therefore move to Enxara dos Caballeros and its neighbourhood. The Portuguese generals, Barcelar and Silveira, and Trant and Miller, have united their corps, and have entered Coïmbra in rear of the enemy, with between 10,000 and 20,000 militia, &c., and have taken the enemy's sick and wounded there to the amount of 4000 men. General Pamplona, a Portuguese traitor now in the French service, it is said, left Coïmbra with 4000 men shortly before to join Massena; the

occupation of Coïmbra must straiten Massena for provisions much. Romana is said to be on the left bank of the Tagus, somewhere about Abrantes.

October 16*th.* (Villa del Rey.) Six deserters of cavalry, with horses, &c., come in to Alhandra, and others to our main body; they represent the French army as not having had bread for many days, and subsisting on raw Indian corn, &c. The Marquis d'Alorna was at Alemquer, and moved to their right. We have fourteen gun-boats in the Tagus; an accidental shot from one of them, yesterday or the day before, killed the French general Grandoes,[1] a very young man, near Villa Franca, where they have now erected a battery which keeps the boats off. A transport brig, manned with some eighteen-pounders, is moored off Alhandra, and flanks the little stream through the town.

—— 21*st.* (Villa del Rey.) Several deserters continue to come in, chiefly Germans and Italians; the statements of all agree that the French army has been without bread for more than twenty days. The enemy have a battery of four guns near Villa Franca to keep off the gun-boats. It is said the enemy are drawing away; that is, Ney with a force has certainly been detached, they suppose to Coïmbra, and the rest are entrenching the heights, on a sort of position they have taken up near Soubral. Thirty or forty of the boats of the Tagus were left by some mistake or treachery, at Santarem, and the enemy have taken possession of them. Some of these boats have been employed bringing down straw, &c., to Villa Franca, and the gunboats have made an attack on them, and taken or destroyed some. Lord Cochrane, who is here on pleasure in a yacht, it is said has volunteered to go up and destroy them all. Six thousand of Romana's army are expected up at the lines immediately. As we had plenty of people before for acting on the defensive, I suppose Lord Wellington's intention is to attack the enemy, when it will be advisable to have the forts well manned in case of accident.

—— 26*th.* (Villa del Rey.) Reports state that the enemy are preparing for making a bridge across the Tagus at Santarem; we have no party or corps of troops on the other bank. Yesterday the Marquess of Romana visited part of the lines with Lord

[1] St. Croix, according to Napier.

Wellington. It is still expected at headquarters that we shall be attacked.

October 29th. (Villa del Rey.) Squire [1] crosses the Tagus on a reconnoissance, and goes up to Salvaterra; the enemy, he ascertains, have only six or seven large boats, and the great battery at Alhandra on the banks of the river, having been built against some bullock cars, the poles on their sides were mistaken for masts of boats, and caused the information of the enemy having *forty* boats! The French are however certainly constructing rafts at Santarem, and whether for a feint or reality, it appears most extraordinary our having no force on the opposite bank, considering our great numbers (about 80,000 men). A small number of regulars, with some militia, and a little organisation of the peasantry, who are very well inclined and pretty well armed, might be very useful there; to these may be added some cavalry, the country being suitable for it, and they not being much wanted here. It is said the great body of the enemy have retired as far as Obidos and Thomar, which are the principal points occupied by them.

November 1st. (Villa del Rey.) It appears that the Admiral (Berkeley) has sent up 100 marines with six field-pieces to the other side of the Tagus, the whole under Captain Houlston, R.N. Squire accompanies him, by General Hill's permission. A few of our gun-boats are also gone up to Salvaterra. Some Portuguese cavalry have at length crossed the Tagus at Lisbon; it is reported they will be followed by the 13th Light Dragoons (British) and a regiment of *caçadores*, or Portuguese light infantry. It is evident that though the enemy might suffer on their first arrival in this part of the country for want of provisions, they must now be very well off. The country they are occupying is a very fertile one, and the harvest was got in entirely when they arrived. No measures were taken for driving the country, though there would have been time enough by means of the Tagus, for securing great part of the produce, even after the action of Busaco, when it was determined to come down to this position. On the contrary the wretched inhabit-

[1] Captain Squire, of the Royal Engineers; a very able officer. He was on the most intimate terms with Captain Burgoyne, and in constant correspondence with him until his death at Truxillo in 1812.

ants had barely time to get off themselves, and I myself was witness to messages coming to a general of a division, informing him of quantities of corn, &c., which they were forced to leave in such and such places, and which he would take no measures about, having no instructions on the subject. Such was the confusion and little warning the people had, that a cargo of English cheeses, &c., were left in Santarem or Villa Franca, quantities of turkeys and all kinds of poultry were left in the villages. So far from being in want, they must be living luxuriously; and with these resources, the French carry with them the art and means of organising them. Most of the upper classes, old men, women, and children, fled towards Lisbon, while numbers of the peasants avoided the present danger, by going into the mountains to the right and left of the high roads; these must go back in a few days for want of provisions, and would be usefully employed by the enemy in collecting their depôts, employing the mills, &c., while the French would just step into the places of the useless mouths. On our side, on the contrary, a great want of provisions is likely to follow, from the increased population of this corner of Portugal as well as our large force. Even at Villa Franca, a town immediately on the Tagus, and only one league in front of our line, a very large quantity of grain was left. Therefore, all things considered, the idea of starving the enemy out of their ground is out of the question. A recent order, animadverting on the desertions of British soldiers, (400 in the last three months!) talks about the miserable half-starved wretches who come in daily from the enemy; while all parts of the army must have observed what fine healthy fellows the deserters from the enemy nearly universally are, and how well clothed and appointed.

Our army of regulars is about 70,000, including the 7000 Spaniards under Romana. We have besides in militia, volunteer artillery, &c., at least 20,000. Trant, Silveira, &c., have at least 15,000, and the masses armed are very numerous, and by a little organisation might be made extremely useful. To blockade us in the position we have taken, the enemy have certainly under 50,000,[1] perfectly detached and separated from

[1] Massena's force before the lines of Lisbon was about 55,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry; but he had large reserves in rear.—Ed.

every other French corps in the Peninsula. It is said our troops are to be cantoned, and made as comfortable as can be for the winter.

November 15*th.* (Villa del.Rey.) In the course of the last night, or early this morning, the enemy retired from in front of Soubral, Villa Franca, &c. Part of our troops marched out of the lines in the morning.

—— 16*th.* (Villa del Rey.) The enemy's rear-guard passed through Azambuja on the Tagus yesterday at four o'clock. General Hill's division march from Alhandra, &c., to Villa Nova. Squire and Foster accompany it by General Hill's order; no instructions arrive from Colonel Fletcher for the officers of Engineers dispersed about the line. Headquarters are moved, and it is said for Alemquer.

—— 27*th.* (Villa del Rey.) The French outposts were driven in a few days ago, but on their army making the appearance of standing their ground, our troops retired. Silveira attacked a body of the enemy in their cantonments between Pinhel and Almeida, and according to his account, killed ten officers and three hundred men, and took four officers and seventy men. The prisoners reported they were the advance of 15,000 men coming to reinforce Massena. Brigadier-General Miller advanced from Viseu to join Silveira. Trant remains about the Mondego. The weather continues rainy and bad. Part of the militia, &c., is withdrawn from the forts in the second line, and sent to Lisbon.

December 1*st.* (Villa del Rey.) The rainy weather continues. Our army under the immediate command of Lord Wellington, within the lines, consists, by the returns, of 66,000 effectives, of which 35,000 are British and 23,000 Portuguese of the line, the remainder militia and Spaniards. It is said that a reinforcement of 12,000 have already joined Massena, who has a bridge across, and a corps on the other side of the Zezere on the Castello Branco road, and that more are expected. All our measures indicate a return to the lines.

CAMPAIGN OF 1811.

Massena checked by the lines of Lisbon, remains inactive for five months, and in March, 1811, retires out of Portugal, followed closely by the British army—Almeida being invested by the Allies, Massena again advances to succour it, but is repulsed at Fuentes d'Onor—Almeida falls on the 10th of May—On the 8th of May, Badajoz is besieged by the English army under Marshal Beresford, while Wellington observes Massena—The siege is raised on the 14th, in consequence of the advance of Soult from the south—The latter is defeated at Albuera, and retires upon Seville—The siege of Badajoz is again formed on the 27th of May, and converted into a blockade on the 12th of June, owing to the advance of the French armies—Lord Wellington then moves to the north, with a view of besieging Ciudad Rodrigo, and occupies the line of the Agueda—The French advance to revictual Ciudad Rodrigo, during which are fought the partial actions of Elbodon and Aldea de Ponte—The French having thrown supplies into Ciudad Rodrigo, retire, and take up winter quarters.

Journal resumed.

FRIDAY, *March* 8, 1811. (Villa del Rey.) The enemy are retiring. Massena left Torres Novas on the 2nd instant, and Regnier quitted Santarem at 10 P.M. of the 5th. Our headquarters were on the 6th at Santarem, and yesterday at Torres Novas. It is said the French are concentrating near Thomar. They have carried off their Punhete flotilla on low-wheeled carriages made for the purpose. The 2nd Division (in the Alentejo) expect to move in the direction of Badajoz. Five thousand men have arrived in the Tagus from England, and more are expected.

March 12*th*. Shift my quarters to the house of the Duchess D'Alca Foens at Alpriate, near Via Longa, and about ten miles from Lisbon.

—— 15*th*. (Alpriate.) Our headquarters are near Pombal; it is said that Regnier's corps went by the Espinhal road, and

the remainder by Pombal. Marshal Beresford, with the 2nd and 4th (General Coles') Divisions, has marched for Elvas. Badajoz has surrendered to the French, and the accounts say that 7000 Spaniards delivered it up to 8000 or 10,000 French, being unbreached, and in want of nothing; that they killed the Governor-General Mendizabel, and appointed another, who instantly surrendered. An account has also come *viâ* Algarva, that General Graham, having embarked at Cadiz and landed in the rear, has defeated the enemy before that place, taking a French general, Ruffin; that the action fell chiefly on the British and Portuguese, whose loss is 1200 men.

April 1*st.* (Alpriate.) Lord Wellington continued to follow the enemy, skirmishing with their rear-guard, and driving them from strong posts. Their main body always moved off before he could form to attack them. In their retreat, which is conducted in a most masterly manner, they leave a great number of animals knocked up, which they universally hough; they leave also some men, and destroy great quantities of ammunition. All the towns and villages they leave they burn to the ground, by order of Massena, and the soldiers commit great acts of barbarity towards the unfortunate inhabitants who fall into their hands, torturing them, burning them alive, &c. They also destroy the bridges they pass. At Ponte de Murcella we took 600 prisoners, and since that they retired unmolested, our army being detained for provisions. The headquarters were successively at Lousa, Arganil, and, by the last accounts, at Santa Marinha. Our cavalry in front patrolling to Freixedas (four leagues short of Almeida) and Guarda. The surrender of Badajoz was even more disgraceful than above mentioned; 9000 men were in the place, in want of nothing; a breach was made of eighteen feet wide and not at all practicable, and the enemy before it only 9600 infantry and 2000 cavalry, when it was given up. The Governor of Elvas sent in a communication to the Governor of Badajoz, by desire of Lord Wellington, to inform him of Massena's retreat, begging him to retain the place to the last, and telling him that a force was already on its march to relieve the place. Immediately on the receipt of this intelligence, the place was surrendered, and the enemy of course made acquainted with Massena's retreat, (which otherwise they

probably would not have known for some time), for they marched immediately for Campo Mayor, a miserable fortress on the Portuguese frontier, and took it. In the meantime Marshal Beresford was on his march towards Elvas with the 2nd Division, and afterwards joined by Coles', or the 4th Division. It is now said that he has reached Elvas, and has everything ready to besiege Badajoz, that he has destroyed or taken 500 cavalry and a howitzer.

General Graham's action was highly creditable to the British, and as much the reverse to the Spaniards. The Spaniards had been long urging him to assist them in an attempt to raise the siege of Cadiz. On the 21st February embarked in boats and transports—

Spanish:		British:	
Infantry, about .	5000	Infantry . . .	3600
Cavalry . . .	400	German Hussars	200
Guns	10	Guns	10

They assembled at Tarifa, where they were joined by some flank companies and the 28th Regiment from Gibraltar, making them in all about 4400; they then moved forward on the 28th towards Medina Sidonia. On the second day they had some slight affairs of pickets, and were joined by about 1500 Spaniards from St. Roque. On the 5th, in the morning, they arrived opposite La Isla, on a hill called Barossa, about five miles from St. Petri. On this hill they halted, and sent forward the advance of the allied army under the Spanish Mendizabel, about 1500 men, to force the point of St. Petri and open the communication into the island, which was easily done, as the enemy had only 400 or 500 men there. "No enemy could be discovered from the hill where we were halted. The Spanish commander-in-chief, La Peña, sent us to occupy the wood in their front, while they went by the sea beach towards St. Petri, leaving on the hill three Spanish regiments. We had penetrated into the thick wood about a mile, when an account was brought us that the enemy were advancing to the hill, in strong bodies of infantry and cavalry. We instantly countermarched, and on coming out found them in possession of the hill, with three strong columns moving quickly to us. It was an anxious moment; our guns

were got into action, the troops coming out of the wood in files. We formed under a heavy fire from guns and sharp-shooters. The men had marched twenty hours with three days' provisions, and could hardly exert themselves to form quickly. The enemy continued advancing up to the guns; the Guards, who were nearest, formed behind the guns. Then came up the 28th, 67th, and 87th, filing out of the wood. The French were in line long before we were formed, and as they advanced kept up a heavy fire on the guns and Guards. While all this took place, the Spaniards deserted the hill, and the enemy, after taking possession, moved down on our right to the attack. The Guards, 67th, and flank detachments were opposed to them, and drove the enemy up the hill and down the other side. On the left, three companies of the Guards who had been left to secure the guns, as the 87th had not formed, moved on and charged, supported by the 87th and 28th. The French for some time waited for us in line, firing, but soon turned; the Guards and 87th had their bayonets into their backs. The day was now ours; the guns advanced some hundred yards and played on them retreating. The German hussars charged the French cavalry on our right, and beat them. Not a Spaniard was to be seen, they entirely deserted us, at least they never showed themselves during the action. We were unable to pursue, so fatigued were the men. Everybody believes we were betrayed by the Spanish Generals La Peña and Lacy. The French are supposed to have had 8000 men. Never did troops form under such disadvantages of ground and fire; never was a victory more decided. Every part of the line was engaged. We took six guns, one eagle, one general of division (Ruffin); two generals killed; 1200 French lay on the field, and we have 300 of their wounded. We have about 240 killed and 1000 wounded. Victor was in the field. The French were upwards of 8000, we were not more than 4000, being reduced to this number by long night marches. Our artillery had seven officers wounded, and one killed. Birch and myself (Nicholas) were thanked on the field for our assistance. Two flank companies of Portuguese behaved admirably. We have retired to La Isla disgusted with the Spaniards, and left them to pursue the object as they can. Their general will most probably be disgraced."

The above is from Captain Nicholas of the Engineers,[1] present in the action.

April 10th. (Alpriate.) A few days ago, our army crossed the Coa near Sabugal. The French guarded a bridge and ford near it, but the Light Infantry Division passed at a ford some distance above, and gained some heights, on which they were attacked by the whole of Regnier's division of 12,000 or 15,000 men. A smart action took place, in which the famous Light Division behaved nobly, being much inferior in number to the enemy, and the heights were gained and lost three times, till at length the 3rd Division having crossed at the bridge and making their appearance, the enemy fled in confusion. It was expected that the French would abandon Almeida. They did not, however, but it is said have left but a weak garrison in the place, who, it is supposed, have not much provisions. On the appearance of Marshal Beresford before Campo Mayor, the enemy drew up outside in great haste—not expecting the visit so soon—to the number of about 800 infantry and some cavalry, with sixteen pieces of artillery. They commenced a retreat for Badajoz. Our cavalry following and coming up with them, they halted and formed their cavalry in front; the 13th Light Dragoons advanced to charge, the enemy trotted to meet them, then halted, opened, and the 13th went through them; the enemy closed and faced to the right about, the 13th rode through them again, and again a third time, when the enemy's cavalry went off in confusion, the 13th and some Portuguese cavalry following, some of them so far as to be taken prisoners on the Bridge of Badajoz. In this charge they received the fire of the French infantry, but took the guns and cut the traces, &c., leaving them to be taken possession of by the troops they naturally supposed were supporting them. The infantry remained formed in a square, Beresford, with the Heavy Brigade of cavalry in their front, Portuguese cavalry on their flanks, and the 13th, as already mentioned, in their rear. The Heavies were ordered to advance, and then suddenly halted, the marshal saying he would wait for the infantry, though the 66th and some light infantry were up. The enemy, finding

[1] Captain Nicholas was afterwards killed whilst leading the assault on the town of Badajoz in 1812.—Ed.

themselves unmolested, made an exertion and moved off, even taking the guns with them, before the face of this superior force—the great body of our infantry were not two miles in the rear. The army under Marshal Beresford, from all accounts, appear much discontented with this affair.

April 23rd. (Alpriate.) Captains By, Macleod, and Boteler, Lieutenants Marshall, Melville, Pringle, and Wright, Engineers, and two draughtsmen, are come out. The three captains, as well as Dickinson, are ordered up to Elvas, as also all the officers of Engineers who were on their road for headquarters. It is expected Badajoz will be besieged. Birch, commanding engineer at Cadiz, is made major, at the recommendation of General Graham in his despatches on the action of Barossa. Thompson is also ordered up to Elvas, and Mulcaster is to proceed there, the moment a siege is decided on. Lord Wellington and the headquarters are gone to reconnoitre Badajoz, to decide on the practicability of besieging it. They write from the neighbourhood of Almeida, that the destruction of Fort Concepcion was very complete.

—— *30th.* (Lisbon.) Came into Lisbon unwell. The French left between 400 and 500 men in Olivença near Badajoz, an extensive town, fortified with nine large bastions, no outworks, few guns, &c. As they would not surrender on the first summons, a siege was undertaken; a small detached work, in shape of a ravelin with flanks, closed in the gorge with a wall and gateway, 340 yards from the place, was fixed upon for a breaching battery to commence with; and this battery was finished on the evening of the second day. The materials, reliefs, &c., went into the gateway notwithstanding its proximity to the place and moonlight nights. Meanwhile an entrance was made in the salient angle, and the ditch traversed for the guns, which did not arrive till the fourth morning, from the difficulty of getting them from Elvas. Four twenty-four-pounders breached the curtain in five hours, and the place surrendered at discretion. Preparations are making for the siege of Badajoz. Lord Wellington has been there and returned, leaving Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher to command the Engineers. A convoy of carts taking in wood was allowed to enter the garrison, in face of Lord Wellington and his reconnoitring party of 1000 men. It is said this was

rather a clumsy business. Twenty officers of Engineers will be employed at the siege of Badajoz, all British. Our loss before Olivença was four killed and nine wounded. The Engineers' stores for siege of Badajoz were to be embarked at Lisbon, and sail round to St. Ubes, from whence is rather shorter land carriage; but from all circumstances, the whole arrangement must be very liable to disappointments and delays. A few means are at Elvas.

May 10*th.* (Lisbon.) By the last accounts, Badajoz was not yet invested, but it was expected that it would be immediately, and that the trenches would be opened about the 9th or 10th. The Engineer stores would arrive about that time also. Squire commanded the Engineers before Olivença, and Dickinson the artillery. Everything went on well and with regularity. The front attacked was on the south.

—— 19*th.* (Lisbon.) During the first days of this month, there were some sharp partial actions between Lord Wellington and Massena, the most important of which took place on the 5th inst. Almeida was blockaded, and had very little provisions. Massena's attempt appears to have been to relieve the garrison or draw them off; he had been joined by Marshal Bessières with 6000 or 7000 men, including part of the Imperial Guard of 3000 infantry and 600 cavalry. Lord Wellington's position was along the river of Duas Casas, about six miles in front of Almeida, having his right near Fuentes d'Onor, and the left near the ruined Fort Concepcion. The enemy's attacks were confined entirely to our right, and they had several times momentary possession of Fuentes, but were as often driven out. Lord Wellington during these days altered his position, more effectually to cover Almeida, and seems to have formed his right *en potence* towards the little river Turon. There was hard fighting, and our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners is 1800; the enemy carried off their wounded, but immediately about Fuentes were found 400 of their killed. At length Massena gave the point up, and retired behind the Agueda. A small force of Portuguese had been left before Almeida, which did not prevent the garrison however from leaving it one night, immediately after these engagements. They lighted the mines they had previously prepared to destroy the works, and escaped so

Action of Fuentes d'Onor.

perfectly unperceived, that the first notice of the evacuation was the explosion which took place half an hour after they left it. Some few were made prisoners, but the greater part, with the commandant, got off by Barba del Puerco, where is a bridge across the Agueda, about eight miles from Almeida. Lord Wellington had previously ordered a detachment to that post, which order not being immediately obeyed was the cause of their escape; it is said a court of inquiry is instituted to inquire into it. Three fronts of Almeida are blown down, the guns destroyed or spiked, and the stores destroyed or placed in the ditch, and buried under the ruins. The mines were carried along the inside of the revetment and placed low, so as to blow a part out, and the upper part fell in, without injuring the town. About the middle of the month, the 3rd and 7th Divisions, consisting of fifteen regiments and two brigades of Portuguese artillery, one nine-pounder and the other six-pounders, were marched off to reinforce Beresford; Lord Wellington follows in a day or two after. Massena, they say, is ordered to France, and Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, left in the command of that part of the army. The ships in the Tagus, having the heavy ordnance, consisting of thirty twenty-four-pounders and some iron howitzers, are ordered round to Oporto, together with a proportion of engineer's stores, viz., 80,000 sand-bags, 600 entrenching tools, &c. It is thought lines are intended to be made round that city; but they are more probably sent under the idea they may be wanted to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, as they will be more easily transported by that route. Badajoz was invested on the 8th, and on the same night the trenches were opened. The project was to commence a parallel embracing the castle, having its right on the river, and to attack that front, the castle being, like most others, on a hill, accessible, and the wall not covered; at the same time, attacks were to be carried on against the Fort of San Christoval, on the opposite side of the Guadiana. This latter attack, however, only was commenced, Marshal Beresford, who commanded, saying he would take that first. The consequence was that this small attack, comprising only six or eight guns and three regiments, the 27th, 40th, and 97th, had to support for three days the whole fire and efforts of the place and fort, being commenced 1000

First Siege of Badajoz.

yards from the former, and 450 from the latter. In a short time the batteries, traverses, &c., were knocked about their ears, and every effort to keep them up was only attended by a useless sacrifice of lives, from the very superior fire from the place. This unfortunate attack, abandoned to itself, was for the whole time a horrid scene of carnage and desolation. Captain Squire was senior engineer employed in this attack, having under him Captains Ross, Boteler, and Dickinson, and Lieutenants Emmett, Reid, and Melville. Dickinson and Melville were killed; Boteler severely, and all the rest slightly, wounded. On the 10th, the enemy made a vigorous sortie, and a number of lives were lost, but they were repulsed without doing any mischief though they had possession of our works. Lieutenant Reid[1] of the Engineers was officer on duty in the trenches at the time, formed the pickets and working party, and charged the enemy. Colonel Harcourt, 40th Regiment, who was also wounded, wrote a handsome letter in his (Reid's) praise to Captain Squire. On the 12th, Marshal Beresford, after repeated solicitations from Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, commanding engineer, who meant to conduct the main attack himself, was induced to allow it to be commenced; accordingly, on that night a parallel was opened, and a false attack on the side of Pardilleros. The soil being most favourable (on the side of San Christoval, to add to their misfortunes, it was rocky and hard,) the party in many parts had covered themselves in an hour and a half, and but for the late arrival of the working parties, batteries would have been also in some forwardness, when in the middle of the night, orders came from the Marshal, to withdraw everything, destroy the stores of gabions, fascines, platforms, splinter-proof timber, &c., in short to raise the siege, it appearing that Marshal Soult was advancing from the south rapidly, with a considerable force. Had the plan originally proposed been allowed to be carried into execution, it is the opinion of many of the Engineers there that the place would have been taken in six or seven days, that is, before it became necessary to raise the siege. Should it be recommenced, it will be under many more disadvantages. We learn this day that on the 16th, a severe engagement was fought

[1] The late Major-General Sir William Reid, Governor of Malta from 1852 to 1857, and the author of the 'Law of Storms.'

between Beresford and Marshal Soult, nine or ten miles in front of Badajoz, that the enemy attacked about 10 A.M., and after an action of six hours, left their wounded on the ground in our possession, but took up a position in our front. General Hoghton and Lieut.-Colonels Duckworth (48th) and Sir William Myers, 7th Regiment, are killed.

May 27th. (Lisbon.) Receive an order to join Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher before Badajoz, as soon as I can arrange the carrying on of the duties of the second line. That place was completely invested on the 25th, and the trenches are to be commenced seriously in eight or nine days after.

From Captain BURGOYNE *to* Lord DERBY.

Lisbon, May 29, 1811.

MY DEAR LORD DERBY,

For the last three or four months, I have been most disagreeably situated in this neighbourhood, while the army has been working hard on the frontier. I have at length obtained an order to assist at the second siege of Badajoz, about to be undertaken, and cross the Tagus this day, on my way up there. Marshal Beresford has not gained much credit in the army by his late operations. He commenced by the affair near Campo Mayor, where the 13th Light Dragoons very gallantly charged a superior body of cavalry, and even took fifteen pieces of artillery, which the French were endeavouring to remove into Badajoz. The enemy's cavalry were driven completely into that place, and a small isolated body of about 800 infantry in a dead plain, were allowed to return to these guns, and take them off from close under the eyes of the marshal, with a good body of cavalry present, and his whole army at his heels.

At the siege of Badajoz, by his acting contrary to the advice of his Engineers, and of every one else, he was the cause of a great number of lives being lost, and on the fifth day of open trenches, our finding ourselves commencing the siege just where we ought to have been on the first. On that same night, the works were stopped on the intelligence of the approach of Soult, so that they had just time to point out to the enemy the mode by which they proposed to attack the place.

I have not heard the particulars yet of the late action of

Albuera, but the letters seem nearly unanimous in attributing our great loss to ill-conceived manœuvres; and as they express themselves, nothing but the admirable conduct of the troops saved them from total dispersion and defeat. The army is much pleased to be placed under a man of the decision and firmness of Lord Wellington, who arrived soon after the action. All agree in giving Beresford credit for great personal bravery; but this, as he says himself, is too common a quality to be thought much of.

Three divisions are drawn from the army in the north to support this corps; some engineers (Portuguese) have been lately sent to Almeida, as I suppose, to complete the destruction of the works; the repair of them would require too much expense and time, and after all, make but an indifferent fortress. Our heavy artillery, hitherto always kept embarked here, have been ordered round to Oporto, with three companies of artillery. The object given out is, that Lord Wellington means to make lines round that city also; but I fancy that is only to conceal the real intent, which I have no doubt is the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, if things remain in the present favourable posture, the route by Oporto being easier, and a shorter land carriage.

I hope to arrive before they commence the siege of Badajoz. Remember me most kindly to Lady Derby, and believe me ever,

My dear Lord Derby,
Your most affectionate and obedient
J. F. Burgoyne.

Journal resumed.

June 2nd. From Estremoz to camp before Badajoz, nine leagues. The camp of the troops is about 2000 yards from the place, and on the south side of the river commanded by Major-General Picton; on the north side by General Houston. The trenches were opened on the night of the 30th of May, by a parallel about 700 yards from the castle at the east end of the town, the right of the attacks being on the Guadiana.[1]

[1] The journal of this siege will be found in Jones's 'Sieges in Spain,' and has therefore been omitted.—Ed.

June 11*th.* Siege of Badajoz. Our guns are in a bad state, and Lord Wellington does not think we have time or means to continue the siege; it is determined therefore to raise it. At night, part of the guns are removed from the batteries, and stores of all sorts sent off to Elvas. It is said that Marmont is marching, with the army lately under Massena, to the south to join Soult.

—— 15*th.* (Elvas.) I am told to expect to join General Picton's division of the army again. There has been some skirmishing in front with some of General Hill's people. Yesterday about 120 French prisoners were brought in, said to have been taken by General Picton's division in a skirmish before Badajoz.

—— 19th. (Elvas.) Sent off Patton and Mulcaster[1] in a spring waggon for Lisbon.

—— 21*st.* To Campo Mayor. Join General Picton's division at Campo Mayor, where are also the 7th, General Houston's division, and General Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry. The remainder of our army lie along the right bank of the river Caya, from the bridge called the Ponte de Caya to Arronches. Soult, Marmont, &c., have joined, and are in our front. Elvas is not supplied with provisions, and Lord Wellington fixes on a position to receive the enemy, should he be inclined to push further forward. It consists of a ridge of heights, falling even and gradually, and chiefly without cover, the right resting on the Caya, about a mile above the Ponte de Caya, and the left on the Atalaya de Onquela, an old square tower on a round bold height, the whole extent about five miles.

—— 22*nd.* (Campo Mayor.) The enemy come forward from near Badajoz with about 1500 cavalry and some guns, and reconnoitre us. They also went out with a larger force of cavalry towards Elvas. Captain Lutyens and about sixty of the Light Dragoons are taken, by mistaking them for our people. The enemy are said to have about 6000 cavalry. We have 4000.

July 8th. (Campo Mayor.) Soult has again marched towards Seville, and Marmont remains in our front, about Caceres, with 15,000 men. The enemy are gathering in the harvest.

[1] They had been severely wounded in the siege.—Ed.

July 13*th.* (Campo Mayor.) Marmont is at Merida, Drouet at Montanches, and Soult at Zafra. An aide-de-camp of Marmont has been taken by the Spanish guerillas on his way to Paris, and the despatches sent to Lord Wellington. They are said to be interesting, and to state their force, viz., of Marmont, Soult, Drouet and Victor at 60,000, including 4000 cavalry. Lord Wellington reviews the 2nd and 4th Divisions, and some of the Portuguese, in all about 16,000 men.

—— 27*th.* (Castello Branco.) By desire of General Picton, who had received a communication from headquarters, examined the road to the Barca de Montalvão on the Tagus, relative to the possibility of passing artillery by it.

—— 28*th.* (Castello Branco.) An order arrives from headquarters, that I am to instruct 200 men of the 3rd Division in the art of carrying on the sap, &c.

To Captain SQUIRE, R.E.

Albergaria, September 1, 1811.

MY DEAR SQUIRE,

We remain here precisely in the same state of uncertainty as to our future operations as when I last wrote, nor can I learn what progress the heavy convoy of besieging stores is making. There is an account current that his Lordship says "if he undertakes another siege, he will be his own engineer." Whatever faults were committed at Badajoz, I suspect he was not aware of them, and I think it is very doubtful whether he knows them now. It appears to me probable that he did say so, by the mystery affected about *our* headquarters respecting the siege, which I believe in fact proceeds from their knowing nothing about the matter. The 1st Division move up to Nave d'Aver and neighbourhood to-day; the 6th are about Gallegos; the 88th Regiment is in front at Elbodon, and we have infantry pickets pushed out, as well as cavalry, in consequence of a party from Ciudad Rodrigo attempting to surprise a cavalry picket by some ravines and broken ground, near where it was posted. Macleod and Thompson are gone to repair the Ponte Murcella and bridge of Val des Pinos. Reid and Wright are with me here, and Emmett is coming. Mulcaster is

marching up my company of Artificers. General Picton has been laid up with an ague, but is now convalescent and doing well. Gipps,[1] in answer to an order to join the army, has written a letter which has given offence, and indeed certainly might have been couched in more appropriate language. He states that Mr. Pink refuses to advance the £120, which is the least an officer can set himself up with, and in consequence he has not horses to enable him to take the field; that Mr. Pink did so before, but refuses now, because the effects of some officers deceased in his debt have been given over to persons entirely out of the corps—a thing, as Gipps unfortunately expresses himself, which he believes *unprecedented in the army.* He has since written another on the subject, which he desires the colonel to submit to the master-general and board. He is now ordered to remain in the lines, and some one else comes up in his place. I have just proposed at headquarters, to pay sixpence apiece for ballast baskets, to contain a cubic foot of earth, to such of my people as choose to make them in headquarters, in the heat of the day. Ten pounds would be well spent, I think, in this, in the event of a siege.

Yours very truly,
J. F. BURGOYNE.

Captain BURGOYNE *to his* SISTER.

Albergaria, September 14, 1811.

* * * * * *

Ever since I have been with the army, I have been full of occupation, and at this moment as much as ever. Preparations are making for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, in the neighbourhood of which we are at present, with the greater part of the army; but it is said to be very doubtful whether we shall undertake it. Marmont's army is not far off, and though we feel ourselves fully equal, or even superior, to it, yet we don't know how far Lord Wellington will like putting himself in the situation of having to fight Marmont with the reinforcements

[1] The late Sir George Gipps, R.E, Governor of New South Wales from 1838 to 1846. He died the 28th of March, 1847.

which join him in a short time from the south, and carrying on the siege at the same time, which he must do, or disgracefully abandon the siege as at Badajoz; unless we could have the good fortune to fight the battle first, which, as it is not Marmont's interest, he will probably not give us the opportunity of doing.

Our army has lately moved up into pretty compact cantonments along the frontiers of Portugal, but chiefly in Spain, for the advantage of subsistence, which we could get in the greatest abundance, and on moderate terms, if we had ready money to pay for it. As it is, corn for the horses is very scarce, great part of the cavalry being without it for days together, and most of the bread is bad and dear; all which difficulties would be removed by the competition there would be for ready money. The country people frequently bring us bread from Salamanca, Placencia, and other places in the midst of the French armies. It is a very abundant country in corn.

I continue with General Picton, who I am sorry to say has been lately laid up with a severe attack of ague, but is now getting better. My principal business now is training 200 men of different regiments to the duties required in a siege, which, to our disgrace and misfortune, we have no regular establishment equal to, notwithstanding the repeated experience of the absolute necessity of such a corps to act under the Engineers in a campaign. For want of such an establishment we are frequently led to the loss of valuable officers, and very undeserved discredit. The undertaking I am set about will be only temporary, and will supply very imperfectly this deficiency.

My friend Mulcaster, who went to Lisbon desperately ill of a fever which he got by great voluntary exertion and fatigue during the siege of Badajoz, is, I am happy to say, returning to the army in high health and spirits. I hope with all my heart that we may undertake this said siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. If we do, I think there is little doubt but we shall take it, for I perceive in the army such a want of spirit about the operation since our bad success in our last, which was also our first, that there appears to be little prospect of it being commenced, without the chances being well calculated beforehand. It would be

esteemed a paltry place, but for the soil around it, which is all rock. This enabled the Spaniards to make so good a defence last year, and adds much to its strength.

We have a great many sick in the army, as is always the case at this time of year, and our Portuguese regular army, from one thing and another, is reduced to less than 15,000, including all branches. We do not, however, hear of there being any immediate probability of the enemy being able to muster any strength sufficient to repel us an inch. The country which was the seat of war last year, and which is sufficiently extensive, is in a most miserable state; great numbers of its inhabitants are dead, and many who formerly lived in a state of comfort and comparative opulence are literally begging and starving in the deserted villages to which they belong. It is quite shocking to travel through that part of the country. The large sums for their relief from England either arrive very late, or have fallen into bad hands, which is sure to be the case unless Englishmen, and not Portuguese, take a very active part in the distribution.

I have enlarged on the politics of this country more than I intended, or than you will probably find entertaining, but my own mind is now so full of them, that I could scarcely write to you on anything else.

Your ever affectionate brother,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

Journal resumed.

September 18th. (To Elbodon.) The 3rd (General Picton's) Division is ordered to Elbodon and Robleda. The 4th Division move to Albergaria, &c., and the 5th and 7th in the rear, rather close up. Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher of the Engineers has been reconnoitring positions in front of Guinaldo and between that and Ciudad Rodrigo—their right resting on the deep and bold ravine of the Agueda, and the left on the steep fall of the heights which is parallel with the Agueda at about four miles distance. By attacking us in these positions, the enemy would have much to lose by defeat, and little to gain by success. The garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo is said not to have more than a

month's provisions. It consists of about 1500 men. The repairs of Almeida have been commenced by eighty or ninety half-starved militiamen; more than three whole fronts of escarp are down. At Ciudad Rodrigo, the enemy have thrown up a square redoubt on the height 300 yards to the north, the angle presented towards the country, and the whole so retired, that the interior is completely exposed to the place, and its salient faces flanked.

To Captain SQUIRE, R.E.

Albergaria, October 4, 1811.

MY DEAR SQUIRE,

I have been in so constant a scene of bustle and movement, as not to have time till now to sit down and write you an account of what was going on in this part of the country; and though you have probably heard all particulars before this, yet I will send you my rough sketch of the business. To make it more intelligible, I will endeavour to make you understand the nature of the country and situation of our force, on the arrival of the French army before Ciudad Rodrigo.

Guinaldo is about two and a half miles from the Agueda, on its left bank, and fifteen miles from Ciudad Rodrigo; the river runs through an extremely bold rocky ravine, except in the immediate neighbourhood of Rodrigo. The summit of the heights on the left bank is plain, tolerably level, and at Guinaldo about four miles wide, falling again steep, rocky, and woody, to a much lower level of country to the westward. At Elbodon, seven miles in front of Guinaldo, this range of heights along the left bank of the river has not more than one and a half mile width on the summit; at Encina, three miles in front of Elbodon, and at Pastores, two miles farther, still less; a mile beyond Pastores, a high round hill immediately above the ford of Cantarana, which is near the Convent de la Caridad, and two and a half miles higher up the river than Rodrigo, apparently terminates the range. A continuation of it however in lower heights stretches out to opposite Rodrigo, and terminates in the two remarkable hills, a mile and a half from the bridge called Perostillo. The villages of Elbodon, Encina, and Pastores, lie on the summit of different ravines, breaking through the

westward fall of the heights. We had been given to understand that Marmont, from Placencia, was to be joined by 18,000 men from Valladolid and the north, chiefly Imperial Guards, and to conduct a convoy of 800 cars, prepared at Salamanca, and containing seven months' provisions, into Ciudad Rodrigo. On the 24th of September, from the hill above Pastores, the enemy were discovered collecting troops under the walls of Rodrigo, principally from the Tamames or Puerto de Baños road; and by the evening, their accumulated force was estimated at 25,000 men, including 5000 or 6000 cavalry. The situation in which we remained during the night, appeared to me extraordinary. The Light Division, on the other side of the Agueda, on the position of the Rio Vadillo, a bold ravine from the Sierra de Gata to the Agueda; the 5th Division, considerably in its rear, somewhere about Payo, where it had been placed to watch the passage of the Sierra de Gata; the 4th, a league in rear of Guinaldo; the 1st, at Nave d'Aver, three leagues to the left of Guinaldo; and the 6th and 7th, somewhere between the 1st and 4th; two brigades of cavalry in the low grounds to the left and rear of Guinaldo; and the 3rd Division, unsupported except by General Alten's brigade of cavalry (the 1st Hussars and 11th Light Dragoons) in front, and dispersed on its small scale, as the whole army was on a large one. The three companies of the 60th, the light companies of the division, and one squadron of the 11th, under Lieut.-Colonel Williams (60th), with an advance on the high hill above, were at Pastores, not above five miles from Rodrigo; the 45th, 74th, and 88th at Encina; the Portuguese (9th and 21st) at Elbodon, and General Colville's brigade, 5th, 83rd, 77th, and 94th, with Arentschild's guns, on the direct road from Rodrigo to Guinaldo, to the left of Elbodon; the brigade of cavalry in rear of General Colville. Make your map as well as you can from this description, and then conceive a Bonaparte in our front, within fifteen miles of *any* part of our extended line, most of it of open country, with his rapid night marches. I confess I thought there was more than one way of striking a good *coup*—fortunately however, for us, they proceeded in the old steady style.[1]

On the morning of the 25th, the enemy appeared situated

[1] See Napier's 'Peninsular War,' p. 250. vol. iv.

nearly as in the preceding evening; many however were crossing the river, and considerable bodies were observed moving towards Guinaldo. On our part, Colonel Williams was kept in his former situation, the 74th were pushed up a height between Pastores and Encina, to support him; the 83rd, 88th, 45th, 94th, and 9th Portuguese were drawn up to the right of the ravine of Elbodon, and General Colville remained posted on the salient bend of the heights (which is on the left of the same ravine), just over which the road from Rodrigo to Guinaldo passes, with the 5th and 77th Regiments, 21st Portuguese, and the guns, supported by General Alten's cavalry (not above 300 or 400 men), one squadron being with Colonel Williams, and another with General Crawfurd. This part of our force was evidently threatened, yet his Lordship would not allow the division to be collected. The five battalions to the right of Elbodon were separated at least two miles, by a great ascent and ravine, from General Colville. Most of the regiments in the 3rd Division were very weak; the 88th may have had 600, the 74th, 500, and the Portuguese regiments 500 each; the others, upon the average, not more than 300 each.

The enemy formed their body of about 3000 infantry, a division of cavalry and guns, on a branch of the height on which General Colville was posted, on a little lower level and barely out of gunshot. Six of their guns were brought up, and played upon ours to divert their attention; one of their regiments of cavalry (the 23rd, I believe,) crossed the hollow, and came upon another small ridge on the right flank of our guns, from whence they immediately charged and *took them all.* They kept but short possession however; the 5th Regiment, who were just at the back of the hill in line, on their showing themselves on the top, gave them a volley, reloaded, advanced in ordinary time in line as they were, and when near, regularly charged them. The enemy fled down the hill, the 5th halted, and fired at them till completely driven off. The unfortunate artillerymen, who had found protection behind the 5th from the cavalry, returned, and again took possession of their guns. The 21st Portuguese were at this time several hundred yards to the right; the 77th were to the left, to oppose the great body of the enemy on the road, and the cavalry on a flat in the rear of

the 77th. The main body of the enemy now advanced (very fortunately not at the same time with the flank attack) up the road, and got firm footing on the summit in that part. Lord Wellington then ordered a retreat in columns of regiments, which were to edge in towards the direction the 21st Portuguese were ordered to take, along the gentle ridge extending from this ground to near Guinaldo. Our cavalry now came into play, and made alternately in succession by regiments most gallant charges into the midst of the enemy's cavalry, as often as it was in motion to get round the flanks of our small columns, &c. By the very able manner in which they were managed, and in which they executed what was required of them, they checked every movement of their opponents, so that the latter were never in motion but in a loose and disorderly manner. As one regiment charged and then extricated itself at full speed, the other, remaining formed and firm, covered it, and checked the advance of the enemy in pursuit, and acting on the flank of our infantry, the latter had opportunities of forming square for their protection, as in one instance, when the 77th checked the enemy's cavalry by an oblique fire. After some time, the enemy evidently gave up all idea of molesting us, except by following and opening a fire of artillery from the different heights, as we left them. On the retreat being ordered, the regiments on the right of Elbodon moved to the direction we were taking, so as to close near us after about two miles, always threatened by part of the enemy's cavalry, which took that direction, but never attacked. Colonel Williams, however, and the 74th, by the operations, were completely cut off from us, and forced to cross the ravine of the Agueda, and by a circuitous route joined us at night near Guinaldo. The squadron of cavalry with him, when on the right bank of the river, had an opportunity of charging a French squadron which was on the look-out in that part, and made three or four prisoners. General Crawfurd retired at night from his advanced position to Robledo, nearly opposite Guinaldo and about six miles from it, and the 4th Division and Heavy Brigade of cavalry we met near Guinaldo. The enemy halted about two miles in front of that place. Two ammunition cars broke down and were left, after being emptied; all the rest of

the artillery and carriages were brought off. Our loss in infantry during the day was sixty-eight killed, wounded, and missing, chiefly from cannon-shot. The 83rd, who, from being nearer, joined us earlier than the 88th, 94th, &c., had fifteen men disabled from a single shell, which fell into its small column. Of the 11th Dragoons, every officer bore marks of the enemy's weapons in his person or horse, as also, I believe, the hussars; this affair was particularly creditable to them, General Colville, General Alten, and the 5th Regiment. It was a disgrace to the enemy that they did not early annihilate our small body of cavalry, and then it must have gone hard with some of our infantry. During the same day, the 14th and 16th had skirmishing and charges with the French cavalry near Espeja, with success on our side. A French colonel of lancers, O'Fyn or O'Glyn, would not take quarter, and was killed, and an officer and several men taken.

On the 26th, we remained in a position taken up close in front of Guinaldo; the centre was at a chapel on a small rising immediately before the town, and round the chapel a redoubt; the right, extending perpendicular to the Elbodon road, at 1000 yards' distance, had a redoubt near the skirt of a wood, which wood continued for the whole descent of a mile and a half down to the river, extending also above and below; the left was thrown out, making the centre a re-entering but very obtuse angle, and rested on a high round hill 2000 yards distant, with a redoubt upon it; farther to the left was a rather lower and woody hill at about 700 yards off, not included in the position, and in the rear of the hollow between the two heights, a rocky ridge fronting it, on which General Pack's Portuguese brigade was posted during the day. The soil being rocky and the Engineers' means small, all the works were very trifling, and though giving some cover, had no ditch that could be esteemed an obstacle, or any other substitute. The 4th Division took up the left of the position from the centre; General Colville's brigade was at the work on the right, and the remainder of the 3rd Division in reserve in the rear of the right, under the probability, I presume, of being required in the wood, should that flank be attacked. The two brigades of cavalry, with two troops of horse artillery, were about 600 yards in front

of the centre. The ground in front was all open and recently ploughed, and on the flanks open woods of oak. In the course of the day, the enemy showed about 24,000 or 26,000 men in our front. In the evening, the Light Division came up from Robledo. Weak as we were most of the day, the enemy might have attacked us to great advantage; everything however remained quiet. It is said that Marmont told Major Gordon, who went in with some flag of truce, that he had a better opinion of Lord W—— than to suppose he ever meant to wait an attack in that position. At 10 P.M. the army commenced a retreat by Casillos and Foncales; at midnight all the troops had been drawn off; at 2 P.M. of the next day (the 27th), the 3rd and 4th Divisions, Pack's brigade, and the two brigades of cavalry, were in position in front of Alfayates; the Light Division joined by 4 P.M. The 4th Division occupied the heights between Alfayates and the convent of Sacriparte; the 3rd and Light Divisions on its right, the cavalry in the valley on its left, through which runs the direct road from Guinaldo to Alfayates by Albergaria and Aldea de Ponte; and General Pack on the opposite heights—the rest of the army not far off. A strong body of the enemy, of perhaps 3000 cavalry and from 6000 to 10,000 infantry, came up by way of Aldea de Ponte, and by 3 P.M. were smartly engaged with the 4th Division. This affair lasted the whole evening, and by a little enterprise we might probably have made this body of the enemy come badly off, for they were not closely supported. Dunn, of the horse artillery, was wounded in the groin, but appeared to be doing well two days after, when I saw him. Captain Prevôt (60th), aide-de-camp to General Cole, was shot through the body, but is also, I believe, doing well, and a few officers of the Fusilier brigade were killed and wounded.

On the 28th, at 2 A.M., we again retreated about a league; the 4th and Light Divisions to the neighbourhood of Soito, as well as most of the cavalry, on the best road from Sabugal; the 3rd to Pocas Farinhas, &c. (where it was joined by the 7th), on the other road, which leads through Nave and Villa Boa; the 1st and 6th farther to the left—the 1st at Rendo. This we understood to be one of his Lordship's fighting positions: the right on the mountains to the right of Soito, the

left thrown back by Rendo to the Coa. The enemy however also retreated on the same night, and the troops, on the 29th, went into cantonments; we have since again come forward to this place and neighbourhood, having one battalion, the 5th, at Payo, beyond the Agueda. The Light Division is at Guinaldo, the 4th somewhere to our left, and the rest, I believe, in the rear. Headquarters, after being near Guardo, are now at Frenedas, near Castel Bom. The enemy have left a regiment of hussars in Ciudad Rodrigo, and have returned to their old cantonments, as we hear Foix's corps moved down as far as Payo. For these last few days we have had heavy rain, but have been under cover. The French have plundered a good deal in their passage through these villages, and have spoiled their credit in this one in particular, where, from former good conduct, we did not think they were looked upon with a very evil eye. They took the trouble to burn every stick of my fascines and gabions, &c.

We have the credit, as may naturally be expected, of running away as long as the enemy thought it worth their while to follow, and on their choosing to retire, valiantly returning. I think it would have been quite as well if his Lordship had kept voluntarily more at a distance, having, as it appears he had, no intention of making an attempt to prevent the relief of the fortress. I cannot help thinking that our very loose dispersed way of acting, while so near the enemy, may one day bring us into a scrape.

Thiebault commanded the infantry, and, I believe, the whole body which made the reconnoissance on the 27th, and the inhabitants speak well of him. He was styled the General of Castile. The general of cavalry in that same advance, whose name they did not ascertain, they describe as a plunderer and ruffian.

I now find that the heavy artillery and stores have been halted all this while at Villa de Ponte, five leagues, if I remember right, this side of Lamego.

I inclose for your perusal an interesting letter (at least it is so to me), on the destruction and temporary repairs of the Alva and Ceira bridges. Send it me back when you have done with it.

Your sincere friend,

J. F. Burgoyne.

October 20th. (Albergaria.) The garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo is of the same strength as before, that is, about 1500 men; but about 50 or 100 cavalry have been left there, consisting chiefly of wounded and other horses unfit for the field. About 200 head of cattle, being a large proportion of the live stock of the garrison, having strayed rather too far in grazing, were seized by some of Don Julian's guerillas; the governor-general, Renaud, and eight or ten people went after them, and fell into an ambuscade, and were taken also.

——*23rd.* (Albergaria.) The governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, after remaining a few days at Frenedas with Lord Wellington, is sent to England; he says that on the night of the 26th ult., the enemy retired at the same time that we did; but learning at twelve at night that we had left the ground, although the heads of their columns were close to Rodrigo, they returned. The Light Division are ordered to occupy Elbodon, their headquarters still remaining at Guinaldo. The 4th Division have their headquarters at Villa de Ciervo, and detachments at San Felices (el Grande), Barba del Puerco, &c. The Light Division have fitted up a theatre in Guinaldo, and will perform in a few days.

To Captain SQUIRE, R.E.

Albergaria, November 3, 1811.

MY DEAR SQUIRE,

We hear General Hill has met with considerable success against a brigade of the enemy at Caceres, and are anxiously awaiting an account of the particulars.

In the meantime, I am sorry to have to acquaint you of what I think a rather discreditable event to us on this side. The enemy have relieved Ciudad Rodrigo without molestation, and thrown in a convoy of cattle and other provisions, with an escort of 4000 men, who returned immediately—the account you will think curious. On the 1st inst., an officer of Ross's troop was sent early in the morning to ascertain the best passage of the Agueda, near Guinaldo, for the guns. At 1 P.M. of the same day, the troop was ordered to march *immediately* to Guinaldo, and it was said then that 4000 men were expected that

evening, to convey a convoy into Rodrigo. At 6 P.M. a communication from Murray acquaints General Picton that the 3rd Division is to move the next day (the 2nd), and occupy Robledo, Payo, &c., that the Light Division is to occupy Martiago, Sango, &c., General Alten's brigade of cavalry (1st Hussars and 11th) to be also on the right bank of the Agueda, at Martiago, Robledo, &c., General Slade's cavalry to remain at Itnero, Espeja, &c., the 4th Division to move to Gallegos, Espeja, and Guinaldo, and the 1st, 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions to move up a little, with a remark that this arrangement would be probably only for a few days. In the middle of the night, another communication comes, that instead of the above, the 3rd Division will be assembled at Guinaldo; accordingly, on the 2nd inst., we march for Guinaldo, and on the road, General Picton receives an order, written on a scrap of paper in pencil, and signed "W.," for the troops of the 3rd Division to move upon Elbodon as they arrive at Guinaldo; and a little farther on, another order to move upon Pastores; about an hour afterwards, that is, when beyond Guinaldo, comes an order for the 3rd Division *to return to their old cantonments*, Albergaria, &c. It appears the enemy had put in the convoy, and the escort returned. The Light Division had pushed on beyond Elbodon, and returned for the night to that place, &c.

By our first order to move to Robledo, &c., it would appear that the enemy had created a jealousy towards the Gata road, and with success, while the convoy came from Salamanca; we hear that Don Julian gave his Lordship information of its being within six leagues of the place on the 1st, when I suppose my Lord did not calculate upon a night or forced march, and thus they succeeded. If they got in after dark on the 1st, it is evident, from the Light Division having the account of their being expected on the morning of that day, that we had plenty of time to have intercepted it.

Yours very truly,
J. F. BURGOYNE.

November 4th. (Albergaria.) It appears General Hill left the frontiers of Portugal on the 22nd ult., in two columns; the right column joined the Spaniards under the Conde de

Surprise of Arroyo de Molinos.

Penne at Aliseda on the 24th; the left column halted that night at the Casa de Cantillana, two leagues on the left of Aliseda; these places are nearly equidistant (one league) from the River Salor. In front of the Casa de Cantillana, the Salor is crossed by a good ford, and in front of Aliseda by a bridge. Girard's division was at Caceres, with some cavalry at Arroyo del Puerco. It consisted of 4000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and three pieces of artillery. On the night of the 25th and 26th, the two columns, each of 2000 infantry, advanced upon Arroyo del Puerco and Malpartida. They arrived at daybreak; the enemy had left these places during the night, and having fallen back on Caceres, their advance united itself with the remainder of the division, and took the road of Terzmirha, leaving it uncertain whether they would march upon Merida or Medellin. On the 27th, General Hill moved to his right on Aldea del Cania, where he heard that Girard had marched from Terzmirha; at seven in the morning, he pushed forward to Alcuerca, six leagues from Malpartida, from whence was observed the enemy's bivouac about the village of Arroyo de Molinos, a short league from Alcuerca. General Hill ordered the troops to halt in a situation completely covered from the enemy, and made dispositions for the attack on the following morning; he allowed no lights or fires, though the night was very inclement, and the enemy had no idea of his being so near them. Arroyo de Molinos is situated at the south extremity of the Sierra de Montanches; it bears nearly due east from Alcuerca, and is separated from it by a plain country; half of the interval (next Alcuerca) covered with wood, the other half a fine open plain. Spies were sent into Arroyo during the night, and information obtained that the enemy's infantry were lodged in the houses, and the cavalry in the olive trees. At 2 A.M. of the 28th, the troops were in movement, and General Hill directed the march of the left column direct upon Arroyo, while the right cut them off from the roads of Medellin and Merida. The ground was extremely favourable for moving and forming these arrangements out of sight of the enemy; the weather was squally with heavy rain, and the wind in our backs. At seven, the columns moved forward. The left column entered the village just as the baggage and rear-guard were leaving it; part of the cavalry was

Action of Arroyo de Molinos.

cut off in the bivouac. The French infantry were just parading in the Medellin road, the right column turned them to the Truxillo road, and from thence they endeavoured to gain the sierra, our column endeavouring to cut them off, and thus the two were marching briskly parallel to each other at the distance of pistol-shot, when the word was given to our column to bring up their right shoulder, and at double-quick time they entered pell-mell into the enemy's column; every man seized upon his prize, the men were knocked down with the butt end of the muskets, mounted officers pulled off their horses, &c. Our cavalry overtook the guns, &c., which were making off, and the result was the capture of all their baggage, the contribution of Caceres of $5000, their artillery (three field-pieces), about 1200 prisoners, besides 25 officers, among them the chief of the staff, General Bron, the Prince d'Ahremberg, &c. Girard was wounded, but escaped into the mountains with about 700 or 800 men. Murillo and the Spaniards pursued them, killed a great many, and made several prisoners. Girard was at last left with 300 men, with whom he escaped. Our loss was seven killed and fifty-three wounded. Only one brigade of Girard's was found at Arroyo, the other having marched at 4 A.M. for Medellin.

November 8th. (Albergaria.) General Hill returned to Portalegre on the 3rd inst., after marching by Merida, and removing the enemy's depôt from thence.

—— *11th.* (Albergaria.) Marmont's force is moving from Placencia, &c., towards the Tagus at Almaraz. An order from headquarters directs the instruction of the 200 men of the 3rd Division in sapping to be resumed.

—— *26th.* (Elbodon.) Ride with Lieut.-Colonel De Lancey, D.Q.M.G., and Major Broke, A.Q.M.G., 4th Division, to reconnoitre a situation for the bivouac of one division, out of sight of Ciudad Rodrigo or the Salamanca roads. We understand that the enemy have a convoy coming down from Salamanca, with 3000 men escort, that 7000 more are on the Tamames road ready to join or co-operate with the first; that on its approach, the 3rd Division is to bivouac on the above ground, and proceed to attack them from thence, supported by the 4th Division. The Light Division is to attempt to gain their rear, and the 6th

Division, which is about San Felices, &c., is to co-operate. In consequence of the Portuguese artillery remaining still inefficient, the brigade from the 5th is to join the 3rd Division.

November 29th. (Albergaria.) The 3rd Division returns to its old cantonments at Albergaria, and the other divisions return nearly to their old situations, the 1st Division to the neighbourhood of Pinhel. It is said the enemy's convoy has returned on the intelligence of our moving. The supplies for the army are difficult, from want of carriage to bring them up from Lisbon, &c. If we had money, we might be supplied easily in the country; but that is also very scarce; the troops are nearly *three* months in arrears, and a quarter of a month's pay has been lately issued. It is in agitation to bring the supplies up the Douro as far as the frontier; the difficult passage called Cachon, near San João de Pesquiera, being practicable.

To Captain SQUIRE, R.E.

Albergaria, December 15, 1811.

MY DEAR SQUIRE,

Major Grey, of the 5th Regiment, was sent in with a flag of truce a few days ago, with letters to some British officers, prisoners, and despatch for Marmont. He found their first post of about 600 infantry, at Val del Obispo, on the left bank of the Alagon. He was in the village before they perceived him, and caused them some alarm; if he had gone with that intent, he might have surprised them at mid-day. In consequence of his reporting that he passed on the road between Villas Buenas and Elcampo great numbers of cattle grazing, which he understood were meant for the enemy, and which he conceived might be easily driven in, he was sent with a party to effect it. The party consisted of forty dragoons and 500 infantry, quite light and without their packs. General Colville went out with them. I took the opportunity of getting a look at the country. The weather was delightful, and it was a very pleasant excursion to *me*.

The whole party crossed by the Pass of Perales from Payo to Villas Buenas, early on the 13th instant; and from thence the dragoons, a few of the infantry, with sixteen bullock-drivers

collected at Payo, pushed on, and first attempted to drive in from 300 to 400 of the cattle. The drivers, however, were either unable or unwilling to manage them; the soldiers began to gallop and run after them, and the consequence was, that these beasts, naturally extremely wild, began to gallop in all directions over the wild rocky ground, like so many deer. The object became impossible, and after being out a whole day over the country we returned from our foraging party, *without a bullock*, by the pass of Gata. A private of the 14th Dragoons, a German, deserted.

Marmont is at Avila. They have about 2000 men (or rather boys, as described,) at Placencia, and the rest of the army in the rear at Avila, Talavera, Bejar, &c. It is just reported that they are assembling. Don Carlos, having made a twelve-league march, his men having nothing to eat but chestnuts, and without grumbling, as Reid describes it, came up with a convoy of money. Took part of it after a successful skirmish, in which the enemy lost, I believe, two or three hundred men, and himself fifty. Reid was with him; and Don Carlos has written to Lord Wellington and the Colonel, mentioning his zeal and activity, and begging he might be allowed to remain with him, which Reid also wishes, and which I hope he may be allowed to do.

Yours very truly,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

Journal resumed.

December 18th. It appears to be the intention of Lord Wellington to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo. By the general orders of this day, the regiments of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, Light Divisions, and General Pack's Portuguese Brigade, are ordered to make fascines, gabions, and pickets of prescribed dimensions at the cantonments of the several regiments. This arrangement appears bad, as the parties will be so dispersed it will be impossible to superintend them well. The distance to Ciudad Rodrigo is in many instances five leagues, and in some as much as seven; in many places the materials are bad or scarce; whereas about Espeja and Campillo, within two leagues of good road, is plenty of stuff to employ the whole.

—— *30th.* (Albergaria.) The commissary is ordered to

supply cars to convey the gabions, &c., made by the divisions, to depôts two or three leagues from Rodrigo, viz., San Felices el Chico, Gallegos, and Las Agallos. I am cutting planks for platforms at Puebla d'Azava. The number of gabions proposed to be made in the first instance was 2500; of fascines, 2500; and of pickets, 10,000. A bridge of trestles has been thrown across the Agueda by the staff corps.

CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

Lord Wellington, taking advantage of the dispersion of the French corps in their winter cantonments, unexpectedly invests Ciudad Rodrigo, effects two breaches, and carries them by storm on the thirteenth day after breaking ground—Immediately afterwards, moves to the attack of Badajoz, breaks ground before it on the 17th of March, and carries it by storm on the 6th of April—Having thus cleared the way for an offensive movement into Spain, he advances against Marmont on the north, defeats him at Salamanca, and gains possession of Madrid—Afterwards advances to the north against Clausel, and besieges the Castle of Burgos, which he is unable to reduce, owing to the absence of a battering train—The junction of the armies of Soult and King Joseph, at length obliges Lord Wellington to raise the siege, and retreat again into Portugal.

Journal.

JANUARY *2nd*, 1812. (Albergaria.) A fall of snow. All the cars that can be collected in the cantonments of the 3rd Division are ordered to be assembled at Gallegos and Las Agallas on the 5th inst., and reported to the officer of Engineers there. They go loaded with fascines and other siege stores. The enemy have moved further into the interior, to Talavera, &c. General Hill is again in motion into Spain. A respectable force was assembled at Albuquerque on the 28th of December. The enemy had then 1000 men in Merida.

—— *4th.* (Albergaria.) The division marches by route for Robledo, Martiago, &c. They take the road by the Puente Villar under Payo, lest the fords should be full, the weather being terrible, snow on the ground, and rain and sleet falling, with a high wind.

—— *5th.* (To Martiago.) Five men of the division died on the road yesterday, from the inclemency of the weather and

the wild country. The cars conveying gabions, fascines, &c., to Las Agallas from Lagiosa and Navas Frias, cannot proceed, from the badness of the roads, and were left in the road.

Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

January 8th. The Light Division invest Ciudad Rodrigo in the morning. One post of a few hundred men is taken up on the Salamanca road, out of cannon-shot of the place, and another on the Pedro de Toro or Tamanes road; the remainder of the division bivouac at the back of the heights to the northward of the place on the San Felices road, to do the duty of the trenches. General Pack's brigade takes up the convent of Caridad, two and a half miles higher up the river than the place—that is, to the southward of it, where this brigade remains during the whole siege. The attacks are to be made to the northward, on the same side as the French made theirs a year and a half before. This side of the place presents a rounded salient angle where the French breached, and have since repaired with a good stone wall. The fausse-braye is laid out in curtains and redans, and forms an uninterrupted communication; two of the redans on the east side are cut off by a ditch, forming ravelins. The same nature of profile goes nearly all round, except that the ramparts and parapets are not so good in the other parts; the upper wall is flanked in some parts only by solid old towers of little capacity, barely able to hold three field-pieces, of which the trails of those in each flank cross one another. On the west side, the hill, on which is the town, falls steep and rocky to the river Agueda; the works under the wall are irregular, and without the fausse-braye or ditch. On the south, there are valleys and cover, but the ground is rocky, and the works commanding. On the east, the ground falls slightly, and at 300 yards' distance is a suburb. On the north, the glacis falls so steep as to give cover to an assailant; then rises a little rocky hill at 200 or 300 yards distance, called the Little Teson, of the same height as the place, at the back of which, again, is a little valley and watercourse under cover; then rises another more extensive height called the Teson, which at less than 600 yards distance, is so much higher as to see the main wall

and fausse-braye sufficiently low for breaching. The summit of this height is flat for about 400 yards; from thence to the rear are valleys completely under cover, except that they can be watched in part from the steeple of the cathedral. On the Teson, and at 580 yards from the place, the French had constructed a small redoubt, presenting a salient angle to the country, on which was a field-piece *en barbette;* the redoubt contained besides another field-piece and a howitzer. The rear of this work was on the slope of the hill, so that from the front only the very salient angle was seen, which had a command of 300 yards all round; it was thus well defiladed. The ditch of one face of this outwork was directed upon the place, and the other on the convent of San Francisco, which was 200 yards from it and 500 from the place; and being a strong building at the extremity of the suburbs, was occupied by the enemy with two field-pieces, a howitzer, and some infantry. The rear of the redoubt was closed by a low crenelled wall with a gate in it, and a chevaux-de-frise along its outside. The other sides of the redoubt had a good parapet, and a ditch of about eight feet deep and twelve feet wide, with a very strong palisading at the foot of the counterscarp; there was a great quantity of water in the lower parts of the ditch. The escarp and counterscarp were not revetted. In the interior was a shed for a guard room, and a small magazine under the barbette platform. The Engineers' depôt was formed in a valley about 1800 yards from the place; and a quantity of entrenching tools, gabions, fascines, &c., placed there in the evening from Gallegos. It was determined to assault the redoubt at dark. For this purpose 400 men as a storming party were placed under command of Colonel Colborne (52nd), of whom thirty conveyed fascines and ladders made on the spot of the railings of the cars, and twelve carried crowbars and axes. Lieut.-Colonel Colborne made an excellent arrangement; one part was destined to fire on the parapets, another to break in by the gate and wall in the rear, and others to cross the ditch, and destroy some of the palisades in it, while the signal of any part getting in was to be three cheers, on which the firing party were to cease firing. Lieutenant Thompson, of the Engineers, accompanied the party. The attack was made about 9 P.M.; the enemy were taken by

surprise, and made but a feeble resistance; many of their firelocks were even found piled along the guard-room wall. Some, however, did what they could, and hand-grenades and shells were thrown down upon the assailants. The impediments were overcome in about ten minutes, and the redoubt taken. We had two officers wounded, and about twelve men killed and wounded. The enemy lost five or six killed, and two officers (one of artillery) and forty-seven prisoners; three or four escaped. The French journal says, they escaped owing to the gallantry of a sergeant of artillery, who, seeing no more hope, threw a lighted shell among the English soldiers, and, followed by a few comrades, made his way through the opening made in the English ranks to avoid the shell. Immediately the redoubt was taken, a working party followed, and broke ground for about 150 yards, on the line of the old French first parallel, and a boyau of communication to it of about 300 yards, being the centre one made by the French; the left of this short parallel rested on the redoubt, and the right on the boyau. The enemy fired a great deal—shot, shells, and grape—during the night; but tolerably good cover was gained by morning. The casualties during the night, of the working party, were between twenty and thirty, out of about 1000 men who were employed. A part of the parapet of the redoubt was thrown into the ditch in the course of the night, some of the palisades were taken up, and the guns and chevaux-de-frise were withdrawn. Myself and Ross, of the Engineers, are to be directors of the attacks alternately for twenty-four hours; the other officers of Engineers are divided into brigades of one captain and one subaltern each, who are eight hours on duty. The soil was stony.

January 9th. At twelve o'clock in the day, the Light Division is relieved by the 1st, and returns to its quarters of Elbodon, &c. Each division is thus to take the duty alternately for twenty-four, viz., the 1st, 4th, 3rd, and Light. The only inconvenience of this arrangement is, that the men make the excuse of the previous twelve or fifteen miles march not to work well. In the night, the first parallel was established along the height of the Teson. Three batteries are also commenced in front of the parallel, for eleven guns each, the left one having a return for two guns, to be directed against the convent of San Francisco.

The batteries are thirty yards in front of the parallel, and about 560 yards from the place, and they have communications with the parallel. As the French attempted, and could not make, a practicable breach from this ground, the intention was that these batteries should serve to ruin the defences, if it was found on trial that breaching was impracticable; as it afterwards turned out, however, they breached the walls effectually. About midnight, Captain Ross, who had the duty, was killed by the splinter of a shell, by which the corps of Engineers lost an active, zealous, clever officer, and his intimates a most good-hearted, excellent friend. He will ever be much regretted by all who knew him.[1]

Storming of Ciudad Rodrigo.

January 19*th*. The breach appears in the morning precisely in the same state as last evening. All our guns continue the whole day battering, and in the evening, both breaches are pronounced practicable, and arrangements made for the storming at 7 P.M. The 3rd Division had the duty this day and the next in succession; the Light Division is ordered up by evening. The attack was to be commenced by the 5th Regiment, 2nd battalion, which at ten minutes before seven, was to move from the convent of Santa Cruz, to the right of the town, where the ditch of the fausse-braye terminated by a gate nearly above the bridge over the Agueda. They had with them axes to break open this gate, and twenty-five feet ladders, by which they were to scale the fausse-braye. They were then to proceed along it, clearing it of troops, and upsetting all the guns, till they came to the great breach, when they were to let the storming party pass up, and to follow it. The 5th was to be supported by the 77th and 94th (the remaining regiments of the same brigade commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Campbell, 94th), who were to enter by the same gateway as the 5th, but then to go along the ditch of the fausse-braye, till they came to the great breach of the fausse-braye, when they were to halt and let the storming party (General McKinnon's brigade) pass up, and to follow. The 2nd Caçadores, under command of Lieut.-Colonel O'Toole (Portuguese belonging to the 3rd Division), and light company of the 83rd, were to cross the bridge, and make

[1] The journal of the siege from this point has been omitted, as it is to be found in Sir John Jones's work.—ED.

an attack on the walls on that side. Major-General McKinnon's brigade of the 3rd Division, consisting of the 45th, 74th, and 88th Regiments, were to storm the great breach at 7 P.M., led by their flank companies, under command of Major Manners, 74th Regiment. Five companies of the 95th were at the same time to enter the ditch between the two breaches, and scale the fausse-braye, and then pass along it, and clear it to the great breach, while the remainder of the Light Division were to storm the little breach at the same hour. These different columns were to be preceded by bodies of the Sappers, conveying about 200 large bags filled with hay, to be thrown into the ditch under the counterscarp; they were found extremely serviceable, the counterscarp being ten and twelve feet high, and large stones from the breaches under it. By means of these bags, the men jumped down quite easily, and without injury. Ladders and axes were also carried where it was thought they might be required. No signal was made, as the whole would be regulated by the attack of the 5th Regiment, ten minutes after which the rest would commence. General McKinnon had his brigade ready in the nearest approach on the Little Teson, and Colonel Campbell's brigade were at the convent of Santa Cruz, when, General Crawfurd being late, an order was sent to detain General McKinnon. In the meantime, the 5th began the attack at the hour prescribed, forced the gate very easily, and scaled the fausse-braye; in this part many of the ladders broke (they were made by the staff corps) and several men were much hurt, particularly as they had their bayonets fixed. Major Ridge, their commanding officer, fell from the very top of one by its breaking. Having gained the fausse-braye, the enemy in it fled, except some few artillerymen, who were bayoneted under the guns. The 77th and 94th supported as directed. In the meantime General McKinnon hesitated, in consequence of the foregoing order, and some time was lost. The enemy, on the approach of the 5th, exploded a quantity of shells they had arranged along the top of the breach, with little or no effect. Major Ridge, of the 5th, on his arrival at the foot of the breach, finding General McKinnon's brigade had not arrived, and thinking it of consequence to give the enemy as little time as possible, their drums being at the

time beating to arms, immediately mounted the breach, followed by the 77th and 94th. In the meantime, General McKinnon had advanced, and the whole entered the breach. The ground was confined on the top by the retrenchment, and a number of men were lost by the fire of the enemy before a body could be got together to move along the parapets, to turn the retrenchment, when the enemy immediately fled, and hid themselves in the houses and barracks. At this time, an explosion of some powder and shells just within the entrenchment, either by accident or design, took place, and General McKinnon was blown up in it, and killed. The Light Division was rather late in its attack, and met with little or no opposition in storming the little breach, but experienced some loss in approaching it, General Crawfurd, commanding, being mortally wounded, General Vandeleur slightly, and Colonel Colborne and Major Napier severely. The breaches were both of them perfectly practicable; steep, but the footing excellent. Colonel O'Toole, who advanced at the same time as the 5th, and nearly to the same spot, took advantage of the enemy in that part being entirely engaged with that regiment and following it round the ramparts, to mount a low outwork and take some prisoners, and then forced its sallyport, and thus entered the town. Captain McLeod and Lieutenant Thompson, of the Engineers, with Captain Thompson (74th), conducted the Sappers with the bags to the great breach, and were among the first to jump into the ditch and mount the breach. Captain Ellicombe, Engineers, conducted the Light Division to the little breach, and Lieutenant Wright, of the Engineers, the five companies of the 95th. Lieutenants Reid and Thomson of the Engineers were wounded on this occasion. Our loss in the storming was altogether about 500 killed and wounded, chiefly of the 3rd Division; and previously at the siege, about 500 more. After the place was carried, a great scene of confusion took place; the men kept plundering the town all night, and some houses were set on fire by lighting fires on the floors, but very little blood was spilt, and in the morning about 1300 prisoners were collected and marched off for Lisbon. The storming Ciudad Rodrigo was done with spirit, and the whole siege (of eleven days) was esteemed highly creditable, the French having been before the place for twenty-five

days of open trenches. Our works were certainly not carried on with great expedition. We must think ourselves highly fortunate in having a continuation of fine weather for the whole operation at such a time of year.

January 21*st.* (Ciudad Rodrigo.) The 5th Division arrives from the rear, and are employed to fill up the trenches, repair the breaches, &c. I am to rejoin the 3rd Division to-morrow at Zamarra.

—— 26*th.* (Zamarra.) Marmont has arrived at Salamanca with about 12,000 men, and 2000 or 3000 have pushed on to near Tamames, six leagues from Rodrigo, in consequence of which, Colonel Campbell's brigade are ordered up to Martiago.

—— 28*th.* (Zamarra.) The enemy went back immediately to Salamanca, and it is said, are again dispersing. All our approaches and trenches are now filled up; they were completed the third day. The old French redoubt is to be re-established and enlarged, and we are raising a square redoubt on the Little Teson. The breaches are completely cleared of rubbish, and the lower part of the wall for about ten feet high is found standing; at about five feet a line of fraises is placed, and the interior parapet is made up of gabions and fascines.

To Major Squire, R.E.

Albergaria, February 7, 1812.

Dear Squire,

I observed a long letter for you from Jones, which I supposed contains all the information requisite on the siege; but as I am not certain of the nature of it, I enclose the copy of the journal of the French engineer. You remember probably what I told you on the making the gabions, fascines, &c. The consequence of that arrangement was, that a very small proportion of those made were brought up; those that came were mostly very bad ones, and the gabions of that unwieldy size, as to cause the greatest impediment and delay, when we got within 200 and 300 yards of the place, that is, under good musketry fire, from the difficulty of getting the men to convey them, particularly at night, when they were most wanted. With respect to fascines, we did not use one during the whole business, except a few to walk on in the wet parts of the

trenches. Now I cannot but think tracing fascines of the greatest advantage; and as they may be of the most trifling nature, I would in no instance be without them. I would also invariably use eighteen or twenty-feet fascines for the cheeks of embrasures; but when your battery is very near, I should think it would be impossible for the artillerymen to serve the guns, if the embrasures are formed according to our present system. There was a great want of arrangement in the bringing up the stores; the fresh working parties were conducted to the engineer depôt, whether by day or night, and loaded with platforms, splinter proofs, sandbags, &c., while another part conveyed their arms. These men with the stores would separate even the different parts of the same platform, and come in by ones and twos for an hour after, causing much delay and confusion in telling off the parties, and the stores constantly went wrong. I don't know whether the best way to remedy this would not be to tell off the parties at the depôt, where each officer of Engineers might take his party, and make them take the articles which he knew were required—the subaltern or assistant engineer of the brigade might do this. You have an idea of our first operations before from Mulcaster and me.

Our original battery for, I think, nine guns, including two against the convent of San Francisco, was placed *behind* the French redoubt; it was nearly finished, some platforms laid, and we had worked hard two nights to level the parapet of the redoubt, when it was at length ascertained that not a single gun of the nine could see the objects to be fired at, as well on account of the crest of the hill as of the redoubt. Our headquarters party have sent home a journal of the siege, in which I presume this battery does not make its appearance—it makes a very ugly one in *my* journal.

Our batteries, you will probably take notice, were very long constructing. I do think sinking the interior three feet is not the quickest way to make them; it is so long before you clear out the interior. British soldiers must be bad as working parties, compared with their enemies—probably from its not being made so much a point of duty and honour, the officers attending to them, &c.; but it scarcely ever happens that we can complete works in the time laid down in the French authors.

The enemy made his sortie at relief time, and we had scarce any one in the trenches. General Graham, however, was there, and exerted himself much, collecting a few men, who repulsed the enemy immediately they showed themselves. Reid was also very active, and went down to the convent of Santa Cruz, where our people had absolutely retired to the rear walls without sufficient reason; they threw down a good many full gabions into the trench, which were afterwards very troublesome to remove. Of those two zigzags in advance, two were very wet indeed, having springs of water in them; the men could not be kept to work in the wet place, and to the last they were never properly finished. Up the side, and on the summit of the Petit Teson was a great deal of rock; otherwise the soil was generally loose and strong, but such as gave good cover in the course of the night.

The nights were long and bitter cold, and the parties could not be kept working decently for twelve hours. They were also ordered without reference to the strength of the division; I think the best distribution would have been, to have divided the men the division could afford to give for working, into three parts: one to go on from their first arrival at mid-day till night, another till midnight, the third till morning, and the first party, who had rested all night, again till mid-day.

Our guns opened on the evening of the 14th of January, two hours before dark, in order to breach the convent of San Francisco, which was to be attacked at night. Those two guns, however, as before observed, could not see the wall low enough, and were of no service; the other guns also fired nearly every shot clear over the town, owing to the haste in opening the embrasures, the shot striking the sill of the embrasure, which were not properly opened till night, after which the artillery made very good practice to the end of the siege. Our last seven-gun battery on the left of all was commenced on the night of the 15th, and opened the morning of the 18th—the object of it to breach a square tower and the fausse-braye a little to our right of it in a part seen through the ditch of a ravelin or redan of the fausse-braye cut off by a ditch; the wall of the tower (like that in many other parts) was a very bad one, and its breach by the evening of the 19th as good as the great

breach. This battery, completed so much quicker than the others, had very little room in it, and being on the side of a steep hill, our interior excavation was very great. Thus, when the battery was opened, there was but just room for the platforms; a ramp was made to the back of each, by which the guns were brought direct into the battery down the hill.

On the evening of the 16th, his Lordship had a summons sent in; the governor answered that he was not put in there to surrender, and his brave garrison would be buried under the ruins of the place. If the summons had been sent in on the evening of the 19th, when we had a practicable breach, they would most probably have surrendered. The French take the credit of stopping our sap, which it was not our intention to attempt to carry on, knowing it would be to no purpose under the fire of their artillery so near. We maintained the ground we had obtained by the night's flying sap, and went on with its completion, having however several sappers killed and wounded, they being placed towards the head, and in the most exposed parts. They behaved on nearly all occasions very well. The French call us at this time 100 toises off; Wright's measurements (which agree very well with the French plans) make our crowning of the Little Teson 230 yards from the rampart of the place. Mr. Metcalf, the draughtsman, however, makes us nearer the place; and as some of his lines of direction are evidently wrong, I believe Wright correct on this point, and suppose that Mr. Metcalf has conjectured it would be agreeable to our headquarters to have our trenches advanced a little in the plan. I have begged Wright to take some sections of the place, which he is doing. Williams tells me he saw our journal of the siege, and that he gave great offence to Jones[1] by pointing out some inaccuracies, as that it was put down there that the seven-gun battery on the left opened on the 17th, instead of the 18th.

The 5th Division were brought up next day, and are still quartered at Ciudad Rodrigo, employed on the repairs, &c. The breaches are cleared and temporarily repaired; the French

[1] Captain John Jones acted as brigade-major of Royal Engineers until his retirement from active service in 1812, after a severe wound received at the siege of Burgos.—Ed.

redoubt is in a state of forwardness; the ill-judged (in my opinion) new redoubt on the little Teson gets on slowly, the soil being rock; Lord Wellington, they say, does not approve of it, and says he only wished a *flêche* there. A new redoubt is just commenced close to the rear of our trenches, at about 1000 yards from the place, and not seen from it, to see into the valleys in front. Stores for a siege are now on their way to Elvas from Lisbon and those parts.

I hear a deserter, a sapper, reports the enemy have extensive mines at Badajoz, and that Jones says that we must work in despite of them, for *that it would be useless our attempting to mine*, in which I do not by any means agree with him; and if we attack a front covered by the counterscarp, I don't see how we can succeed, unless we oppose the countermines by the same means. The rumour is that Picurina has been mentioned as the probable side of attack. Mulcaster, McCulloch, and Reid are getting on well, though still confined; but of poor Thompson I fear there are little hopes, Doctor Gunning having declared that now his leg must be prepared for amputation.

Yours very truly,
J. F. BURGOYNE.

Colonel Fletcher's report to the inspector-general of fortifications upon this siege, dated the 21st of January, 1812, states, "It is impossible that any language of mine can do justice to the judgment and exertions of the officers of the corps under my orders during this important service. Captain Burgoyne, who was next in seniority to myself, gave me every assistance, and executed the works under his charge with great zeal and ability."

It has been generally supposed that the first proposal for the formation of a trained body of Engineer soldiers, emanated from Lord Wellington after the siege of Badajoz. I find however, from the correspondence in the War Office, that in a letter, dated from Ciudad Rodrigo, the 29th of January, 1812, addressed to the inspector-general of fortifications, Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher points

out in strong terms the necessity of such a body, and adds, "The sappers we lately employed were taken from the 3rd Division, and had received such instruction as time and means afforded, under Captain Burgoyne. They were certainly useful, but far from expert. Had it become necessary to blow in the counterscarp, we had not any men at all equal to the undertaking."

Captain Burgoyne always demurred to this conclusion, and considered that soldiers of the line could be trained to mine, and form lodgments on the glacis of a fortress, and he proved this to be the case at Burgos. With a strongly avowed preference for a special corps of Sappers and Miners, he considered that the projects of attack in the Peninsula should not have been based exclusively on the assumed impossibility of crowning the glacis of a fortress without such a body.

From Captain PASLEY, R.E., *to* Captain BURGOYNE, R.E.

"London, March 2, 1812.

"DEAR BURGOYNE,

"I congratulate you upon the honour which you *will have* of being the officer who trained the first sappers in the British service that ever acted against an enemy. I believe my men at Plymouth were prior, as far as the mere practice goes. I have now sent out a detachment to Portugal, who are all to be attached to your company. Sergeant Davis is at the head of it, a man whom I recommend to you most particularly in consequence of his superior abilities and good conduct. Corporal Hooker is also a fine fellow, but the former was the cleverest man at Plymouth. He made my models of pontoons, and taught plan drawing, &c., to the other men. There are also two privates, Hugh Best and Hugh Watt, whom I recommend to you as deserving of promotion. These two men also understand the principles of plan drawing, and have marked out batteries, &c.

"You have been unlucky in having two junior officers promoted over you, who were employed on the same service.

Macleod's case in particular is a great shame; his father took advantage of the mere *mention* of his name, and settled the matter in a moment.[1]

"They have sent for me up to town, and mean, I believe, to employ me on a duty for which I formerly volunteered, that is to digest and put in practice a system for training all the young officers and men to their field duties; and I believe it is at last determined that the men are to be called 'Sappers and Miners.' What is very absurd, old Morse[2] is to be at the head of a committee for considering this point—he who threw cold water on it from the first, in all its stages. After Jones's promotion, I sent a memorial to Lord Mulgrave, stating my services, and requesting him to recommend me to the Commander-in-Chief. Mann supported it, I believe, to the best of his power. To my great surprise, I received an answer to say, that Captain Pasley's services were certainly *very great and meritorious*, but they were performed in a *different administration*, consequently Lord Mulgrave did not think it incumbent upon him to *notice them*. He also stated, fortunately for me, that as for training the young officers, sappers, &c., he considered that a duty which could not give an officer any possible claim to notice, as it was not performed in the face of an enemy. Hence you see that Lord Mulgrave erases all my past services at once, and, as a great favour, it appears that he intended to deprive me of all opportunity of performing new ones, by appointing me drill master; for I collected from his conversation, when I had an interview with him, that he was stupid enough to confound the plan I had in view, with the drudgery of a brigade-major in an office, or of an adjutant on parade. I have announced, both to him and to General Mann, my decided aversion to be employed in a situation which it appears is considered so worthless a duty, and have retracted my former offer. If they do not promote me (but of this I assure you I have no hope), I have deter-

[1] In Lord Wellington's despatch announcing the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, he had mentioned Captains John Jones and McLeod of the Royal Engineers by name, and had omitted all mention of Captain Burgoyne, who was senior to both these officers, and had served as director throughout the siege. The error was afterwards rectified, and Captain Burgoyne obtained a majority for this siege.—Ed.

[2] General Morse was inspector-general of fortifications.

mined to publish the system of instruction which I adopted at Plymouth, and which was brought to so much perfection that Sergeant Davis and two of the privates were able to teach practical geometry, plan drawing, and the principles of the attack of places, to the rest of the men. By this means I shall at least secure the credit of my labours, which have been so thanklessly received. Sergeant Davis made me a model of the Neapolitan copper pontoons, which I lately offered to send to Lord Wellington. I think his Lordship rather used me ill. I sent him a present of my book, which, as a gentleman, he ought to have acknowledged. At the same time, I wrote to him a full account of the difficulties we laboured under, owing to the want of men trained to the making of fascines, gabions, &c., and sapping. This letter, which was dated the 27th of July, 1811, he never thought proper to answer. I wrote to him because I thought Fletcher would be too timid to say anything about the department that would implicate Morse.

"Everyone here thinks that you will get the brevet if you go properly about it, and do not put yourself in a rage. Be stoical, is my advice.[1]

"Your very sincere friend,
"C. W. Pasley."

Siege of Badajoz. 1812.[2]

March 15th. A bridge of small English pontoons is established across the Guadiana, about ten miles below Badajoz, in the narrowest part that could be found (about 120 yards), there not being sufficient pontoons to form a longer bridge; they are placed 4 ft. 6 in. asunder, and reckoned equal to pass nine-pounders. About a mile and a half higher up the river, a flying bridge is commenced, composed of three large boats, to pass the battering train. The river is now fordable in various parts.

[1] Burgoyne's friends, who were acquainted with his habitual good temper, and placidity under any degree of annoyance, used to make a common joke of beseeching him on all occasions not to lose his temper, or fly out. The late Lord Hardinge, on some occasion of great irritation to both, exclaimed, "If I could once see you in a passion, Burgoyne, I should be happy."

[2] The details of the works of attack have been omitted, as they are to be found in Jones's 'Sieges in Spain.'—Ed.

Our battering train is at Elvas; it consists of sixty-two pieces, very fine ones, of iron, and English, including ten or twelve heavy howitzers. A Portuguese brigade is pushed across the Guadiana, to protect the bridges.

March 16th. The 1st, 6th, and 7th Divisions, under Lieut.-General Sir T. Graham, march to-day to Valverde, and to-morrow to Zafra, where they will form a corps of observation to the south, to watch the movements of Soult. The French general Drouet, with two divisions, is at present at Zafra.

The 2nd Division, under Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill, is on its march to Merida, to form a corps of observation against the army from the north, under Marmont.

The 3rd, 4th, and Light Divisions, in all about 11,000 men, are to undertake the siege.

The flying bridge is completed at mid-day, and the battering train begins to move this day.

Siege of Badajoz.

General Graham's corps march from Elvas at daylight, and having to pass the same bridge of pontoons, the 3rd and 4th Divisions march from Elvas at 8 A.M. for the investment. The Light Division march by a different road, and will arrive before Badajoz to-morrow. The intention was to invest the place and break-ground this night, but owing to the delay occasioned by the string of baggage of Graham's corps filing over the bridge, and to the 3rd and 4th Divisions marching in one column, and following the heights on the right instead of the road, there was not time to complete the investment before night; the 3rd Division therefore halted on the heights between Picolini[1] and Pardilleiros, and the 4th on its left. Lord Wellington being unwell, Marshal Beresford took the command in this operation. The column was preceded by thirty or forty Portuguese cavalry. Some of our light infantry and Portuguese dragoons skirmished with some French parties, on the left near the river. It appears the enemy were out last night with field-pieces near our bridge, but made no attack on the Portuguese brigade.

A Portuguese brigade encamped on the banks of the Caya, between Badajoz and Elvas, to secure the communication from Elvas. Showers.

[1] This work was styled Picurina, according to information subsequently received.

March 17th. Marmont is moving to the northward, apparently to make some attempt on Ciudad Rodrigo, as a diversion.

The French have a force at Medellin, a town five leagues above Merida, and on the Guadiana, and General Hill is to move forward against it. A great number of Spaniards came out of the place with their effects, and even flocks of sheep and goats. The French have given them twenty-four hours to evacuate the place. The garrison is still commanded by Philippon, and consists of about 4500 men, of which eighty are cavalry. The inhabitants report that the enemy lost five men and a horse, in skirmishing yesterday evening.

We complete the investment early and encamp, and during it, General Kempt sent out a company to occupy the little height 300 yards in front of Picolini. The French sentries retire, and it gives an opportunity to reconnoitre; in about an hour they are withdrawn, the situation being much exposed. The enemy are working hard at a retrenchment in the Pardilleiros outwork; between that and the river they have countermined; they have dammed the little river Rivellas, near the bridge leading from the Talavera gate to the detached ravelin, and got ten feet water in that part, and a wet ditch to the ravelin, which is a most complete work, but small. The Picolini redoubt, which is about thirty-five yards from the place, is garrisoned by grenadiers, and they are opening an embrasure in the face of the nearest bastion, to bear on it, otherwise they do not appear to be doing anything on that side. On the castle, the side we attacked last siege, they have made much improvement; the breach in it is built up in form of a large tower, the escarp in other parts is renewed, and a very good parapet is made to the whole castle front, with several new embrasures and guns mounted; the rocky side of the hill below is also occupied. The fort of San Christoval, on the opposite side of the river, is well covered by a new glacis and covert-way, at great labour, and a strong new redoubt erected 400 yards in front, on the height, where our breaching battery was situated last siege.

The enemy fire several shots at a reconnoissance made between Pardilleiros and the river.

At 4 P.M. heavy rain with a high wind, which continued all

night. Fortunately the troops were encamped just before it commenced.

At night we break ground on the height about 250 yards in front of Picolini, by a parallel of about 600 yards extent, and part of four extensive zigzags of communication; the working party 1800, with a covering party of 2000. Much confusion, and the party is not at work till eleven at night; no stores are up but the pickaxes and shovels, consequently no tracing fascines, which occasions much inconvenience. The enemy, probably, did not perceive the working till morning, as they did not fire a single shot all night, nor for an hour after daylight. The working parties are to be relieved every six hours; the three general officers, Generals Colville, Howes, and Kempt, are to take duty of the trenches in turns for twenty-four hours. Major Squire and myself are to be directors of the works, and relieve each other every twenty-four hours at 1 P.M. There are besides eight brigades of Engineers, of one captain, one subaltern, and one assistant engineer, each of whom are relieved three times a day. A French officer came out to reconnoitre in the morning, and was shot at a great distance by our picket.

March 19th. The enemy made a sortie at mid-day, with about 1000 infantry, 40 cavalry, and a field-piece. They came out by the Trinidad Gate, and in a quick pace formed about 700 men on the flank of the new parallel, which is not above 500 yards' distance, about 300 sharpshooters in front, and advance. Our covering party and workmen (the latter with their arms also) mix, and get into confusion, and without forming at all, at length repulse the enemy, after allowing them to come halfway up the new parallel. Their cavalry, in the meantime, gallop to our rear, and even take two officers prisoners in the Engineers' depôt, whom they release without injury, on finding they could not take them off, and gallop back. We had 112 men killed and wounded, and the enemy must have lost nearly as many. After this, the duty of the covering party is ordered to be taken by divisions, and not detachments.

The enemy take two field-pieces down into the low grounds on the other side of the Guadiana, to enfilade the right of our parallel at 900 or 1000 yards' distance, and do some execution.

A party of our riflemen are sent down to the banks of the river on this side, to drive them from their guns, without effect. Part of the battering train are in the camp; Lord Wellington ordered the rest to be detained at the bridge, till likely to be wanted. The duty is extremely hard on the troops, scarcely two reliefs. Confusion and delay arise from having the covering party and working party relieved at the same hour. The enemy continue to fire but few shells, but a great many shot, which however can do but little execution in our very extended line. An officer of Engineers is ordered off immediately for another bridge of pontoons from Villa Velha.

March 22*nd*. It appears that our bridge of pontoons over the Guadiana is carried away by the rising of the river from the late heavy rains, which still continue; the flying bridge, however, is still of service. The field-pieces are brought down to enfilade our right, and annoy us much all day. It is determined therefore, to invest the place to-morrow on the Christoval side, by one British regiment from the 5th Division, and the Portuguese brigade before on the Caya.

Philippon sends a despatch for Soult, folded up in the button of a Spaniard's coat; the Spaniard makes a *détour*, and brings in the despatch to Lord Wellington. It states that he had made a sortie which had completely answered all his purposes, that we had lost in it 600 or 700 men, and that his loss had been *only* 100; he adds that he learned from some prisoners that we had 15,000 men before the place, and 20,000 at Merida; that affairs began to look serious, but that he and General Laval had taken every precaution to give us a warm reception, should we attempt to attack the place *de vive force*.

—— 23*rd*. The two field-pieces come down in the morning, and open upon us as usual, and kill several men. A signal is established on two heights which look in some degree into the enemy's works, to give notice on any assembly of troops indicating a sortie.

It was intended to open the batteries on the 24th, but from the bad weather, or having to raise some of the batteries, &c., it now becomes doubtful whether we shall have them ready before the 25th. The weather continues so bad, that the river Guadiana rises very considerably—it is said fifteen feet. The

bridge of pontoons is carried away, and the flying bridge is so difficult as to take two hours in going and coming. It was proposed to work the flying bridge by bullocks on both sides.

March 24th. The enemy throw down trees and large beams of wood, to float down the river and destroy our bridges; they could not do it at a worse time than when we have none. A regiment of the 5th Division from Campo Mayor, a Portuguese brigade, and a small body of cavalry, invest the Christoval side. The enemy fire no more from their enfilading field-pieces, after a few rounds in the morning; they are also forced to drive in their horses, cattle, and sheep which grazed on the banks of the Xevora.

At night, we complete our batteries, and open the embrasures. In some of the batteries, the men in the ditch had been allowed to cut from the escarp side instead of the counterscarp, in consequence of which, the base of the parapet having been originally only twenty feet, there was no thickness at top, and for a remedy, we were forced to commence a new escarp of sand-bags in the ditch. If the base had been originally twenty-four feet, it would have allowed for such accidents, and though it would not have been necessary to have such a thickness of parapet, a berme of four feet might have been left without inconvenience.

The corners of our embrasures consisted of two gabions, and from this point they were lined with sand-bags for six or eight feet; the remainder of the cheek of the embrasure without revetment. All this comes down after a few rounds, from the explosion of our own guns. Very long fascines (eighteen or twenty feet) are I conceive the only material for making good embrasures. Our usual mode was to sink the batteries in the interior three feet; this created too much interior excavation and caused delay. In the low grounds, we are forced to raise the batteries entirely, and the difficulty is to get out sufficient stuff from the ditch; perhaps sinking one foot only in the interior would be the most expeditious mode. On all occasions men should be kept all night on the berme, throwing the stuff backward, in order to give as much cover in the interior as possible, and as early.

—— *25th.* Fine day. The river has fallen, and the bridge

of pontoons re-established with those saved, and some more brought up to Elvas.

The guns were got in by the different roads by midnight, not going through the trenches.

At half-past ten, the batteries opened, all being directed to destroy the defences.

Poor Mulcaster was struck in the head by a cannon-shot, about ten o'clock, and half of it was taken off; his death was instantaneous. A better fellow or more promising officer never existed.

Lieutenant Ramage, 74th, assistant engineer, was also killed. Two other assistant engineers had been wounded before.

The enemy are at work endeavouring to cover the first front from the castle, which they seem to think threatened.

At half-past eight, the Picolini redoubt was stormed. The 3rd Division happened to give the covering party, and Major-General Kempt was general officer of the trenches; these troops therefore had this affair to undertake. General Kempt's arrangements were extremely good. He appointed 100 men of the 88th to go round by the right and 100 by the left, to clear everything round the work; then to form a junction in its rear, and proceed forward to a narrow part of the covered communication or covert-way, and there oppose with the bayonet any party that might come out to succour the fort. Two hundred men were appointed to storm it by the gorge, which it was supposed would be the weakest point; it was however extremely high, and had a triple row of palisading. This party was detained so long by these defences, that General Kempt ordered another storming party to attempt the front. Both parties got in about the same time, and it is feared, fired at each other, while the enemy retired to a low part of the work, in which was a loopholed guard-room. At this time an alarm spread that the enemy were coming out, and our people, in consequence, leaving the neighbourhood of the guard-room, the enemy rushed out and made for the place. The advanced party of the 88th observed this, and rushed at them, and drove them into the inundation, where several were drowned and bayoneted. This post was guarded by 230 men, of whom one colonel commanding, some officers, and about sixty men were taken in the first instance, and about twenty more were brought out of the

guard-room, most of whom were wounded. Our loss was about 170 killed and wounded, with a large proportion of officers, among whom Captain Holloway of the Engineers, was shot through the body and lungs, and Lieutenant Gipps very slightly wounded in the arm. The redoubt was extremely strong; a palisaded covert-way, then a scarp of about fifteen feet perpendicular, then a very strong row of fraises, and above an earth parapet. The fire of our artillery had done it no injury whatever, the scarp and fraises being perfectly covered by the crest of the glacis. The interior was very narrow; they had commenced casemates in the salient angle of the counterscarp, to flank the ditch of the two faces, and pots containing live shells, were preparing in the ditch. The enemy must have behaved very ill, notwithstanding our loss, and the time we took to get possession of it, or we never could have got in. A second parallel was immediately commenced at this point.

April 4th. The breaches not thought practicable in the evening. At night go with Wells,[1] and examine the fords of the Rivellas under the castle. It can be crossed with difficulty near its mouth, and even the wall from the castle into the river can be crossed by a path that might easily escape observation. We therefore propose introducing 200 men by that way, round the foot of the castle to the river line wall, and endeavour to get in by surprise, while another body makes the same attempt below the bridge; if one succeeds, the way might be open to the other, and then the two uniting would secure a footing sufficient to introduce a large body. But this project is thought hazardous, and the castle is to be scaled instead in the highest part, under which the river may be crossed at a mill-dam, as we ascertained. Continued fine and hot weather.

—— *5th.* The breaches are pronounced practicable early in the day, and all the arrangements made for storming the place at night, when to the astonishment and disappointment of every one, at 5 P.M. the whole is countermanded.[2] The breaches are made precisely according to a project formed two or three months ago, which had been approved of by his Lordship, and

[1] Lieutenant Wells of the Royal Engineers.

[2] For the purpose of making a third breach. See Jones's 'Sieges in Spain.'—ED.

entirely acted upon; they appear very good ones, and are very large; one taking in nearly the whole of a flank, and the other very nearly the whole length of a face of a bastion. At night, the sap in front of the ravelin of St. Roque is pushed on.

April 6th. The breach commenced at 3 P.M. yesterday, in the part of the curtain close to the flank of the bastion Trinidad, which is seen to the foot through the small ravelin, is battered all day continuously, and being low, and a bad wall, a very good and practicable breach is effected by night. At 10 P.M. the place is to be stormed. The 4th Division attack the large breach in the face of the bastion Trinidad, and the new one in the curtain, the Light Division, that in the opposite flank. The 3rd Division is to make the attempt to scale the castle wall at the summit of the hill, and the 5th Division, to scale near the first bastion (St. Vicente), near the river at the lower end of the town.

Assault of Badajoz.

At 9½ P.M. the advance of the 3rd Division, under Lieut.-Colonel Williams, 60th Regiment, was quietly introduced across the mill-dam under the castle, which is about 300 yards below the ravelin of St. Roque, and lie down under the banks on the opposite side; the ladders were being brought over, to be formed six or eight abreast, ready to be taken up the hill, when a French sentinel in the covert-way fired, as was common at nights. The advance, not being aware they were so near the enemy, and thinking themselves discovered, commenced firing, and the garrison immediately took the alarm. The attack on the castle was therefore commenced directly. The ladders (upwards of thirty feet long) were carried up the steep rugged height, with great spirit, under a heavy fire of musketry, the troops following. The ladders were well placed, and the 5th, 45th, and 83rd Regiments led up them, in spite of stones, live shells, &c., thrown down upon them. Some of the ladders were thrown down by the enemy, and one they pulled up into the castle; several men were precipitated from top to bottom, but others followed, and at length gained a firm footing. The whole division was then introduced, about 3000 men, and the castle taken complete possession of. The loss of the 3rd Division in

this bold attack, was between 400 and 500 men, and many officers. In the meantime, our troops had been completely unsuccessful in their attacks on the breaches.

At 10 P.M. the 4th and Light Divisions marched to the attack along the left bank of the inundation. The 4th Division, on arriving at the counterscarp opposite the great breach, found a wet ditch at its foot, which continued to the salient angle of the ravelin; they were forced therefore to incline to their left as far as that point, before they could descend into the ditch; the Light Division making for the same point originally, the two divisions got clubbed and mixed, and great confusion consequently took place, to which circumstance in great measure may be attributed their want of success. The counterscarp was from sixteen to twenty feet high (which was double what was expected), but the ditch was entered without much loss.

From that time a great deal of firing commenced on both sides, and the breaches were not attacked with the vigour they should have been, the cause of which was principally owing to the confusion before mentioned. After repeated efforts, these two divisions were ordered to retreat, having lost a great number of officers and men. On the summit of the breaches was a retrenchment, consisting of a parapet only, but retired so far back as not to be able to fire down the slope of the breach; in front was a row of chevaux-de-frise, the spears of which were made of sword blades, probably taken from the old armoury. These chevaux-de-frise must have been made immediately after dark, and being fixed only at the extreme ends, could not have presented any very formidable obstacle. Small passages were cut into the entire parts of the parapet, by which a single man could get close to the outer revetment, and fire into the ditch. They had a large force at the breaches, and kept up a very heavy fire of musketry, and threw down a great number of large shells and grenades; in short, their defence of the breaches was spirited.

The 5th Division were to scale the front on the lower side of the river; having only just arrived however, they were late, and did not commence their attack till after eleven. They gained the works, and the first party, General Walker's brigade, moved along them towards the breaches, when they were opposed at

the second bastion and driven hastily back; the other troops, who had by this time got up, supported them, and the enemy were turned. Those at the breaches, having learned that we had gained the castle, threw down their arms, and the 4th and Light Divisions entered without opposition. The enemy had previously, however, with a strong body, attempted to regain the castle without effect. The governor and second in command had taken refuge in San Christoval, and there gave themselves up.

Our loss was about 3000 killed and wounded, and among the latter, Generals Colville, Bowes, Walker, and Kempt. Our previous loss in the siege, about 1500. The garrison at the commencement, consisted of 4800 men, of whom about 3000 were marched away prisoners. Lieutenants Lascelles and De Saluberry were killed, and Captains Nicholas and Williams, of the Engineers, wounded in the assault.

The castle is still, in my opinion, by much the weakest side of the place, its wall seen to the foot from a distance; and by commencing from the foot of the hill, where it joins the river, and breaching gradually upwards, a great extent would be opened easily, before the wall becomes embanked against the natural soil. This breach would be unflanked, and the little river Rivellas at the foot of the hill, being partly fordable, and otherwise so small as to admit of small bridges being thrown quickly over, would scarcely present an obstacle. As there was no sluice, the water of the inundation could not be readily let out. The fort of Christoval and its advanced work might have their gorges completely and immediately destroyed, by batteries on the low ground under the castle. Had we commenced with vigour, by a parallel in this part, about 400 yards from the castle wall, I think we should have taken the place in eight or ten days.[1]

As Major Burgoyne gives no account of the part he personally took in the escalade of the castle of Badajoz by Picton's division, I append a vivid description of the

[1] This was also the opinion of Colonel Lamare, who commanded the French engineers within the place. He expressed this opinion in a pamphlet published after the peace, and which is quoted by Napier, vol. iv. p. 472.—Ed.

scene from a pamphlet published many years ago, by an officer of the line, who served under him at this siege, as an assistant Engineer.

The Storming of Badajoz.[1]

"On the 6th, all minds were anxious for the 'Advance,' and orders were issued for the attack at ten o'clock that night. I again, with Major Burgoyne, attended by appointment General Picton, at 8 o'clock P.M. General Kempt and several others were there. General Picton, having explained his arrangements and given his orders, pulled out his watch, and said, 'It is time, gentlemen, to go;' and added emphatically, 'Some persons are of opinion that the attack on the castle will not succeed; but I will forfeit my life if it does not!' We returned to the engineer depôt, where the fatigue party and others had assembled to receive ladders, axes, &c., which General Picton superintended himself, and repeated to them some directions. He then asked, 'Who is to show me the way?" and Major Burgoyne presented me to him. When the General had sent off the party, he turned to me, 'Now, sir, I am going to my division,' and rode away. I followed, and soon lost sight of him in the dark, but pursuing the same direction, (not knowing where the division was) I fortunately arrived at the division, which was drawn up in column between two hills, at the distance, I supposed, of three miles, and quite out of sight of Badajoz. General Picton having addressed each of the brigades, he returned to the head of the division, ordered the 'March,' and said to me, 'Now, sir, which way are we to go?' We proceeded a considerable distance, and again came within sight of the fortress, the lights of which were altered and much extended. I was to conduct the division to a certain point in the trenches to meet Major Burgoyne,[2] and thence to the escalade, and naturally felt the weight of the charge; for if I had

[1] Extracted from a pamphlet entitled 'Recollections of the Storming of Badajoz,' by Captain McCarthy, 50th Regiment, and assistant engineer, 3rd Division.

[2] Major Burgoyne was ordered to conduct the 3rd Division to the escalade of the castle. See the orders of the day in Jones's 'Sieges.'—ED.

misconducted, so that *this* division arrived too late, I cannot, even now, ruminate on the result. But I had been so perfectly instructed by Major Burgoyne, that I could not err; notwithstanding, to prevent the possibility of deviating, I several times ran ahead, to ascertain the correctness of my guidance towards the given point; the General inquiring each time if we were going right, I confidently answered in the affirmative. Again I departed, and approaching in the direction of the ravelin, but far from it, stumbled on a dead soldier of the 52nd Regiment, which, operating as a landmark, proved that I was perfectly correct. No delay or error occurred. I returned to the column, and informed the General that it was necessary to incline to the right; and coming to the side of the Talavera Road, the column descended into it. Here General Picton, dismounting, sent away his horse, and headed his division on foot. The firing of the enemy's musketry becoming brisk, increased the General's anxiety lest any occurrence should retard the operation of his division; and when I had again advanced some distance, to discover Major Burgoyne, and returned, General Picton, emphatically expressing himself, said that I was blind, he supposed, and going wrong, and drawing his sword, swore he would cut me down. I explained, and he was appeased. We soon after arrived at the very spot in the first parallel where Major Burgoyne was waiting, when, seizing his hand with the affection of a brother-soldier, I expressed my happiness on the perfection of my guidance, and my assurance to the General that 'I had not led him an inch out of the way.' Indeed, it was as correct as a line. The division then entered the trench, and proceeded nearly to the end of it, when the enemy's fire burst forth in every direction over the division. The grandeur of the scene was indescribable. It was as light as day. General Picton exclaimed, 'Some of them are too soon. What o'clock is it?' And, comparing his watch with others, the time was a quarter before ten o'clock. I mention this, because it has been supposed that General Picton's division approached too soon. When the division had advanced some distance from the parallel, and General Picton at its head, with General Kempt, Major Burgoyne, the staff, and myself, the enemy's fire increased considerably, and I was walking between General Picton and

General Kempt, when General Picton stumbled and dropped, wounded in the foot. He was immediately assisted to the left of the column, and the command devolving on General Kempt, he continued to lead it with the greatest gallantry. On arrival at the mill-dam (extremely narrow), over which the troops were to pass, streams of fire blazed on the division: the party with ladders, axes, &c., which had preceded, were overwhelmed, mingled in a dense crowd, and stopped the way. Being by the side of General Kempt, I said, for recognition sake, if we survived, 'This is a glorious night, sir—a glorious night!' and rushing through the crowd (numbers were sliding into the water and drowning), I found the ladders left on the palisades in the fosse, and this barrier unbroken. In the exigence, I cried out, 'Down with the paling!' and aided by the officers and men in rocking the fence, made the opening at which the division entered, and which was opposite the before-mentioned mound; then 'Up with the ladders!' 'What! up here?' said a brave officer (45th). 'Yes!' was replied. And all seizing the ladders, pulled and pushed each other with them up the acclivity of the mound, as the shortest way to its summit. The above officer, and a major of brigade, laboriously assisted in raising the ladders against the wall, where the fire was so destructive, that with difficulty five ladders were reared on the mound, and I arranged the troops on them successively, according to my instructions, during which I was visited by General Kempt and Major Burgoyne, although this place and the whole face of the wall, being opposed by the guns of the citadel, were so swept by their discharges of round shot, broken shells, bundles of cartridges, and other missiles, and also from the top of the wall ignited shells, &c., that it was almost impossible to twinkle the eye on any man, before he was knocked down. In such an extremity, four of my ladders with troops on them, and an officer on the top of each, were broken successively near the upper ends, and slid into the angle of the abutment. On the remaining ladder was no officer; but a private soldier at the top, in attempting to go over the wall, was shot in the head as soon as he appeared above the parapet, and tumbled backwards to the ground, when the next man (45th Regiment) to him upon the ladder, instantly sprang over. I instantly

cheered 'Huzza! There is one over, follow him!' But the circumstance of the ladders being broken, delayed the escaladers in this part a short time, until the ladders were replaced, so as to reach the top of the wall, which enabled the troops to pass over."

Journal resumed.

April 8th. Before Badajoz. Brigadier-General Powers' brigade of Portuguese put into Badajoz, to establish order.

—— *9th.* (Badajoz.) In the evening, 500 men of General Powers' brigade commence filling in the trenches.

—— *10th.* At 6 P.M. received instructions to proceed to Villa Velha, and if, on my arrival, the enemy were at Castello Branco, the floating-bridge of Villa Velha was immediately to be taken up, the materials put into the boats, and the boats sent about a league down the river, to a place of safety on the left bank, in order to be replaced as a bridge, as soon as our troops arrive. Set out at midnight.

Instructions to remove Bridge of Villa Velha,[1] *10th of April,* 1812, *given to me by* Lord WELLINGTON.

"Mem^{m} April 10th.

"Major Burgoyne is to set out this evening for Villa Velha, and if possible to arrive there to-morrow. If on his arrival at Villa Velha, he shall find the enemy at Castello Branco, he is to have the bridge taken up at Villa Velha, and all the materials put into the boats, and the boats must be sent about a league down the stream, and left there on the left bank, in a place to which the enemy cannot get at them, ready to be drawn up and replaced as a bridge as soon as the troops will arrive at Villa Velha to cross the Tagus.

"The bridge is not to be taken up till the enemy arrives at Castello Branco.

"The 1st Hussars have been ordered to Castello Branco, and Major Burgoyne should communicate with General Alten and General La Cor.

"W."

[1] The object was to stop the irruption which Marmont had made into Portugal, as a diversion, to save Badajoz. The original of these instructions is in Lord Wellington's own handwriting.—ED.

April 11*th*. Met with difficulties, and delayed in passing the gates and getting through the town. Arrive at Arronches, seven leagues, about half-past 10 A.M. Remained there till 2 P.M. to refresh my horses, and then proceeded on to Portalegre, four leagues more. Took post-horses there, and set out at 10 P.M.

—— 12*th*. Reached Villa Velha at 9 A.M. Found the Portuguese captain of Engineers in charge of the bridge, in great distress, having received an order from Marshal Beresford to remove the bridge when the enemy should arrive, that is, in his immediate presence. Knowing how impossible this would be, from the nature of the business, and the few experienced people he had, he determined on preparing to burn it, as the only resource, in the presence of the enemy, for the French had entered Castello Branco yesterday, about 7000 strong at 4 P.M., and were expected down at Villa Velha hourly. Neither General La Cor, who commanded in the province, and had two or three regiments of militia, nor General Baron Alten with the 1st Hussars, also near Castello Branco, would take upon themselves to give an order for removing the bridge, not knowing the situation of our troops. On my arrival, however, I had it immediately withdrawn, and the boats removed down to just below the bold narrow pass of the river within the mountains, to a sandy bay, about two miles below the site of the bridge. This operation took an hour and a half, the boats being twelve in number. The cables were thrown into the river, except those which would reach the left bank. The sick and stores from Castello Branco had before got over safe. The commandant of the sick depôt at Castello Branco, Captain Stewart (74th) wrote from that place on the 4th inst. to the adjutant-general at headquarters, that General La Cor had informed him that it was possible the enemy might come down there, and that he therefore recommended him to be prepared to move the sick and stores, &c., in consequence of which, he had procured carts for the purpose. He received the answer to this letter *this evening* — that as the commander of the forces had as good information of the movements of the enemy as General La Cor or any other general, he desired he would not receive instructions from anybody but his Lordship. Now this letter was

dated the 9th, from Badajoz, 100 miles off, and the French entered Castella Branco on the 11th.

April 13th. (Niza.) General Alten is within a league of Castello Branco, and his advance skirmishes with the enemy; a *chasseur à cheval,* wounded and taken, says they have 7000 men, infantry and cavalry.

—— *14th.* (Niza.) Receive a note from General Alten that the enemy had retired yesterday-morning at daybreak from Castello Branco, taking the Peña Mayor road.[1] Immediately order the bridge to be re-established. Rode down to where the boats are situated under Monte do Duque—two or three small villages so called. Found there already two or three hundred peasants and the Portuguese engineer, at work getting the boats up. He assures me the bridge will be ready early to-morrow morning. A sufficient number of the cables thrown into the river are recovered for immediate use, and the rest will be gained when there is more leisure. Heavy rain. The Light Division march on to Niza from Portalegre, there not being sufficient cover for them, and the 3rd Division at Alpalhão, where the 3rd remain. From Abrantes to Niza the navigation of the Tagus is so difficult as to be next to impossible, and the cause is said to arise from large loose rocks which have fallen into its current. These are dry, or nearly so, in summer, and might be blown to pieces by powder.

—— *15th.* Headquarters arrive at Niza, and the 3rd and Light Divisions and 11th Light Dragoons move forward. I am now attached to headquarters, Colonel Fletcher and other officers of Engineers remaining at Badajoz.[2]

—— *17th.* Headquarters 3rd Division and 11th Dragoons move to Castello Branco. Heavy rain. Tagus swollen so as to require seventeen boats to the bridge. Our cavalry have defeated that of the enemy near Llerena, in the south, and

[1] Major Burgoyne's account of these events appears to show that Sir W. Napier's strictures on General Alten's measures are undeserved. See Napier, vol iv. p. 443.—Ed.

[2] Lord Wellington left Colonel Fletcher behind to repair the works at Badajoz, and for the remainder of the campaign of 1812, Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne was commanding engineer with the field force. He obtained his brevet of lieutenant-colonel for the siege of Badajoz.

taken 150 prisoners, and killed and wounded 150 more. Our loss is twelve killed and thirty wounded.

April 19th. Lord Wellington inspects the two regiments of Heavy German Dragoons; they are in excellent order, and about 700 strong the two. Marmont is said to have twenty-five or thirty thousand men, and to be determined to fight for Ciudad Rodrigo. Trant, with his Portuguese militia, is at Guarda.

—— *25th.* (Headquarters, Guinaldo.) The French have retired beyond the Agueda. Don Carlos D'España visits Lord Wellington. Marmont, in his late excursion into Portugal, attempted to pass the bridge over the Agueda, at San Felices, but a Portuguese engineer from Almeida, having mined it, blew it up and destroyed it, as the enemy were moving down the hill. They reconnoitred Ciudad Rodrigo, but attempted nothing against it. In the place, at the last there were twelve days' provisions. The enemy formed a bridge over the Agueda, near the convent of Caridad, about two miles below Rodrigo. They passed a great quantity of ladders over in cars, and reconnoitred Almeida very closely, particularly the part they had destroyed a year before; but the preparations of the garrison, the walls being lined with people, and the place well provided with artillery, which was served against them the whole time of the reconnoissance, prevented their attempting anything against it. The governor (Colonel Le Mesurier) made several sorties on their advanced *tirailleurs*. The enemy left twenty-five men dead. The garrison consisted of 3000 militia. In consequence of his spirit on this occasion, he appears to possess very much the confidence of the Portuguese in this part of the country. Not so Colonel Trant, who had a body of about 3000 militia from Oporto, said to be in a much better state than any other militia in the country, and with whom he had just solicited Lord Wellington to allow him to try an action with the enemy. This corps, being at or near Guarda, was completely surprised and routed by the enemy, with little or no opposition, and lost its colours, in consequence of which Marshal Beresford has taken away the colours from all the regiments of militia. The Portuguese are said to have lost 1500 men on this occasion, who were disarmed

and dismissed; the fugitive remainder only stopped at Coïmbra. Trant escaped. The enemy then advanced to Lagiosa, within one league of Celorico, where was what they call "a half depôt of ammunition," consisting of 500,000 rounds of musket ammunition, &c., and a depôt of provisions, all of which was destroyed by our people. This, with the feat of Guarda, were the only advantages gained by the enemy, in this campaign of diversion in favour of Badajoz. It is said they collected a great quantity of cattle in Portugal, a thing of little consequence, as I have never heard that either the French or ourselves were in want of meat, bread being the great difficulty, which is daily increasing, from the emigration of the natives, and the want of cultivation, owing to the absence of security for the produce. To the inhabitants the consequences of these excursions of the French into Portugal are disastrous enough, the alarm of the people being so great, that they universally abandon their houses, and the soldiers have no restraint in plundering and destroying, so that on their retiring, numerous families return to their houses literally to starve. Much of this depopulation is also occasioned by us, as may be seen in many villages seldom or never visited by the enemy, where the corn, &c., being seized for the use of the troops, the people have little or no chance of being paid, if taken on account of the Portuguese army; and even when taken by the British, at times the price is small, and at others, if we may believe the people, nearly universally, it is not paid at all. Sometimes they are referred to Lisbon for a few dollars, and usually put off to a distant time. In short, none but the wealthiest can stand it, and the inhabitants either die or emigrate. The houses, when left without inhabitants, become the prey of the soldiers, who burn the floors, doors, &c., to save the trouble of cutting wood after a day's march, and thus numerous villages become utterly desolate.

Colonel Burgoyne *to the* Earl of Derby.

Guinaldo, May 13, 1812.

My dear Lord Derby,

It is a long time since I have written to you, but as you will have heard of me from M. you will not attribute my silence to any neglect.

After the rough and busy scenes of Badajoz, we are enjoying now a complete calm. Lord Wellington was forced to move up to the north, to rescue Ciudad Rodrigo, which was closely blockaded by the French, and had but twelve days' provisions when we relieved them. Our army is now thrown into cantonments, while that place and Almeida are revictualled for three or four months. The Spaniards were much abused for not putting provisions into the place in time, from San João de Pesquiera, on the Douro, where Lord Wellington had left them a large quantity; but we now find how difficult it is to get them conveyed, even with all the resources we have at command, in addition to those of the Spaniards. How impossible, therefore, it must have been for them unassisted.

This operation will take at least a fortnight more, even if we are not molested by the enemy, which we probably shall be, at least to the extent of obliging our army to be collected together again, for it is now much scattered. This will create delay, and fix us longer in the north, for it is reported that when these places are provisioned, the army will move down to the south and be very active there. I shall be very glad to find that the case, and that we may, at least, cause the siege of Cadiz to be raised, which it has so long been a disgrace to us not to have done.

The siege of Badajoz was a hard service, and caused a severe loss to all concerned; the object gained, however, was great and the experience worth anything. I had the good fortune to be attached to my friend General Picton and the 3rd Division at the *finale;* and it was to them, undoubtedly, that our success was owing. Had that attack not succeeded, the consequences would have been dreadful. The attacks on the breaches had evidently failed, when I am told nothing could exceed the delight of Lord Wellington, on receiving an official report from General Picton that the castle was ours, for that secured everything. When the General visited him next day, his Lordship burst into tears, as the General told me.

I am sorry to say General Picton is going to England. The army will then lose one of its best officers and most deservedly popular men, and I the best military friend I ever had.

He entered the country, I fancy, certainly with unfavourable opinions towards him. The regiments put under him were generally not of the best, yet he has never failed in anything he has been directed to do, and the division under his command has been particularly distinguished, and I will venture to say, has done more than any division in the army, besides being notorious over the country for the regularity of its conduct—General Picton having universally taken the greatest pains, and using all possible exertions to protect the inhabitants of the country from any excesses of the soldiers; and when unavoidable irregularities have been committed, he has frequently given considerable sums out of his own pocket, to remedy the mischief done. It is an infinite source of satisfaction to me, and this is not the only instance in which I have enjoyed it, that the friend who has taken me by the hand, and showed me every encouragement and regard, should be so distinguished a character himself in the opinion of every one. The friendship of such men is an honour, and cause of my greatest pride.

With kindest remembrances to Lady Derby and all the family, I remain,

Your most attached and faithful

J. F. BURGOYNE.

Journal resumed.

May 13th. (Guinaldo.) The Spanish General, Longa, a guerilla chief under Mina, has sent in a present to Lord Wellington of 1000 bottles of claret, and another 1000 to other officers of this army, being a prize he took lately from the French near Vittoria, said to belong to King Joseph. He also took at the same time several thousand dollars, and 100 prisoners, and released 450 Spaniards, prisoners with the enemy.

—— *15th.* Rode over to Ciudad Rodrigo. The works are getting on much better, since Don Carlos has given Lieutenant Reid, of our Engineers, charge of part of them. His exertions have even shamed the Spanish engineers into working. He appears to meet with difficulties in his communications with them, though outwardly very civil; but with Don Carlos and the governor he is on the best of terms.

May 16th. (Guinaldo.) Return and dine with Lord Wellington, being the anniversary of the battle of Albuera.

—— *17th.* Rode over to Barba del Puerco, seven and a half leagues, with Colonel Framingham and others. Immediately opposite is San Felices; from its situation, and its having one of the only three bridges over that river, and the strong nature of its pass, this passage has always been an important post. Just after Sir John Moore's retreat to Corunna, Sir Robert Wilson, who was acting the partisan in this country with the Lusitanian Legion and a few Spaniards, could not prevent the enemy passing this bridge. Having a party down among the rocks keeping up a fire on the bridge, the French ran over one by one, till they had collected about 500 men on the left bank; they then advanced up the hill without firing, and Sir Robert abandoned the post. They did some execution among the enemy passing the bridge, but none afterwards, and it is probable, that if the whole force had been down there or a large proportion, the enemy could not have passed the long narrow bridge. Early in 1810, Colonel Beckwith, with four companies of the 95th, was stationed at Barba del Puerco, to watch this pass. The enemy had troops at San Felices, and one night, attempted to surprise Beckwith, but without success. They employed about 500 men for this purpose, and were conducted by a Spanish priest. They succeeded in surprising and putting to death the corporal and three men posted at the bridge, and it is said they were enabled to do this by the noise the water makes, owing to its rapid course over the rocks. This enabled them to mount the hill for some distance undiscovered. The pickets, however, gave the alarm, time enough for the whole of the four companies to get under arms, and oppose the enemy just at the summit of the height. After an obstinate fight of two or three hours, they gave way, and were driven back across the river. In May, 1811, Brenier, the French governor of Almeida, took advantage of our troops not having returned to the blockade after the action of Fuentes d'Onoro, to destroy part of the works, and make his escape in the night, which he did by way of Barba del Puerco, followed by some of our troops. None of them, however, being able to cut across his front, he was supported after passing the river by the French troops in San Felices.

May 18*th.* On returning, made a little detour to see Fort Concepcion. Found it in a state of ruin, having all the outworks destroyed, and several breaches in the body of the fort. A quantity of provisions have already been put into Rodrigo, and the rest will be in soon. Some boat loads have, with some difficulty, got up the Douro to the frontier. An intercepted letter says that Soult had left lately a small garrison in Seville, in a convent which they had fortified by a ditch and some exterior works. The same letter (it was to a general officer) stated Lord Wellington's force at Badajoz at 53,000 men. The French are carrying off their sick and granaries, &c., from Salamanca towards Valladolid. They have about 4000 or 5000 men there. They are fortifying some of the convents, and have pulled down 300 or 400 houses round them. They have 400 peasants employed daily. One of their posts commands the bridge. The direct route to Salamanca is very swampy now; at this same time of year, the French were a month moving their heavy artillery down to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. A better road is round about by the bridges of Yecla or Cerralvo, over the Huebra. The former is the best road, but both these bridges are destroyed, and the breaches, it is supposed, are very large. There is a very good ford, however, about 100 yards below Cerralvo bridge.

—— 23*rd.* (Guinaldo.) Ross having reported in December last, after being some time employed on the Douro, clearing tracking paths, destroying mill-dams, &c., that the river was navigable from Quinta dos Carvalhos (the port under San João de Pesquiera) up to the frontier at Barca d'Alva, the mouth of the Agueda, a number of large boats with provisions were sent up, under charge of a commissary, who in the end of January, made a report of his voyage, stating a great number of difficulties from the shallowness of the water, and particularly that he was forced to take out the cargo three times, to get the boats over the shoals. On arriving again this time in this part of the country, Lord Wellington desired me to write to Lieutenant Marshall, Royal Engineers, who was sent after the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo to continue the work of improving the navigation, and ask him how he was getting on, the state of the river now, and what it would be when completed. He returned for answer, that the river had been so high since he was sent,

that the precise nature of the impediments could not be examined or the work continued, till the latter end of the summer, and then mentioned something of confining the bed of the river by moles in the shallow parts. Lord Wellington, now thinking that Ross had been wrong, referred the different reports to Colonel Fletcher, who proposed various projects, but never having seen the river, it was very doubtful how far they would answer. He remarked on the apparent inconsistency of the reports, imagined that such works as moles in the bed of the river would be quite out of the contemplation of his Lordship, and recommended my being sent to examine the exact circumstances. Lord Wellington having referred the whole of the papers to me, and having heard me say that I could not reconcile these different reports on perusing them, desired me to proceed to examine the matter, and let him hear from me, saying at the same time that it would not take many days. Accordingly I set out this day for Almeida. Sir Rowland Hill has taken the *tête de pont* of Almaraz by assault, made 300 prisoners, and killed 200. Wright of ours said to be wounded slightly. We also just learn that poor Squire [1] died suddenly of a paralytic stroke at Truxillo; thus we have lost, in my mind, the best officer of the corps, and a man who, I believe, never had an enemy.[2]

* * * * *

June 15th. To Aldihuela, nine leagues. Found headquarters there, and the army near it. It is now moving up towards Salamanca, in three columns about three miles asunder.

—— *16th.* Some slight skirmishing with cavalry. The enemy retired across the Tormes; our advanced posts are close to them, and the main body about ten miles from Salamanca. The enemy do not show many men.

Siege of Fort St. Vincent, Salamanca. 17th June, 1812.[3]

The French retired from Salamanca before daylight, leaving a garrison in Fort St. Vincent, and redoubts Gayetano and

[1] Lieut.-Colonel Squire was attached to Sir Rowland Hill's corps.—ED.

[2] The journal up to the 15th of June is occupied entirely with the reconnoissance of the Douro, and has been omitted.—ED.

[3] The details relative to the batteries and trenches have been omitted, as they are to be found in Jones's 'Sieges in Spain.'—ED.

Merced, which they had constructed at considerable labour and expense.

Our army crossed the river Tormes early, by the ford of Santa Martha, one mile above the city, and the ford of San Canto, four miles below it.

The 6th Division, under the command of Major-General Clinton, invested the forts, occupying on the side of the town the houses and ruins, which gave cover at from 150 to 250 yards' distance.

The enemy set fire to a row of houses in the valley between the fort and the redoubts, and they were burning on our arrival.

Their works consisted of a fort on the north-west angle of the city, round which angle the old high town wall is built on a perpendicular cliff over the river. The large convent of St. Vincent was included, and its windows built up into loopholes. Lines of works with masonry escarps and counterscarps, loopholed and with covered embrasures, connected the convent on both sides with the old line wall; a re-entering angle of the convent not enclosed by these masonry works, was cut off by a fascine battery, round which was a loopholed wall, which was itself protected by a row of strong inclined palisades. An entrenchment of earthworks round the convent, and palisaded, formed an interior defence. The whole was constructed to be well flanked in every part.

On the south side—that is, towards the bridge over the Tormes—the ground from St. Vincent falls steep into a valley, and on the opposite height, at about 250 yards' distance, were constructed two redoubts from the ruins of convents. The walls of these buildings, by removing the roof, were made in parts to form the escarp and counterscarp, so that by preserving some walls, and building others with ingenious nicety, two redoubts, full of bomb-proofs, with well-covered perpendicular escarps, deep ditches, and casemated counterscarps, were obtained: the larger, called Gayetano, from a convent of that name out of which it was formed; and the smaller, above the river, Merced.

Our information, on commencing the march, having been only to the extent that some convents had been fortified, and a con-

fused sketch of them by some spy who was not a military man, the means conducted with the army were very trifling. They consisted, in artillery, of four long iron eighteen-pounders, four twenty-four-pounder carronades, and 100 rounds of ammunition per gun. The Engineers' means were, in the *personnel*, myself and Lieutenants Pitt and Reid. Major Thomson (74th) and Lieutenant Barney, Chasseurs Britanniques, who had served as assistant engineers at the sieges of Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, were again employed on this occasion, and three officers from the 6th Division. We had one clerk of stores, and nine Royal Military Artificers.

I accompanied Lord Wellington to reconnoitre the fort from the cathedral, and other high buildings of the city, and although it was found to be more respectable than had been conceived, it was determined to attempt to breach the convent wall of St. Vincent, and the most convenient spot was selected for erecting a battery for that purpose. This battery, with its communication, was commenced at night by a working party of 400 men. Being full moon, the work was soon discovered by the enemy, and a fire of musketry directed on it. The nights were very short, and the ruins rendered it impracticable to excavate, inside or out. The 6th Division had not been employed in the previous sieges, and great difficulty was found in keeping them to work under this fire; the Portuguese in particular absolutely went on their hands and knees, and dragged their baskets along the ground. It was impossible much work could be done under such circumstances; the battery by daylight was not quite to the height of the *genouillère*.

The ditch presenting a considerable obstacle, Lieutenant Reid, with four miners of the line and twenty men of the covering party, made an attempt at night to blow up a part of the counterscarp opposite the end wall of the convent proposed to be breached; the glacis there not being complete, it appeared that the miners might work under cover. The enemy had a picket outside, and a dog with them gave the alarm on the approach of our party. The picket was driven in after some little opposition, and the miners set to work, but the soil being loose and difficult to sink in, and the spot exposed to plunging fire from the convent loopholes, after losing several men, the party

was withdrawn, the object under the circumstances being impracticable. It had the effect, however, of engaging the attention of the enemy very much from the working party at the battery.

June 23*rd*. The enemy's army were found to have retired in the night in different directions, and were followed by our cavalry. At 4 P.M. Lord Wellington had information that a considerable body had crossed the Tormes, twelve miles above Salamanca. He immediately ordered two divisions down to the ford of Santa Martha, and went himself out to camp, to counteract any movements the enemy might make to succour the forts, or to draw off the garrison. At 9 A.M. the new battery opened on the gorge of Gayetano; it fired all day, but at night there was no breach. It was ordered to be stormed however at 10 P.M., as well as the Merced. The undertaking was difficult, and the troops before starting seemed to be fully aware of it. Lieutenant Reid conducted the party to the largest redoubt, and even got two ladders fixed. The attempt however failed, and we lost 120 men killed and wounded, and among the former Major-General Bowes.

—— 25*th*. Marmont manœuvred about our right, but our army always kept between him and Salamanca. At night, we carried on a communication along the street between the redoubts and the great fort, and by morning, we were enabled to lodge a picket under the gorge of Gayetano. Several of the working party were killed or wounded.

—— 26*th*. Fresh ammunition having arrived, our batteries opened again at 3 P.M. The roof of a large square tower in the convent caught fire from the red-hot shot from the carronades, and burned, but the fire did not spread.

—— 27*th*. The batteries opened this morning as on the preceding evening, and by 10 A.M. the convent of San Vicente was completely in flames from the red-hot shot. By the same time a breach was effected in the gorge of Gayetano, and troops formed in the lower communication ready to storm it, when a white flag was hoisted on that redoubt, and the commanding officer offered to surrender it and the Merced in two hours, which he said he wished to have, to represent his situation to the commandant in San Vicente. Lord Wellington offered him

five minutes to march out, in which case he should preserve his baggage. After many tricks and quibbles, he said he could not comply with those terms, and was ordered to take down his white flag. In the meantime, the commandant of San Vicente sent out a flag of truce, and offered to surrender in three hours. As Lord Wellington however would not lose the favourable opportunity of the convent being in flames, he would allow them only five minutes, when they might march out with the honours of war, and preserve their baggagê. The five minutes having expired, and no appearance of their coming out, we again opened our fire, and shortly afterwards, stormed Gayetano at the gorge, the enemy making little opposition. Some of the Portuguese *caçadores* entered San Vicente also from the low houses, without opposition, and we became masters of the whole.

We found in the forts between five and six hundred men, and thirty-six pieces of ordnance. The commandant stated that the garrison had extinguished eighteen fires the day before, in the convent.

Our total loss during the siege was 300 men; 120 in the attempt on Gayetano, between 30 and 40 artillerymen, and the remainder in the working parties, from the moonlight nights and short distance from the works.

Lord Wellington ordered the works to be destroyed, with the powder found in them. The Spanish troops were put in possession of all the other stores.

July 7th. Headquarters at Rueda, and centre of the army; the left at Pollos, two leagues lower down the Douro. Rueda is on the high road from Paris to Madrid. Lord Wellington informed me he wished more of the works at Salamanca to be destroyed, and Lieutenant Reid is ordered down to complete the demolition. Yesterday morning, about an hour after we left Salamanca, a Spanish magazine of powder, cartridges, and live shells they had collected from the forts, exploded in the tower, where they had collected it, and destroyed many houses and people. An officer and party of Spanish artillery were working in it at the time.

—— *8th.* (Rueda.) Don Julian sends in twenty-five prisoners whom he took, with twenty horses, on the banks of the Douro

on our left. In the evening, the baggage of the army is ordered a short way to the rear; the troops having been previously ordered to be in readiness to march at a moment's warning, the enemy having moved in the morning; but it proved to be only a move from the bivouac into the town of Tordesillas. There have been several opportunities of attacking the enemy with superior force, but from their not being taken, Lord Wellington appears to conceive a probability of compassing his ends without fighting.

July 9th. (Rueda.) Bonnet has joined the enemy from the Asturias, with between 4000 and 6000 men; General d'Urban, with three Portuguese regiments of cavalry, is three leagues from Toro. The 3rd Division, and Don Carlos with 2000 or 3000 Spaniards, are on our left, on the heights above the village of Pollos, nine miles from Rueda; the enemy, with about 3000 men, are on similar low steep heights on the opposite side of the Douro, which is in that part fordable in several places, and runs through a flat of about a mile and a half, between the two ranges of heights; the enemy have the advantage of a good wood on the bank of the river on their right, while our men, that are at bivouac all over the country, have nothing to shelter them. All the spring waggons have been sent down to a little below Pollos, where the staff corps have prepared them for bridges by taking off the tilts; they are, when used, to be laid lengthways across the river, and two men on foot will be able to cross over abreast. They stand 4 ft. 8 in. above the ground.

—— *12th.* (Rueda.) It appears that the enemy yesterday evening and this morning, were moving bodies along the river to their right. It is said that the enemy, in an excursion from Zamora, have taken 150 of our mules coming loaded with provisions, from Barca d'Alva. It is reported by the Spaniards that Astorga has fallen to the Spanish Galician army under Castaños, which has been some time lying before it.

—— *13th.* (Rueda.) Twenty-five deserters came in to-day. The 1st and 7th Divisions, which were at Medina, two leagues in rear of Rueda, have moved somewhat to their left. The enemy keep moving troops by degrees to their right, and we to our left.

General Hill arrived at Llerena on the 9th, Soult having

retired before him, but it is understood he is not to advance farther.

July 15th. (To La Nava del Rey.) The enemy were observed, to the number of about 7000, moving to their right. Lord Wellington, in the evening, shifts his headquarters to La Nava del Rey, a village seven miles from Rueda, on the road to Salamanca. The object of moving in the night is to conceal our movements as much as possible.

—— *16th.* (To Alaejos.) At 9 P.M. the headquarters and the troops are put in movement by a sudden order, in consequence of information that the enemy had crossed the Douro with two divisions, by the bridge of Toro. The baggage ordered to Canizal, five leagues on the Salamanca road. Lord Wellington remained for the night at Alaejos.

—— *17th.* (To Canizal.) The troops after the night-march are thus disposed: the 3rd, 6th, and 7th Divisions at Fuente la Peña; the 1st and 5th at Canizal, where is some little wood—a thing very rare in this part of the country—and a small running stream (water is also scarce in most parts at this time of year); the cavalry are dispersed at the different cantonments. The troops usually go out to bivouac every night, and are put into the villages in the day time, to get shelter from the violent heats in the open country.

—— *18th.* At 2 A.M. headquarters were ordered to proceed in the course of the day to La Nava del Rey, though it was known yesterday evening that the enemy, who had left the left bank of the Douro near Toro, were passing that river higher up. The 4th and Light Divisions were last night at Castrejon, a village on the right of La Nava del Rey, and the enemy were in the course of the night at Alaejos, that is, two leagues nearer Canizal. In the morning these two divisions had their outposts driven in, and took up a position on the heights above the left bank of the little river Trabaneos, where there was some skirmishing and a little confusion, owing to the attack of a squadron of our cavalry by the enemy, by which we nearly lost two guns of the horse artillery. The enemy showed a very large force of 20,000 or 25,000 men, and pushed in great force along the roads from La Nava del Rey to Alaejos (which they had again given up). General Alten's brigade of cavalry and three

squadrons of General Bock's Heavy Germans, watched this advance, and the two divisions of infantry retired in column, but not till the enemy, by the movement towards Alaejos, had outflanked them. From Tordesilla de la Orden to the head of the valley of the little river Guarena, about one mile, the enemy's flank movement brought them near enough at one point to cannonade us, and approaching at the same time in rear of the column, placed it between two fires, which it had to sustain while crossing a piece of flat. Our people hastened their pace, maintaining perfect order, and there being much dust on the road, the enemy's shot did not have much effect. A regiment of *caçadores* were posted on the edge of the bold heights by which we descended into the valley, and covered the retreat. Having crossed the little river Guarena, the 5th Division joined (the 1st were on the heights above), and we halted, and formed along the left bank, to let the men get water, and rest a little. After being there about an hour, the enemy had brought up about fifteen guns along the heights above, and commenced a cannonade on our line, which then moved up to the summit of the heights to a position above, again suffering a little from their cannonade. On the position we had now the whole army. It was situated thus: the ridge of heights occupied followed the left bank of the Guarena; the right of the army was near Velaza and Lormo, that is, on a bend in the same river, one league from Canizal; the centre (now occupied by the 1st, 5th, and Light Divisions), in front of Canizal, and crossing the road leading to Torresilla de la Orden; the left then inclined back, and crossing another small stream (which falls into the Guarena about two miles lower down), occupied the heights across the road from Canizal to Fuente la Peña, and rested on a high knoll, about half a mile to the left of that road; on this part of the position were the 3rd, 6th, and 7th Divisions. The high bold point where these two streams united, as above described, two miles in front of the left of the centre, and just above Castrillos, was occupied by the 4th Division. A column of the enemy, not before in action, and which came direct by the road from Alaejos towards Fuente la Peña, endeavoured to get possession of this point, and in the affair which followed, the 14th Light Dragoons lost several men and horses, having charged

through a line of cavalry which was well supported by a second, who repulsed and followed them; and they would have been very severely treated, if the enemy had not been checked by the 3rd Dragoons from the rear. Soon after, the French cavalry and infantry advanced towards the hill, under the fire of our guns, and when near it, were charged and completely repulsed by the 27th and 40th Regiments, who killed many, and made about 350 prisoners. Some of our hussars at the same time, took a French general, Lecor.[1] The enemy desisted immediately from the attack, and all firing ceased for the rest of the day. The right of our position was considered the weakest, and Lord Wellington seemed to conjecture that the enemy would move their principal force in that direction; the 3rd and 6th Divisions and some cavalry were accordingly ordered to Velaza. The 3rd, however, were brought back shortly after starting, and returned to their old ground. The 7th moved to the rear of Canizal; the 1st, after being sent two leagues to the rear, in the latter end of the evening were brought back to Canizal.

July 19th. (Position of Canizal.) The enemy do not appear to be so numerous this morning in our front; they remain perfectly quiet, and not having spread, our position is made more compact. The height above Castrillos becomes the left of the position, and the height close to the right of the road leading from Canizal to Torresilla de la Orden, the right. The 3rd, 1st, and 7th Divisions are near Canizal in reserve. In the evening, it was found the enemy had moved forces to his left, and those who were in our front within sight, began to move in the same direction. Lord Wellington immediately put his troops in movement, to prevent his right flank from being turned, and the Light Division, being sent straight along the bottom, to a projecting part of the ridge on the left of the Guarena, just above a mill, reached it before the enemy, and took up position; the enemy halted on the opposite height about 900 yards off. Four guns of the Light Division were brought up, and ordered to open upon them, but their fire was quickly returned by eighteen guns on the part of the enemy, and ours were withdrawn. A French ammunition waggon

[1] General Carier, according to Napier. He was in command of the French cavalry engaged in this affair.

was blown up by a shell from one of two guns with the cavalry, which had come up to assist. Nearly all our cavalry, and three divisions of infantry, on the same extensive, flat, stony height all night; the line of the enemy rather outflanking our right.

July 20th. (To Cabeça Velhosa.) At daylight, the enemy were perceived a considerable distance off, in full march to their left, and we immediately marched to our right; but by the time our infantry were crossing the first stream, at about two miles' distance, the enemy were on the next, at about two miles farther, and by crossing it and pushing up the opposite heights, that is, those on our side, turned us. We then marched along the first-mentioned little stream running through a wide valley, and passing a little village with a clump of fir trees by it, and thence up the high road, took up the heights above and in front of Cabeça Velhosa. The enemy appeared close in our front at nightfall, and a small body went down to the Tormes near Huerta. The 6th Division had been first sent to Aldea Lengua; but on this move taking place, were sent across the Tormes to the left bank. We are now three leagues only from Salamanca.[1]

—— *21st.* (To Cabrerizos position.) On the advance of the enemy in the morning, our army retired, and took up the position along the heights in front of Cabrerizos on the right, and Villares de la Reina on the left. Towards evening, it was perceived that the enemy was passing all his army across the Tormes; our army was also passed over, and an hour after dark, halted on the rocky heights in front of Pinella, down to near Arapiles on the right. At night a very heavy shower of rain, with thunder and lightning; many horses took fright and broke loose, and killed and wounded several dragoons. In the morning, orders had been sent to remove the sick and everything, out of Salamanca, on the Ciudad Rodrigo road. Two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry were ordered to protect the baggage.

—— *22nd.* Battle of Salamanca.

In the morning, our troops were extended along the rocky heights above mentioned, and the enemy came up to the edge of the opposite wood, and manœuvred. About 8 A.M. a strong

Battle of Salamanca.

[1] Marmont had out-manœuvred Lord Wellington up to this time, and forced the latter to retire several miles.—Ed.

body moved forward rapidly, and took possession of a high bold rocky knoll on the right of our line, and the extreme one of the ridge; this had not been occupied by us, and was not above 400 yards from the one on our right, which was of a similar description. This point being occupied in force, he moved most of his force on the heights at the back of it, leaving however on his right, on strong rocky ground near, a body of about 2000 men. Our right was then extended, but thrown rather back at the same time to the rear of the village of Arapiles, and some cannonading took place on both sides. About 1 P.M. the enemy moved out at a very rapid pace, with a very strong force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, and gained some commanding ground opposite the village of Arapiles, and about 1000 yards from it, by which they were thrown upon our right, and took post there; their artillery opened a very heavy cannonade upon our troops, and the few guns that were opposed to them, while they kept adding forces to that part, and moved out lines and columns, as if about to attack, at the same time they sent out large bodies of sharpshooters to keep ours back, particularly towards the village of Arapiles, where they pushed so far forward, as to have many killed at the outskirts of it.

In consequence of these demonstrations of attack, Lord Wellington brought down from the upper heights the 4th, 5th, and 7th Divisions, and formed them in lines and columns at the back of the low heights above Arapiles; the 3rd Division, with Don Carlos's Spaniards, were brought down to a height a little to the right, and rear of our former right. The manœuvre of the French appears to have been intended as a reconnoissance, and to threaten our right, and make us retire and abandon Salamanca; for till 3 P.M. the cannonading continued without any further attempt against us, when Lord Wellington ordered an attack to be made on them. Our situation was favourable for it; and having been taken up on the defensive, which was the line we had always hitherto adopted, the enemy did not in the least expect us to attack them.

The 3rd Division, to be supported by the Spaniards and a large body of our cavalry, moved along the back of the height to turn their left flank. This movement did not appear to be understood by the enemy as intended for an attack for a con-

siderable time, in consequence of our troops having been in motion so much previously, to take up defensive ground. Immediately they perceived our intention, they pushed troops in force to gain a height between us and them, and their advance and ours met on the summit; and though they were in much greater force, in the confusion which followed, instead of driving our men back, and getting possession of the whole height, they began to form on the part they had gained, which gave time to the 3rd Division to mount it. The contest there was not long, though they stood till our troops were very near the muzzles of their pieces; a desperate rush of our infantry, supported by the cavalry, overwhelmed them, and this whole body must have been killed, or made prisoners (the latter amounted to between 2000 and 3000). Several guns were run over by our infantry, or overtaken by the cavalry, and eagles were picked up in the rear. The 3rd Division then continued moving forward on the right, and co-operated in the attack of the other positions taken up by the enemy. Very soon after the 3rd Division moved off its ground, the 4th and 5th advanced direct for the heights in two lines; they were supported by the 6th and 7th. They advanced at a steady pace, and in spite of the heavy fire from the enemy, they never stopped till they had gained the heights, the 5th being on the right of the 4th, and pressing forwards its right, to continue the attack to the next range of heights on which the enemy took post, forming an angle with the first, as their left flank was turned. In the meantime the left of the 4th Division approached the rocky height which the enemy had taken possession of in the morning, the attack of which by General Pack's Portuguese brigade, had failed. The enemy accordingly made a rally on the left of the 4th Division, where the Fusiliers had just gained a height, the most commanding part of their first position, and by a spirited charge of four battalions in column, drove the Fusiliers from it down about 100 yards; but following them down, they were opposed by the 27th and 40th, who opened a most destructive close fire, and advanced in company with the Fusiliers, who had rallied behind them. At the same time with this attack, a small body of French dragoons advanced on the right flank of the four battalions, and charged, and put

into some confusion the 53rd Regiment, who were supporting the 4th Division on their left and rather in the rear; the 53rd on this occasion lost one of their colours. These spirited attempts were made at the impulse of the moment, by the commanding officers of these French corps; but as they necessarily, from the situation of the two armies at that time, could not be supported, they had no effect beyond causing the fall of most of their men concerned. In the meantime, the enemy's second position was carried, and a third was taken up along the heights skirting the extensive woods on the side of Alba de Tormes. These being more formidable, and our troops requiring to be formed again, the 6th Division was brought up to the centre of the front, and formed in two lines with the 4th in their rear, and the 5th, 3rd, and 7th on their right. The rocky height was abandoned by the enemy, and the 1st Division moved against the right of their new position, from which they drove them with very little opposition; on the left and centre they were charged, and driven from the woods, after doing much execution by their fire. At this time it became dark, and the enemy retired through the woods in great confusion to Alba de Tormes, through which they were passing all night. The result of the battle was upwards of 3000 of the enemy prisoners, about 6000 killed and wounded, three eagles and eighteen guns taken.

July 23*rd*. To Alba de Tormes. Our cavalry was pushed on after the enemy, and picked up many prisoners, stragglers, sick, and wounded. The enemy's rear-guard retired in order at 8 A.M.; the remainder of their army was still in the greatest confusion. Most of our infantry marched to Alba de Tormes; the 1st Division was pushed forward. Part of our cavalry came up with the rear-guard of the enemy, two leagues beyond Alba de Tormes, consisting of cavalry and infantry, and Lord Wellington ordered them to be charged. Their square of infantry broke, and 900 prisoners were taken, most of the remainder throwing away their arms, and being protected by their cavalry, which was much more numerous than ours. On this occasion, the German Heavy Dragoons particularly distinguished themselves by charging the French infantry up a height. Our cavalry and the 1st and Light Divisions halted about a league short of Peñaranda, through which the enemy were passing all

day, in great confusion, and with a great number of wounded. Marmont lost his left arm, and had a wound in his body; Generals Bonnet and Foy, and two others, were also wounded. On our side General Le Marchant was killed, General Cole and Marshal Beresford badly wounded, and Sir Stapleton Cotton and Brigadier-General Collins (of the Portuguese) slightly.

July 24th. To Flores de Avila. Six leagues. The country quite open and roads excellent. The Light Division halt at Flores, the 1st at Cantarasilla and Peñaranda, and the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th, one and two leagues in the rear. Part of our cavalry, with two troops of horse artillery, follow the enemy, who reach Fontiveros this day, three leagues beyond Flores, on the road towards Segovia.

—— *25th.* (Flores de Avila.) The commissariat stores having been sent to the rear on the approach of the enemy to Salamanca,[1] the army halts one day, to give them time to come up; only part of the cavalry keep up with the enemy, who are going off by fatiguing marches, with a very strong rear-guard, and columns on each flank, to protect the body of the army from insult. They leave very few stragglers, and are moving towards the Douro.

Colonel BURGOYNE *to his* SISTER.

Flores de Avila, July 25, 1812.

Lord Wellington has at length done what we have so long been wishing him to do, that is, attack the enemy; and it has been attended with the greatest success, as you will see by his Lordship's despatch. He had always expressed himself as afraid of the impetuosity of the British troops in attack, carrying them forward in disorder after the first driving of the enemy, and giving him the only chance they can possibly have of defeating us. The result of this last action near Salamanca has given our army a character of which many thought they were not deserving—that of the highest state of discipline and attention to their officers in the heat of action; which, with

[1] Lord Wellington did not expect to be able to hold his ground after the junction of King Joseph with Marmont, and was prepared to retreat. Marmont's false movements at Salamanca entirely changed the aspect of affairs.—ED.

their very superior coolness and courage, has enabled them completely to defeat and drive before them a French army of nearly 50,000 men, in nearly as quick time as they could walk over the ground.

The conduct of my old friends the 3rd Division was most conspicuous. Supported by a body of our cavalry, they made a tremendous rush, and overwhelmed everything before them. The Frenchmen threw down their arms, and delivered themselves up prisoners by hundreds.

One strong French regiment, with a body of cavalry, made a splendid rally, and retook a height with the bayonet, in the most gallant style. Our troops had but just gained it, and had not had time to form again in order, but even then they did not give it up, although ours was a much smaller regiment, until the enemy's column was close to them. . The French regiment came up the hill with a brisk and regular step, and their drums beating the *pas de charge;* our men fired wildly and at random among them; the French never returned a shot, but continued their steady advance. The English fired again, but still without return; they stood their ground however with great courage. But men in such confusion had no chance against the perfect order of the enemy, and when the French were close upon them, they wavered and gave way. The officers all advanced in a line in front, waving their swords, and cheering their men to come on, but the confusion became a panic, and there was a regular *sauve qui peut* down the hill. No sooner had they arrived at the bottom, than they came to their senses, and were furious with themselves for having allowed the enemy to gain the advantage. In about five minutes, they were formed in perfect order at a short distance below, and they then reascended the hill most gallantly, and drove the French down on the other side as quickly as they themselves had been driven before. I went down and came up the hill with them, and I could not help thinking what credit was due to our troops, who could so universally beat an enemy capable of such efforts.

The defeat was most decisive. The French army is now getting off as fast as it can, in the greatest confusion and dismay. Their terror was evinced the day before yesterday, when Lord Wellington (I suppose reckoning on it) ordered a part of

our cavalry to charge their rear-guard. Although in order, they gave way at once, and we made 900 prisoners more, the remainder throwing down their arms, and getting protection behind a superior body of the enemy's cavalry, who were quiet witnesses of our success.

We are halted here, I believe, only for one day, to allow our provisions to come up forty miles from the seat of action, after which I don't know what course we shall pursue, but I trust it will lead to our gaining Madrid. The enemy continue on the road to Segovia, where it is said they go to secure their treasure. The people of Salamanca have shown the greatest loyalty and attachment to the cause, even when there was every appearance of our being about to abandon them; and when the battle was over, I met, at ten o'clock at night, all the medical men of the city coming out by torchlight, with jackasses loaded with bandages, &c., to dress the wounded.

For several days before the action, we did nothing but manœuvre and counter-manœuvre, and so long as we kept acting on the defensive, and taking the law from them, we were wheedled out of thirty or forty miles of country. Marmont certainly had no intention to attack us, and he felt confident we should not attack him, from all Lord Wellington's previous campaigns, and he kept up a noisy cannonading all the morning, to get the credit of driving us from Salamanca by force as well as manœuvre. Even our first movement to attack was mistaken by them for a defensive one, and their consequent hurry in making their dispositions to receive us, and their imprudence in meeting us half-way, led to their first overthrow by the 3rd Division.

The events of the war here, and our constant state of movement and activity, have thrown me into the greatest confusion of business, public and private, but at the same time, I never was so happy or in better health. * * * *

Journal resumed.

July 28th. (Olmedo.) An old town, with several churches and convents. In one of the latter the French had a garrison of 150 or 200 men, the walls of it loopholed, a barricade and ditch

round the entrance, and the streets leading from it barricaded for fear of the guerillas. The officers as well as men always slept within their little fortress, and none dared ever go beyond the limits of the town. At a league and a half towards Valladolid was another post, and so on, and a courier or despatch sent by them, was always escorted by thirty or forty infantry soldiers from one stage to another. At Portillo, a town on a height, they had a larger station. Their army from Olmedo took different roads to cross the Douro, and broke down the bridges, it is said, of Toro, Tordesillas, Puerta del Douro, and Tudela. The French buried a general at this place.

July 30th. (To Boacilla.) The enemy having evacuated Valladolid, two squadrons of our dragoons entered, and Lord Wellington passed through the city, amidst the cheers of the inhabitants. The French abandoned it yesterday evening, and soon after Martines's guerillas (1000 infantry and 500 cavalry) entered. The French left 800 sick in the hospital, a large quantity of shot and shells, a little powder, and some artillery and ammunition waggons, and a few old guns; they loopholed and secured against a sudden attack, a large convent in the Campo Grande, at the skirts of the town, which they called the fort. They destroyed the bridge over the Pisuerga, and the Spaniards are repairing it. King José, it is said, is moving towards us, and General d'Urban remains at Olmedo, with about 1000 cavalry, a troop of horse artillery, and a battalion of light infantry, to watch him. The French army has moved along the Douro. The three eighteen-pounders travel with the army.

August 7th. To Segovia. An old city and a very good one, situated on the point of junction of the river of Segovia which falls to the Eresma, and another small stream, both running through deep ravines of almost perpendicular banks. On the apex of the junction of the ravines is the Alcazar, or old Moorish castle, on a very high perpendicular rock. All round, except on the side of the town, where the hill rises gradually from the castle, the whole space is occupied by the building, the windows looking completely over the precipices, and contains two small open courts within. On the side of the town, it is cut off by a ditch, cut out of the solid rock, of not less than ninety feet deep. There is nothing remarkable in the building,

except its size and romantic situation and form; the interior is a perfect barrack. The castle was formerly a prison of state criminals, of which some account, real or fictitious, is given in 'Gil Blas.' Some years ago, it was employed as the academy for cadets for the artillery. The French made it their citadel, but very prudently abandoned it, as notwithstanding its situation, being all building, and the roof exceedingly lofty, we should probably have soon set it in flames with red-hot shot, or at worst, have knocked it about their ears; it is even probable that battering down the keep, from the mass of materials that would fall, would have rendered it untenable, and from its great height, it would assuredly have soon come down. The heights on the opposite side of the ravine on the west side, would be favourable for batteries, and from the boldness of the ravine, you might, from the edge of the cliff, place your musketry within about 100 yards, and your battery on the summit of the height, at not more than 200 yards. The French have destroyed a quantity of ammunition here, and left musket balls and some shells; fifteen or sixteen guns and mortars are spiked, and rendered otherwise unserviceable; the carriages are burned, or broken to pieces, by being thrown into the ditch. Soult's army, in front of Sir R. Hill, has been giving balls, concerts, and fêtes, in honour of *Marmont's victory over Lord Wellington*, who they say lost 8000 prisoners, and retired for shelter behind Ciudad Rodrigo. General Hill was at Zafra on the 1st of August.

August 11*th*. The enemy have abandoned Madrid, and also, it is said, the Retiro Fort, and are a short distance from it on our right of it; fifteen or eighteen hundred cavalry are about three leagues from us, and General d'Urban near them; but they do not move. We have for some time had the idea that Lord Wellington meant to enter Madrid on the Prince's birthday, the 12th of August.

—— 12*th*. (To Madrid.) Yesterday evening about 5 P.M. the enemy advanced towards General d'Urban, near La Rosas, with his cavalry. The Portuguese cavalry were formed, and brought to the charge, but ran away, and three guns out of four of the horse artillery with them were taken; the German heavy cavalry checked the enemy by some gallant charges, but not

till he had cut off a good deal of baggage at La Rozas. In the morning the guns were found on the ground, spiked, and the carriages burned; the enemy retired about a league, and afterwards entirely clear of Madrid. The Empecinado, the Medico, Morales, and other famous guerillas, visited Lord Wellington; the former has shut up a garrison of 800 French in Guadalaxara, and has some of his men in Madrid. Our troops march for Madrid; some into the town, and others to bivouac on the Manzanares. Learning from the Spaniards that there is a garrison in the Retiro to protect their sick *only*, Lord Wellington sent me on with six dragoons, to summon the place. They fired repeatedly at me when I attempted to go in on the side of the town, from the walls of the Retiro park, which they occupy, but on the country side they let me in. The governor was hurt at a verbal message being sent him, and answered, "*Les Français ne se rendent pas si facilement.*"

August 13*th.* (Madrid.) Reconnoitre the Retiro early, and afterwards with Lord Wellington. The principal post is the large strong square building called La China, on the summit of the hill, formerly a china manufactory; round this they have a large star fort, with a ditch twelve feet deep and twenty-four wide, palisaded, but without revetment; round this is an extensive complete line of field work of a similar nature, of ten fronts with bastions, and within three of the bastions are buildings, one of them the Observatory, strong and commanding; but neither this line nor the buildings within them appear prepared for defence, having no guns in them, and only a few guards. Round the wall, they occupy the park wall, and buildings, skirting the Prado, with *flèches* to flank the wall; this is of course very extensive. Lord Wellington orders them to be driven from this outer line of wall at night, for which purpose a body of 300 men break into the wall and gates above the Retiro, and near the gate of Alcala, with little opposition, and take post on the skirt of the woods, very near their outer bastioned enceinte. Another 300 break through the two walls of the Botanic Gardens with little opposition, and are under cover equally, near the same line, i.e. (within eighty yards) under the Observatory. The enemy immediately abandon the strong buildings of the Retiro, for fear of being cut off, and

retire within their outer line. We have ten men killed and wounded. In the morning, we had cut off the aqueduct. The enemy left their sick in the town, though they had a post on the spot. In the evening, they sent out a flag of truce to inform us that, observing we were making batteries in the town, they should be forced to fire on the town, if we continued. Lord Wellington answered that they were mistaken in the idea that we were making batteries in the town; but that for the matter of firing on them, the inhabitants, after three years' experience, know them too well to give them any credit for their forbearance; that they may fire on the town if they like, and destroy their own hospital of sick, which they have left in a manner unheard of before in war; but the time will come, and that before long, when all these accounts may be settled.

August 14th. (Madrid.) Arrangements were made, after reconnoitring again with Lord Wellington from the Retiro buildings, for storming the enemy's outer line of works from the Botanic Garden, and wood in front of the gate of Alcala, when an officer of rank came out with a flag of truce, demanding an interview with Lord Wellington, to explain the letter of yesterday. As his Lordship was on the spot, he saw the officer, and an opening being made, Lord FitzRoy Somerset went in, and settled terms of capitulation: the garrison to march out with the honours of war, lay down their arms, and become prisoners of war, keeping their private baggage and horses, and the officers their swords. At 4 P.M. they marched out, most of them drunk, and affecting great rage against the governor for surrendering. It consisted of 1700 men, exclusive of the sick in the town; and in the fort we found 180 brass guns, chiefly field-pieces, with a large quantity of powder, 20,000 stand of arms, clothing, saddles, and equipments of all sorts (this being their grand depôt), and two eagles.

—— *18th.* (Madrid.) The 1st and 5th Divisions are marched for the Escurial; the 3rd and Light Divisions, it is expected, will remain in Madrid. Soult did not know the result of the battle of Salamanca on the 10th, as some of the French intercepted letters express uneasiness about it. We hear some of Marmont's old army has entered Valladolid. Guadalaxara, nine

leagues from this, has surrendered to the Empecinado; the garrison consisted of near 700 men, of whom many were Spaniards.

August 31*st.* (Madrid.) The French have moved in force down to Zamora and Astorga; the latter place however had previously surrendered to the Spanish general, Santorildes, who made near 1000 prisoners. General Clinton, with the 6th Division, moved to Arevalo, where he is joined by the 5th, and afterwards by the 1st Division; the 7th also moves to-morrow from the Escurial in the same direction; the 3rd and Light Divisions remain for the present at Madrid, and the 4th at the Escurial. A grand bull-fight is given this evening, in honour of our entry into Madrid, and 500 tickets given for the British and Portuguese officers, and 1000 for the men; nine bulls killed, and all the four horses engaged wounded; three of them must die. Two of the bulls leaped clear over the paling of about 5ft. 6in. high.

September 1*st.* (To the Escurial, six and three quarter leagues.) Along the high Guadarrama road for five leagues; then leave it on the right, and through the park. The palace of the Escurial is a gigantic building, with a church in the centre: half the building is convent, and the other half palace. Adjoining it is a good town, chiefly composed of the houses of the ministers and other persons attached to the court. We had four divisions lately quartered here, and ample room for them. It lies on the south side, at the foot of the *sierra*, and was a winter palace of the kings. The French have removed the finest pictures to France, and ruined the interior of the palace.

—— 3*rd.* We hear that the French have evacuated Zamora; that out of 22,000 that Marmont has left, (for he is not dead), 15,000 are now in the field.

—— 4*th.* (To Olmedo, four leagues.) The garrison of Astorga were induced to surrender to Santorildes, on condition of being conducted to the nearest French posts to be exchanged; they were however immediately marched off into the interior, and finding they had been deceived, began to mutiny, and a great many of them were in consequence killed by the Spaniards. The French were advancing to relieve the place, and had reached La Bañeza, seven leagues from it, when they heard of its fall;

their infantry therefore halted, and the cavalry pushed on, drove off Santorildes' cavalry, and entered Astorga. The Spaniards had however moved off part of the stores, and destroyed part, burned the palisading, &c. The French then retired, and took with them the garrisons of Zamora and Toro, and are now concentrating, it is said, near Valladolid.

September 6th. (To La Secca.) Headquarters move to Boacilla, five leagues. While on the march, I was ordered by Lord Wellington to proceed immediately to report to him the state of the French forts of Zamora and Toro, and return as quickly as possible. Accordingly I set off from Boacilla, and crossing the country by Ventosa, went to La Secca, five leagues more.

—— *7th.* (To Toro.) From Pollos, where is a good ford, the advantage of position is on the right bank as far as Castro Nuña. At Castro Nuña, where the river makes an acute bend, the point is very favourable for forcing a passage from the left bank; there is a ford there. The fort at Toro is an old castle of little importance,

—— *11th.* (To Dueñas.) Rejoined headquarters at Dueñas, a small town on the right bank of the Pisuerga. The Spanish General Cruz and Colonel Skerret have entered Seville, after a slight opposition, on the 27th ult. On the 28th, the siege of Cadiz was raised. The enemy left in their lines 700 pieces of ordnance spiked, and the carriages destroyed, a large quantity of ammunition, &c. They sunk their gunboats, but without destroying them. They had previously bombarded the town of Cadiz with a newly-constructed ten-inch mortar, throwing their shells nearly 7000 yards. On the 29th, General Sir Rowland Hill entered Llerena; Soult retiring from thence by Fuente d'Ovenjuno to Cordova. General Hill continued by easy marches by Bulanga, Campillo, and Zalamca, and at Castuero on the 4th inst.

—— *13th.* (Torquemada.) The reason of our very slow movements is supposed to be our waiting to be joined by Santorildes' army, which might have been up yesterday, but made some bungling in their movements. The whole army march on the same high road to Burgos.

—— *14th.* (To Cordovilla.) The Spanish Galician army is come up, and we expect now to move on faster. The French are at Villadrigo, five leagues in front. The Sicilian army first

threatened Catalonia,[1] and then sailed down towards Valencia; that city was reconnoitred, and found not to be strong; and information being received that the enemy's principal force was in Catalonia, that Suchet had only about 1000 men in Valencia, and 5000 between that and Alicante on the Xucar, it was at first decided by General Maitland to land near Valencia, force that small body, and then move down, and attack the 5000 posted below. This, it is thought, would have succeeded, and even General Maitland, when he gave up the project, in a written statement of his reasons for doing so, says he has no doubt but that he could have taken Valencia, but that, from the force of the French in that part of Spain, he conceived he could not have held it, and that it would have been *committing the inhabitants and our credit* too much to have taken it, and then to have deserted them immediately afterwards.

September 16th. (To Pampliega.) The Spanish army follows us at about one and two leagues' distance; they consist of about 12,000 men, and have eight light pieces of artillery, very well appointed. The French are in a position about a league in our front, their right on the bold heights on the right bank, the front along a ridge, then stretches across the river and a small flat, and their left rests on a high bold round hill, with the ruins of some old castle on it.

—— *17th.* The French were to have been attacked this morning, if they remained in their position, which was not a good one for their amount of force. They retired, however, before daylight, and we followed, and found them again in position along the heights above a bridge over the Arlanzon, where the high road crosses it. On our showing a disposition to attack, they again retired, and headquarters remained on the right bank, two leagues from Burgos.

Siege of Burgos.

—— *18th.* The enemy had retired to Burgos and beyond it, and on our advancing, left it so far behind them, that our cavalry pushed on beyond, and we were enabled to ride round, and look at their works round the castle. The post is strong, and they have in it nine nineteen-pounders, and eleven light guns, with two large howitzers.

[1] The English force sent from Sicily, to make diversion on the east coast of Spain.—Ed.

September 19th. (To Villa Toro. Siege of Burgos).[1] The place was invested in the morning; the 1st and 5th Divisions march round with General Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese brigades, and immediately take possession of as much of the height on which is the enemy's unfinished hornwork as is under cover, driving the enemy from some *flèches*. At night, the hornwork is carried by assault by the 42nd Regiment, the flank companies of that brigade, and some Portuguese, all under General Pack. The front of the work had already a very good profile, but the gorge was simply enclosed by a row of very strong palisades. Two storming parties of 100 each, were to descend the ditch, (the counterscarp in the salient angles being no obstacle), and scale the demi-bastions, while a strong firing party were to keep down the fire of the front, and another 100 men were to attempt the gorge. The attack was not well managed, the firing party advanced to the counterscarp, it being nearly full moon, and remained there, firing and exposed for a quarter of an hour, till they lost a number of men, and then dispersed. Another was led on, and the storming parties advanced, and the enemy abandoned the work, the attack on the gorge having succeeded. We lost between 300 and 400 men, and took above sixty prisoners, with a captain. The French left fifteen or twenty dead in the fort. About an hour after it was taken, the small magazine in the rampart blew up, probably from some soldier looking about for plunder. We immediately set to work, and make a communication into the ditch, and another from the gateway in the curtain to the centre of the work, with a lodgment of about 100 yards of parallel, also two zigzags just outside of the left bank towards a proposed battery, which should be covered from the enemy's battery of seven heavy guns on the top of the castle, but be able to enfilade a lower line of works, and destroy a church on the same level with the castle.

—— *20th.* Visited the trenches, and was hit in the head by a musket shot; it was fortunately a distant shot, and of not much consequence. Continued the works of the preceding night. Applied to the people of Burgos, through Colonel Santiago, of

[1] The details of batteries and trenches have been omitted, as they are to be found in Jones's 'Sieges in Spain.'—Ed.

Castaño's staff, for various articles. Reconnoitred with Lord Wellington, the lower side towards the river.

September 22nd. At night, get two eighteen-pounders and three howitzers into the batteries on the right which are finished. At twelve at night, assault the lower exterior line, without success. The orders given were for Lieut.-Colonel Browne, at ten minutes before 11 P.M. (afterwards put off till ten minutes before 12), to march out of the nearest houses within the old wall, with 150 men of his Portuguese detachments, provided with twelve felling axes; they were to keep along the wall, and making their way through the first palisading in a very slight trench, to proceed on to the next line of palisading, which they were also to break through, and then immediately to communicate with a storming party of 400 men of the 1st Division, who were to scale the old wall just beyond the above mentioned palisades. This party of 400 men were to shelter themselves in the first instance, under a bank about fifty yards from the old wall, and at twelve o'clock, they were to push out in the following order:—first, the five ladders, carried by thirty men, twelve felling axes, and an officer and twenty men; when the ladders were fixed, the twenty men were to mount them, and fifty more from the bank were to follow, and when they were nearly all in the work, more men would advance and enter, till they were completed to 200. The other 200 were to cover this operation by a smart fire on the parapet from behind the bank, and were to be considered as the reserve. The work being carried, the 150 Portuguese were to lie down behind the second palisading, which would afford them some cover, and keep a good look-out on their right flank, on the gateway out of the castle. The 200 men who entered by the ladders, were to advance a short way up the hill, and to lie down at the back of some shot piles or other situation, the best they could find, to cover the workmen. The 200 men in reserve were then to form the working party, tools and axes were ready prepared, and they were to make as good a breach as they could, in the parts of the line where the wall was very low, and a perpendicular bank of earth with fraises above, and a communication to it. This project would probably have succeeded, had the Portuguese detachment done their duty, but they never reached even the

first line of palisading; and without that support, it was impossible the wall of twenty-four feet high could be carried by the five ladders. The firing party did not do their duty either, and the enemy mounted to the top of the wall, and fired down into the little ditch with impunity. Neither were the orders obeyed in the other instances, for the 200 storming party nearly all crowded into the ditch. Four ladders, however, were placed, and were sufficiently long, and some officers mounted them, but were not followed. The consequence was, that with the commanding officer, Major Lawrie, killed, and four or five officers and 150 men (including the Portuguese) killed and wounded, after about an hour, the party retired. Lieutenant Reid of the Engineers, accompanied this party, and fixed the ladders.

September 24th. The enemy's fire is well kept down by our musketry, except where, on one corner of a short salient face, a thick double palisade, with small openings for muskets, was planted on the very edge of the wall, from which they plunge down, and do us much mischief, our musketry having no effect on it. In the night, a line of gabions was pushed out from the parallel towards the wall (clear of enfilade), and by morning, the extremity of it was within twenty-five yards of the wall, and just below the heap of earth thrown up from the excavation of the small ditch. This work, however, was much annoyed from the above-mentioned palisade, and Captain Williams, of the Engineers, was killed by a shot from it, while laying out the gabions.

—— *25th.* About 10 A.M. the miners commence a small shaft, from which to run a gallery through to the ditch. The gallery will be so much under the wall and ditch, that it is determined to push it completely under; the distance is measured at night, and found to be sixty feet. The sap was prolonged a little in the night. At twelve in the day, one of the twenty-pounder howitzers[1] was opened on the palisade which annoys us so much, fired an hour without hitting it, and then ceased.

—— *26th.* The enemy have good marksmen placed in the palisade tower on the top of the wall, who pick off any one who does not go cautiously through the lower trenches. Captain

[1] The old twenty-four-pound howitzer was a short brass gun of position, very useless for a siege, and very inaccurate in its fire.—ED.

Kenny, 9th Regiment, and assistant engineer, was killed while placing a gabion there. In the evening, the gallery of the mine eighteen feet in.

September 27th. The enemy have placed a row of palisades in front of their gate in the second line, and appear to be preparing the second line for defence. In the morning, the gallery twenty-eight feet in. Commenced another at the extremity of the right, where the enemy hit several of our men on the head, with stones thrown blindly over the parapet. If they had had grenades, we must have covered the trench overhead.

—— *28th.* The first mine forty-two feet in. At night, complete the communication between the upper and lower attacks.

—— *29th.* The artillery fired from one howitzer for an hour, to endeavour to destroy the palisade tower on the top of the old wall, from whence the enemy annoy us so much, but without effect, never once hitting it. Having run the gallery of the first mine exactly on the foundation of the old wall, excavated about five feet under it, and loaded the mine with twelve barrels of powder. At twelve at night it was fired, and threw down the wall completely, leaving the bank of earth very steep; the sides of the walls were practicable. The storming party of 300 men were to have assailed it, led by one officer and twenty men; of these a sergeant and four men gained the top of the breach, and describe the enemy as quite taken by surprise. They do not appear to have been supported, for the officer returned, and even said the wall was *not injured.* Two of the men who ascended were wounded in the hand with bayonets—a certain sign they were up. False attacks were made on the flanks.

—— *30th.* Continued working at the second mine, the mouth of which is found by measurement, to be something more than seventy feet from the wall. At night, constructed a battery for the three eighteen-pounders, with a parapet proof against musketry only, about fifty yards from the wall, and got the guns in.

October 1st. By 10 A.M the enemy produced a howitzer and gun, in a flank of the old wall, and served them admirably against our new battery, in spite of our musketry, and without

exposing their gunners, in consequence of their height above us. The consequence was, they soon ruined the battery, damaged two carriages, and had the good fortune to strike one of the guns on the trunnion, and knock it off. These guns of ours never opened; they were meant to improve the breach made by the first mine, and open another, the wall appearing very bad. At night, removed the guns, and commenced another battery, to be shot proof, a little to the left of the first, and to be sunk inside. The reason these batteries are put so near, is to avoid exposing them to the upper lines of the castle, where the enemy have several guns of large calibre mounted.

October 2nd. In the morning, the enemy open three guns and howitzers from the flank in the wall, and four howitzers or mortars from other parts, and plunge into the new battery in such a manner that, notwithstanding the quantity of earth thrown up, it is thought not possible to effect our purpose on this low ground, and it is given up. The two eighteen-pounders are ordered to be removed to Nos. 1 and 2 batteries, in order to open at daylight in the morning, on the first breach, to improve it. The gallery of second mine at night seventy-two feet in.

—— *3rd.* Last night very rainy. The guns were not got up into the batteries, owing to the desertion of their working party—a common complaint with us; we seldom can keep above half our working party through the night. Lord Wellington has ordered them to be punished by extra duty, and at my suggestion, gave out the day before yesterday an order for me to state the progress of the works each twenty-four hours, with remarks, and the names of the commanding officers of the working parties. The brigades of miners did not do their duty last night, and I have ordered them extra duty, and their pay to be checked; they were promised at the commencement, two dollars per running foot. The mine only seventy-four feet in in the morning.

—— *4th.* The guns having been got into the batteries, they opened at daylight, with two eighteen-pounders and three howitzers, on the breach of the first mine, which was made practicable, but very steep, for twenty men abreast, by evening. The second mine was eighty-three feet in (the measure from

the mouth of the gallery to the wall seventy-five) at 10 A.M.; when the loading was commenced with twelve barrels. Everything being prepared, at 5 P.M. the second mine was sprung, making an excellent breach, and this was the signal for the storming the two by the 24th Regiment, who were drawn up in the parallel fifty yards distant, for the purpose. Lieut.-Colonel Jones had superintended the arrangement for the storm, and pointed out the different points to the officers, and when giving the signal that everything was ready, received a severe wound from a musket ball through his ankle. Almost before the dust caused by the mine had cleared away, the 24th had gained the summit of the two breaches, and driven the enemy in to their new palisades. Lieut.-Colonel Browne, as usual, made a diversion on our right, and gained a loopholed house near the works, which the enemy abandoned. At dark, a lodgment was formed within, and a communication of two zigzags to it, but owing to the confusion created by the working parties being under arms to support the 24th Regiment if necessary, and other causes, little progress was made.

October 5th. Lieutenant Neville, 30th Regiment, assistant engineer,[1] badly wounded this morning. By the exertions of the working party this day, particularly of the Guards, the parapet was turned, and some excellent communications made by evening. At 5 P.M. the enemy made a sortie from their covert-way (which they had cut out along the counterscarp a few days before), and by the gateway at the end of their palisaded line, and rushing down, got possession of the first breach, which our people abandoned, and lining the wall about the breach, commenced firing, while parties destroyed our lodgment within, and removed the tools. The parapet on our left of the breach, which had been turned against them, our men maintained, and at one period, the enemy were on one side of the lodgment, and ours on the other, with only the parapet between them. Major Arnot (Portuguese service), the field officer commanding, and Captain Clitheroe, of the Guards,

[1] The late Colonel Neville, for many years lieutenant of the corps of Gentlemen at Arms. His tall and soldier-like figure rendered him a conspicuous object at the levees and drawing-rooms of the present sovereign. —ED.

jumped on the parapet, and endeavoured to get our men to make a charge over it, and attack the enemy, who were in the breach in the rear. They were both wounded, being only followed by a few men; they were picked off from the second line. The men (chiefly Portuguese) who had left the breach, and were firing from our parallel, were ordered by Lord Wellington to attack the breach again, and ceased firing and formed, but did not advance till the enemy abandoned it. The Queen's had been ordered up to storm the breach again, but when they arrived, it was again in our possession. Ensign Twigg, 38th Regiment, assistant engineer, was wounded severely, being the sixth, out of thirteen of the Engineers at this siege, killed or wounded.

We suddenly find ourselves in great want of tools; we brought with us 600, and got from the town (left by the French in their stores) 800; many were broken, particularly in the handles, many buried in the trenches, some taken by the enemy in this sortie; in short, not above 200 could be collected at night, besides those at the depôt requiring handles, being one or two hundred.

October 6th. From the right or second breach, commence a sap towards the return in the palisades, which return gives cover itself, and in which we lodge fifteen of the covering party, with bayonets fixed, in case of sortie. Our miners we divide into brigades of sappers now; they are very clumsy at first, and we promise them a dollar for each four yards of gabion work, whether done by the full or flying sap. In the latter case, they lay out the gabions, and the working parties excavate the trench; the non-commissioned officer (whose pay is distinct) gives each brigade a certificate of the number of yards done by it. The enemy's guns will not depress down to us, but we suffer very great inconvenience from the large shells which they roll down the steep glacis, and which knock over the gabions, and frighten the working parties. Two of the miners were killed last night. Our arrangements against sorties now are—the fifteen men at the return of the palisade line on the flank of the enemy, to be supported by twenty more, who were ready always in rear of the second breach; 100 formed in column in rear of the first breach, ready to charge up in front,

and the remainder of the covering party lining the parapets. The covering party is now 300 in this part, and 150 on the heights of St. Miguel. The Queen's remains in the Barrio de St. Pedro, ready to support if required. In the evening, the enemy assemble in their covert-way, and appear to be preparing to come out. Our parties are prepared to meet them, but they do not sally.

October 7th. During the day, improve the trenches, carried on by sap, and proceed with three heads of sap, but these advance very slowly, from the awkwardness of the men. One of our eighteen-pounders disabled, but the other, and only one left, makes much impression on the wall. In the evening, came on heavy rain, and at night, which was exceedingly dark, wind and rain. The trenches became muddy rivers, and the steep banks of earth and breaches so slippery, that it was with exceeding difficulty parties could find their way about, and move to their posts.

The inclemency of the night, added to our usual difficulties in getting the men to work so near the enemy, causes little progress to be made, which is of little consequence, however, as at two in the morning, the enemy make a sally from their covert-way, upset the thirty men of the covering party who were put under the shot piles in front, surprise the workmen, and everything is in an instant in confusion. The covering party is composed of the German Legion, the working party of Portuguese. The old wall is abandoned, and the enemy line it, and level our works within.

Major the Hon. Somers Cocks, a young man, and one of the most promising officers in the army, was field officer of the trenches. He did what he could to preserve the post, and afterwards, when he could assemble the men, he led them to re-take it, in doing which he was killed. We obtained possession again, however, probably by the enemy abandoning it after they had effected their purpose of destroying our works. Lieutenant Dumaresq, 9th Regiment, an assistant engineer and an excellent officer, was wounded by a grape shot through the thigh, endeavouring to rally our people; he is the seventh of the Engineers and assistant engineers, killed or wounded this siege, out of twelve doing duty.

October 8th. By evening, there is a practicable breach in the re-entering angle, narrow at top, and made only with one eighteen-pounder, which has had eight pieces, most of them heavy, bearing on it. At night, the other eighteen-pounder, which had lost a trunnion, is mounted notwithstanding in No. 1 battery, to improve the breach.

—— *9th.* Set the miners to run a gallery from the nearest houses, to penetrate under the church of St. Roman, just outside the enemy's works, and which he occupies, the distance apparently about 25 yards. The covering parties are now 450, of which 300 are retained below, to guard the old wall and breaches, and 150 for the protection of the height of St. Miguel; 50 of these last go down at night to the hollow road under the tower and sallyport, in order to watch it, throwing out a double sentry; 50 are posted on our left of the hornwork, and the remaining 50 in reserve near the batteries, for their protection.

An officer and twenty men are posted for the night in the hollow way in front of the new breach, to prevent the enemy working at it, which they attempt three times, and as often these twenty men advanced and fired into them, driving them away. This created a false alarm in the garrison, every one turned out, and a great deal of firing took place, by which we lost an officer of the Guards, and forty or fifty men amongst our covering and working parties. Three Frenchmen made their appearance at the gateway leading out of the lower line, and were immediately shot by our people, who were working close to it. Those who were following them, closed the gate and went off.

—— *10th.* The enemy have succeeded in the night in clearing away about four feet of the upper part of the breach. We delay attacking the second line, for want of musket ammunition. Deserter comes out, and reports the garrison 1500 men; their loss during the siege 500 men. They have an officer and forty men prisoners, taken at the last sortie, and one deserter, a Highlander. The garrison live on the ramparts, officers and all, without cover. They expect to hold out five days more. He also reports they have prepared three countermines or fougasses, one at the new breach, and two under the church on the second

line; they have another under the church of St. Roman, to blow it up, if we get possession of it; shells along the parapets, with soldiers' caps over them; water served out in rations, being very scarce, their supply being derived from a well in the castle; very few artillerymen; no sappers or miners; two or three engineers, who, he says, do nothing. They lost sixty men by the explosion of our last mine. The upper church is their hospital. Our twenty-four-pounder shot is now finished.

October 13th. The enemy have cleared six or eight feet at the top of the new breach, notwithstanding our musketry fire. At night we alter the embrasures of No. 3 battery, to fire on the castle only,[1] for four guns, three of which were for the eighteen-pounders, and the other for a howitzer. The guns, however, were not got in during the night, as Lord Wellington wished, and therefore could not open in the morning.

—— *14th.* At night, pull down palisades of the tambour, to give a freer passage to the breach. In the evening, open two howitzers on the palisades of the ditch of the second line, which, I fear, do no more than advertise the enemy of our proposed attack, and may induce them to repair the broken palisades, and strengthen that part. The guns at night were got into No. 3 battery.

—— *15th.* The guns opened from No. 3 at mid-day, and were silenced in half an hour, having the whole strength of the garrison of fifteen or sixteen guns and mortars concentrated upon them. Two artillerymen were killed, and three wounded, and the battery much injured. At night, repair the battery, and clear the road to the new breach. The embrasures of No. 3 turned upon the breach to perfect it. Lieutenant Rae, of the 1st Regiment, or Royals, assistant engineer, was slightly wounded in the night.

—— *16th.* (Headquarters, Villa Toro. Twenty-seventh day of the siege of the Castle of Burgos.) The fougasse to make an opening in the palisade communication of the enemy will not answer, owing to a quantity of old masonry, which the miners cannot penetrate. Towards evening, the enemy commence a sort of cavalier in this angle, to drive us from our sap. We had before attempted the same thing against them, but our

[1] This was against the wish of Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne.—Ed.

people would not stand the shells the enemy threw over at them to impede the work. The gallery to the church of St. Roman is sixty-three yards long at 4 A.M., the measurement taken outside to the terrace wall being fifty-two yards, and the miners report that they hear the enemy working against them. For fear of accidents, therefore, I ordered them to make a return, and load as soon as possible. The battery is ordered to open to improve the breach, in order that the assault of the second line may take place at 2 P.M., by which it is hoped the mine under St. Roman will be ready. The weather, however, is so bad, with so much rain, that the revetments of the batteries have given way, so that they cannot open. Lord Wellington, however, gives me authority to explode the mine, notwithstanding, if I see any reason to fear any accident from the enemy's miners, and to take the measures I think right, to secure a lodgment in the ruins. Lieutenant Reid, however, examined the mine itself, and could hear nothing like the enemy working against us, but could plainly distinguish the voices of the French in the church, talking, singing, and whistling. I accordingly desired the gallery to be continued to the extent necessary to ensure the effect of the mine, and then to be loaded without tamping, and two miners constantly to watch, that if they heard the enemy working towards it, they might report the circumstance, and on its being *verified*, the mine to be exploded, whether by day or night, as the main object was to obtain the breach; but if everything remained quiet it was to be left in that state till Lord Wellington chose to give the assault, when this mine might add to the effect, which was what his Lordship wished. An hour before it took place we might employ in tamping it with sand-bags, &c. This church of St. Roman is situated about twenty yards in front and outside one of their principal entrances into the fort. It is entrenched by a palisaded terrace, and serves them for a store for clothing and couvreport. Corporal Develin, of Royal Military Artificers, a brave soldier and good non-commissioned officer, was severely wounded on the morning of the 16th. The mine was loaded with 900 pounds of powder, and watched as directed, and all remained quiet. Some gabions and tools were collected ready near St. Roman. The batteries were repaired.

October 17th. Very bad rainy weather continues. The batteries open at 9 A.M., and play on the breach, which they make practicable again, the enemy having previously cleared the upper part, for a height of about eight feet. No. 2 battery threw shells into the second line, which seemed to annoy them much, as they directed most of their fire upon that battery. It is said that the colonel of the 34th French has volunteered the defence of the breach. In the course of the day, they kill nine of our men in the sap along the palisade, from the cavalier they have just raised. The gallery for a fougasse to make an opening in the enemy's part of the palisade, having got through the stone wall, it was loaded with two barrels of powder, and about 7 P.M. it was sprung. It was found not to have been quite far enough in, for the entonnoir just reached the angle, without bringing down any of their palisades. They ran out, however, and we attempted to crown the angle, but gave it up on their returning, and the heavy fire of shells and musketry they brought on it, it not being worth losing many men about. It is nearly full moon.

—— *18th.* Very bad rainy weather. The batteries opened at 9 A.M. No. 3 on the breach, which they improve, and destroy a chevaux-de-frise on the parapet to its left, which is in continuation of an entrenchment of palisades between the second and third line. During the morning, we made the approaches to the new breach and up the old ones, as good as possible, for the men to debouch out of. At half-past 4 P.M. the enemy's second line was attacked; the signal was the explosion of the mine under the church of St. Roman; but lest that should not be perceived by all the different points of attack, a colour was hoisted on a conspicuous height west of the castle, at the moment of explosion. The orders for the attack were as follows:

"On the mine being exploded, Lieut.-Colonel Browne will order an officer and twenty men to rush forward, and establish themselves on the breach which the mine will have made; an officer and fifty men will be in readiness to support these. Colonel Browne will have the effects of the mine well reconnoitred, and if he should find that it is practicable to enter the second line, after his troops will have been established on the emplacement of the church, he will order them to do so,

and establishing themselves in the second line, communicating by his left with the troops which will attack the second line from the piles of shot. If Colonel Browne cannot enter the second line, he will keep up a fire on it. He will be provided with six ladders of eighteen feet long.

"The troops of the 6th Division cantoned in Burgos, will be under arms, to support the attack on the second line, if it should be necessary. At 4 P.M. the parallel along the parapet of the first line must be fully occupied. When the signal will be made, an officer and twenty men, who must be previously placed in the sap leading to the palisade in front of the gate of the second line, are to rush forward, and drive the enemy from behind that palisade, and follow them into the covert-way. The sap must be immediately reoccupied by an officer and thirty men, who are to protect the rear and right flank of the detachment which will have entered the covert-way. At the same time, an officer and forty men, eighteen of them carrying three ladders, must rush forward from the left breach in the first line to the shot piles, and thence to the line in front of the shot piles, where they will descend into the ditch, which they will pass at the places where the palisades have been destroyed by shot; they are then to scale the line at that point. An officer and fifty men are to be in readiness at the back of the same breach, to rush forward to the shot piles, as soon as the first party which will have gone there will have advanced from thence; these troops are to support the storming party, and are to move on from the cover of the shot piles, as soon as they will find the head of the storming party established on the parapet of the second line. These men are to carry with them three ladders. Fifty men must be in readiness to move up to the shot piles, as soon as the preceding fifty will have moved forward to the escalade. These will likewise carry three ladders. As soon as the party will have succeeded in the escalade, they are to turn to their left, and communicate with those who will storm the breach in the second line. As soon as the party will have escaladed the line, the thirty men ordered in the sap, are to endeavour to force the gate of the second line, and, if they should succeed, to communicate by their left with the party which will escalade. Three hundred and fifty men of

the relief for the trenches, must go down under command of a field officer, so as to be in the trenches at 3 P.M. On their arrival, the whole of the old covering party will be assembled on the right. When the signal will be made, an officer and twenty men (of the new covering party) are to rush forward from the advanced trench, to storm the breach. Fifty men are to be in readiness to follow these, and are to move out as soon as the head of the first detachment will have ascended the breach. One hundred men are to be in readiness in the parallel formed in the hollow road, to support the storming party in the breach; but they are not to leave the trench till the storming party will be established in the breach, and then only in case support should be wanted. When the storming party will enter the breach, they must turn along the parapet to the left, and drive the enemy from the stockade which is there established. The troops formed in the parallel along the parapet of the first line, and in the trenches under the hornwork, must keep up a fire during the storm, on the enemy's third line and the castle, so as to keep down the fire of the enemy. Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne will convey these orders to the field officer in the trenches, and he will see that they are carried into execution on the right, according to the intentions of the Commander of the Forces. Lieut.-Colonel Sturgeon will convey these orders to the field officer commanding the relief for the trenches ordered to be there at 3 P.M., and will see that all the arrangements ordered are made, and that the intentions of the Commander of the Forces are carried into execution on the left."

All these arrangements were punctually attended to. About a quarter before 5 P.M., every one being ready at his post, the mine was sprung; it did not bring down the church, but made a large breach in the palisaded terrace in its front. Colonel Browne's people, and some Spanish troops who had been ordered to join him, advanced to the ruins. On a very short interval after this mine, another, made and prepared by the enemy under the church, exploded, and threw down the church, all but the wall nearest the enemy's works. Three Spaniards who were most forward, were buried in the ruins. The ruins of the church were then taken possession of by Colonel Browne's detachment and the Spaniards. On the signal being made, the

different storming parties advanced, and gained the respective parts of the second line allotted to them, with scarcely any opposition; viz., the Guards, who were the old covering party on the right, advanced successively by fifties, as directed, by the shot piles, and passed the ditch with little difficulty, placed their ladders, and having gained the parapet, remained at back of it on the berme. The German Legion, who were the new covering party, advanced as ordered, first twenty and then fifty, and gained the summit of the breach, and some of them even went on, and gained the summit of the third line by its flat slope, and got in at the embrasures, but were soon after driven down; the remainder, instead of turning to their left to attack the palisade entrenchment, turned to the right, and getting behind the parapet, communicated with the Guards. A short flank, with a gun under the castle, bore upon the breach. The 100 men of the German Legion, who were to have supported if required, never mounted the breach. Our men remained in this situation for about ten minutes, when the enemy advanced upon them from their left (our right), and lining the parapet again, drove our men down, who were then forced to return to their old posts in the first line. In this business, all the officers but one or two of the Guards and German Legion concerned, were killed or wounded; and our want of success I attribute to the few men employed, and to their not driving the enemy with the bayonet completely from the terre-plein of the work, before they sought the shelter of the parapet.

At night, a communication was made to the ruins of the church of St. Roman, and the miners commenced clearing a place, to run a shaft from thence to the second line.

October 19*th*. The weather worse than ever; high wind and heavy rain. The enemy have been for some time advancing and manœuvring in front, and our force before this place has been gradually diminished by the troops sent day after day to join our army of observation in front; so that at present, of part of the 1st and 6th Divisions and General Pack's brigade, there are only left a little over 2600 men. Lord Wellington is out in front very much himself. In the morning, the enemy come out on the church of St. Roman, and very nearly catch Lieutenant Reid of the Engineers, and some miners. They are

forced to run off, and three of the miners are killed and wounded. The enemy are soon driven in. We continue to work to secure the church to ourselves. At night, improve the communication and defences of the church of St. Roman.

October 20th. Sent for by Lord Wellington at 5 A.M., who is just going out to the front. Consulted about the number of men who could keep the trenches and town, against the enemy in the fort. Nothing definitive settled; but the miners, masons, carpenters, and gabion makers attached to the Engineers, are ordered to join their corps in the front. General Pack is left to command the blockade of the fort with his brigade, Colonel Browne's Portuguese *Caçadores*, one weak British brigade of the 6th, and one of the 1st Division. With these troops, he is to maintain the trenches and the town, in which are also some Spanish troops under his orders. The artillery are to be moved out of the trenches this night, and the reserve artillery to move a short distance to the rear; only a French gun and howitzer taken in the hornwork, are to remain in the batteries, to fire a shot now and then, and to give some protection in case of sorties. General Pack is ordered to be in readiness to move at a moment's warning, with all the troops, except Colonel Browne's corps, the Spaniards in the town, and a fresh party of 500 men in proportion of British and Portuguese, for the guard of the trenches. I am ordered to load the mines in the hornwork, and to fire them if the troops leave the trenches. Demanded of Colonel Dickson twenty barrels of powder for the purpose. Towards evening, our party are driven out of the church of St. Roman.

—— 21*st*. Raise the siege.

In the morning, our troops again occupy the church of St. Roman. Forty barrels of powder arrive, and I request twenty to be sent round for the mines of the hornwork. In the meantime, at 3.30 P.M. General Pack received a letter from Lord Wellington, saying "He was sorry to inform him that it was probable he should have occasion to retire from his position, in consequence of the movements of Soult in the south, and that if he did not receive contradictory accounts, he should march this evening, and in that case, General Pack should hear from him again. He was therefore to send the baggage of the

troops before Burgos immediately to the rear, by Villalon to Franquinozo, and the arrangement would be, at 7 P.M. at moonrise, he would march and enter the town by the side of the trenches, which he would keep, as well as the trenches, till 5 A.M., when the covering parties and pickets would be drawn off, commencing with the hornwork. At five, the mines at the hornwork were to be exploded, as the last of the troops quitted the trenches, by an officer, to be mounted. The covering party were to take the road on the right bank of the Arlanzon by Villalon, and the rest of the troops by the left bank." All this was executed as far as could be. With respect to the mines, two were prepared at the salient angles, which I meant to have loaded with six barrels each, and in the others, where the galleries were run in only ten and twelve feet, I meant to have overcharged, in order to bring down the escarp; but by the stupidity of an Artificer, the powder, after arriving safe, was sent off, and notwithstanding our endeavours, we could not get it back. With a single barrel and a half, we loaded the mine in the salient angle of the left demi-bastion, the gallery of which was eighteen feet in, with a return when exploded; it went off like a gun, and only made the gallery larger, the soil being like a stiff chalk. The troops were drawn off as directed, and the mine sprung, without the enemy taking apparently any particular notice of it. The two French pieces were spiked, and left in the battery; our eighteen-pounders, owing to the state of the cross-roads, could not be removed, and their trunnions being knocked off, they were left. If they had been taken across the bridge, which might have been done in the night, they would have been brought off.

Thus ended the siege of the Castle of Burgos, which in my opinion would have succeeded, had the troops on all the various occasions done their duty, had the Engineers had a competent establishment, viz., of stores, sappers and miners, officers, &c., or had a larger force been sent to the attack of the second and third line, on the evening of the 18th instant. The general opinion however was, that our failure was owing to a deficiency in artillery, and some attribute it partly to our attacking the strongest side; but this last I am prepared to argue with them. The baggage of the army having been sent off to the rear in

the course of the day, the army march off at night by different roads, some crossing the Arlanzon by foot bridges below Burgos, (the fords not being passable owing to the late rains,) and some moving by Villalon on the right bank.

Remarks on the Siege of the Castle of Burgos. 1812.

Our personal engineer means were myself, Lieut.-Colonel Jones, Captain Williams, Lieutenants Pitts and Reid; to these I added from first to last by degrees ten assistant engineers (all who volunteered,) of whom five had been with us before, and I knew would be useful; the rest we took on trial, and were good and bad. These numbers appear well; but when it is considered that Captain Williams joined after the commencement, and was killed before he had been with us three days; that Colonel Jones was wounded as the business became anxious; that Lieutenants Reid and Pitts were laid up part of the time, and one of the best assistant engineers the whole time; that some of the assistant engineers joined late, and that six were killed and wounded at different periods; it will be easily understood the difficulty I was under for want of officers.

We had eight Royal Military Artificers, who knew nothing that could make them useful, but who certainly behaved with spirit. We had 200 men from the line, to make fascines and gabions, who required to be taught, not one of them ever having seen such a thing before, and I obtained about eighty constant men from the line—miners, carpenters, and masons, all requiring instructions also. Of course we had all the disadvantages of no previous acquaintance with the men, their characters or abilities.

Our entrenching tools were nearly all miserable country ones, too small for men, even when inclined to do much work with them, very easily broken, still easier buried and lost.

I still think the place might, and ought to have been, taken, if the plan laid down had been steadily and vigorously acted upon, and every one had done his duty.

It is certain that, with proper artillery or engineer means, we could have reduced the fort in a short time; but independent of our want of them, I attribute our failure to our feeble efforts in the assaults, to the unfortunate arrangements of some of them,

and to an apparent want of confidence and languor in the troops concerned, whose conduct was very different from what I had been before accustomed to witness. I must, however, except the Guards, who, for regularity, docility, discipline, and spirit, as shown either in working, covering, or storming parties, were an example to any troops in the world.

There was one point much against us, which was, that in the force particularly allotted to the siege, were included two independent brigades of Portuguese, besides those with the divisions; so that the larger proportion of our force was Portuguese, who certainly are not to be depended upon for such services as that of a close siege with numerous assaults.

A circumstance occurred which will give some idea of Lord Wellington's opinion of the Portuguese. During the siege, when we had approached very near the enemy's works, when great difficulty arose in getting the working parties to do their duty, and impossibility indeed, when the parties in question were Portuguese, I applied to Captain Goodman, the adjutant-general, to let us have at all reliefs a proportion of British, telling him that the preceding night, the Portuguese party could not be induced to do anything. He told me if I would send him an official letter upon it, he would get it done, which I did, without reflection, and imagining I should hear no more of it; but he, having a quarrel with the adjutant-general of the division concerned, sent off my letter as a regular complaint against the Portuguese of that division. From him it was forwarded to the field officer in the trenches that day, who happened to be a British officer in the Portuguese service, and who showed it to Colonel Douglas, commanding the brigade. These two gentlemen wrote most thundering letters against me, which were forwarded to me by the adjutant-general. The first demanded an inquiry; said that he was not witness to any misconduct on the part of the Portuguese on the occasion, that no complaint was made to him, and that my report was most *untrue* and *unjust*, &c. The other, in more elegant language, as more becoming his situation, was "astonished that Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne could presume to make such remarks on a body of troops who had so often had the honour of receiving the approbation of the Commander of the Forces."

As I could not submit quietly to such abuse, I immediately took the letters to Lord Wellington, and telling him that a most furious attack had been made upon me, I related the whole circumstances; adding, that it was not my wish or intention to make an accusation against the whole Portuguese nation (for in my letter I begged for a proportion of British, because our works, being within fifty yards of the enemy, I did not think the Portuguese at present adapted to it,) and that I was sorry that my report had been handed about in that manner; that I should be perfectly satisfied that nothing more should be said on the subject, but that I did not acknowledge myself deserving the remarks in the letters, and that if he pleased, I could easily prove the facts I had stated. His Lordship said that the remark in my letter had been perfectly just, and that he would settle the business. He added, that "it was rather hard that we should be losing frequently the best men in the army, because the Portuguese would not do their duty, and then should not be allowed to say so, but on the contrary be forced to compliment them. The Portuguese troops are useful; but in fact we are employing them beyond their sphere in these assaults," &c. He then ordered a letter to be written to General Clinton, to acquaint him that, if the said field officer did not immediately withdraw his letter containing his very unjust and improper remarks on Colonel Burgoyne, he would bring him to a court-martial; and to inform Colonel Douglas that Colonel Burgoyne's observation was perfectly just, and that he himself knew the Portuguese as well as Colonel Douglas did, and that he had frequently witnessed their neglect to do their duty, and that he who would maintain the contrary was no friend to the Portuguese."

Although the Portuguese were so utterly useless, I must say that the British were very deficient, more so than I had ever before seen; but it is a melancholy fact, and one which unfortunately tells particularly against the operations of the engineer department, that British soldiers, who have undoubtedly as much as, if not more, spirit than any in the world, are not ashamed of flinching in the most disgraceful manner from *work* under fire. But I think this, as well as their inactivity and want of exertion on working parties, will be very much got the better

of, when we have (if it ever happens) proper means and experience for carrying on a siege with éclat and certainty.

Our undertakings at this siege, every night we broke ground, appear most pitiful; but there was scarcely a single instance where at least double the work was not projected, and sufficient men and tools collected, and which was afterwards not executed, owing to the neglect and misconduct of the working parties. For how much better is the policy, and what time and men will be saved, when you can get cover in ten minutes, as you can in decent soil with handy gabions, to complete an extent of work at once, even in the teeth of the enemy, rather than going on from night to night, adding a little to the end of a trench, where the enemy is always expecting you, and ready to concentrate his fire upon so small a space. All this was out of the question, however, at Burgos; it was seldom the men could be induced to take out their own gabions and set to work, and I have myself placed at different times hundreds of gabions with my own hands, and then *entreated* the men to go and fill them, to no purpose. The business was new to them, and they wanted confidence; sometimes they would tell you, you were taking them to be butchered. The loss was, to be sure, sometimes heavy, but it was chiefly occasioned by the confused and spiritless way in which the men set about their work, added to the great depth we were obliged to excavate most of our trenches to obtain cover, from the commanding ground of the enemy.

I had an opportunity of pointing out to Lord Wellington one day, a French and an English working party, each excavating a trench; while the French shovels were going on as merrily as possible, we saw in an equal space, at long intervals, a single English shovelful make its appearance.

We could not get a *dozen* gabions filled in one day. Our musketry fire, kept up by the covering parties, of whomever they might happen to be composed, was noisy, wasteful, and ineffective; while the French kept a small number of steady men who fired well, and never but at a fair object. Every gabion we placed at the full sap, had ten or twenty shots through it, and an extraordinary number of our foolish firing parties were shot in the head by one unobserved Frenchman, while their attention was purposely engaged by another.

On the first symptom of failure, it was soon found out of course, that we had attacked the strongest side: it is a short cut to criticism, a knock-me-down argument easily applied. The projects were numerous; not a point in the fort but had its assailants; and where every one acknowledged the decision to be a matter of great difficulty, three or four had the presumption, and paid me the compliment, to offer their plans to Lord Wellington, who I am happy to say listened to them, and talked them over with me. I treated them fairly, and pointed out coolly my objections, and how I thought the other plan better; which I could do with more decency, as I called the one adopted Colonel Jones's, because while we were reconnoitring that side, having settled it to be the weakest, he sketched out a project of attack which, with some little variations, I proposed to Lord Wellington as his. After a fair consideration, all the projects were rejected.

For my part, I always recommended not attempting to breach the castle, except as a *dernier ressort.* There was no harm, however, in making the batteries; and the opening one of them was only very late in the business, when any sort of fantastic plan was adopted as "worth trying," instead of adhering firmly to one project, and expending the whole of our means, trifling as they were, on one point.

At midnight on the 22nd of September, the enemy's lower exterior line was assaulted without success; the reasons why this attack failed were in my opinion various.

In the first place, it was a rule that the troops immediately on duty or near the spot, were always to storm, or do whatever service might be required. These troops might be most unfit for it; and by this mode, the good old custom is done away of employing grenadiers, that is, chosen men, for occasions of difficulty. Our troops are by no means such as can be taken indiscriminately for brilliant services, and undoubtedly none are more so than storming works. Besides this, the duties were at this time taken by detachments; consequently the officers and men neither knew nor cared for each other, nor was there any stimulus of *esprit de corps* to push them on.

To prevent the line being turned, there was a palisaded ditch in one indented line, and a palisaded covert-way; the ditch

was of a weaker profile than in other parts of the works, and its parapet imperfectly, or rather not manned, there being only a small guard in that part of the works; it was therefore proposed to turn it at the same time by that side. This unfortunately, fell to the lot of the Portuguese detachments, and became a miserable false attack, when it should have been a determined one. I believe they scarcely issued from the cover of the houses; they certainly never got to the ditch, and the other attack could not have succeeded, even if it had been carried on with spirit, which it certainly was not, although the officers behaved exceedingly well.

Another strong objection of mine was to the manner of the attack. It was ordered that 400 men in detachments, with five ladders, were to proceed to the hollow road under the wall, and to get under cover there; 200 of these were to become a firing party from the bank, and to keep the enemy down from the wall. Then, of the other 200, thirty were to advance, and place the ladders to the wall (the ditch was no obstacle). When the ladders were placed, an officer and twenty men were to advance from their cover and mount them, and when they were *well up*, twenty more were to follow them, and so on successively by twenties, until the 200 were in; who were then to secure themselves in such and such situations, &c. By this mode, the first small party has in fact to take the work by itself, without the encouragement of a close and strong support, and if they do not succeed, the next party, who coolly from behind their cover see them bayoneted, are valiantly to jump up, and proceed to be served in the same way. The argument in its favour, (as stated to a hint I gave for a contrary mode[1]) was, "Why expose more men than can ascend the ladders, or enter the work at one time, when by this mode, the support is ordered to be up in time to follow the tail of the preceding party close?" My answer is, because large bodies encourage one another, and carry with them the confidence of success; because there is more chance of a few very brave men to lead; and because,

[1] Lord Wellington was dictating the orders for the assault to a staff officer sitting on the reverse slope of the trenches, and on Colonel Burgoyne reminding him that the garrison was stronger than that of Ciudad Rodrigo, gave him the answer quoted above.—Ed.

although we had but ten or twelve ladders to storm the castle of Badajoz, and therefore not more than forty or fifty men could mount at once, I am convinced it was only carried by the whole 3rd Division being there, and the emulation between the officers of the different regiments to get their men to mount; and although we lost 600 or 700 men, it caused success, which eventually always saves men.

It was, however, by the faulty mode pointed out, that all our assaults at Burgos were ordered, and with the miserable, doubting, unmilitary policy of small storming parties, because then "if we fail, we can't lose many men," caused us, in my opinion, much mischief throughout, more losses, and gave the enemy great confidence.

On the occasion immediately concerned moreover, no order was kept, all was confusion; part of the men went up to the wall; and the remainder to the rear; none remained in the hollow way, nor acted as a firing party. During the latter part of the business, therefore, the Frenchmen stood on the top of the parapet, and fired down on our people crowded in the ditch, who from thence returned the fire, and thus stood some time to be killed, as Bonaparte describes the Russians, "afraid to advance, unwilling to retire, and having given up all hope of success."

I have heard a hint that Lord Wellington said that the engineers told him "the fort might be taken without guns." This I do not believe; first, because it is not like him to say that he went by other people's advice; but chiefly because I never said any such thing, as I thought that even the little artillery we had might have been of service. I do not know what his Lordship's opinion may be now; but he certainly appeared, all through the siege, perfectly satisfied with me, and with the exertions of the engineer department; and although he occasionally listened to some project or other, that was put into his head by other people, as an accompaniment to the attack, for a general plan he always declared his approbation of mine.

Lord Wellington's despatch to Earl Bathurst, dated Caberzon the 26th of October, 1812, states: "The

officers at the head of the artillery and engineer departments, Lieut.-Colonel Robe and Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne, rendered me every assistance, and the failure of success is not to be attributed to them."

Sir John Jones, in his 'History of the War in Spain,' states: "This siege failed entirely from want of the necessary means of attack with the besieging force. The plan of the attack of Burgos had considerable professional merit as well as boldness, and notwithstanding its failure, added much, in the opinion of the army, to the previously high reputation of Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne, the Engineer in Command."

As a matter of fact, there was no occasion in the Peninsular war, in which Colonel Burgoyne distinguished himself more than at Burgos. It was the first occasion on which British engineers had sapped up to the works of a place, and made a lodgment on the exterior defences. Two practicable breaches were likewise made by mine, and this was effected without a single trained sapper or miner, and against a very strong garrison. At the period in question, when all the events were fresh in men's minds, it does not appear that any censure was cast upon him for his want of success on this occasion; his contemporaries would have as little thought of doing so, as of imputing blame to his brother officers for the failure of the two first sieges of Badajoz. But it is the nature of the ignorant to make success the sole criterion of merit; and in 1854, when disasters appeared to threaten our arms in the Crimea, an outcry was raised against him for imputed faults in the conduct of this siege, as well as that of Sebastopol.

Sir John Burgoyne, who was always ready to take upon himself the responsibility of a failure, never shrank from avowing that he had represented to Lord Welling-

ton that the place could be taken with the means at their disposal; and he always remained of opinion that it would have fallen, if powerful assaulting columns had been employed to storm it, as in the previous sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. The garrison at Burgos was considerably stronger than that of Ciudad Rodrigo; and it is difficult to understand the reasoning which prompted the employment of 400 men to assault Burgos, garrisoned by 2000 men, when two divisions (Picton's and Craufurd's) were considered necessary for the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo. The great achievements of the Duke of Wellington, and his subsequent fame, must not blind military critics to his faults; and it must be acknowledged that the brilliant qualities of the Duke were accompanied by a coldness of temperament, which led him occasionally to disregard the moral agencies which lead to victory or defeat. His orders for the assaults of Burgos might have been drawn up by a chessplayer or a mathematician; they were certainly unworthy of a great general.

In some notes on Choumara's work, written several years after this date, Sir John lays down a military maxim which is worth quoting: "This *bicoque*, which ought not to have resisted (according to Choumara) six days, could not have been so miserable, or the French would not have left in it a garrison of 2000 men, nine heavy guns, six mortars or howitzers, and eleven field pieces. M. Choumara hides from view altogether the total deficiency of artillery means for this siege—a want which occasioned all the irregular proceedings. The inadequacy of artillery and engineer means was such that, had the place been fortified on the ordinary system, no idea of attempting its reduction would have been contemplated for a moment. Still, wherever there is a

want of success, there can hardly fail to have been an error of some kind; and the error at Burgos was, too much enterprise in the planning, and too little in the execution. *An attempt with inadequate means, unless used with great vigour, is almost certain to end in failure.*"

Lord Wellington virtually acknowledged his error on this occasion, by recurring to the employment of heavy assaulting columns at the subsequent siege of San Sebastian.

The indifference which Colonel Burgoyne showed to his own safety during this siege, was a subject of much comment at the time. The late Lieut.-Colonel Nevill, who served as assistant engineer under him, says in his memoirs, "Colonel Burgoyne was the wonder of us all; he seemed to bear a charmed life, for he was almost ever in the trenches, mines, and lodgments."

In an article written by Sir John Burgoyne for 'Blackwood's Magazine' of November, 1860, entitled 'The Courtesies of War,' he gives the following description of himself at this siege:

"At the siege of Burgos, the Engineers were in very small numbers, so much so that the same few individuals were as much in the trenches as the necessity for refreshment would possibly admit. One in particular, who had a more general superintendence than the others, commenced early to try and take a few liberties, by crossing the open from one part of the trenches to another, very charily at first, till by degrees the enemy became accustomed to him, and would allow him to do what they would not permit to others. Of course he received the compliment with respect, and did not attempt to take impertinent or obtrusive advantage of his privilege. Among his comrades, the peculiarity was in joke thought to arise from a very particular kind of coat down to his ankles which he wore, being a new and outrageous fashion just arrived from England."

It has been remarked upon other occasions, that soldiers will allow a figure which has grown familiar to them an immunity which they will not extend to others.

Journal resumed.

October 23rd. (To Cordovilla.) The enemy came up with our rear-guard, with a force of cavalry and infantry at 8 A.M., and some skirmishing took place. Headquarters were first ordered to Rivellas de Pallijera, four leagues, and on the road they were ordered two leagues further to Cordovilla. During our late siege, the expenditure of tools was immense, and we could never have kept it up, had we not found a great many French implements in the arsenal. We have in our field depôt no miners' tools, which caused great inconvenience. We also want a portable forge, and some steel to repair tools with. We ought to have a siege depôt, at any rate at Almeida. Our rear-guard consisted of two brigades of cavalry (about 900). The enemy came up with them, with about 1600, and immediately advanced against some guerillas on our left, who ran away, by which they turned our left, and attacking it in front and flank, drove us off. The Germans made a good charge, but were overpowered, and throughout all the day, our cavalry made a very hasty forced retreat. At one time we lost an opportunity, where, on account of a deep ditch running from the heights to the river, it was necessary to defile by the road. Our cavalry had formed on our side of it, the enemy pushed past, and had got about half his force over, when our horse artillery were brought to bear on the little bridge, and prevented more advancing; at this favourable moment, our cavalry were ordered to charge, but did not break the enemy, who immediately after retired back again till we were farther removed. At last our cavalry fell back on Colonel Halket's brigade of German light infantry, who received the enemy's cavalry with a volley, and checked them.

—— *24th.* (To Dueñas.) Five leagues along the high road, at the bridge of Torquemada, our artillery kept the enemy off for about an hour; he did not, however, push us quite so much to-day as yesterday, and very little skirmishing took place. At

9 P.M. sent for by Lord Wellington, and ordered to mine the bridges of Dueñas Tariego, Villa Muriel, and Palencia. Sent officers off for the purpose. At Tariego, the cavalry officer at our outposts and a little in rear of the town, reported to Lieutenant Pitts that the enemy was in possession of the bridge, and he returned without attempting anything in consequence. We have troops at Villa Muriel, and the Royals and two guns, in front of Palencia.

October 25th. (Dueñas.) Major Thompson, assistant-engineer, went off at 2 P.M. to Villa Muriel, and arrived and set to work at four. The powder had gone so far to the rear, that it did not return to Dueñas till 6 A.M., and I immediately sent it off. Thompson received his at eight, and commenced loading. The enemy approached before he had finished, and brought guns to bear on the bridge and village; he succeeded, however, in destroying one arch completely, having a line of least resistance, (including the arch stone) below of four feet, and above to the road of four feet also, which he increased by heavy stones on the summit. The enemy, however, crossed by a ford, and gained the village; the Spaniards would not retake it till a company of the Brunswick corps advanced at double-quick time, with their arms trailed, into the village; the Spaniards then advanced, and entered with them, while on the right, two British regiments drove off at least an equal number of the enemy, though they were protected by a cannonade of ten guns from a hollow way near the village. Our troops remained on the heights above Villa Muriel all night. At Palencia, Lieutenant Reid proceeded to destroy the bridges with a working party and 100 men covering party, whom he posted at the gates of the town (Palencia is a walled town); these men were surprised at one of the gates, and were nearly all taken. The officer commanding the Royals, who had been sent there with his regiment and two guns, did not think it prudent to remain, and the bridges fell entire into the enemy's hands. It was found in the morning that the enemy were not at Tariego, and Pitts went off again to mine it; the enemy, however, were very close, and he was consequently hurried; and on the enemy advancing against him, the mine was sprung, and failed, the enemy immediately crossed the bridge, and made most of his working and covering

parties, (sixty-two men) prisoners. A squadron of our dragoons who were there, of course got safe off. The bridge of Dueñas was found too solid to get down to the haunch; a hole was sunk therefore, down to the crown of it, three feet in depth, and loaded with two barrels, which blew in about thirteen feet of the arch, the whole span of it being thirty feet. The wooden bridge was cut down.

October 26th. (At Cabezon on the Pisuerga.) During my absence, Lord Wellington wanted to have the bridge at this place mined, and no officer of Royal Engineers being present, Colonel Sturgeon, of the staff corps, offered to do it, and gave him a memorandum of the means and time required, mentioning thirty-six hours for the latter, which struck his Lordship as extraordinary, and on my appearance he gave me the paper, and said he did not think we used to be so long; to which I replied, "Certainly not," and by his orders, went about it, and had it ready in four or five hours. After it was commenced according to my directions, Sturgeon met me and said that I, "had better go and see what they were about, for they seemed to be proceeding oddly." I found his idea was to work into the *side* of the bridge through the masonry, which would have been quite impracticable. The mine was made on the haunch, with a line of explosion below of upwards of five feet, and about the same above, but with the resistance increased by heavy stones; it was loaded with three barrels. The bridge was very wide, and the arch forty-eight feet span. The enemy were delayed by the bridges destroyed yesterday, and did not follow till late. We barricaded the bridge with country cars having long strong beams run through their wheels. The enemy patrolled several times to the bridge in the night, and once advanced on it with several men, some of whom suffered by our fire, and a non-commissioned officer was left dead on it. Sir Richard Fletcher arrives from Badajoz.

—— *27th.* (Cabezon.) The enemy bring up ten guns, and cannonade our position of Cabezon for ten minutes, when they retired quickly on our producing twelve guns to oppose them. Our ground was very strong; they then appear to be moving in force to our left by Cigales. Reid, Barney, and Pitts had been previously sent off to mine the bridges of Simancas and

Valladolid on the Pisuerga, and Tordesillas on the Douro, with orders not to blow them up without a further order, or the enemy advancing on them. Lieutenant Jones was sent to Toro, to destroy the arches of the bridge, which had been repaired with timber.

October 28th. (Cabezon.) The enemy still appear moving to our left. I was sent to Tordesillas (eight leagues) to see if the mine was all ready, and to get intelligence of the enemy. Found everything quiet there and ready, the enemy being expected hourly, having been in the morning at Simancas, where the bridge was blown up, and the battalion there sent on to Tordesillas. About 7 P.M., however, the enemy advancing on Tordesillas, that bridge was also blown up. The enemy this whole day had troops and artillery on the heights above Valladolid, from whence they commanded the bridge and road to Puente del Douro.

—— *29th.* (To Boacilla.) General Souham, it is said, commands the army now opposed to us, which has been lately reinforced from France. At 7 A.M. the bridge of Cabezon was blown up, and our army retreated; at 8 A.M. the bridge of Valladolid was blown up. The fords are either not passable, or very difficult, but small rear-guards were left at them, and at the bridges. The army crossed the Douro at the Puente del Douro and Tudela. Lieutenant Reid had been sent in the morning to Quintanilla above Tudela, where there is a bridge over the Douro, to mine it, and with orders, if the enemy approached, to blow it up. In the evening, a wooden arch of the bridge of Tudela was broken down. Lieutenant Pitts was sent off to mine the bridge of Zamora, and to destroy it on the approach of the enemy. He was to get powder from the staff corps at Puente del Douro, who had taken the last barrels in our possession. On his arrival, they had already used it to destroy the lately-repaired wooden arch; he therefore returned, and was sent back with some powder procured from the artillery.

About 5 P.M. the enemy passed seven or eight hundred men across the Douro by a ford, and, coming in the rear, forced the party of Brunswickers who were defending the broken bridge of Tordesillas, to retire, by which they gained possession of both banks at that spot, and commenced repairing the bridge,

the opening of which was only thirty feet. This was the report made; it was however not believed that they passed by any ford, but probably got possession of some boats, and surprised the Brunswickers.[1]

October 30*th.* (To Rueda.) Very heavy rain all day. In consequence of the enemy becoming completely masters of the bridge of Tordesillas, the 1st, 6th, and 7th Divisions, and most of our cavalry, are moved down, and encamp in front of it at about 2000 yards' distance. In the evening, we commence two batteries for six guns each, on the low ground on our left, at about 1200 yards from the bridge. Two more redoubts were to have been commenced on the heights, but we could only muster tools for 100 men.

—— 31*st.* (Rueda.) Cold weather, with heavy dews at night. It is astonishing how our men can stand it. Their clothing very old, and having no covering but a single blanket or a great coat; the ground wet; no tents or wood near enough to make huts. The enemy busy repairing the bridge. Observed that a flag of truce, which came out to bring letters from prisoners, were forced to lead their horses over the bridge. They have an infantry picket on this side the river. They appear to have only three or four thousand men in Tordesillas. The enemy reach Toro, but not before one wooden arch out of the two was cut away. At night, they surprise one of our pickets near the bridge, and take twelve men. We continue our batteries and redoubts night and day.

November 2*nd.* (Rueda.) The bridge of Zamora was blown up on the night of the 31st of October, on information from Lieutenant Pitts, who was sent for that purpose, that the enemy were likely to enter Zamora from Toro. Continue working at the batteries and redoubts in front of the bridge of Tordesillas.

—— 5*th.* (Rueda.) The enemy are working at a *tête de pont* at Tordesillas. Sir Rowland Hill's corps is somewhere near Arevalo; it is said that the enemy press him.[2]

[1] They swam across, pushing before them a small raft with their arms and clothes. See an account of this daring feat in Napier, vol. 5, p. 306.—Ed.

[2] Sir Rowland Hill was moving up from the Tagus, to join the army of Lord Wellington.—Ed.

November 8th. (To Salamanca.) Four leagues. The army cantoned and encamped in front, and in Salamanca. General Hill at Alba de Tormes. It appears that the enemy only followed General Hill with a small force, and it is reported that Soult is moving on Placencia. Lord Wellington orders some batteries and redoubts to be thrown up on the San Christoval position, three miles in front of Salamanca, the right of it on the Tormes, in front of Cabrerizos, and the left near San Christoval, on a stream called El Arroyo. Two officers, Lieutenants Pitts and Barney, sent off to mine the bridges of Congosta and Barco de Avila, above Salamanca, both over the Tormes, to be sprung if the enemy advance in that direction.

—— *14th.* (Salamanca.) It appears that Soult, with about 32,000 men, Souham with about 30,000, and King Joseph with probably 10,000 men, are now in our front. Of this force they say at least 10,000 are cavalry. Our cavalry is not above 5000, and the army do not seem satisfied with the conduct even of these. Since the 8th, the enemy have reconnoitred us, but chiefly seemed to direct their attention towards Alba de Tormes, and one day cannonaded it, and showed an intention of attacking with ten or twelve thousand men in heavy columns, but made no attack. We had one brigade of the 2nd Division in it. Skirmishing took place for several days afterwards near that town; and this morning, it is said that a considerable force have crossed the Tormes, by a ford above Alba de Galisancho.

—— *15th.* All the troops cross the Tormes early, to the left bank, and the baggage of the headquarters is sent back half a league on the Ciudad Rodrigo road. Towards evening, the army retires again into the Ciudad Rodrigo road, from the heights to the right of Arapiles. The enemy have passed their whole army across the Tormes, and Alba de Tormes is abandoned by us, two contiguous arches of the bridge being first destroyed. It is supposed to have been an error, not opposing the passage of the enemy across the Tormes; but it is said that General Hill, who was nearest the spot, had no authority to do so.

—— *16th.* (To Boadilla.) The army in full retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo, it being understood that the French are pushing down by the Tamames road on our right, which turns us. Lord Wellington having information that the new walls to the

breaches of Ciudad Rodrigo have fallen in, I am ordered to proceed there immediately, and endeavour to get them put into a state to resist a *coup de main*. I accordingly pass the army, and stop for the night at Boadilla, making an eight-league journey. The weather continues exceedingly bad; the country and roads very muddy, and the fords across several of the little rivers deep and bad. Nearly the whole army is retreating by one road.

November 17*th*. (To Ciudad Rodrigo, six leagues.) The weather continues bad, but this part of the road is better. Found the breaches not fallen in, but menacing it strongly, and propped up with beams. These new walls are five feet thick at bottom, and four at top, twenty-four feet high, without counterforts, and apparently without drains; it was to be expected, therefore, that they would fall down. Sir Richard Fletcher, our commanding Engineer, who planned them, declares they were to have been only sixteen feet high; still, however, I should imagine they would have been too weak. Headquarters this day at Boadilla.

—— 18*th*. Headquarters come into Ciudad Rodrigo. It appears that the army has lost a number of men and quantity of baggage, during this retreat from Salamanca. Some knocked up from the inclement weather, others could not pass the fords from weakness. Quantities of baggage strayed out of the road, and were immediately picked up by the enemy; and the French cavalry found an opportunity of making a dash between the 3rd and 4th Divisions, at a halt near a river; in short, Lieut.-General Sir Edward Paget, the second in command, has fallen into their hands. Lieut.-General Lord Dalhousie lost all his baggage and horses, taken by the enemy. Colonel Delancy, Deputy Quartermaster-General, lost his horses. A whole brigade, it is said, lost its baggage from taking a wrong road, besides various other individual misfortunes.

—— 23*rd*. (Ciudad Rodrigo). The enemy have moved, it is said, 20,000 men from Salamanca on the Placencia road. The Medico, a guerilla, entered Madrid. A number of our stragglers have been brought in from the woods. We hear that Salamanca has been sacked by the French. Ballasteros, who objected to move his army from the south, because Lord Wellington was appointed generalissimo in Spain by the Cortes, and who

mutinied, and attempted to get his army to follow him, has been arrested and banished to Ceuta; his army was consequently too late to help us, when they advanced under his second in command.

From the Earl of DERBY *to* Lieut.-Colonel BURGOYNE, *on Service with the* Marquis of WELLINGTON'S *Army, Burgos, Spain.*

"Knowsley, October 29, 1812.

"DEAR BURGOYNE,

"I yesterday received your letter from Burgos, and write to congratulate you upon the narrow escape you have had, in the prosecution of that siege. I am so little of a military man, that your account of the difficulties your general has to encounter appears such as to make me apprehend this business will still prove a difficult one, and not be achieved without much greater loss of valuable lives; but surely it is strange that you should be so ill supplied both with artillery, and particularly, with musket ammunition. I trust, however, you will surmount every obstacle, and that Burgos will add another wreath to those you have so honourably gained at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. Believe me, nobody can rejoice more sincerely than I do at every good that can befall you, and it was to congratulate you upon your former well and hardly-earned honours that my former letter was written, which I fear (both from your present one and from Maria's accounts) you have not even yet received. It was directed for you with the army under Lord Wellington, and I cannot conceive how it has miscarried. For the telescope, you have no thanks to give to me, but to Lady Derby, who is one of your most attached friends, and has shared as warmly as any of us in the joy which your success has occasioned in this family. She desires I will present her best wishes that it may prove useful, and also serve to remind you of an absent and much-attached friend. Phipps' ship, the *Stag*, has sailed from the Downs for Portsmouth, and each post we look for his order to join. He fancies his destination will be the Mediterranean, where I hope he will be fortunate enough to pick up some prizes, to enable him to make himself and your good sister happy in an union for life. We have been at this place all the summer, which has been one of

great bustle, first from the riots, and lastly from the elections. The former have now, however, subsided, but God knows how long this may be the case, if the war continues and provisions rise, as they seem likely to do, notwithstanding a very good harvest. The elections, as far as I am concerned, are well over. Stanley is returned for the county without opposition, and Edmund Hornby has succeeded at Preston, after a poll of eight days, begun by Mr. Hanson (brother to the former candidate) without a chance of success. It has however cost me less than might have been expected, and I am quite satisfied that all is well over.

"Believe me, dear Burgoyne,

"Ever yours, most sincerely and faithfully,

"DERBY."

Journal resumed.

December 1st. (Mealhada Sorda.) The army goes into cantonments. Lord Wellington has caused a circular letter to be sent round to each commanding officer of a regiment, signed by himself, complaining of the state of the army during the late retreat, which was not very rapid, nor without reasonable halts. He laments the want of attention on the part of the officers, particularly of the captains and subalterns, and desires the commanding officers to use their best exertions during the present cantonments, to renew the proper discipline, and put their regiments into the best possible order.

—— *7th.* To Ciudad Rodrigo. It having been reported to Lord Wellington, that water might be let into the ditch of the fausse-braye at Ciudad Rodrigo, from the aqueduct in front of the great breach, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Richard Fletcher, Commanding Engineer, and myself, went over to examine it. We found the levels would admit the water, but various objections to the proposal. First, the body of water was small, and the distance being considerable, unless the drain was lined, much would be lost in the passage; the soil of the ditch also is shown to be porous, from the rain water not lodging. Secondly, the walls of the escarp and counterscarp being very bad, letting the water in would probably bring them down; and thirdly, it would only lay in the deep part of the ditch, where it is least

required. The people who form these projects, suggesting alterations in the engineer service, very indelicately make their representations direct to Lord Wellington, which they would never venture to do in the case of any other department.

December 25th. (Mealhada Sorda.) Lord Wellington set out about the middle of the month for Cadiz,[1] where we hope he will induce the Spanish Government to undertake some measures that may lead to more effectual co-operation on the part of their armies, now that he has been appointed generalissimo of the Spanish armies. The army of the south, late under Ballasteros, who was superseded in his command for remonstrating in strong terms against Lord Wellington's appointment, was three months ago near 20,000 strong, in good order, and well appointed. It is now commanded by the Duque del Parque, a man of but little military reputation.

—— *30th.* (Mealhada Sorda.) The army increases in strength in these cantonments, 100 men a day from the hospitals, &c., exclusive of reinforcements; but this may be partly accounted for by the few detachments that are now necessary from the army, and also by the fact of the sick, except the bad cases, being kept with the regiments, and consequently not returned as absent.

[1] Cadiz was the seat of government.

CAMPAIGN OF 1813.

Lord Wellington advances into Spain, defeats the French in a pitched battle at Vittoria, on the 20th of June, drives them beyond the Pyrenees—Blockades Pampeluna with a portion of his army, while the remainder besiege St. Sebastian—Two practicable breaches having been formed, on the 25th of June the place was assaulted, but without success, and owing to the advance of the French, the siege was turned into a blockade—On the repulse of the French under Soult, the siege was resumed, and practicable breaches having been formed, the town was stormed on the 31st of August, the garrison taking refuge in the castle—On the 9th of September, a heavy fire was opened on the castle of St. Sebastian, and the garrison surrendered prisoners of war —Lord Wellington advances, and defeats the French on the Bidassoa, on the 7th of October—On the fall of Pampeluna on the 31st of October, Lord Wellington concentrates his forces, and dislodges the French from a formidable position on the Nivelle, on the 10th of November—Repulses an attack by the French on the Nive, on the 12th of December—Then advances into France, leaving a corps in his rear to blockade Bayonne.

From Colonel BURGOYNE *to his* SISTER.

Headquarters, Freneda,
January 27, 1813.

I THINK you would all laugh if you could see me sitting all day over a fireplace I have made in my miserable cottage here; for I must say, that after months of hard work in the field, I do take the liberty of indulging, on such an occasion as this, in the house; and indeed my horse and myself are the astonishment of every one, how we thrive so well; for he is as fond of the stable as I am of the house, and we neither of us ever stir out by any accident.

I am in hopes, however, of having plenty of outdoors work again before long, though I am much haunted with fears of being left on some garrison job. The folks in England do not

give us a chance of getting to the top in this country, for as fast as vacancies occur, they send out others over our heads. I have now more senior officers to me belonging to this army than I had when I came out four years ago. I fancy it is, that now they find something is to be got, they begin to volunteer to come out. I shall continue, however, to jog on as I have done before, perfectly contented if I can only contrive to keep with the army in the field. Lord Wellington has just returned from his triumphal tour to Cadiz and Lisbon, but our arrangements are not yet settled for the ensuing campaign, and until they are, I must be uneasy, for I really expect next summer will be a busy and very interesting one to us. I do not think I have his Lordship's interest since the siege of Burgos,[1] which is, I think, rather hard, for he has never, that I can learn, expressed the slightest disapproval on any point; and independent of our miserable means there, I am not ashamed to say that if everybody had done their duty as well as the Engineers, the event would have been favourable to us. But we shall see.

* * * * * *

Journal resumed.

January 26th, 1813. (Mealhada Sorda.) Lord Wellington returns to headquarters, Freneda, having been received triumphantly at Cadiz and Lisbon. The army is healthy and increases in strength, but is not yet clothed. A number of men have died in hospital.

Lieutenant Wright has been sent to destroy effectually Fort Napoleon at Almarez, and the castle of Moriavete near it, which he has effected. The whole of the pontoons that were at Lisbon, (thirty-four large ones, equal to between 500 and 600 feet length of bridge) are ordered up to Abrantes, where they are to be immediately got into complete marching order, instead of the little establishment we had in Estremadura before. The enemy occupy the line of the Tagus down to the Tietar, below Oropeza and the Tormes. Soult is at Toledo with 12,000 men. Lord

[1] This was written under the supposition that he was to superintend the repairs at Ciudad Rodrigo. See Journal for the 7th of February following.—Ed.

William Bentinck has arrived at Alicante from Sicily, with 5000 men, reinforcements; he has now therefore 20,000 British and Sicilians under his immediate command, and 5000 Spaniards under Whittingham and Roche, in British pay, and consequently also entirely at his disposition. The Spanish general, Elio, has in that province about 12,000, and the Duque del Parque, in La Mancha, with Ballastero's old army (the best organised in Spain), a force of about 14,000. Suchet, it is said, is preparing Valencia for abandoning it, that is, dismantling the works. Our army, British and Portuguese, including General Hill's corps, cannot be less than 60,000, of which about 5000 are cavalry.

The officers of the Light Division act plays at Gallegos in a chapel, which, contrary to the predictions of the old priest there, does not fall down upon their heads, and crush them to death. Lord Wellington has a pack of foxhounds, and hunts twice and three times a week. General Hill has another pack, and Major Stewart, quartermaster-general to the Light Division, has another smaller pack. The weather has been constantly bad, generally rain or snow. It is now becoming finer, but freezes hard at nights.

February 7th. (Mealhada Sorda.) The very great success of the Russians leads us to expect the French force in Spain will be weakened the next campaign, and that we may be able to act offensively to some effect. Lord Wellington has sent all his battering train round to Alicante, and has just applied to Goldfinch (senior Engineer) for a list of twelve or fourteen heavy guns, to be ordered from England to Corunna, in case they should be required to reduce Burgos. The demand is made out for fourteen twenty-four-pounders, six eight-inch howitzers, and four ten-inch mortars, and 4000 entrenching tools, &c. Two regiments of the hussar brigade, 10th, 15th, and 18th, arrived at Lisbon, and extremely well, not having lost a single horse in the passage.

Captain —— having given Lord Wellington offence at Badajoz, it was settled that I should take the odious job of repairing the breaches of Ciudad Rodrigo; but in talking over the general arrangements of the corps for the ensuing campaign, his Lordship agreed it would be advisable to attach officers of Engineers to the different divisions of the army, and

said they might be very useful in a thousand instances. "There was Burgoyne," said he, "in the 3rd Division, always took the command of the Portuguese. After the business of El Bodon, Marmont told my aide-de-camp, who went in with a flag of truce, that he observed we were forced to attach a British officer to encourage the Portuguese regiment on that day and keep it to its duty, and that was Burgoyne." A day or two after, it was agreed that —— should go to Ciudad Rodrigo, and I might join a division, to my infinite satisfaction. This business of El Bodon was on the 25th of September, 1811, and Lord Wellington himself was present; our small force retired for six miles across a plain, in presence of a much superior body of the enemy, particularly cavalry. There being some difficulty in moving the 21st Portuguese Regiment, I volunteered to interpret to them all orders, and regulate their movements, and ultimately, the Portuguese colonel being an inactive old fool, I took complete command of the regiment through the day. They were frequently threatened but never absolutely charged, though it would appear by Marmont's observation, that he particularly watched for an opportunity against them, as the part on which he was most likely to make an impression. Lord Wellington appeared very well pleased at the time, but I imagined it was all forgotten. This remark of Marmont's, however, appears to have fixed it in his memory as a point in my favour.[1]

February 23rd. (Mealhada Sorda.) Our army is said to have a smaller proportion of sick than has almost ever been known, and yet it amounts to nearly one-fourth of the whole force. We have lost, however, during the winter a great number, and the army is therefore now by no means strong; I believe not above 30,000 effective British. It is said to be Lord Wellington's intention to remain in his present cantonments as long as he can, that is, till some movement of the enemy forces him out. The troops are not yet equipped, and indeed the artillery are still very deficient in horses. Lord March, aide-de-camp to Lord Wellington, has been in to Ledesma with a flag of truce. Don Julian keeps near that place, and the French are much annoyed by him, and cannot move out except in large bodies.

[1] Lord Wellington thanked Captain Burgoyne publicly on the field, for the part he took on this occasion.—ED.

The French of Foy's corps have made an attempt on Bejar, a large town three leagues in front of Baños, and have been repulsed by a detachment there. An officer of the 71st is killed or wounded. The 6th Caçadores behaved very well. A brigade from the 2nd Division is at Baños, from whence, I believe, the above detachment was taken. Lieut. Wright is throwing a bridge over the Alagon at Galisteo. Major Elphinstone has come out to this country, to be second in command of the Engineers.

April 21st. Mealhada Sorda. Sir Richard Fletcher returned to this country from leave of absence in England.

The four companies of Royal Sappers and Miners, with four sub-lieutenants (about 200 in all) move with headquarters and 100 mule-loads of stores, including 1000 entrenching tools, and other stores in proportion. Most of our officers have joined their divisions. The army has been waiting for its equipments, and latterly it has been healthy and strengthening. We shall undoubtedly take the field in greater strength this year. Lord Wellington also being commander-in-chief of the Spanish armies, can direct their movements in co-operation with his own. The French are weaker, having been forced to draw men from Spain to oppose the Russians; they will be however much more concentrated. It is said we are now all ready to move, and only wait the arrival of the pontoon establishment from Abrantes. This moves very slow, being drawn by bullocks, and constantly meeting with accidents in the Portuguese roads. They will be up in about ten days. Lord Wellington expects opposition on the Douro, and even prepares for the French leaving garrisons in Zamora and Toro, where they have strengthened the castles, which may hold two or three hundred men each. These would be useful posts, if we advance by the left bank, and have to force a passage; for at the bridges, viz., Zamora, Toro, and Tordesillas, the advantage of ground is entirely on their side; and indeed, in nearly all parts of the river. Castro Murio, between Tordesillas and Toro, is almost the only point favourable for forcing the passage from the left bank.[1] A brigade of six iron eighteen-pounders on travelling

[1] In consequence of this feature of the Douro, Lord Wellington advanced by the right bank, through the difficult country of the Traz-os-Montes, thus turning all the French positions.—Ed.

carriages is to move with the army, and has been, or is to be well equipped with horses and bullocks. It is at present at Corvilhão, and has 150 rounds per gun. It is ordered to be completed to 700 per gun. Five millions of rations are ordered to be collected at Barca d'Aloa, at the mouth of the Agueda, by means of the Douro boats, which is partly effected; and a very large number of rations (probably from the same stores) are now being put into Ciudad Rodrigo. About 100 bullock-cars a day, enter that place with biscuit and corn. These cattle are very fine, consisting of the black wild cattle of the Sierra de Gata, and each car carries from ten to twelve bags of biscuit, of upwards of 100 lbs. each bag. Some of the Quarter-master-General's Department have been busily employed in examining the roads of Traz-os-Montes, up to Miranda, Braganza, &c. Part of the army is certainly to move up that way, so as to be on the right bank of the Douro at once.

Sir Thomas Picton set out on the 28th from Lisbon for head-quarters; just returned from a long absence of about nine months in England from ill-health.

May 2nd. To Almeida. Having been requested by Major-General Murray, Quartermaster-General, to prepare for the passage of the troops of the 3rd Division across the Douro into Traz-os-Montes, I started this day, and moved to Almeida with Lieutenant Hulme.

—— *8th.* (Murça.) By an arrangement ordered by Lord Wellington in the course of the winter for the British forces, the iron camp-kettles carried on one mule per company are to be abolished, and light tin ones used instead, after the manner of the Portuguese. These are to be put up in a bag, and carried by the men, at the rate of one for each six men, who on march will carry it alternately; and to allow for accidents, the commissary of each division is always to have fifty in store with the division, ready in bags for delivery. All the soldiers besides have their little semi-circular tin saucepan, with its soup-plate in it.

The mule formerly allotted to carrying the camp-kettles, is now to carry bell-tents, three for each company, for the men exclusively, and the captains have an increased allowance of £8 to their bat, and forage to keep this mule.

The Portuguese will be, as before (at least most of them),

without cover. The tents are ordered to be pitched as much as possible out of sight of the enemy, at the back of heights, &c.

Yesterday, the 7th of May, arrived a company of 9th Portuguese, of eighty-four men and four officers, from the 3rd Division, to be at my orders. They remain for the present at Murça, but relieved the guard of the 4th Division in the boats at the Barca de Villarinho. A company of the 21st Portuguese have marched to join Lieutenant Hulme. Wrote yesterday to General Colville, to state that we could pass at the ferries of Collegio and Villarinho, 700 men and 60 loaded beasts per hour. Sent the letter by a peasant.

May 16th. (Murça.) The 3rd Division march this day. The right and Portuguese brigades cross the Douro at Foz, Tua, &c., and the left brigade at the ferries of Collegio and Villarinho. Sir Thomas Picton took command of the division on the 12th, but is now so unwell as not to be able to march with it.

—— *17th.* To Quinta de Louvosin; General Colville passes the river, and takes up his quarters at the Quinta of Donna Anna, about one mile up on the right bank, and called Louvosin.

—— *18th.* To Villa Flor. The brigade was ordered to march at 4 A.M. At 5.30 the 94th and 83rd reached the ferries, and were completely passed over by 7 A.M. Indeed, the commanding officer of the 94th states that his whole regiment of about 400 strong were passed over in three turns in half an hour. At the ferry of Villarinho was one boat of seventy pipes or thirty-five tons, (the largest class on the river), which passed from 140 to 180 men at a time. These boats are flat-bottomed, draw little water, and are very favourable for the purpose. By preparing a good double stage for them to embark and disembark, animals might very well be crossed in them, twenty or thirty at a time; as it was, however, these boats only passed the troops or baggage, and the horses and mules were ferried over in the regular passage boat. At the Collegio ferrying place, the embarking 150 soldiers and officers, by two short planks from the beach to the side of the boat, occupied twelve minutes; the disembarking by the same means took six minutes; the boat rowed across the river in six minutes, and the same time to return made a total of half an hour for each turn. It did not lose fifty yards in rowing across. The Villarinho ferry-boat

passed over from six to eight beasts at a time loaded, and took about three turns per hour, with assistance of soldiers. It lost about 300 yards in crossing. That of Collegio took the animals unloaded, and passed over from ten to fifteen at a time, but lost about 600 yards in the passage, and did not make above three turns in two hours. The Douro boat there passed over the baggage, that of each regiment at once.

May 19th: (Villa Flor.) The whole division move up, and are cantoned in Villa Flor and villages, within a league. Sir Thomas Picton arrives, recovered from his illness. The other brigades and their baggage crossed the Douro yesterday near St. João de Pesquiera, and were all over by 2 P.M.

—— *29th.* To Losilla. A Spanish peasant comes over with a letter from Castaños; says he left Lord Wellington on the 26th inst. in Salamanca, where he had that day entered, and made 500 men and three guns prisoners.

—— *30th.* (Losilla.) Rode down to Sta. Eufemia, two miles in front, where General D'Urban is quartered. One of his cavalry officers, sent to reconnoitre the river, found a ford which was not known to the enemy, and very imperfectly to the peasants; it is about a mile below the ferry of St. Vicente, and is passed by crossing and zigzagging over islands overgrown with brushwood. It is scarcely up to a large horse's belly, but has a bottom of large stones, and is rather rapid. Lord Wellington arrived at Carvajales. In the evening, an order was received for the Heavy German Brigade of cavalry, and General D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, and the 3rd and 5th Divisions of infantry, to march at night, down to the ford of Palomilla (the one newly found out below St. Vicente). The left column was also put in motion at night, to follow across the same ford. The troops accordingly marched at dark, but about 10 P.M., when preparations were making to clear the tracks across the islands and put marks to ascertain the ford well, the guide reported, and it appeared the same to the officers who had seen it before, that the river was somewhat risen, and the ford, which was esteemed a bad one before, was now thought impracticable to infantry. The troops were therefore halted and put to bivouac in the valley of Sta. Eufemia at 1 A.M., out of sight of the enemy, and information sent to Lord Wellington, who in

answer, insisted upon the ford being tried. The troops were accordingly marched back, and men, stripped first, tried it, and though using a pole, could not keep their legs. It was accordingly necessarily abandoned by the infantry, who returned to camp; the 3rd and 5th Divisions to their old camps, and the left column, which had come up to Losilla, in a wood in its neighbourhood, at 9 A.M. of the 31st.

May 31st. (Losilla.) The Heavy German Brigade, and the Portuguese cavalry, crossed the ford of Palomilla by mid-day, with a loss of five or six men, and as many horses drowned; it had then become worse, and no more passed there. On this morning, the enemy had retired from the Ezla, except one or two cavalry pickets. The Hussar Brigade, and some infantry of the 7th Division, crossed at the ford of Almendra, with the loss of twelve or fifteen men drowned. The picket of the enemy retired, without giving notice to their support. This, consisting of an officer and twenty or thirty men, were all taken by the hussars after a chase. In the meantime, the bridge of pontoons was thrown over at the ferry of Manzaval, and in the course of the day, all the cavalry, and the 4th, 6th, and 7th Divisions, were on the left bank.

June 2nd. Lord Wellington proposes putting twelve or fourteen guns, and two or three thousand Spaniards, into Zamora, which has a good old wall all round it, and Lieutenant Hulme, Royal Engineers, is left there to improve it. When our troops entered Salamanca, the enemy were very late in leaving it with a corps of two or three thousand infantry, and two or three hundred cavalry. Our cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, soon came up with them, and though they killed about 150, and wounded and made prisoners about 200, the enemy got off with the remainder, our cavalry having just marched five leagues; but the confusion of the enemy was so great, that many think their whole force might have been reduced by perseverance and determination. The brigades are much dispersed, water and wood being very scarce. The people burn straw pressed down in the chimney, and in the ovens vine trimmings; not a tree is to be seen all over the country, except here and there a solitary one or two in a village. The country is one open plain, with very slight eminences, covered with corn; the villages are good

and the houses very neat and clean; the roads now excellent. Headquarters remain at Toro. The enemy had a large force near the river Hornija, about three leagues in our front, but are understood to be now retiring. The Hussar Brigade came up with their cavalry yesterday, and the 10th charged and took about 200 prisoners, and killed several. Our loss was, one officer killed, one taken, and thirty men killed and taken and wounded. This took place near Morales. The bridge of Toro will be repaired to-day. The Light Division are ready on this side the Douro.

Colonel BURGOYNE *to* Lord DERBY.

Mouzon, near Palencia,
June 9, 1813.

MY DEAR LORD DERBY,

We commenced the campaign, that is, passed the frontiers of Portugal, about a fortnight ago, and have made very good progress. The enemy were certainly prepared to linger about the Douro, and delay for a short time our advance in that direction; but by moving a great part of the army through the Traz-os-Montes, and so up its right bank, we turned effectually every position they could have taken up, except that of the Ezla, which was too far in advance for them to occupy in force. By the direction in which we have advanced, there has been no ground affording them any material advantage, and without it we understand their force at present to be totally inadequate to cope with us. They keep therefore retiring at a very respectful distance, so that we scarcely ever get even a sight of them. As they retire they increase in strength, and will, I hope, before long make a stand, probably somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Ebro. Our army was never before so strong, in so complete a state of equipment, or more full of health and spirits, than at present; our cavalry, artillery, everything, in highest order; and what is very unusual, we are in superior numbers, I believe, to the enemy. We are all anxious to bring him to action; *his* policy is evidently to avoid it, but I have great hopes that his dignity and reputation will stimulate him not to give up so much country without fighting.

King Joseph is with the army, but we are told that the chiefs of their several united forces, as usual, do not agree among

themselves. We reckon the French army now retiring before us, to be about 60,000 men, which perhaps they may ultimately increase at most to eighty or ninety thousand. Ours, British and Portuguese, are about 75,000, besides the different Spanish forces acting with us, who are in better order, and appear more inclined to act with prudence and system now than ever they have done hitherto.

We are within about thirty miles of Burgos, which the French have used the greatest exertions all through the winter to strengthen. We cannot now attempt its reduction as we did last year, but must bring up a regular battering train to go through it by system, and even then the undertaking will be an arduous one, both from the great improvements that have been made in the place, and from a foolish dread that has got about our army respecting the difficulty of the enterprise, from not properly estimating the cause of our last failure. They are all for masking it, and even blockading it for any length of time, in preference to besieging it; for my part, I think such a measure would be a great disgrace to us, and I sincerely hope that if we do mask it in the first instance, it may only be for the time necessary to bring up the necessary artillery and stores to besiege it in form, and not be frightened from a third-rate fortress. I fear, however, that the battering train which was applied for by Lord Wellington several months ago, has not yet arrived at Corunna; when it does arrive, it will probably be sent round to St. Andero, which is not more than eighty miles from Burgos.

After Burgos, they have, I believe, no strong fortified post till Pamplona, except perhaps Santona, on the coast, which the neighbourhood of the sea would probably give us advantages to reduce with ease. Our prospect for the campaign is therefore very favourable, provided the war is carried on in Germany with such spirit as to prevent many reinforcements being sent to the Peninsula from France.

I am personally most pleasantly situated, being, by the kind invitation of Sir Thomas Picton, again attached to his (the 3rd) Division, and living in his family on the most sociable and agreeable footing.

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Journal resumed.

June 14*th.* The enemy have blown up the works of the castle of Burgos, and abandoned it; the firing of guns several days ago there, which was taken for rejoicing, must have been caused by the destruction of the guns. A despatch from Urquizo (the Spanish minister) to King Joseph, was intercepted a few days ago, saying that it was totally unprovided with everything necessary for a defence. This measure is very disgraceful to them; after expending so much money and labour all the winter on this work, and having that time to prepare and organise a system of defence, and now to be so unprovided, shows a total want of system and unanimity of action which must be favourable to us.

—— 20*th.* (To Chavarri.) There was yesterday a skirmish near Subijana Morillas. The little river Bayas runs by that village, having now from the late rains, a considerable stream; above it, on the left bank, crossing the road, is a bold height with much wood on it, having on its flanks, about 2000 yards asunder, perpendicular rocks. The French occupied this pass with about 10,000 men; the 4th and Light Divisions only were up; the 4th fronted them, while the Light, at some distance below, crossed the river, and a regiment of Portuguese *caçadores* drove a French battalion off the bold height on their left flank, and appearing upon it rather in their rear, their whole body went off. From this height afterwards, a large quantity of baggage of all sorts was seen filing along the high road from Miranda del Ebro to Vittoria, but our force was not sufficient to attempt anything upon it. King Joseph entered Vittoria on one of these last days, and went out again at night, after a few hours' stay. The arrangements first ordered for this day were for General Hill to move the right column into the neighbourhood of Pobes, keeping it upon the right bank of the River Bayas, near Pobes (one league below and to the right of Subijana), Sir T. Picton to move the 3rd division at daybreak towards Morillas and Subijana, leaving the baggage at Carcamo to follow when ordered. The reserve artillery to remain at Carcamo. Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie to move the 7th Division, followed by its baggage at daybreak, from Berberana by Guil-

lerte, St. Eulalia, and Jocano, to Africano. Sir T. Graham to order Major-General Pack's and Major-General Bradford's brigades to Murjina, and to move the remainder of the left column towards the same point, as soon as one of the centre divisions reaches Africano. The Spanish corps of General Giron to move to Ordiño. Headquarters to remain at Subijana de Morillas, the other troops to remain in their present situations. On arriving at Morillas, two leagues, by a stony bad road, the 3rd Division was ordered on to Zuazo, one league, crossed the River Bayas by the stone bridge connecting Morillas and Subijana, and then turned to the left by a tolerably good road along the left bank, and through a most extraordinary bold pass of perpendicular rocky mountains.

Battle of Vittoria.

June 21*st*. Battle of Vittoria. The 4th and Light Divisions marched by the direct road. The 3rd and 7th from Chavarri, across the mountain by Castillana and Los Guetos, and the left column (1st and 5th Divisions) from Murquia by the direct road to Vittoria. The enemy was in position in front of Vittoria, having a division on the right bank of the Zadora, forming his right, and then about one league from Vittoria, across the plain on a ridge of heights to the mountains on his left. The 4th and Light Divisions advanced and skirmished, and passed the river, while the right column gained the summit of the mountain on the enemy's left; the enemy reinforced that part from the side of the river, after which the 3rd and 7th Divisions came down to it, and the 3rd forced the bridge of Momario; the 5th Division drove the enemy on his right across the river. The front was attacked chiefly by the 3rd Division, and forced repeatedly; and in every part the enemy kept fighting and retiring all day. They showed little confidence, and seldom allowed our troops to come very near them. We marched over their guns by twos and threes, and tens and twelves; at length, when passing the city of Vittoria, their retreat became rapid, and about that place and beyond it, the great mass of their artillery and baggage and military chest was taken. We halted about Arcante, one league in front of Vittoria.

—— 22*nd*. (To Salvatierra, four leagues.) The whole army move to Salvatierra by three routes, in pursuit of the enemy, who was marching all night.

Colonel BURGOYNE *to his* SISTER.

Salvatierra, between Vittoria and Pamplona,
June 23rd, 1813.

* * * * * *

We have had another fight, and *of course* gained another victory. The day of the 21st was very brilliant. We drove the enemy in all directions; and he showed even an unusual degree of want of confidence, for in but few instances could our people get near enough to come in actual contact with them. The 3rd Division had been before kept very much in the background, for Sir Thomas Picton is by no means a favourite with Lord Wellington; but when it came to a day of action, we passed all our competitors, and certainly had the most arduous and forward situation in the field, by the promptitude and energy of my friend General Picton. It was very pleasant and gratifying to have, in several instances in the course of the day, messages from Lord Wellington to do the very things General Picton had previously ordered, and which were absolutely in execution.

My poor horse, well known in the army for my attachment to him, from having done the whole of my work for three years, was wounded under me in three places; and while I was lamenting the loss, and particularly the want of a horse at such a time, to a friend of mine in the artillery, he, poor fellow, was knocked off his, which I mounted, after seeing the master safe with a surgeon and attendants. My own horse, I am happy to say, is likely to recover.

We are now pursuing the enemy by pretty long marches; but as he is disencumbered of most of his artillery and heavy articles, and is running away, we have no chance of coming up with him in a hurry; but I hear we have hopes of cutting off a corps which was at Logroño on the Ebro.

We are now approaching Pamplona, a very strong fortress, where I trust we Engineers will have some professional operation to undertake. It will be some time, however, before we can get up proper means, during which it is to be hoped we shall drive the enemy in the field to as great extremities as possible.

* * * * * *

Journal resumed.

June 23rd. To Alsasua, three leagues. The right column strikes off to the left to the high Bayonne road. The remainder of the army continue on the road to Pamplona, after the main body of the enemy.

—— *24th.* To Huarte Araquil, three leagues. The whole army and baggage being on one road; very heavy rains, and roads exceedingly muddy, the progress of the troops is slow and very fatiguing. The enemy are much pressed by the Light Division and brigade of cavalry, and prevented from breaking down the bridges.

—— *25th.* To Sarasa. Near the two-league stone from Pamplona, three leagues. At Irurzum was a strong pass and bridge across another river, which the enemy's rear-guard attempted to defend, without success. A little beyond, and at the three-league stone from Pamplona, commences a fine open plain, bounded by mountains. The enemy carried off only two guns from the battle of Vittoria, and one of them was taken yesterday. The Light and 4th Divisions halt near Pamplona, on the right bank of the River Arga, and cut off the communication between it and their routed army, which continues marching towards France by Roncesvalles.

—— *26th.* To Villalba, three leagues, where the Light Division halted yesterday. The people here, as in all the villages we have passed since Vittoria, appear very inimical to the French, and deserted their houses on their appearance. The enemy burned one or two of the principal houses in each village, and at Villalba they murdered the priest. Mina is in great reputation here in Navarre, and very popular. Clausel, who had his division at Logroño, and marched up to very near Vittoria the day after the action, ignorant of the event, says, in an intercepted despatch, that he would join King Joseph either at Salvatierra or Pamplona. The enemy have left 600 men in Pancorvo, near which is O'Donnell's Spanish corps. Lieutenant Stanway, of the Engineers, is gone to join him, to assist to reduce it. No guns can be spared, but it is thought that the town may be gained, and then that the water may be cut off from the castle.

June 27*th.* To Mouron. The 2nd Division takes up the ground on the north of Pamplona, occupied by the 3rd and 7th Divisions, who are ordered first to Tiebas, three leagues from Pamplona on the high Tafalla road, the 3rd Division to cross the Orga above the town, and the 7th by the bridge of Arazun below it. An after order came to march immediately (11 A.M.) and proceed as far as we could without too much fatigue, on the same road on which the 4th and Light Divisions were the day before, with some cavalry. The object is to intercept Clausel's corps, which are still somewhere on the Ebro, and to impede the movements of which, various guerillas, &c., have been already sent. We march late, and by a bad road, impassable for artillery, for a league and a half, reach the high road beyond Pamplona, then continue on it for a league and a half, and halt near Mouron.

—— 29*th.* (Eslaba.) Halt. Clausel's corps are moving down the Ebro towards Saragossa, and our pursuit of it is given up. It was at one time moving directly up for Pamplona, and would have come up into our teeth, had not an *alcalde* of a village given them complete information of the state of affairs.

July 11*th.* (Huarte.) The 3rd, 4th, and 6th Divisions continue the blockade of Pamplona, under the Earl of Dalhousie. The 4th Division has the whole right bank of the Arga, from Villabar to Arazuri; the 6th, from thence to the high Tafalla road; and the 3rd, the remainder. O'Donnel's corps of Spaniards, are near Puente la Reyna. We are constructing redoubts on favourable points about 1200 yards from the place, to secure the blockade. The enemy came out to-day with about 60 cavalry and 400 infantry, to forage on the side of Paranain, very near the place. They were opposed by our pickets and two guns, and lost in the skirmish about thirty men. Our loss was eleven. They are little enterprising, and appear weak. We reckon on their having provisions for six weeks. Clausel's corps is said to be halted about Jaca. Sir Thomas Graham's corps is on the Bidassoa (the frontier river) at Irun, whither we hear the pontoons are gone. Sir Rowland Hill, after several days mountain fighting, has gained possession of all the passes of the Pyrenees on this side. Two Portuguese guns were got through the Pass of Maya, being the first which ever passed there. Our

battering train are gone to Las Pasages for the siege of St. Sebastian, which Lord Wellington is now on his way to reconnoitre.

July 14th. To Tolosa. The siege of St. Sebastian being commenced, I set out with Sir R. Fletcher for that place; followed an uncommon fine road by Irurzum and Lecumberri, through extraordinary bold passes in the mountains to Tolosa, a good town. Finding it full of Spaniards, continued to a village half a league farther—total 11½ leagues.

Siege of St. Sebastian.[1] 1813.

—— *17th.* At 10 A.M. the convent and redoubt of St. Bartolomeo were carried by General Bradford's Portuguese brigade, supported by part of the British of the 5th Division, the whole of which however were paraded in rear of the trenches. At twelve we remained in quiet possession of this height, and a working party was employed in opening communications along it. Applied for 400 men for the night working party, to open trenches in the gorge of the redoubt, and favourable ground on our left of the convent, to be hereafter converted into batteries.

—— *20th.* General Bradford's Portuguese Brigade, and all the troops belonging to the 1st Division, march from this side at daylight, and leave only the 5th Division to take all the duties of the siege on the left attacks. The covering party, hitherto of 600 men, is to be increased to 800 to-night, and for the future; all to be posted below in the village of San Martin, &c., to be supported by a battalion encamped on the back of the convent height.

A party of 400 men had been obtained after some difficulty from General Bradford's brigade, to make fascines and gabions; and now, after one day's work, employed in giving them directions, they march with the brigade. I accordingly applied to Lieut.-Colonel Berkeley for a party of 200 Portuguese from the 5th Division, under a selected officer, to be employed as assistant engineer for this purpose. They cannot commence

[1] All details of siege works have been omitted, as they are to be found in Jones's 'Sieges in Spain.'—ED.

before to-morrow, and will be then new to the work. Under present circumstances, no greater number can be afforded. Our batteries open about 10 A.M. Those on this side, for enfilading and taking in reverse the works bearing on the other side.

Night of the 20th. Seven hundred men were sent for a working party, of 3rd and 15th Portuguese. The night was exceedingly inclement; constant heavy rain, sometimes a perfect deluge, and very high wind. The working party sneaked away by degrees, into houses and holes and corners. On application, General Hay gave us a party of 250 men of the covering party of the same regiment; these did the same; so that, after numerous difficulties and exertions, only about 150 could be set to work at about 11 P.M., to form a communication direct from the ditch of the semicircular end of the enemy's counter-approach along the causeway to the farther extremity of the right trench of the night before. The party were not discovered, and the soil being light, soon got under cover; and Lieutenant Reid, by taking the same men to break fresh ground, and forty-six more from the covering party, opened another trench, as part of a parallel from the ditch of the same work, in a direction to the front of the ruined houses at the head of the burned bridge. This parallel was for about one-third the extent required. The semicircular work we found at dark abandoned, it having been much injured, indeed breached, by the two eighteen-pounders of No. 4 battery.

July 21st. At 10 A.M. I was sent with a flag of truce, with a letter from Sir T. Graham to the governor. I was met by a French officer on the glacis. They expressed great anger that we continued working when *we* held out the flag of truce, and would not receive the letter. Finer weather, but the trenches in a horrible state.

—— *22nd.* Lieutenant Reid, observing the drain of the aqueduct, where it was cut through in our parallel, to be large enough to get into, explored it, and with much difficulty and perseverance, went completely through (240 yards), to where it ended in a fastened door in the counterscarp, opposite the face of the right demi-bastion of the hornwork, into which, through chinks in the door, he was enabled to look. The ditch appeared

narrow, the escarp about twenty-four feet high, the drain on the level of the bottom of the ditch. It was determined, in consequence of this discovery, to make a globe of compression in this drain, and endeavour to force earth enough from the counterscarp and ditch, to form a ramp up the escarp of the hornwork. Lieutenant Reid, assisted by Lieutenant Matson, is directed to take the arrangement of this mine. It had been calculated that the troops left for the siege, (viz., the 5th Division for the left attacks), should supply a covering party of 800 men for the lower ground, to be relieved every twelve hours, and supported by a battalion encamped at the back of the convent height; and that the Engineer working parties should be of 800 each night for the whole night, and two reliefs of 400 each per day. Seven hundred were demanded for this night's work, but only 400 were sent; these were employed improving the trenches generally, cutting off a piece near the right extremity of the parallel that was enfiladed, and continuing to the right, so as to give cover down to the water, as far as the stony beach leading to the breach.

July 23*rd*. The breach is perfectly practicable,[1] and the guns are turned upon a wall to our left of it, to make a second. Shot and shells have been thrown into the buildings in rear of the breach. The enemy are observed moving their effects into the castle, and small parties of men appear to be working to secure the approach to it. Otherwise everything appears very quiet among them, and very few are to be seen anywhere. Our casualties continue very trifling. The houses at the back of the breach take fire. We are making a second breach to our right of the first in the line wall, which by evening is practicable. It is understood, by information from the place, that the enemy's interior defences are thus: the town front is very high; it is casemated, and the interior a high perpendicular wall; the ends are cut off by traverses and ditches, and all the ramps and steps of communication up it cut away; the interior parapet wall completed for firing over, with sandbags, makes the whole one enclosure of difficult access, and brings a fire up all the long streets, the town being very regular. One corner

[1] The breach had been made by the batteries of the night attack.—Ed.

of the town is also entrenched, covering the *debouché* up to the castle, and including the great square; the right of this entrenchment is thrown forward, so as to include the moles and harbour gate, and the left retired, so as just to cover the road up to the Mirador battery.

July 24th. The storming of the breach was to have taken place at 4 A.M., about an hour before low tide, and the troops were got down for the purpose; but just before it was to take place, it was countermanded, and the troops returned to camp. The cause of this was the extent of the fire on the first breach, which, it was conceived, would prove too great an impediment. As I understood the plan, it was to have been attacked with 2000 men of the 5th Division, part of whom were to have made their way to the right, and maintained themselves among some strong buildings on the flank of the enemy's rear entrenchment; and the other part to endeavour to get possession of the town front, by driving the enemy from the rampart, by a fire from the houses which command it. The mine was to have been exploded as a signal only, and with the chance of alarming them. The mine was all loaded ready, but not tamped, in consequence of the difficulty caused by the great length of so confined a gallery, and from want of air, which began now to be experienced. The powder was put in in barrels; the gallery would only contain two on their sides, and then one on its end, and so on alternately; the length occupied, therefore, by the thirty barrels was very great. Our batteries open, as usual, after daylight, and No. 3 on this side, fires on a loopholed wall on a small square tower above the harbour gate, and which is the only flank to the sea-wall on the harbour side, except perhaps the two guns called the Battery of Sta. Theresa.

—•— *25th.* The mine is sprung at about 4.30 A.M. (nearly low water), and makes an extensive opening in the counterscarp and crest of glacis, and the storming parties advance to the breaches, supported by a firing party of a regiment of *caçadores* in the parallel. They are repulsed with some loss. The Royals preceded. Some of them found difficulty in getting to the breach; part got to it very well, but only a few individuals mounted. Many of the officers said they could have got in very well, but could not get the men to

follow them. The 38th were to have followed the Royals. The enemy did not oppose much fire, or show many men to defend the breach; they brought one gun to bear, and rolled down shells from the little towers on the flanks. Our principal loss was returning from the breach, and on the open beach and in the crowded trenches, from the heavy fire of shot, shells, and grape. Of the Engineers, we have Lieutenant Machell killed, Captain Lewis lost a leg, Lieutenant Reid shot in the neck, Lieutenant Jones wounded in the leg and taken prisoner, and Sir Richard Fletcher a severe contusion. There is a cessation of firing for an hour after, and the French take in our wounded. The loss altogether was about 500 men. Lord Wellington came to the other side of the river about 2 P.M., and immediately sent for Sir Richard Fletcher, who, not being able to go, sent me. His Lordship seemed determined to persevere, talked of opening the breach more extensively on the left, said he expected much more heavy artillery, and demanded a project attacking the place in front regularly.

July 26th. A letter comes from Lord Wellington, dated last night at ten o'clock, desiring that, as we cannot go on with the siege till more ammunition, &c., arrives, all spare artillery, wheels, stores, &c., may be embarked at Pasages, and all the artillery withdrawn to the embarkation place there, except two guns for each side the river, to fire now and then. At the same time, Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham, who commands on the spot, orders redoubts, &c., to be commenced along the convent height, to blockade the place. A flag of truce in the evening, to inquire after the officers, prisoners in the place; they will take nothing in for them, and say they have money and everything they want.

Remarks on the Siege of St Sebastian. July 26th, 1813.

The project of attack was precisely similar to that carried on by the Duke of Berwick, in the war after that of the Succession, as stated in the supplement to his 'Memoirs.'

We discovered our intentions too soon; while the enemy possessed the convent of St. Bartolomeo and advanced position, and while we were forced to wait for the arrival of sufficient

ammunition to commence with, *the whole* of the batteries and trenches were constructing on the right bank of the river, which gave them immediate insight into the nature of the attack; and the breach was practicable two days before the trenches on the left attack were sufficiently forward for the reception of the storming party.

We should have commenced on the right bank, merely with enfilading and other batteries against the defences, and opened with them only till the parallel in the low ground of the left attacks was nearly completed, and even approaches conducted towards the front of the hornwork; then the breaching batteries might have been rapidly completed from the trenches previously prepared for the purpose, and the assault take place immediately it was practicable.

On the discovery of the drain of the aqueduct leading to the ditch of the hornwork, I should have recommended immediately altering the project of attack; as I think the advantages it would give us would convert a very dangerous assault, and one liable to a great loss of lives, into an attack of comparative certainty and probably trifling loss, but with a delay of probably four or five days. I would make a globe of compression to blow in the counterscarp and crest of the glacis; then at low water I would threaten the attack on the breaches, and explode the mine, and really assault the hornwork, which, not being now threatened, has but a few people in it, and would undoubtedly be carried easily; the sallyport in the curtain would afford a good communication into the ditch, which gives a large space of perfect cover to the troops for retaining it; this might be done in the evening at five or six o'clock, being the time of low water, and the night employed in making good lodgments within it, commencing breaching batteries in its terre-plein, and crest of the glacis of the branches, against the front of the body of the place and communications to the parallel.

July 26th. The position ordered to be taken up for blockading the place of St. Sebastian is very strong; but being within easy gun-shot of the castle, the situation of the troops will be uneasy and harassing. The ground in the rear is strong, and I doubt whether it would not be better policy to give them up the

convent height, in addition to other reasons, because they might be induced to fortify it, instead of expending all their means on the place; and though the French engineers may conceive, as well as myself, the latter to be the best mode, the generals, who always like positions in the field, may very likely overrule them. The sudden symptoms of raising the siege are owing to the enemy having assembled on the right of our army, and driven the 2nd division from the Puerto de Maya.

July 27th. The enemy make a sortie at 7 A.M. with about 100 or 300 men; they surprise the people in the trenches, gain the circular work on the causeway, and enter the parallel from that point, and from the opening in the covert-way made by the mine, and cut off and make prisoners a number of men along the parallel, chiefly Portuguese.

Night of 28th. At one in the morning, a sudden order arrives to withdraw all the working parties, who are to return to camp, and bring in the tools to the depôt; the covering parties remain; one brigade of the 5th Division is ordered to march at daylight in the morning from this side of the river, and one Portuguese brigade from the other side, to join Sir Thomas Graham, in consequence of a French force having advanced to Vera, and Sir Thomas not having any accounts of Lord Wellington for three days.

July 29th. The guns are all ordered by Sir Thomas Graham to be taken out of the batteries this night, and everything to be embarked at Pasages, and the vessels to get out of the harbour. We keep the trenches still, but do no work. In the evening, accounts are received that Soult attacked, on the 28th, the 3rd and 4th Divisions, under Lord Wellington, and some Spaniards, with 35,000 men, and was repulsed twice. The 6th Division joined them at the latter end of the day, and Sir Rowland Hill was expected to join the next (this) morning. There was no artillery or cavalry in the action, which was somewhere near Pamplona, on either side. A fresh supply of musketry ammunition is sent for.

—— *30th.* Preparations for resuming the siege are to be continued.

August 3rd. At 8 A.M. hoisted a British Union flag on one

battery, and a Portuguese flag on another, and fired a salute of twenty-one guns in honour of Lord Wellington's successes. The enemy man their batteries soon after, and return a fire for an hour or two.

August 4th. By order of Sir Thomas Graham, the works carried on are to be such as will strengthen a blockading position.

—— *6th.* The stores, guns, &c., for the siege are all relanding at Las Pasages, and the order now is to continue the works on the *besieging* principle.

—— *7th.* The proposal sent in[1] to Lord Wellington for continuing the siege is to persevere on the same plan enlarged; that is, to add more guns to the old breaching batteries, continue to enlarge the old breach right and left, and from a powerful battery in the gorge of the French redoubt, to endeavour to continue the breach round the main front, by laying open the adjoining demi-bastion and end of the curtain above it. We therefore continue preparing these batteries, and improving the trenches generally. From observations made from the lighthouse height, it is thought the enemy are countermining the glacis of the hornwork at the salient angles.

The present plan of attack, it appears to me, cannot succeed. The breaches are 300 yards from where our storming parties must debouch from the trenches, the approach over large rocks covered with seaweed, and with pools of water, and over all which much fire can be brought; the breach itself has to all appearance, a dip at the back, and the houses in flames in the rear, apparently intentionally by the enemy. After this is all carried, however, the town main front must be forced; for if that is not taken, we must return before high water, having no communication but along the beach. This town front is casemated, and high in the interior; therefore, by cutting off the two ends, which is evidently done, it becomes a strong enclosure, which enfilades all the long streets; for the town is regular, and has itself a part adjoining the foot of the castle

[1] The project of attack had been drawn up by Major Smith, R.E., afterwards Lieut.-General Sir Charles Smith; upon the arrival of Colonel Fletcher and Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne, the latter thought it a bad one, and proposed another plan to Lord Wellington on the 25th of July. (See *ante.*)—Ed.

hill, cut off by strong entrenchments. I fear we never can succeed without taking the hornwork, and thence breaching the main town front as extensively as we please.

August 8th. The enemy regularly at 6 P.M. (the hour of relief for our covering parties) man all their batteries, and open a fire, as heavy as they can, on the worst parts of our trenches, where, from the sandy soil, sharp corners, and commanding situation of the castle, the men appear to be much exposed; but their fire has astonishingly little effect. They have repaired the glacis injured by our mine, and entrenched the two demi-bastions of the hornwork; they have also put up palisades across the ditch within the counterguard on their right, where the wall is low. We imagine that they have been much annoyed by our spherical case shot; for they put musket balls into their cannon shells, and burst them short, with no effect.

A report is made to General Oswald that miners were heard last night at work under the Cask Redoubt (the circular work on the causeway), about 250 yards from the enemy's ditch; this has been frequently before mentioned as having been heard both at right and left of the parallel, and little attention paid to it; now, however, to quiet our people's minds, I apply to the general for a party of miners from the line (32) to be attached to us.

—— *9th.* The miners are to set to work this morning. I propose sinking a shaft in the parallel, near the work, about nine feet deep, and then drive a gallery nearly round the work, by which, if they were at any mischief, I think we must hit upon them.

—— *12th.* The enemy continue to work hard; they are entrenching the two demi-bastions of the hornwork. Made covered communications from the town up to the castle; are constructing a new battery on a low level of the castle hill above the town; and the openings to countermines in the counterscarp of the salient angles of the hornwork are plainly seen, or rather nearer the place than the salient angles. It is probable that on the left they will have chambers to blow the sea-wall in upon the storming party, if we again attempt it in that direction.[1]

[1] This is exactly what happened.—ED.

August 15th. The enemy, yesterday evening at sunset, fired a salvo from all their guns, mortars, and howitzers at once, and this morning at daylight, they fire three to usher in Napoleon's birthday, three at noon, and three at sunset. "*Vive Napoleon le Grand!*" is put on the castle in large wooden letters, and illuminated at night. The miners are twenty-two feet in the gallery, and now understand the work better. It has a complete casing of timber and planks, the frames about two feet asunder. With the spade, they first make a small slit for the planks of the roof, which they insert, and prop with an upright in the centre; they then cut down even with the edge of the planks, then insert them a little farther, and so on, till it is time to put up another frame.

—— *18th.* The artillery we had at the first period of this siege, was that sent out under the idea of besieging the castle of Burgos, viz., fourteen twenty-four-pounders with 1500 rounds per gun, six eight-inch howitzers with 1000 rounds each, and four ten-inch mortars with 500 rounds each; to which we were enabled to add the six eighteen-pounders with the army, and four sixty-eight-pounder carronades and two short twenty-four-pounders from the navy. Lord Wellington also desired in the winter, to have double the above proportion in addition prepared and embarked, ready to be sent for, if he should require them. These he sent for lately, but was answered by Lord Bathurst that they had been prepared according to his demand, but were sent on a sudden emergency to the Baltic; that there was however a proportion of heavy guns embarked for Cuxhaven, and now not wanted there, which he might have if it would answer, or if not, the first demand should be complied with as early as possible. The list of this Cuxhaven proportion contained guns on ship carriages and *traversing platforms*, no shells, various articles of no service to us, many most essential deficient, &c., and would not answer. Accordingly a fresh assortment was prepared, and has now arrived at Pasages.

—— *19th.* Captain Collyer and Lieutenant Wortham, with a company of sappers, join from Pasages, where they have just arrived from England. The gallery is eighty feet in, and has reached the first wall of the causeway. The French have put

merlons to their batteries in the castle, which were before all *en barbette.*

August 21*st.* The gallery is upwards of eighty feet in; there is much difficulty to keep the candles burning. This morning, a large hole at the end falls in from the road, and I desire the gallery to be stopped. The Portuguese sappers, about fifty, arrive with eight officers of Portuguese engineers, including one major and adjutant.

—— 24*th.* At night, broke out at the end of the approach on the left, a short head of about thirty gabions, from the ends of which we could continue to the right and left a parallel at about fifty yards from the salient angles of the covert-way, and at the same time, it forms a traverse to that trench, which was before rather looked into obliquely. Previous to the working party commencing, the director on duty caused an officer and twenty-five men (Brunswickers) of the covering party, to be posted in the trench as a support, three of them at the point where the new work struck out, and three along the trench, as sentries. The work is not, I think, above fifty yards from the covert-way, and therefore it was not according to rule or prudence to send men in front. About twelve or one o'clock, the enemy came out, and hurrahing, charged round the two ends, ran over the parapet into the trench, put everything into confusion, and made their way down to the parallel, and thence along it to our right, at the end of which was a small body of the covering party, who checked them, and in a short time they retired. The result has been, as far as I can ascertain, one officer of the covering party, and eleven or twelve men of covering and working parties, taken, among them three sappers; one private of the covering party on the right killed. A single shell, during the relief of the covering party in the evening, wounds seven men.

—— 25*th.* A single shot this morning, strikes the wall in front of No. 5, and wounds two sappers and five men of the working party, chiefly by the stones.

—— 26*th.* Our batteries open at 8 A.M. On this side the seven twenty-four-pounders and six eighteen-pounders, to open the left demi-bastion of the main front and end of the curtain above it, in continuation of the old breach and the left face of

the hornwork demi-bastion; two howitzers in No. 6 at the front defences generally, with spherical case. The batteries of right attack are to breach the two towers on the flanks of the present breach, and to widen it to the salient angle of the demi-bastion and the end of the curtain above it. Captain Rhodes and myself are ordered to take the duty of director of the works alternately for twenty-four hours. I go on at 1 P.M., and have my tent immediately pitched behind a wall in St. Martin's, where we have formed an advanced depôt of stores. Two shafts are commenced in the advanced trench to the right, to seek the enemy's mines; the one about forty feet from the sea-wall, and the other about sixty feet on its left. The galleries are both to point to the gate near the salient angle of the covert-way.

August 27th. At 3 A.M. (high tide) the island at the mouth of the bay was attacked. This island is about 360 yards long; it is high, rocky, and much scarped; on the sea side no landing was possible, and on the bay side it was very difficult. The enemy had between twenty and thirty men on it, but without guns or works, except at the point towards the lighthouse, where they maintained a guard, who had buried themselves well in the ground. Eight or ten boats, and about 200 men, formed the party; the boats came in from the sea through the narrow channel; the enemy fired till our people were ashore, and then gave it up, and were made prisoners. We had eight or nine men killed and wounded, and one officer, an assistant engineer, badly wounded. At about midnight, the enemy make a sortie on our right, but Lieutenant Reid, of the Engineers, on duty there, having caused sentries to be laid out in front on the glacis, and given the covering party in the trench directions how to act on such an occasion, and explained to them the probability there was of a sortie, it had no effect. The sentries called out immediately, "Stand to your arms!" The French ran up to the top of the parapet, and some of them down on the banquette, but our men all standing firm, calling out, "Charge them!" and advancing, drove them in immediately.

—— *28th.* About midnight, was a false alarm of a sortie, occasioned by the field officer visiting the out sentries, and

taking the sergeant of the post for a Frenchman. Everybody was very alert, however, and it soon subsided.

August 29th. The breach is of great extent, and most of it quite practicable, but has a fall at the back. About midnight, a false attack is made on it, to ascertain their force, and try if they will blow their mines. A good deal of firing from the enemy, and throwing shells down the breach, but no mines exploded.

—— *30th.* Commenced sinking three shafts; the first, close at the back of the sea-wall, which is about four feet thick, of good masonry; the next, about twenty-five feet from it; and the third, forty feet from that. They were forced to be lined with planking, on account of the looseness of the soil, and were sunk eight feet below the surface of the ground, and loaded each with six barrels of 90 lbs. each.

—— *31st.* At about two in the morning, the three mines were sprung; they exploded successively, as we had not saucisson sufficient to *compasser les feux.* The wall was completely blown down, and the diameter of the *entonnoirs* was about thirty feet; we immediately cut through to connect the *entonnoirs*, and by 10 A.M. we formed a good passage out for troops; this was one of the objects. The other was to insure no enemy's galleries doing us mischief as far as the trench, which, from the length of time they had been at work, might have been the case. It was the intention to have last night prolonged the sap to the crest of the glacis of the salient angle, and run it a short distance along it to the gateway; but it was given up, as it was wished to preserve all the gabions for a lodgment on the breach, for which also a great number of empty and filled sandbags were prepared.

At the trench of sortie, in front of No. 7, a double row of large gabions (6 feet high by 3 in diameter) were placed on end on the beach, filled with full sandbags, to protect the storming party from the fire of grape from the Mirador.

Storming of St. Sebastian.

The assault of the breach took place this day at about 11.30 A.M. The order was to seize the summit of the breach, and make a lodgment on it; on the left, the storming party was to gain the curtain, and hold it as far as the nearest traverse to the centre bastion, by which it was hoped we might command

the left branch of the hornwork sufficiently to force the enemy from it, whilst a communication along its covert-way was to be effected.

It was nearly low water when the storming parties first moved out of the trenches in front of No. 7 battery, and the new trench in its front made by the three mines. A few minutes after the forlorn hope advanced, the enemy exploded in succession two mines, which blew down part of the sea-line wall, with very little effect, for the men were not close to the wall; the parties were passing quick, and not in close order, and the impression was trifling. Amidst the noise and firing, scarce anybody observed them, though one certainly did bury several of our men.

From the Mirador, and the battery between it and the keep, a fire of grape-shot was opened on the beach and places of sortie, and continued during the whole time of the assault. The main curtain, even to the end breached, was strongly occupied by grenadiers, and the left branch of the hornwork was well manned; and from thence, a heavy fire maintained on the breach, great part of which was exposed to it; but the tower on our right of the breach, which was accessible up to the top, was not occupied. At the end of the curtain, the breach was accessible quite to the traverses and terre-plein; but the situation there was commanding, and on that point particularly exposed to the fire from the hornwork. At the back of the whole of the rest of the breach was a perpendicular fall, more or less high, from fifteen to twenty-five feet, under which were great beams, and houses more or less in ruins, and which had been mined; a line of entrenchment along these ruins was strongly occupied by the enemy. The storming parties advanced to the breach, and there remained on the side of it, without even crowning the top of it, in consequence of the heavy fire from the ruins within; several efforts were made without effect to gain it, particularly up to the curtain, but the enemy maintained that part very firmly. More troops were sent on successively, as fast as they could be got out of the trenches, and 500 Portuguese, in two close columns, forded the River Urumea at its mouth, in very good style, under a heavy fire of grape from a gun in the flank of St. Elmo and the sea-wall. The breach

was covered with troops, still in the same unfavourable situation, unable to advance; when on a sudden, by accident or mismanagement, a quantity of powder, shells, and combustibles, was exploded by the enemy along the interior of the breach, and they then began to waver; the ravelin and left branch of the hornwork were immediately abandoned by them, and an effort made by us to take that work. Their numbers on the curtain and behind the breach, became gradually reduced, and our people got in, and being in considerable number, and the enemy now much dispirited, they drove them past all their retrenchments, and gained the whole town except the convent and gardens of Sta.Teresa. The difficulties of storming this breach were undoubtedly very great, and the enemy were sensible of it, and had proportionate confidence. Nor do I conceive we should have gained it, but for their premature explosion behind it. Had they occupied and fought the tower on the other flank of the breach, in the same style they did the end of the curtain, it would have been decisive against us at a much earlier period, for then no part of the breach would have given cover from their fire. Our artillery was admirably served during the assault, and did great execution. During the end of the business, a number of boats pushed off from a man-of-war, to threaten a landing at the back of the castle hill. On the island there were a gun and a howitzer, which played. Our loss was very considerable, probably 2000 or 3000; the enemy's must also have been great, though not probably as much as 1500, as their own soldiers since estimate it. Sir Richard Fletcher, commanding engineer, was killed by a musket shot, and Captains Rhodes and Collyer killed on the breach. The former headed the first party that made a push for the curtain, and fell on the summit, covered with wounds (eleven). Besides myself slightly, were Lieutenants Barry and Marshall, severely wounded. About twenty sappers were killed and wounded.

The Portuguese troops behaved remarkably well. We made 200 or 300 prisoners.

An extensive fire broke out in the centre of the town soon after the assault, and our people say they found fires made on the floors in several houses; the confusion that commenced,

and the plundering and drunkenness, were as great as usual on such occasions.

I was wounded by a musket ball in the jaw, whilst endeavouring to get a party to storm the hornwork; the wound of little consequence.[1] I therefore assume the command, in consequence of the death of Sir Richard Fletcher, killed on this occasion.

September 1st. The plundering of the town, and drunkenness, continue; the fire in the town spreads to an alarming extent; the streets are narrow, and the houses high and very combustible. The communication to the town is perfected, and the end of the town secured to us.

From Colonel BURGOYNE *to* his SISTER.

Camp before St. Sebastian,
September 1, 1813.

* * * * * *

We at length, yesterday, took the town of St. Sebastian by assault, after a long and very severe struggle. Our loss has been heavy, and among the wounded, you will probably meet with my name. The injury, however, I have received, is slight. A musket ball hit me in the jaw and neck, a little under the right ear, but has not lodged, and I believe the bone is not broken. It gives me a stiff neck, however, and what is worse, with a very good appetite I *can't* eat, except very soft substances. I expect, however, to be able to attack a piece of roast beef again in a few days.

Our loss in Engineers was, as usual, very considerable indeed. Sir Richard Fletcher, the commanding Engineer, was killed; the command, therefore, for the present devolves upon me; though I don't know how long I shall keep it, as a senior officer to me in the corps, though not in army rank, is before Pamplona, and another at Lisbon. The arrangement will rest entirely with Lord Wellington, as in this mixture of ranks, he can make our situation so as to throw the command into any

[1] The bullet grazed the great artery. Sir Thomas Graham states in his despatch: "Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne was himself wounded, and only quitted the field from loss of blood, but I am happy to say he is able to carry on the duty of the department."—ED.

hands he pleases, and I have no reason to expect he will put it in mine.[1]

We are now about to proceed against the castle, which, standing on a mountain, cannot be entirely overcome regularly; its fall will in great measure depend on the perseverance of the enemy under hardship, which as yet we have no reason to doubt.

* * * * * *

Journal resumed.

Siege of the castle of St. Sebastian.

September 2nd. The fire in the town spreads, and the same scene continues. The idea is now to erect powerful batteries on the works of the town, and breach the main points of the castle defences, as the Battery de la Reyna, the Keep and the Mirador.

—— *3rd.* A battery is commenced, all along the curtain of the hornwork and gorge of its demi-bastions, for seventeen guns. We feel our way towards the convent of Sta. Teresa, and, having some contiguous houses, break through the walls, and come upon the church, its last building, without meeting the enemy, who are on its roof, which is on a level with the terrace they occupy as their lower line.[2]

The enemy sends out a flag of truce in the morning, with a letter, begging that we will remove their wounded in time from the hospital, &c.; and by agreement, Colonel de Lancey meets an officer from them to confer on this and our prisoners in the castle; he takes the opportunity to give in a summons. General Rey, the governor, returns for answer that, from his military position, means, and the bravery of his garrison, he demands to be given fifteen days, and if not relieved then, to give up the

[1] The present General Matson, who was acting as adjutant at headquarters, has informed me there was no doubt Lord Wellington wished to retain the command in Colonel Burgoyne's hands, but would not violate the rules of the service to the prejudice of another officer. He went so far however, as not to order up to headquarters either of the officers senior to Colonel Burgoyne, until one of them (the senior officer), Colonel Elphinstone, wrote to him on the subject.—Ed.

[2] Colonel Burgoyne had entered the church by himself, and heard a voice from the ceiling, calling out "*Retirez-vous! Retirez-vous!*" Looking up, he could see nobody, but took the hint and retired. Sir John Burgoyne used to relate this circumstance, as showing the civilised nature of the warfare between the French and English.—Ed.

castle, the garrison marching to France with their arms, &c. Sir Thomas Graham answers that nothing less than being prisoners of war would have been listened to at the commencement of the siege, but that as their conduct merited it, they should have all the honours usual on such occasions, and their baggage, if they gave up now; that hostilities would recommence at 7 P.M. if no answer was given. The governor answered that he would not agree to those terms, and a few shots were fired by us, and, as for the last two nights, two or three salvos from all our ten-inch mortars (sixteen) at once. Their guns have been silent since the day of the assault. Some deserters come in, and declare (and it appears confirmed by the conversation during the flag of truce between our people and the enemy) that the garrison are much dispirited, and want to surrender; but we understand the governor has positive directions to hold out.

September 4th. The town is nearly entirely consumed by the fire. A communication is now effected through the centre of the ruins. We fire a shot or shell now and then, but do not open largely till the new batteries are ready. We fire no musketry, and the enemy fire nothing, though our people are exposed in crowds very close to them; except the trifling fire from our batteries, it would be supposed there was a truce, from the way we stand looking at one another. Our working parties continue working *à découvert.*

Lord Wellington visits the breach.[1] We have established a

[1] On this occasion Lord Wellington asked Colonel Burgoyne how he proposed to obtain possession of the castle. He replied by explaining the measures in progress, which consisted in the erection of additional batteries, so as to bring a converging fire upon the castle from both sides of the river and harbour, and thus force the garrison to surrender. Lord Wellington, who always wished to know what the next step would be if the measures contemplated did not produce the desired result, then asked him, "But if the garrison don't surrender, what then?" Colonel Burgoyne found it difficult to answer this question, for the castle hill was all rock, and approaches by sap or mine were impracticable. He was forced therefore to confess that there was no resource left but to continue the cannonade, and to storm the castle by open force if the garrison did not surrender; but he added, that he was convinced they would surrender; it was impossible to believe that they could sustain such a fire in so small a compass. The event proved that his reasoning was correct; but the question was characteristic of Lord Wellington, and puzzled him for the moment.—ED.

flying bridge near the burned bridge, to bring the guns over, but they were brought at night, in preference, through a ford at low water. Small boats also ply there, to bring over our ammunition, &c.

September 6th. The enemy begin to rouse a little; they post parties to fire musketry at us in the town, and at the new batteries in the hornwork.

—— *7th.* The new battery in the hornwork for seventeen guns, eleven against the Mirador on the right of the gateway, and six on the left *en échelon* against the battery De la Reyna, are continued. We have a few men wounded from the enemy's musketry; he also fires a four-pounder from the Mirador. The new three-gun battery on the left of the Cask Redoubt is completed, and No. 7 repaired. All the houses, steeples, &c., on the extremity of the town under the castle height, are prepared for musketry.

—— *8th.* The batteries open at 10 A.M., viz.: against the Mirador, eleven guns from the hornwork battery, and three in No. 7, and some on the right attacks; against the battery De la Reyna, the six on the left in the hornwork; the battery of three eighteen-pounders on the left of the Cask Redoubt on the loopholed walls, sandbag defences, and two guns on the enemy's lower line from the town wall above the moles. From the island, three twenty-four-pounders and one howitzer open upon all that end of the castle height, of which it sees a great deal. No. 1, on the right attack upon the mountain, opens on the other flank, and the sixteen mortars fire slowly but generally everywhere, particularly on the parts not seen by the others. The enemy keep concealed, chiefly in the little narrow trenches they have run along the front of the height. In an hour or two, a good impression is made on the Mirador, but on the battery De la Reyna the effect is trifling; it is proposed, therefore, instead of breaching it, to destroy its parapet, and open considerable extent of the musketry walls on each side of it. About twelve o'clock, however, a white flag is shown from the Mirador, and in the course of the evening, the garrison surrendered prisoners of war, to march out with honours, and preserve their private baggage, and the officers their swords.

—— *9th.* The garrison marched out, about 1500 effectives.

From Sir LOWRY COLE *to* Lieut.-Colonel BURGOYNE,

"Lesaca, September 24, 1813.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"I enclose you the letter you required respecting your friend Pitts, which I have written as if to poor Fletcher, who had written to me on the subject, and have done it so to appear as if it came from myself, without the suggestion of others. Independent of my regard for Pitts, I shall feel great pleasure at all times in doing justice to a corps, throughout the younger branches of which there is a spirit that no other corps I know of possess to the same degree.

"Most truly yours,

"J. LOWRY COLE,

"Lieut.-General."

Journal resumed.

September 27th. From St. Sebastian to Oyazun. Having made out a detailed report on the place, with the repairs and improvements required to put it in a state of defence, with an estimate of its expense to the amount of £10,000, and it being, the whole of it, approved by Lord Wellington, as well as that Captain Stanway should remain to execute them, I gave up everything to him, and set off towards headquarters. The Spanish garrison marched into St. Sebastian on the 24th instant.

—— 28th. To Lesaca. Arrived at headquarters at Lesaca, a little in rear of Vera, being situated in a valley of the Pyrenees, about a mile south of the Bidassoa.

October 7th. (Lesaca.) The left of the army was on the sea at the mouth of the Bidassoa; the position then ran along the left bank of that river, and crossed it at Vera, which our advanced posts held, and along the heights in front of Echalar, leaving the enemy in possession of the high mountain called La Runa, and its branches along the right bank of the Bidassoa to the sea. The enemy was attacked at 8 A.M. this morning, being low water. The left column, 1st and 5th Divisions, and Generals Wilson and Bradford's Portuguese brigades, and 12th Light Dragoons, forded the Bidassoa near Fuenterrabia, and attacked the enemy's right. Battle of the Bidassoa.

The Spanish Galician army, under General Freire, forded under the heights of San Marcial, and attacked the mountain in front. The Light Division ascended the pass of Vera; and the Spanish army of reserve, under General Giron, attacked the high Runa itself. The enemy was forced at all points, and the heights gained, except the summit and some of the points of the Runa. The Spaniards behaved very well.

October 8th. (Lesaca.) Lord Wellington went to the Runa, and ordered some of the Spanish troops there to drive the enemy from some of the points of the Runa, which they did with the bayonet very well. The enemy still remained on the summit of that bold mountain, but retired from it in the night, and remained in position along the left bank of the Nivelle, covered by numerous entrenchments. We commenced throwing bridges of trestles, boats, pontoons, &c., over the Bidassoa, and entrenching the new position we took up on the right bank, from the Runa along the main ridge to the sea.

—— *12th.* (Vera.) Headquarters had been moved to Vera. Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone joined from Lisbon, to assume the command of the Engineers.

—— *17th.* (To Andaya.) I joined the left column under Lieut.-General Sir John Hope.

November 4th. (Andaya.) Pamplona surrendered on the 31st of October, and the garrison marched out on the 1st of November. Our army were to have advanced immediately afterwards, but the weather has been so extremely inclement that the movement is deferred.

Action of the Nivelle.

—— *7th.* (Andaya.) The orders were given out for our advance this morning. Sir Rowland Hill's corps were to have attacked from Roncesvalles, and all along the line the enemy's positions were to have been forced, including Sarre and Aissain; but from the Pass of Vera to the left, it was intended to have made a demonstration only, by cannonading and driving in the outposts, so as to prevent the enemy detaching from that front, and when he was forced to retire, from his left being driven back, to press him, and endeavour to get possession of the bridges. The snow has been so heavy and deep on the right, that the troops could not be collected in readiness, and at 9 P.M. last night, a counter-order came, and we remained quiet.

November 9th. (Andaya.) The order for the advance is for to-morrow, with the same arrangements; these two last days are fine.

—— 10*th.* Drove in the enemy's pickets soon after daylight, and threatened his strongly entrenched position on this part with attack all day. The divisions on the right forced the enemy's positions, in consequence of which, he retired in the night from St. Jean de Luz.

—— 11*th.* Found the bridges of St. Jean de Luz burning, but saved them before much mischief was done; advanced to Guethary. The enemy halted at Bidart, and burned the bridge between us.

—— 12*th.* The enemy retired from Bidart, and the army took up ground from Bidart to the Nive at Arauntz, and then up it to Cambo and the mountains. At Cambo the enemy have a *tête de pont.*

—— 17*th.* The enemy have blown up their *tête de pont* of Cambo, and keep the right bank of the Nive. Very bad weather continues.

—— 20*th.* (Guethary.) The army go into cantonments. Fine weather recommences.

—— 29*th.* Headquarters of left column under Lieut.-General Sir John Hope. Guethary, four miles in front of St. Jean de Luz, on the high road to Bayonne. Our army have been in cantonments about ten days. The left, viz., 5th Division and General Bradford's and Wilson's Portuguese brigades, a regiment of cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, are on the sea at Bidart, Guethary, &c. The 1st Division and Lord Aylmer's brigade in their rear, in and near St. Jean de Luz. On the right of the 5th Division is the Light, occupying Arbonne, Bassassuri, &c.; then the 3rd Division extends to the Nive; on their right is the 6th at Ustaritz; then the 2nd, on the right of all, at Cambo, and resting our right on the Pyrenees. The 4th at Aissain, and the 7th, &c., also in reserve. The enemy extend all round in our front. We occupy nothing on the right bank of the Nive, but lay close along the left. Headquarters of the army are at St. Jean de Luz. Five pontoons have been ordered to Ustaritz, to throw a bridge across the Nive, where an island, to which we have access, makes it very narrow; and it is sup-

posed to be the intention to fix a force on the right bank. There is great difficulty however to get the pontoons to the spot, on account of the state of the cross roads and the heavy rains that have now recommenced; two days of them will probably increase the Nive so much as to stop the operation. We have now in the field about 30,000 British infantry and 15,000 Portuguese, 100 pieces of field artillery, nearly all British; 5000 cavalry, British; 36 pontoons, &c. The Spanish force it is difficult to estimate; they may have under arms perhaps on this side, exclusive of garrisons, 25,000 men, but with scarce any artillery or cavalry, and without any commissariat, or other arrangements to keep them effective. The French continue to work very hard at Bayonne, as we can see from our outposts; their troops are either composed of recruits, or are much dispirited at being so constantly beat, for they fought extremely ill on the 10th of November.

December 9th. (Guethary.) Sir Rowland Hill's corps, consisting of the 2nd Division, General Hamilton's Portuguese Division, and General Murillo's Spanish Division, crossed the Nive, by the fords near Cambo. The 3rd and 6th Divisions threw over a bridge of boats at Ustaritz, and sent troops across there, and the 7th Division moved up to Ustaritz. The Light Division from Arcangues, and the left column from Bidart, to favour the advance on the right, drove the enemy's corps in their front into their entrenched camp in front of Bayonne, and made a reconnoissance there. This entrenched camp is strong; its right rests on the Adour, and its left on the Nive; it is about three miles in extent, and runs round Bayonne in nearly a parallel direction, at about 1000 yards' distance. Two miles of its right has in its front a wide marshy valley, near the Adour, almost impracticable; the other mile crosses the connecting ridge between the above valley and the Nive. The works are extensive, and though not finished, are in a great state of forwardness; they are in regular bastioned lines, generally with open glacis ground in their front to a lower ridge or more broken ground, which looks immediately into the valley, and on which are detached *flèches* and batteries; on the right, where the ground is stronger and the impediments greater, they have only detached works on the flanking points. The

mouth of the Adour is about four miles below Bayonne; for the first two and half miles from the town, it is 820 or 1000 yards wide; from thence, at the village on the right bank, commence two strong stone walls or dykes, of about fourteen feet high above low-water mark, and fifteen feet thick, which at each bank extend for about a mile, and confine the bed of the river to between 200 and 300 yards wide; from thence to the mouth, half a mile, it is no wider between the sand hills, but the walls are not completed, though the piles show it to have been intended to carry them further. From a bend at the village above-named, down to its mouth, the river is out of sight of the town. The sand hills on the coast here extend for about three miles inland, and are covered with pine woods, some vineyards, and very light pasture. The *Sappho*, a French man-of-war, apparently a twenty or twenty-four gun ship, was lying just below Bayonne, and one or two armed schooners. There appeared to be a number of boats at Bayonne, but not above five or six, and those very small, on the river below it. The French have no posts below Bayonne, except a small open battery on the right bank, at the mouth. The mouth has a difficult bar. At night, this part of the army returned to its cantonments.

Battle of the Nive.

December 10*th*. (Guethary.) In the morning, Sir Rowland Hill's corps was on the right of the Nive, the remainder of the army in their old cantonments. The enemy appeared in force in front of the Light Division and left column, having driven in their pickets, and taken possession of the connecting ridge fronting the two. In the course of the day, he attacked slightly the Light Division at Arcangues, and more strongly the left column, at the mayor's house, about two miles in front of Bidart. The 5th Division, and Generals Bradford and Wilson's Portuguese brigades, were up, and repulsed him. The 1st Division and Lord Aylmer's brigade, who had returned to cantonments in and near St. Jean de Luz, could not be got up before evening. Sir Rowland Hill had only some slight skirmishing.

—— 11*th*. (Guethary.) The 4th and 7th Divisions had been brought up, and were near the Light Division, and at Arbonne, between that and the left. The enemy remained in force as on

the preceding day. The left column pushed to a height more advanced, but in the evening, the enemy forming strong columns to attack, it was determined to return to the old ground near the mayor's house, which was not completely effected before he advanced, and therefore drove in hastily the Portuguese who were the rearmost. He did not however attempt to attack the old post we occupied. Sir Rowland Hill still remained quiet. Three German battalions deserted to us with officers, arms, &c.

December 12*th*. (Guethary.) The enemy still in our front, and apparently preparing to attack. Measures were taken to receive him; by the result it appeared, however, he was also preparing to receive us. A few shots were fired by two of our guns, and both parties taking it to be the commencement of an attack, a sharp fire of musketry took place at the advance, in which we lost about 200 men in three or four hours, before it could be stopped. Finding we were not so weak on the left as he imagined, after crossing the Nive, and that the main body of the army still retained its old positions, Soult thought of trying the force on the right bank; but by this time, a good position had been taken up by Sir Rowland Hill, near Bayonne, and the bridges of communication over the Nive at Herraritz, Ustaritz, and Cambo, formed.

—— 13*th*. (Guethary.) The enemy had in the night disappeared altogether from before us on the left, and attacked Sir Rowland Hill on the right in force, where he was completely beaten, with a loss of 4000 or 5000 men. Our loss about 2000. The loss on the left, in the different actions, was about 2000; that of the enemy at least double. Altogether, including the deserters of the Germans (about 1300 in the three battalions), the loss of the enemy in the last five days cannot be less than 10,000 men. We continue to entrench our positions, and again the troops go into cantonments, except a few brigades encamped in front.

February 12*th*, 1814. Sir John Hope's, the left column, is at Bidart, Guethary, St. Jean de Luz, and Arcangues; the Light Division at Garrat's house, above the Nive; the 4th in rear at Ustaritz; the 6th and Sir Rowland Hill's corps on the right of the Nive; the 3rd at Hasparen. The weather having become

fine, and the Allies in the north still advancing, Lord Wellington is preparing to move the army forward. We are in an awkward corner however to get out of. The roads and country are all exceedingly deep, and difficult to get over; and Bayonne cuts most inconveniently across at the junction of the Nive and Adour, and is only about four miles from the mouth of the latter—a considerable river.

It is his Lordship's intention to force the passage of the Adour below Bayonne; as we understand the project now, the 7th Division is to take up the blockade of the town between the Nive and the Adour, by St. Pierre and Vieux Monguerre. Sir Rowland Hill and the 3rd Division, &c., are to advance upon Sauveterre, and draw Soult's attention and his army in that direction, while the bar is to be passed, and a bridge thrown across the Adour, about three miles below the town, and a corps passed, after which Sir Rowland is to return rapidly to Urt, and pass it there. Passage of the Adour.

The execution of this bridge below the town is very difficult. The enemy have at present only a battery on the right bank at the mouth of the river. A party of men are to be sent over in some small transports' jolly boats (to be conveyed there on the pontoon carriages for the purpose) at night, to seize the battery. In the morning, about forty coasting boats of the country (from ten to twenty tons) are to run in, preceded by six British gun-boats, and, it is said, also a small brig of war.' I suppose a body of men, equal to meet any effort of the garrison, would then be passed over. The *Sappho*, French man-of-war, is to be burned by red-hot shot from our eighteen-pounders, and the bridge is to be laid. The boats are to be strongly moored, head and stern, at about thirty feet asunder (the width of the river between the wharves is about 250 yards), five cables are to be stretched across all the boats, to be supported on them and to answer instead of sleepers, one end of them fixed to the right bank, and the other stretched by capstans on the left bank.

To secure the bridge from the vessels, &c., which the enemy might float down the river, (for they have several brigs and large vessels, besides two armed American schooners), a boom is to be laid across higher up. The first idea for the boom was

to have it of large spars, such as masts of ships, &c., fixed together, at intervals of about ten feet, by good chains, and laid slanting across the river, so as to tilt a vessel to the shoal water, to ground there.

If the enemy encamp a small corps on the right bank, the operation will be very difficult.

February 18*th.* (Guethary.) Sir Rowland Hill moved on the 13th to Urcuray, near Hasparen. The 7th Division took up the ground before occupied by the 2nd at St. Pierre and Vieux Monguerre, &c. On the succeeding days, Sir Rowland's corps and 3rd Division advanced, and Lord Wellington is over there, himself directing the movement. By the last accounts, on yesterday morning, headquarters were at Garris, near St. Palais; there was a slight affair on the evening of the 15th or 16th, in dislodging the enemy's rear-guard, in which he had 100 killed, and we took 250 prisoners. Our loss was trifling. The Light Division has crossed to the right bank of the Nive, and the 4th, under Marshal Beresford, has moved to Bastide. All the arrangements for the bridge itself for the Adour, below Bayonne, will be ready to-morrow. The whole are collecting in Socoa Harbour; forty *chasse-marées* (large coasting boats, mostly decked) are prepared for the bridge, each with the necessary planks on board for one bay, and two or three with the cables. Five or six officers of Engineers have each a division of the boats of seven or eight, which he is to take care are properly loaded. The boats are numbered with yellow paint on the bow. Each boat will have two sappers on board, with means to cut away the sides above the deck, and a British sailor or two to see them moored in their proper place. To moor them in one line readily, it has been proposed to plant two flagstaffs or poles on our bank, and each boat let go its first anchor when she has them in a line. The ends of the bridge cables are to be fixed on the other bank by six eighteen-pounders thrown over the wall. Six transports' jolly boats are to be carried on six of the old pontoon carriages, and are each to tow over six rafts, made of the eighteen pontoons, to take first possession of the right bank.

—— 21*st.* Lord Wellington goes off to the right, to join the

main body of the army with Sir Rowland Hill, and leaves Sir John Hope instructions to pass the Adour if he can. The 5th Division move to the right; one brigade across the Nive, and one at Garrat's house on left bank.

February 22*nd.* An order arrived at 3 P.M. for the pontoons and eighteen-pounders to march, the wind being fair for the flotilla. One brigade of Guards and one of Germans march at night to the mouth of the Adour. Only five pontoons and four boats could be got there by morning, the road being so heavy. General Howard, who was on the spot, would not undertake the attempt with means so inferior to what was intended; the pontoons and troops, &c., were therefore put out of sight among the sand hills.

—— 23*rd.* (Passage of the Adour.) Sir John Hope came down about 9 A.M., and finding the enemy all quiet, with only the usual post of nine or ten men on the right bank, ordered the attempt to be made to cross. Passage of the Adour.

The horses having had a few hours' rest, the whole of the pontoons were brought up and collected under the nearest cover. The advanced party of about fifty light infantry was conveyed across by the six jolly boats. The French picket retired towards Bayonne. The six jolly boats continued passing reinforcements as fast as possible. Two rafts were constructed of three pontoons each; they could not be towed across by the small boats, on account of the rapidity of the tide, and their unwieldiness; a rope was therefore stretched across the river, and two or three turns made by the rafts at slack tide, with some difficulty. At length the tide became very strong, and the raft, loaded with fifty men (with their packs, arms, &c.), stuck in the middle of the stream, and could neither be got one way or the other till about 6 P.M. at slack tide.

By the evening, only one battalion of Guards (about 600 men) and a few rockets, were across. The enemy came out from the citadel side of Bayonne with about 1200 men, and drove in our advanced parties, and advanced to very near our line. The battalion was drawn up near where they had crossed, on the point from the river to the sea.

On the advance of the enemy with an apparent determination to attack, some guns were opened on them from the left

bank; and the rockets fired very sharply on them from a short distance. They had great effect, and checked them completely.

At night, the enemy retired, and we continued passing troops, but very slowly. The rafts only took two or three turns at each slack tide. One jolly-boat was destroyed against the rafts, and three were allowed to drift away. The men in one raft let go the rope when in the middle of the river, full of Germans, but the Portuguese pontoon sailors had oars in it, and brought it safe to the shore.

February 24th. By morning, one brigade of Guards and one battalion of Germans only were across. The flotilla appeared off, but could not cross the bar. Our mode of passing the troops was so slow, that it was necessary to try some other. We put four oars to each pontoon, and loading it besides with from twelve to twenty soldiers, they crossed well and quickly for about four hours of the six of each tide. Picked up one of our lost jolly boats on the beach, making in all now three. Continued passing the troops, by rowing them over in the jolly boats and pontoons, and to keep them going well, obtained about 300 soldiers who could row, to man them; formed three reliefs, and having a quantity of rum from the commissary to give them half a ration before and after every tour of this duty, kept them going very well. By night (8 P.M.) all the 1st Division—about 6000 strong—were over, with thirty cavalry, and two guns with their horses; the guns were conveyed over on the raft, and the cavalry horses were swum over. The width of the river was under 300 yards, but the tide very strong. A message had been sent to the admiral, to point out the necessity of getting some vessels in, if only row-boats, and a few seamen, if possible; accordingly he made every effort, and was determined to try it. The few pilots he had were either very ignorant or frightened. The agent of transports beached his boat on a spit of sand with effect, and hauled her across into the river. Captain O'Reilly of the Navy attempted the same, and was swamped in the surf, and five seamen drowned; the boat, however, was recovered, not much damaged, and got into the river. The admiral offered a reward to the first country vessel of the flotilla that should get

in. At 2 P.M. we entered, passed the bar safely, and the rest followed, with three gunboats, and two small light transport brigs conveying the boom. One gunboat and two small vessels were cast ashore, but no people in them lost. One country boat, and one or two open English row-boats, were lost on the bar, and almost all the people in them drowned. The navy lost between thirty and forty men.

February 25th. The weather continues very fine. We continue passing over the troops on the pontoons. The cavalry horses are swum across, two or three towed by each boat or pontoon. The bridge is commenced opposite two houses called Arcachon. The river does not turn out to be above 300 yards wide, and twenty-five boats are ample. The agent of transports constructs a raft of six pontoons. Two rows of three each, tied together by baulks and chesses, carry four guns complete, or sixteen cavalry or artillery horses. It was necessary, however, to load the two ends of the stage, and leave the centre light, to prevent the bending of the centre and letting the water into the pontoons, as happened once, the raft sinking close to the shore. The raft was passed across the river by a rope sent in a small boat to the opposite bank, to which it was secured; the people on the raft then let go from the shore on the side they start from, and swing across by the other, hauling upon it all the while to shorten the curve. The operation took nearly an hour each turn. The troops on the right bank take up ground along a position all round the citadel, from the Adour below to the Adour above the place.

—— *26th.* The bridge was passable at 11 A.M., and answered well according to the project. A single boom was also laid across. By the time the bridge was ready, the whole of the troops intended to be conveyed across had been passed by the boats and pontoons, viz., the 1st Division, Generals Bradford and Wilson's Portuguese Brigades, Don Carlos' Spanish Division, the 14th and 16th Light Dragoons, a troop of horse artillery, and a brigade of rockets: in all about 12,000 men. The troops advanced, and invested the citadel, closely taking up ground from 700 to 1000 yards from the work, along a lane,

with banks, walls, and large country houses, from the church of St. Etienne on the left. The enemy have an entrenched position about 400 yards in front of the citadel. We lost about 500 men in driving them in.

March 1st. The wind comes round to the westward, and brings heavy rain. A sketch of the ground is commenced, and we improve the communication along the front. The enemy cannonade the houses and walls a good deal, and cause us some casualties. An arrangement is made to hold the front line with about 1500 men, and the rest encamp in reserve. Lord Wellington has defeated Soult near Orthes, and is following him towards Mont Marsan.

—— *2nd.* The 5th Division and Lord Aylmer's Brigade take the blockade from the left bank of the Nive to the Adour, Don Carlos from the right bank of the Nive to the Adour. Freire's Spanish troops are ordered to join Lord Wellington; the rest remain as before. Soult has crossed the Garonne, it is said, at Agen, Lord Wellington following.

—— *4th.* A project for the attack of the citadel has been given in by Lord Wellington's order. Sixteen days, 20 twenty-four-pounders, 8 howitzers, 8 mortars, 20 coehorns, and 12 field-pieces, and 15,000 men required. The enemy do not cannonade much now.

—— *8th.* The heavy artillery is ordered to be disembarked at Pasages, and brought up for the siege.

We calculate that we shall require for the siege of the citadel:

Eighteen-feet battery fascines	1500
Small gabions for revetting the near works, &c. .	17,000
Large do.	10
Six-feet fascines for banquetting	3000
Fascine pickets	30,000

which we estimate will require the employment of 200 men for 20 days, for making alone, having the stuff brought for them.

—— *17th.* Blockade of Bayonne. Lord Wellington is at Aire, with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and Light Divisions, General

Lecor's Portuguese Division, and Morilla's and Freire's Spanish. Marshal Beresford is at Bordeaux with the 7th Division. The people there have proclaimed the Bourbons, and treat the Duke d'Angoulême as their prince. The French hold forts on the back of the River Garonne, below Bordeaux. The cavalry from the rear continue to pass, to join Lord Wellington. The 37th Regiment, and numerous detachments for other regiments, are arrived at Pasages.

March 23rd. Blockade of Bayonne. Bad weather recommences. Soult appeared lately before Lord Wellington near Aire, and again retired. His Lordship is advancing.

May 19th.[1] To Dax. The affairs in France being settled, a force from the army is ordered to America. I am appointed to command the engineer department on that expedition, by general order, dated the 17th of May, and set out this day for Bordeaux, where it is to assemble.

The intention of embarking the expedition to America from Bordeaux having been abandoned, Colonel Burgoyne set out for England on the 17th of June, and travelled by diligence to Paris, where he arrived on the 22nd. He remained but five days in that city, and reached London on the 1st of July, 1814, after an absence of nearly six years, during which he had served in the field without intermission. After a short stay at the Oaks and Knowsley, he was recalled from the latter place by a letter from Lord Hill, requesting him to make arrangements for the expedition to America.

[1] The Journal, not having been kept up between these dates, gives no account of the sortie from Bayonne, in which the English commander, Sir John Hope, was taken prisoner. This took place on the 14th of April. In his despatch reporting the affair, General Howard, who had succeeded to the command, mentions Colonel Burgoyne in complimentary terms. By order of the Board of Ordnance of the 4th of March, 1814, Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne is awarded 10s. a day command pay, as commanding Royal Engineer, with the corps under Lieut.-General Sir John Hope, in consideration of that corps being separate from the rest of the army. Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone was with headquarters to the right, and Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne was in command of the operations before Bayonne.

"Hawkstone, near Shrewsbury,
"August 9, 1814.

"My dear Burgoyne,

"In case you are not in London, I think you had better repair there without loss of time, for the purpose of ascertaining the proportion and nature of the ordnance, and to see that an adequate supply of engineers' stores, &c., is sent with us.

"I am sure you will be glad to find that Dickson is going out with us. He and Chapman, I am certain, will give you every information you may require on the subject of our ordnance; and I request you will let me know the names of the officers you propose to accompany you, and also every arrangement you may think it necessary for us to make for the engineer department. Believe me

"Yours very faithfully,
"Hill."

Lord Wellington, in order to compensate him for his supersession by Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone in the south of France, had appointed him in general orders commanding engineer with the expedition to America. It had been originally intended that a considerable force should have been sent from the south of France, in order to make a descent upon the American territory, but the unsettled state of Europe subsequently caused the English ministers to abandon the proposed expedition to America on the scale first organised, and a smaller expedition was set on foot, which sailed from Spithead on the 1st of November, 1814. As Colonel Burgoyne was transferred to the new expedition as commanding engineer, this well-meant act of Lord Wellington operated to his disadvantage, as he lost by it the command of the Engineer force with the army of the Netherlands in the following year. On the 25th of October, the inspector-general of fortifications writes to inform him that

"The Master-General of the Ordnance having directed that you shall be withdrawn from the service under the command of

Lieut.-General Lord Hill, and placed under the orders of Major-General Sir Edward Pakenham, you will proceed to town without loss of time, and report your arrival to Sir Edward Pakenham, whose address is at Warren's Hotel, Charles Street, St. James's Square."

Journal resumed.

November 1*st.* Sailed from Spithead with a fair wind, at 8.15 A.M. in the *Statira* frigate, with General Sir Edward Pakenham, General Gibbs, Colonel Dickson, Royal Artillery, &c., to join the forces lately under the command of General Ross, on the coast of America.

—— 3*rd.* On board the *Statira.* Opened the sealed orders under which we sailed, at mid-day, according to the instructions, at fifty leagues southwest of Scilly. Our destination is Negril Bay, in Jamaica, without delay. Continue with fair wind, and from eight to ten knots an hour.

Colonel BURGOYNE *to his* SISTER.

On board the *Statira,*
December 3, 1814.

I WRITE a few lines, for the chance of being able to put them on board some vessel, as we pass the Island of Barbadoes, from which we are not now very distant.

You will be surprised to find us making the best of our way to Jamaica, as I was myself when the secret was let out, a few days after we sailed. We are not told on which side we shall direct our course from Jamaica, but I take it for granted that we are going to seize upon Louisiana. We are to be joined by all the troops hitherto sent to America, except the Canada and Nova Scotia people, and shall compose a force of about 7000 men.

Sir Edward Pakenham affects to talk a great deal about Charleston in America, but I can't believe we are going there with such a trifling force and equipment.

Our passage hitherto has been prosperous and pleasant. Captain Swaine is extremely civil and polite to us, and the

party on board are lively and good-humoured. We expect to reach Jamaica in ten days.

With best regards to Lord and Lady Derby, and all the family, I remain ever, my dear Maria,

Your most affectionate brother,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

December 6.

We passed between the islands of St. Lucie and St. Vincent last night, and are just going to speak a man-of-war brig, by which I may possibly have an opportunity of sending you this note.

Journal resumed.

December 13th. At 8 A.M., while hauling round North Negril Point, fell in with the *Vengeur* (74), with her convoy, containing General Lambert and about 2000 troops—7th Fusiliers, 43rd Regiment, &c. The *Vengeur* made the signal for us to speak, and the Captain (Ricketts) and General Lambert came on board. After a consultation, we left them laying-to off Negril, and made sail for the channel round the west point of Cuba. The *Vengeur* and convoy sailed from Plymouth a week before us, for the same destination and service. We suppose they will now water in Negril Bay before they continue. Sir Alexander Cochrane was to have brought down the army late under General Ross, together with the reinforcements they had received, consisting principally of 2000 men under General Keane, who sailed from England nearly two months before us. Off St. Vincent's we spoke the *Swaggerer*, brig-of-war, who informed us that Sir Alexander had been at Guadaloupe, and left it for Jamaica about a month before. The *Vengeur* informs us that the same admiral sailed from Negril Bay about a fortnight ago.

—— 21*st.* In the evening, we ran into the bay to the west of the mouths of the Mississippi, and at fifteen miles' distance could not see the land. At dark tacked.

—— 22*nd.* At 10 A.M., the wind at south, thought we saw the land from the deck distinctly—low, flat, and of a sandy or clay colour. It proved to be haze. We were then eighteen miles distant only. At eleven, saw a vessel at anchor, appa-

rently in the midst of this supposed land; the masts appeared however such a great distance asunder and so low, that at one time she was taken for buildings on shore, at another, for a large ship on her beam ends. Soon after, we made her out to get under way, tack, and stand towards us, still always appearing very long and low from the effects of the haze; shortly after spoke her. She turned out to be the *Herald* man-of-war. It seems that the land at the entrance of the Mississippi is nothing but low mud banks, not seen till very near. The colour of the water outside the river is of a bright clay colour. Ships take in perfectly good fresh water from alongside, several miles outside the bar of the river, the same as outside of the Nile. We learn that the admiral and fleet are laying to the north of the Chandeleur Islands, preparatory to landing the troops up Lake Pontchartrain. Five gunboats have been taken thereabouts out of six, and the other destroyed. The Americans have taken possession of Mobile and Pensacola; and two or three of our sloops of war, attacking a battery at the entrance of Mobile, were completely beaten off; one of them, the *Hermes*, was forced to be blown up.

December 25th. Landed near the Mississippi with Sir Edward Pakenham.

—— *28th.* Advanced, and reconnoitred the enemy's position.

January 8th, 1815. Attacked the enemy's position without success. Sir Edward Pakenham killed.

It would be difficult in the whole range of English military enterprise, to find a more injudicious operation than the attack upon New Orleans. A report by Captain H. D. Jones, of the Royal Engineers, who was sent by Colonel Burgoyne to report upon the place after the peace, will give some idea of the difficulties of the undertaking.

"The city of New Orleans is situated on the left bank of the Mississippi, at thirty-five leagues from its mouth. The river opposite the city forms an elbow; both above and below the city the suburbs have extended very considerably, their length being about three miles, and breadth half a mile. In the rear

of the city is an open space of marsh for the distance of 700 yards, when it joins the thick cypress wood so prevalent in these parts. The population is about 30,000 souls, consisting of French, Spanish, Americans, and people of colour.

"New Orleans, from its situation, must naturally be very unhealthy, situated in and surrounded by marsh, and covered by thick woods, which prevent the city from receiving the benefit of the winds; and the sun, striking into the plains, and drawing forth the pestilential vapours from the marshes, brings on fevers which generally prove fatal.

"There are no permanent works for the defence of the place, but the situation of New Orleans is one of the strongest possible by nature. Its defence is reduced to three points, viz., the two approaches to the town over the marsh, and the opposite side of the river. The first two are easily defended by running flanked lines from the river to the wood below the town, and from wood to wood across the approach from the Bayou[1] St. John; neither of these lines exceeding 1000 yards, the soil easy to work, and their flanks perfectly secure, for the wood is impenetrable. The city can only be attacked during the winter, on account of the excessive heat of the other seasons, and in that season the rains commence, and render the roads and country almost impracticable to move through, and if the river rises a few feet, the country can be inundated. Slaves may be had in great numbers to work upon the lines, and by that means, the army will always be strong and ready for action. Palisades and abbatis may be formed in a very short time, timber being plentiful.

"From the first appearance of a fleet off the coast, so much time must elapse before a point of debarkation can be reached, that the enemy would be able to collect seven or eight thousand men, and their lines of defence being so short and easily thrown up, such a force behind them ought to resist any number which could be landed from a fleet.

"The lines thrown up for the defence of the city of New Orleans were commenced upon the 25th of December, 1814. The most advanced, about four miles from the city, was thrown up by the troops, by forming a parapet in rear of the bayou; no

[1] Bayou, a local term, signifying a canal or natural creek.—Ed.

attempt appears to have been made to widen or deepen the bayou, which served as a ditch, the parapet being formed of earth scraped up from the rear, and revetted with planks supported by stakes.

"An advanced work was thrown up upon the right to flank the line; from the river to within 150 yards of the wood the line was straight; here an inverted redan was made, the faces of which were about forty yards in length. The line then continued into the wood (following the bayou, which still served as a ditch,) for 400 yards, and then making a return to the rear at right angles for 100 yards. The breastwork in the wood was composed of trees with loopholes; the wood was cleared to the rear of the breastwork for about fifty yards. The section of the ditch for two-thirds the distance from the river to the wood was eight feet deep and fifteen feet wide; from that to the left, ten feet wide and four feet deep. The whole length of the ditch was filled with large brambles, which would have greatly assisted any ladders or fascines which might have been placed as communications across the ditch.

"The second line is about a mile and a half in the rear of the advanced line, and has been constructed upon the edge of a large bayou which unites with the river. On the right of the line is an inclosed redoubt, with heavy artillery, and a wet ditch. One hundred yards to the left of this work is a circular battery with a wet ditch in front: under it is a communication with a bayou by sluices. The breadth of the bayou is about twelve feet, and it is quite filled with water. These works are commanding, and flank the ground in front well. The parapet of this line is good, and has a banquette parapet revetted with plank.

"The third line is about a mile in rear of the second line. This is entirely different from the other two, having a ditch of twelve feet broad and six feet deep, cut expressly. It is well flanked. On the right is an inclined redoubt with its gorge palisaded; at 500 yards from the river is a flat bastion of brickwork for musketry only. The line continues from this to the wood. The redoubt on the right has a good command from being constructed upon the Levée. The parapet of this line is in an unfinished state.

"Nine hundred slaves were employed upon the two rear lines, sent, by order of General Jackson, from the plantations up the river.

"It was intended to have inundated the country, but the river falling prevented them. The batteries were manned by the pirates of Barataria, who were let out of prison on purpose.

"The determined character of General Jackson procured him 2500 men in arms from the town; no general before him could ever turn out more than 500, they having pleaded their being Spaniards or French—in fact anything for an excuse. This number is exclusive of the militia of the state, which numbered about 5000 men.

"Preparations were made in the arsenal to blow it up, in case the Americans were driven back; and the general opinion is that the general commanding would have burned the town also.

"HARRY D. JONES,
"2nd Captain Royal Engineers."

"Dauphin Island,
"March 30, 1815."

The events of this expedition are familiar to most military readers, from the interesting account of it by the Rev. G. R. Gleig, the present chaplain-general of the forces, who took part in it, while serving as a subaltern in the 85th foot. In conversation with me, Sir John Burgoyne has stated that the operation had originated with the admiral on the station, who anticipated a large amount of prize money from its success. The general in command, Sir Edward Pakenham, who distrusted the proceedings of Sir Alexander Cochrane, showed great anxiety on the voyage to arrive at the scene of operations before the troops had been put on shore; but General Keane's brigade had disembarked, and were in presence of the enemy before the *Statira* frigate reached the mouth of the Mississippi. The situation of affairs on the arrival of headquarters was as follows: the base of operations and the only source

of supply for the army was the English fleet, seventy-five miles distant, the communication over sixty miles of this distance being by means of open boats; for several miles of the ground to be traversed by the troops the road passed over the Levée, or bank of the river, exposed to the fire of any American ships which might be in the river; and if discovered by the enemy, the line of operations was necessarily thrown into the marshes,[1] over which there was no road. It was by this line that the army was forced to retreat.

Nothing was known of the position or force of the Americans, until the works were reconnoitred by Sir Edward Pakenham and Colonel Burgoyne on the 28th of December. The enemy were then found to be posted too strongly to be overcome by an open attack in front, and the folly of the enterprise became then apparent, for no retreat was open to the army except by the road on the Levée, which was commanded by the fire of the enemy's ships in the river. In this dilemma, a very ingenious scheme was proposed by the admiral, which, if perseveringly followed up, would have undoubtedly led to the capture of the place. This consisted in cutting a canal from Lake Pontchartrain to the river, and passing over a body of men in men-of-war's boats to the opposite side of the Mississippi, in order to take possession of an American battery on the right bank, which enfiladed the lines covering the town. It was intended that this attack should precede that on the main works of the enemy, the arrival of this party and their success being notified to the general in command by the discharge of a signal rocket. This portion of the scheme proved successful; but the troops having been delayed in their

[1] The English fleet could not advance up the main channel of the Mississippi, and the operation was conducted by Lake Borgne, partly over land, and partly by boating across the shallow lakes.

passage to the opposite side of the river, by the falling in of the banks of the new cutting, the English general gave the order for the assault on the lines before they had reached their destination. After the failure of the main attack, in which Sir Edward Pakenham was killed, it was reported that the American works on the right bank were in our hands, and in a council of war held on the ground, Colonel Burgoyne strongly urged a renewal of the attack.[1] It is reported that the American general had given orders for the evacuation of the town when he heard that the English army was in possession of this work; and there is every reason to believe that the enterprise, if persevered in, would have proved successful. It is worth recording, as showing the loyalty of Sir John Burgoyne's character, that he never divulged to any one that he had urged a renewal of the attack upon this occasion, although, owing to the circumstance of his having carried to the troops on the right bank the order for their retirement across the river, he laid for many years under the imputation of having counselled the relinquishment of the undertaking.

It is a remarkable feature of English wars, that so large a number of combined naval and military operations should have been undertaken by English ministers, on information supplied by admirals on foreign stations. It can hardly be expected that naval officers should have the power of estimating the relative strength of the various kinds of defensive works, and seamen are too apt to look upon the storming of a fortress in the same light as boarding an enemy's ship. It is related in the 'Life of Sir John Moore' that, on the outbreak of the war with Spain, Mr. Pitt sent for him, and offered him

[1] The late Sir Frederick Stovin, who was assistant adjutant-general to the force, and who was present at the council of war, is my authority for this statement.

the command of an expedition intended to destroy the Spanish arsenal and fleet at Ferrol. Sir John Moore suggested to the prime minister that Ferrol was defended by permanent works of fortification, and that a very considerable force would be necessary to besiege the place, and cover the besieging force from attacks in their rear. It then appeared that the proposal came from the admiral on the station, who had reported that the works could be carried by a *coup de main* on the land side, if troops were sent for the purpose. Sir John Moore pointed out to Mr. Pitt that the admiral gave no reasons for this opinion, that permanent works could not be stormed by open force unless very feebly garrisoned, and that it was extremely unlikely the Spaniards would leave such an important point without an adequate garrison. Finding, however, that his arguments made very little impression upon the minister, he proposed to make a reconnoissance of the place himself. This offer being gladly accepted, Sir John started for the coast of Spain in a fast frigate, and after inspecting the works, returned, and reported that they were such as would defy an open assault, if properly garrisoned, and that the place appeared full of troops.

Four years before this took place, the English ministers, acting on the representations of a former admiral, had sent a force of 15,000 men, under Sir James Pulteney, to attack the place. The troops landed without opposition, but after an inspection of the defences, the general re-embarked his forces, and returned to England. The usual outcry followed; the naval officers declared that the place could have been taken without difficulty, and a parliamentary inquiry was held into the causes "of this disgraceful failure," as it was termed in the House of Commons.

Another equally foolish attempt was made about the

same time upon Cadiz, by a force under Sir Ralph Abercrombie, which failed from the same cause; and similar errors of military policy are observable in every war we undertake. When fleets, unassisted by a land force, attack fortified places the operation costs at most one or two ships of war,[1] a retreat is always open, and a failure may be pardoned for the gallantry of the attempt; but when the influence of the admiral of the station is sufficient, as in the case of New Orleans, Cadiz, Ferrol, and other places, to lead ministers to embark a large expeditionary force on such an attempt, trusting to take foreign arsenals by a *coup de main* on imperfect information, the honour of the English arms is compromised, a retreat is always difficult, often impracticable, and a failure becomes ignominious. If works of fortification, on which much time and money have been expended, could not defy a *coup de main*, the art of the military engineer would be a delusion and a snare; and yet such is the want of knowledge on these subjects among persons otherwise well informed, that it is not uncommon to find persons, for whose understanding it is impossible not to feel great respect, gravely arguing that no works can stop a victorious army; and few Englishmen believed that the forts of Paris would have held the Prussian army at bay during the whole winter of 1870–71.

Journal resumed.

Attack on Fort Bowyer, at the Point of Mobile Bay. February, 1815.

FEBRUARY *7th.* Late in the evening, the small expedition prepared for this service came to anchor, about seven miles to the south and east of the fort. The force was under the immediate

[1] At the same time, the unsuccessful attack upon Vera Cruz nearly cost us the life of Nelson.

command of Major-General Lambert, and consisted of the 2nd brigade (4th, 21st, 44th Regiments)—about 1000 men. The commanding Engineer[1] and nine Sappers, the remainder of the two companies, with the other officers of Royal Engineers, were expected from Dauphin Island. Some marine artillery, with small mortars, were also to follow. Fort Bowyer consists of a semicircular sea battery, inclosed in the gorge by two small fronts, having an escarp of about sixteen feet, fraised, a counterscarp of about ten feet, and the ditch palisaded. It is raised of strong timber and sand, and the guns are chiefly heavy, and on traversing platforms.

February 8th. The troops were landed about three miles from the point, by 11 A.M., and moved up, and invested the fort, without opposition. A new landing-place was selected near the camp, and the stores and provisions commenced to be put on shore. Captain Ricketts, senior officer, R.N., ordered a telegraphic communication to be established between the shipping and the shore. At night, a working party of 100 men commenced the parallel from 40 to 100 yards distant from the ditch of the fort,[2] breaking out from the nearest cover. About 100 yards in extent was effected during the night, with a loss of ten or twelve of the workmen. Nothing could have been better than the conduct of the men on this occasion. As we broke ground so near the place, I explained to them that it was important that no noise should be made which might attract the notice of the garrison. Shortly after beginning work, however, the enemy commenced firing in our direction; two or three men were hit, and began crying out. I held up my hand and said "Hush!" and immediately there was a dead silence.

—— *9th.* At daybreak, we opened a fire of musketry from the new parallel, which kept the enemy very much under. We also commenced at night two batteries at about 700 yards distance. In the evening, two officers of Engineers and fourteen

[1] Colonel Burgoyne himself.—ED.

[2] The guns within the fort were of large calibre, and the fact of the first parallel having been opened so close to the place, illustrates an axiom of Sir John Burgoyne, that the distance of the first parallel at a siege, depends upon the strength of the garrison, and not upon the range of the arms in use, as taught in military schools.—ED.

Sappers joined. At night, a fire of musketry was kept up on the fort, to prevent the enemy working to improve his parapet.

February 10th. The 88th Regiment was brought from Dauphin Island, and posted about a mile in our rear, to cover us from any attempt that might be made in that direction. By evening, the remainder of the officers of Engineers, and the companies of Sappers joined. At night, we completed the four batteries. A brigade of Sappers relieved at midnight, and, assisted by thirty workmen of the line, added by sap about 200 yards to the parallel, with only one man, a sapper, wounded. By this work, the two fronts could be completely enveloped by musketry fire at from 30 to 100 yards distance.

—— *11th.* The batteries and parallel being completely armed, General Lambert summoned the fort at 9 A.M., and, after some negotiation, it capitulated, without a gun being fired on our side. Our casualties during the three days amounted to twenty-four or twenty-five. The British flag was hoisted at 3 P.M., and the light company of the 4th Regiment took possession of the gateway.

—— *12th.* The garrison marched out at mid-day with the honours of war, as prisoners, and grounded their arms on the glacis. It consisted of near 400 of the 2nd Regiment of the line, being the body of the regiment, with its colours, and commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence. Could the enemy have withstood the effect of our batteries, we should, on the 11th, have blown in his counterscarp, and on the 12th, have breached the escarp by mine, which would have also been the mode of proceeding had a surf arisen on the sea beach sufficient to prevent the guns being landed. It was since ascertained, that in the evening of the 12th a force of Americans from Mobile landed about twelve miles higher up the bay than Fort Bowyer, with the intention of attacking our rear, but made no attempt, probably from perceiving that the fort was already taken.

April 8th. Sailed from the anchorage off Dauphin Island in the *Bucephalus* frigate, Captain D'Aeth, having under convoy five transports, containing the 43rd Regiment, &c. The *Thistle* gun brig with us.

May 30th. Arrived at Spithead.

On Colonel Burgoyne's arrival at Portsmouth, a letter from the inspector-general of fortifications was placed in his hands, informing him that "it was the master-general's pleasure that he was not to consider himself included in any general order that may have been given for the troops coming from America to proceed to the Netherlands, but on the receipt of this communication, he was to return to London."

This communication was owing to the circumstance that Lieut.-Colonel Carmichael Smith, of the Royal Engineers, had been appointed commanding engineer with the army in the Netherlands; and Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne, although junior to him in the corps, held higher army rank. The latter lost no time in appealing to the Duke of Wellington on the subject, and received from his military secretary the following reply:

"Brussels, June 10, 1815.

"My dear Burgoyne,

"The Duke of Wellington has received your letter of the 5th, and has desired me to write to Colonel Chapman on the subject of it, who will probably communicate to you the result of the application. The Duke would be happy to have you with the army, and will regret very much if the rules of the Ordnance prevent Lord Mulgrave from complying with his request.

"Yours very truly,

"Fitzroy Somerset."

In the meantime, while Col. Burgoyne was anxiously waiting in London for an answer to his application to the Duke, Sir Thomas Picton passed through town, on his way to join the army in the Netherlands,[1] and on

[1] Sir Thomas Picton left London on the 11th of June, and did not arrive at Brussels till the 15th, i.e., not until after the opening of the campaign. He had been very much annoyed at having been omitted in the creation of peers after the peace of 1814, when Hope, Graham, Hill,

hearing from him the facts of the case, and his wish to join the Duke's army, immediately offered to take him as his aide-de-camp. Colonel Burgoyne applied to the master-general of the Ordnance for permission to accompany Sir Thomas Picton in this capacity; but the application was refused, on the ground, it is believed, of his rank (that of regimental lieutenant-colonel) being too high for the post of aide-de-camp to a general of division.

Five days before the Duke's letter had been written from Brussels, Colonel Burgoyne had been ordered to Hull, to take charge of the northern engineer district; but in consequence of the Duke's application, a letter countermanding these orders was forwarded to him on the 27th of June, and two days afterwards, he was directed to proceed to the Netherlands by the Ostend packet, and place himself under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Carmichael Smith, the commanding engineer.

Journal resumed.

June 27th, 1815. Date of my first order to prepare to join the Duke of Wellington's army.

July 5th. (Ramsgate.) Embarked on board the *Lord Liverpool* packet, with two servants and four horses, and went out of harbour immediately.

—— *6th.* At 1 P.M. entered Ostend Harbour. One of my horses considerably cut in landing on the stone quay; spirited horses are very liable to injure themselves in embarking and being landed from such small craft as these packets.

—— *11th.* (Mons.) Rode out to visit the attacks by the Prussians on Maubeuge, a town five leagues or fifteen miles from Mons, situated on the Sambre, which runs through the

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Cotton, and others, received peerages and pensions for three lives, and it is said, obtained a promise from the Duke before he joined him on this occasion, that he should not be placed under the command of any other general.—ED.

town, and fills its ditches . . . . They reckon upon reducing it in eighteen days from the time of breaking ground. The French garrison is supposed to be about 3000, and the troops to be of inferior quality. The battering train is English, and very fine, consisting of about sixty pieces, and a large quantity of ammunition. As soon as they get within 200 yards of the redoubts, they place small mortars in the trenches, and work on under cover of their fire and musketry.

July 13th. Halted three days at Mons, the horse which was cut in disembarking being worse. Being better, however, by the 13th, set out again for Paris.

I went by Maubeuge, which was just given up by capitulation to the Prussians. The regulars of the garrison did not exceed 200 or 300 men; they marched out, and are to be conducted to the French army. In Maubeuge are about eighty pieces of artillery. The fortifications consist of seven large fronts, one of them towards the river, very large. The front attacked by the Prussians, which is contiguous to the lower part of the river, is decidedly the weakest; one of the faces of the right bastion of this front can be enfiladed and taken *en écharpe* by batteries on the heights on the right bank of the river, at 500 or 600 yards' distance; the left face can be enfiladed from ground just above a marsh at about 500 yards' distance, and which might be the right of the first parallel, the centre of which, on the ground of the French redoubt, would not be above 350 yards from the ditch, the rear of it being under cover from the place.

The people all over the country are much in fear of the Prussians, who lay heavy contributions on them.

—— *15th.* From Cambray, nine leagues to Peronne.

Peronne is a small fortified town, and was called *la vierge*, having never been taken before its late capture. When the Duke of Wellington advanced, learning there were only a few hundred National Guards in it, he ordered it to be assaulted. A few shots were fired, and the hornwork was forced, and then the field pieces opened again on the main entrance, and preparations being made to attack it, the town capitulated. The post, however, is an excellent one against a *coup de main*. Found a Dutch colonel commandant, who was remarkably polite, lent me

a horse, and rode round the works with me; he appeared enthusiastically attached to the English; said that his first commission was given him on the recommendation of Lord Macdonald, of the Guards, at Linselles, in 1793. He then served many years under Bonaparte, was taken prisoner in Russia, &c. He joined the Prince of Orange the first opportunity, and at the battle of Waterloo, Sir Thomas Picton tapped him on the shoulder just before he was killed, and said, "*Brave Hollandais! Ferme!*" These compliments from Lord Macdonald and General Picton, in the first and last of his services, he says he values infinitely more than the two crosses of the Legion of Honour given him by Napoleon.

July 19*th*. From Paris about three miles out to Neuilly, to join Sir Lowry Cole, commanding the reserve, consisting of the 5th and 6th British Divisions, and one division of Brunswickers, being attached to the reserve.

—— 21*st*. By permission of Sir Lowry Cole, I obtained a quarter in Paris at No. 18, rue Neuve-d'Orléans, on the boulevards, between the *portes* of St.-Denis and St.-Martin. Visited the Dépôt de la Guerre at the Hôtel des Invalides.

The French army, before they left Paris, removed all the papers, *mémoires*, and plans. There remain only the models, which are very fine, and comprise nearly every fortress and fort in France, being sixty or seventy in number. The Prussians have packed up nineteen of the places nearest their own frontier, as Mézières, Landrecies, Maubeuge, &c. The largest in the depôt now is that of Brest, being as large as three or four of the average of the others. Our conductor told us that it cost the government 45,000 francs, or about £2000—which is probably somewhat exaggerated.

From the Countess of Derby *to* Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne, *Paris.*

"Knowsley, August 7, 1815.

"Your letter has afforded Lord Derby and myself (and I may add, all your friends here), the highest satisfaction and amusement; it calls for and has my best thanks, which I beg you to accept with our warmest good wishes for your health and happiness. I cannot well conceive a situation of more interest to a

young man than your present one; it combines everything that can make it agreeable, and such an opportunity of observing the military character of all nations will be to you invaluable. To say truth, I do envy you not a little. We have not the consolation here of seeing what we might; is it not too provoking to know Bonaparte so near, and not to get one peep at him? How the Regent could resist the temptation, I cannot guess; he certainly cannot have a grain of curiosity in his whole composition! You will of course have heard that he is destined to amuse himself for the remainder of his existence (for I cannot call it *life*) at St. Helena, where he may cultivate his genius for history and poetry in philosophic leisure. However agreeable this sort of retirement may have appeared to various Roman heroes, I hear it by no means suits the inclinations or expectations of the ex-Emperor. He came in full security of remaining here upon the same terms his brother Lucien Bonaparte had lived among us, and is indignant beyond expression at the disappointment of his hopes. My own opinion is that he will escape and be at large again; he is anxious to get to America or India, and with his plotting head and fascinating manners, he will, I doubt, accomplish his purpose. What are you all going to do in France? New troops arriving every day from all quarters; there must be something intended.

You will not thank me for dwelling upon this subject, when you are wishing to know something of your private friends; and most happy am I to assure you they are all as well as you could wish them to be. M—— is more busy and occupied with the alterations of her cottage, than the Allies are in settling all the affairs of France; and I question whether the fate of kingdoms has ever cost them so many sleepless nights, as bow windows and blue curtains have caused her. It is quite delightful to see the interest she takes in this little dwelling; which, to say truth, she will make very pretty and comfortable, and the employment keeps her in good health and spirits. We had last night the pleasure of reading over some of your old charades, which were much admired, and you much wished for by the whole party. Sir William Hoste is staying here at present, and you would not have been mortified to hear what he said of your character as a soldier and a gentleman. Your ally

James,[1] longs to be with you, and begs me to tell you with his best regards, that he hopes you will write often, and long letters. Mary[2] will not forgive me if I do not offer her kindest remembrances; she is so grown since you saw her, that I must not send her love. If there are any ladies in Paris whom I know, that you would like an introduction to, pray let me know, and I will with pleasure send you letters, if you have any time or desire for female society. Lord Derby desires to be affectionately remembered to you again and again.

"Your very faithful friend,

"E. DERBY."

A letter from his friend, Captain Reid,[3] of the Royal Engineers, gives an account of the dashing exploit of Lord Exmouth, at Algiers.

"*Queen Charlotte*, off Algiers,

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE, "August 28, 1816.

"I have made a rough sketch of Algiers, sufficient to give you an idea of our attack, though otherwise not much to be depended on. I have not time to detail the action, which you will have in the despatch. This ship led and anchored head and stern within less than 120 yards from casemated batteries obliquely. It was the admiration of our fleet, and astonished our enemy, who were driven from them the first broadside. But the batteries farther from us were not so easily silenced, and wherever they could fire long shots they had the advantage. During the action, the *Queen Charlotte* was veered round to different batteries as on a pivot, and when a large enemy's frigate on flames was coming on board of us, she veered away both cables, and hauled on a hawser, and saved herself. Major Gosset, with an officer of the navy and one of the Marine Artillery, boarded the nearest frigate under a heavy fire (she was not manned) and set her on fire. I think it was our carcasses set fire to the others, and caused amongst our enemies a general conflagration. It was intended to have stormed the mole oppo-

[1] The Hon. James Stanley, the only son of Lady Derby. He died young, in 1817.

[2] Lady Mary Stanley, afterwards Countess of Wilton.

[3] Afterwards Major-General Sir William Reid, K.C.B.

site the *Queen Charlotte*, but it was the difficulty of communicating with us and getting us off again, that prevented Lord Exmouth's ordering it. The ships would soon have fired away all their ammunition (for we had thundered from two or three till ten at night), and if the rigging had been totally ruined, we ran the risk of being all taken. Audacity has a great effect in war, and here it has succeeded. Our Sappers were prepared with their arms, hand-grenades, smoke balls, and rockets, to storm. We had thirteen wounded at the guns. Neither rockets nor shells would set the town on fire.

"The most of the Algerine guns are very long. I saw, as we dropped our anchors, two men outside the casemate, one at each end of an immense sponge, getting it into the gun!

"In case that this should be the first you hear of us, I should say that we gained a victory, and made a peace. I have not time to say more.

"Yours sincerely,
"WILLIAM REID."

Journal resumed.

December 9th, 1815. (Paris.) Received orders to proceed to Mézières and Sedan, with Colonel Adye, Royal Artillery, as commissioners on the Duke of Wellington's part, to take an account of the state of those places, and to hand them over to the Prussians.

—— *14th*. (Mézières). Had a communication with the Prussian commandant, and Prussian and French commissioners. The instructions of the latter are precisely similar to ours. Those of the Prussians from General Ziethen, direct them expressly not to take any account of the movables, such as artillery, ammunition, and stores, which he esteems Prussian property, and never to be restored to the French, but only the works, public buildings, and their fixtures. All the guns (brass) found in the place are already removed by the Prussians, except a few of very small calibre; but they have collected here, for sending off to Prussia, about 100 very fine iron guns, mostly heavy, and their carriages, supposed to be brought from St. Quentin or La Fère, and probably quantities of different stores in the same way. As General Ziethen is at Sedan, we go over to see if anything can be done by communicating with him, and

wrote to Sir George Murray, to apprise him of the difficulty, and to demand further instructions.

December 15th. (To Sedan.) Visited General Ziethen, who was very decided about not allowing the *mobiles* (guns, &c.) to be given over with the places. He was very violent at first about it, and said that the Duke of Wellington was of the same opinion with him. He agreed, however, to our commencing with the fortifications and public buildings, on which there was no difference of opinion, and which, being the most laborious part of the business, would be so much work done; and he offered to forward a duplicate of our letter to Sir George Murray, which we accepted. He agreed also that, with the instructions worded as ours were, we could not act otherwise than we did. Dined with General Ziethen at 4 P.M. in company with fifteen or sixteen Prussian officers. Their dinner very much in the French style—only the plates changed, and the knives and forks left uncleaned for every different dish; the dessert was on the table from the commencement, and a tureen of soup, which being finished, the tureen was removed, and no other dish produced on the table at all, but brought up from the kitchen, served, and handed round one after the other.

—— *16th.* Met the Prussian and French commissioners at the Prussian commandant's. The instructions of the former from General Ziethen are positive to consider the *mobiles* as their entire property; and they have another difference from those of the French, which neither party think themselves at liberty to recede from, which is, that on completing the states and returns, &c., the place is to be formally, by a *procès-verbal*, delivered over by them to the French and English commission conjointly, and then to be given back over to them in trust by the French commissioners; whereas the French say that the place is to be given over to them by the Prussian and English commission jointly as Allies, and re-delivered over by them in trust to the Prussians, or any other of the Allies appointed to receive it. The Prussians also require that the French commissioners in the *procès-verbal*, state expressly that they renounce for their government all claim to the *mobiles* of the places thus given up, which the French refused to do. Dined again with General Ziethen.

December 17th. Met the other commissioners at 9 A.M. to continue the inventory of the military buildings, which they had already been at work at for some days. It is a long and tedious operation, as the account must necessarily be very detailed—the number of doors and windows of every room, with what is wanting to make them complete and in good order, the state of repair of the building, and list of all fixtures. Dined with the Prussian commandant, at a kind of mess of a number of superior officers, kept at an inn. The dinner was profuse, and in the French style. A band of one of the regiments attended. After dinner, champagne was introduced, with long glasses and toasts. First, 'The Prince Regent of England' ('God save the King' played); then 'The King of France, Louis XVIII.' ('Henri Quatre'); then we gave 'The King of Prussia ('God save the King' again, which it appears has Prussian words applied to it, and is also a national tune with them); then the principal French commissioner gave a toast to a continuation of the peace and amity so happily established in Europe. We went afterwards to the play—a very pretty little theatre, and the performance not very bad for a country town. They perform every other night; but, except Sundays, the house is not well attended, and then almost the whole audience are Prussians. The general and staff retain the stage box on each side.

—— *19th.* Received an answer from Sir George Murray, that "although it remains with us to take an account of the actual state of the places as they are delivered over to the Allies, any questions which may arise between the French government and the separate power of the Allies who occupied the places previous to the treaty of peace, such as those mentioned in our letter, are entirely foreign to the object of our special mission." We are therefore happily freed from all kind of discussion, and have only to take an accurate account of what the French and Prussians may agree shall be given up. Dined again with General Ziethen. Mr. Bradley, Ordnance clerk of stores, arrived.

—— *20th.* Gave a quiet dinner to the Prussian commandant and French and Prussian commissioners, at our inn, the *Croix d'Or.* Sedan is a considerable manufacturing town on the Meuse, which is here large enough to float good-sized barges.

The bridge (of stone) is very long, crossing an extensive flat, which can be inundated from the place; and protects that side. Round the other sides, and along the side of the heights which come immediately down to the town, was a complete enclosure of extensive works, of which no less than seven are hornworks. All these works have been sold piecemeal to individuals, who have made gardens, &c., of them, and they are consequently in a very dilapidated state; but still, as they chiefly preserve their escarps and counterscarps of a tolerable profile, a good military post might if necessary be made of the place, in which, on particular occasions, a considerable body of men might be free from surprise or a *coup de main*. The government have, however, retained the castle, which is now alone considered as the fortress of Sedan. This is old, of an enormous profile, its escarps built on rock of from fifty to ninety feet high. It is covered by a counterscarp and the old works of the town; it is an irregular square, large, but nearly filled with buildings, of which some are bomb-proof. It was formerly the property of the Duke or Prince of Bouillon, and Turenne was born in it, the memory of which is retained by a stone tablet on a wall in the castle, pointing out the spot. It is considered that there are barracks in the castle for 600 men; last war, however, 1200 English prisoners were confined there, many of whose names we found on the walls. They were chiefly sailors, and astonished the people occasionally by the way many of them made their escape over the enormously high walls, during the command of a tyrannical governor. In the town are excellent barracks for about 2500 men and 500 horses.

December 24th. (Sedan.) Continue taking the account of the military buildings, works, and fixtures. The Prussian corps to remain in France is of 30,000 men. The engineer department attached to it, consists of four companies of sappers, called by them Pioneers. They are, like ours, of all trades. Each company is 200 strong, in all, therefore, 800 men. They have the pontoon train in their charge; twenty-one pontoons very similar to ours are now packed at Sedan. With them, they have six four-wheeled waggons, and one solid flat-bottomed small boat. It is calculated that the bomb-proofs in the castle might contain in all, and if crowded, upon an emergency,

as many as 4000 men, besides the ammunition and provisions. They are, however, mostly bad, dark, and very wet in winter.

December 29th. Dined with the French commissioners, in company with the Prussian commissioners and commandant.

—— 31*st.* (Sedan.) Dined with General Ziethen. The inventories of the fortifications, public buildings, and fixtures being completely taken, the French commissioners were invited to sign them, and complete the *remise* of the place; and on their refusing, in consequence of the guns, stores, &c. (*mobiles*) not being included, General Ziethen caused it to be signified to them, in the politest manner possible, that he must therefore look upon their mission as at an end, and their longer presence in the place as unnecessary. At midnight, and from thence till morning, the drums and bands of the Prussians go about the town, serenading in the new year.

January 1st, 1816. (To Mézières.) The French commissioners, that is, Monsieur Mabru, *chef de bataillon* of Artillery, and Monsieur Cressai, *Capitaine du génie*, set out for Metz, in consequence of the message from General Ziethen, there to wait for further instructions from their government. The third, Monsieur Beraud, Commissary of War, remains at Sedan, being charged with the provisioning the allied troops on the peace arrangement. Colonel Adye and myself, with General Ziethen's approbation, go to Mézières, to see if we can get the inventories taken of the works, &c., on which the two parties are agreed. Found at the Palais Royal at Mézières (the only inn there) an immense dinner, given by the Prussian officers of the garrison on account of the first of the year, to which a number of the inhabitants were invited. They seem on much better terms with the French at Mézières than at Sedan, where it appears to be a complete system not to have any intercourse, probably arising from the turn given to their feelings by General Ziethen, who seems given up to the most complete detestation of the French nation. At his table, the conversation almost entirely turns upon abuse and unfavourable anecdotes of their character.

—— 2*nd.* (Mézières.) Met the whole of the commissioners at the commandant's. The French seem anxious to begin, and

take as much of the inventories as they can immediately, apparently under the idea that, when definitive orders come to take an account of the *mobiles*, everything else being completed, they will be able to commence upon them directly, without giving the Prussians time to convey off much. The commandant wished them to declare positively whether, the account of the works, &c., being completed, they would then sign definitively to the *remise* of the place, and they said that at present they did not see any objection to doing so, entering a protest however in the *procès-verbal* which the Prussians would sign, to their claim still to the *mobiles;* and also they seemed inclined to waive the difficulty about the form of the *remise*, the Prussians requiring that the place should be first given up by them to the united French and British commission, and afterwards delivered to them by the British alone. The French instructions are for the Prussians to give it up to them, and they to restore it in depôt to the united Prussian and British commission, as the representatives of the Allies. It was agreed that on the 3rd, the Prussians and French engineers should compare their notes on the state of the works which they had already taken, and that on the 4th, we should all together continue the inventories. Everything required for the subsistence of the Prussian troops in this part of the country, is demanded from the authorities, barrack furniture, &c., and on the most complete scale. In barrack rooms in Sedan, stoves were placed, obtained from the town, although there was in most a fine large fire-place; three benches for twelve men were provided where the French regulations allowed their own troops only two for twenty men, &c. The officers, with their servants, are fed by the people on whom they are billeted. The French commissioners at Sedan told us, in their complaints of General Ziethen, that he had received the prefect (a man of consequence, being at the head of a whole department,) very ill, on a recent visit the prefect paid him.

January 10th. (Mézières.) Continue taking the inventories. There is an essential difference in the organisation of the Prussian 30,000 men from ours who are to remain in France. They have but five generals, including General Ziethen; we have fifteen; our staff also generally is proportionately more nume-

rous. This makes ours more expensive, and gives inconveniences in quarters, the number of horses, &c., but also gives us great advantages in manœuvring; and I believe fully that no army in Europe can manœuvre so well as ours. They have also no less than 160 field pieces, and 5000 horses for the artillery service, whilst ours is reduced (to keep to the 10,000 rations for horses, which is allowed to each 30,000 men,) to 60 guns and 1500 horses only.

January 25th. (Sedan.) One of the French commissioners from Mézières has come over to Sedan, to consult with a French colonel from the minister of war's office, who happens to be here on some business, as to a difficulty which has arisen there, and stopped the operation of even continuing to make out the copies of the inventories. The Prussian commission there insisted upon having inserted in the inventories for the commission to sign, the work necessary to be done by the French government to put the place into a state of defence. The French commission will not consent, as they say it would be dictating in an improper manner to their government what they ought to do; that besides, they do not fully agree to all the work which the Prussians require. They offer, according to their instructions, after the *remise* of the place, to make out a detailed statement of the repairs requisite in their opinion, and they will insert the opinion of the Prussian officers where they differ, for the consideration of their government and the commanding general, according to the treaty. The colonel, it seems, has seen General Ziethen, and informs Captain Lebel, the French Commissioner, that he may return to Mézières (for the Prussian commandant there had ordered him to leave the town, since he would not consent to their terms,) and that General Ziethen will write to the commandant to allow him to remain, as it seems he is content with the French mode of arranging about the repairs.

—— *27th.* (Sedan.) Received a letter from Sir G. Murray, dated the 22nd instant, inclosing a letter for our information from the Duc de Richelieu, prime minister of the French government, to the Duke of Wellington, which Sir George hopes will remove all the difficulties between the Prussians and French, at the different fortresses held by the Prussians before

the peace. The Duc de Richelieu states that he agrees with the Duke of Wellington that the best mode will be to refer to their capitulations, and that he shall in consequence have orders given to the French commissioners at Landrecy, Rocroy, Longwy, Montmédy, &c., to give up the *mobiles, in toto;* but the capitulations of Mézières and Sedan, expressly stipulating that those places were to be held in depôt for the King of France, and restored to him at the peace, he requests the Duke of Wellington to give orders that the whole of the *matériel* without exception be inventoried. In the evening, received a letter from General Ziethen, requesting us to go over to Mézières, the commandant having written to him that the French commissioners were ready to sign the *procès-verbal,* but that the presence of the British commissioners was necessary.

January 28*th.* To Mézières. Waited on General Ziethen, and showed him the Duc de Richelieu's letter. He said that he could make no alteration in his measure of retaining the *mobiles,* unless his government should settle otherwise, or the Duke of Wellington should take upon himself to order it; that he looked upon it as too serious a thing, and that he knew nothing of the capitulations of the places, but that he had no doubt that eventually the French would obtain the *mobiles* of those two places.

—— 30*th.* (Mézières.) At a meeting held by appointment of the different commissions, the French commissioners were about to sign the *procès-verbal* for the *remise* of the place, which only included a slight reservation on account of the *mobiles,* to the effect that they reserved to themselves the power of acquainting their government that the Prussians claimed them all. Upon our producing, however, the copy of the Duc de Richelieu's letter, they refused to sign it, until they could get an answer on the subject from Paris. The Prussian commandant and commissioners were vexed, and reproached us for having shown this letter, without which the French would have signed, and that would at least have given room for further discussions and negotiations on the subject. As this paper was sent to us officially, and with the hope that it would remove all difficulties, and no other party appeared to have had

any communication of it, it was certainly not for us to conceal it, or so far to make ourselves a party on one side, as to show it to one and not to the other, and that merely to the end of favouring the Prussians, (however well we might be inclined in our own private minds towards them,) by giving them an opportunity of gaining a new opening for negotiation; which, so far from removing difficulties, would increase them tenfold, since undoubtedly the French ministers would disavow the act of their commissioners, as being contrary to their instructions. Wrote to Sir G. Murray in duplicate the whole account of their proceedings.

February 2nd. (Mézières.) Had another meeting of the commissions by appointment of the commandant, in consequence of a communication from General Ziethen. The French commissioners were again invited to sign the *procès-verbal* for the *remise*, which they refused, but offered to sign the states of the fortifications and public buildings which had been taken. This the Prussians declined, as leading to nothing; and in consequence of the French persisting in refusing to sign to the final arrangement, the commandant signified to them that their further presence in the place was unnecessary. They accordingly separated, and there is now no French commission, either at Mézières or Sedan, and the whole business of our mission is at a standstill. Wrote immediately to General Murray, requesting his further directions.

—— *5th.* By a letter from Sir G. Murray of the 2nd he expresses himself "sorry that we should have thought it necessary to show the copy of the Duc de Richelieu's letter to the Prussian and French commissioners, it having been sent us for our information only, to acquaint us that there was a probability of the Prussians and French coming to an understanding on the subject." The letter was certainly not a private one, and we being the only channel through which it could come, even putting it on the same footing as Sir George, that the Prussians and French were likely to come to an understanding, our suppressing that letter would certainly have caused a great delay in that understanding, as the *procès-verbal* would have been signed, and a new subject of discussion opened. It was out of our power, however, to have kept back the letter

without incurring much responsibility, since Sir George says in two letters (in reference to the Duc de Richelieu's), "which it is hoped will remove the difficulties."

February 10*th.* (Mézières.) The commandant communicates to us a request of General Ziethen that we would sign the states, as far as already completed, with the Prussian commissioners, which we are happy to do, as it establishes so much of the work, and is the means of inducing the Prussians, who are very dilatory, to complete the numerous copies they require without delay.

—— 16*th.* (To Sedan.) Two complete copies of the states being made, we signed them with the Prussians, and kept one; when the remainder shall be finished, they will be sent over to us to Sedan to sign. The *procès-verbal* which the French refused latterly to sign was added, and to it another, specifying the reasons why it remained unsigned. We went over to Sedan, to do the same thing there. We find they get on very slowly in making out their states there; or rather, it would appear that they stop altogether whilst we are away, and are still very far from completing.

—— 17*th.* (Sedan.) Called on General Ziethen. He informs us that he has just received permission from his king to allow the *matériel* of these places to be inventoried, and he has written this day to the Duke of Wellington to inform him. There will now, however, still be a great delay, as the French commissioners have been sent away, before the entire commission can re-assemble. Dined with the general.

On the return of the French commissioners, they objected to the proposal of the Prussians to include in the inventories only those articles originally belonging to the places which this corps of the Prussian army found in it when delivered over to them by the corps which took them. This, therefore, required another reference to Paris. The French ministers, in their answer, desire their commissioners to take whatever part of the *matériel* of the places the Prussians might give over to them in the first instance, for the *remise* of the places, since the whole of what was taken at the time of the capitulation could not be forthcoming immediately, and that the claims for the remainder would be made diplomatically. Accordingly, we

proceeded about completing the inventories of the *mobiles*, and signed them complete, with *procès-verbal*, &c., for Sedan, on the 4th of April, 1816.

April 6th. (Mézières.) Signed the whole of the papers necessary for the *remise* of Mézières.

Waterloo—Remarks made on a Visit to the Ground. 1816.

The field of Waterloo, in front of Mont St. Jean, is frequently accounted as no position, and does not show to very much advantage, even on Craan's plan, although that appears to be an accurate survey. On inspection, however, without which it is impossible to have a perfect idea of ground, it is certainly favourable for giving battle on, and if a little work could have been done on it, might have been made excellent.

It was not that commanding kind of position that is sometimes found, and which strikes the eye at once; on the contrary, the ridge occupied by our army is lower than the heights a mile or two in front, from whence the French army advanced. But it still had many of the essentials of a good fighting position. The flanks were on commanding points, that discovered the ground well all round them, at a fair distance from the main road by which the enemy approached, and would have required him to make a considerable detour across the country to have turned them.

The real left of the position, at a turning of the cross road, was not more than three-quarters of a mile from the Genappe *chaussée* in the centre, the right resting immediately above Goumont; the whole being about a mile and a half or two miles in extent; it was, therefore, very compact. In front of the left the ground was well discovered, and with no very favourable points for the enemy's artillery. A road ran along the line in this part with thin hedges along it, and a very slight bank, affording some little cover to the infantry if they laid down. This road continued along the centre and right of the position, out of sight of the enemy in those parts, but not affording any cover. The ground in front of the centre and right was more broken, but the hollows were well looked into by the *château* of Goumont in front of the right, and the farm

of the Haye Sainte on the high road. The whole line was on a ridge, which, rounding back to the rear, covered the troops from the sight and from the direct fire of the enemy.

The *château* of Goumont and the Haye Sainte were strong buildings, not too far in front of the line, and situated in hollows, so as not to be much exposed to be cannonaded severely. They were both of very great consequence as posts. The first was occupied and defended so well as to be retained through the whole day, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy. The troops were put into the Haye Sainte only a short time before the action commenced. The approach to it from the position was very much exposed indeed. The men in it became a kind of forlorn hope; they fired all their ammunition away, and then, for want of communication and support, were overpowered. When the French were in possession of this point an extensive hollow was open to them, which could not be seen from any part of our line, and under favour of which, their great mass of cavalry remained for some hours within 400 yards of our line, from whence they advanced, and made charges at their pleasure.

Such was the nature of our ground. Even a single company of Sappers with their tools might, in a very few hours, have rendered most essential service in improving it, by preparing the two buildings for defence, and throwing up traverses for guns across the two *chaussées*. The Guards did to the *château* what was necessary for its defence. Had the Haye Sainte been loopholed, all its doors and approaches towards the front and flanks been strongly barricaded, and a communication made to the rear, it would probably have been held through the whole day. The traverse across the Genappe *chaussée* would have given our artillery the command of that road by which the enemy brought down his troops to many of the most serious attacks, and still more so had the eighteen-pounders been up, which had been prepared for the field.

Had there been opportunity and means for more work, the points are clearly marked out where four or six detached works might have been placed to advantage, besides the cover that might be thrown up for the line. The duke did not wish to have any ground entrenched beforehand which might give any

clue to his intentions, but would have been glad to have had anything which could be thrown up at the time. Two companies of Sappers and 3000 men might, on the night of the 17th, in addition to the above-mentioned posts, have thrown up such a line as would have afforded great cover to our infantry and guns, have brought them more to the ridge of the hill, and would have considerably checked and broken the advances of cavalry.

The French attacks do not appear to have been well judged, for want of union or combination. At one time, they made a great attack on Goumont on the right; at another, and for a considerable period, the great mass of cavalry were acting without support; at another, a powerful attack of infantry on our left; and last of all, when the cavalry was nearly annihilated and great part of the infantry of the line beaten, the infantry of the Imperial Guard, who had been in reserve, were brought up, and shared the same fate. Each of these efforts appear to have been so powerful, that if united, in the style of the Duke of Wellington's attacks at Salamanca and Vittoria, certainly there would have been a better chance of success.

Had the Prussians and British, even on the morning of the 18th, been under one general, it is probable that many of the former, who marched by Obain, might have been brought up regiment by regiment much earlier in the day; and they were much wanted in our line. As it was, it is probable that Blucher rather preferred bringing up his own army in mass together, as the Prussian army, than have portions of them falling in and beating the enemy off, under the duke. As we were able to maintain our ground, the victory was more complete as it was, and Blucher gained great credit for acting so decisively respecting Grouchy's corps. Had the enemy turned our left to separate us from the Prussians, the position would have been altered, with the left on the Forest of Soignies, the right probably where the left was in the battle, and the army would still have held a very good position.

J. F. B.

In the distribution of rewards for the Peninsular campaign, an act of injustice was inflicted on Colonel Bur-

goyne which will appear incredible. It has been shown that after the death of Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher at St. Sebastian, Burgoyne was the senior surviving officer of Royal Engineers who had been present at all the sieges of the Peninsula; but at the same date Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone, a senior regimental officer of Royal Engineers, was quartered at Lisbon, and on hearing of Colonel Fletcher's death, wrote to Lord Wellington, to ask what his wishes were, respecting his joining headquarters. Lord Wellington desired to retain Colonel Burgoyne as commanding engineer with the field force; but unwilling to transgress by any formal act the rules of the Ordnance service, which required that the senior officer of the department should be at headquarters, sent a reply through the military secretary, which left the matter optional with Colonel Elphinstone, The latter, very properly considering that it would be a slur upon him if he remained in the rear of the army while active operations were in progress, on receiving this answer, hastened up to the front, and although the operations in the field very shortly afterwards came to an end, owing to the general peace, he was created a baronet on the conclusion of the war, as the representative of the corps of Royal Engineers in the Peninsula. At this period, Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone was junior in army rank to Colonel Burgoyne, and had been present at none of the sieges of the war, and but one general action, and this method of distributing rewards on so strict a system of seniority was considered at the time to be based on a vicious principle. But a worse act of injustice was to follow.

At the enlargement of the Order of the Bath early in 1815, and its division into three classes, it had been arranged that every general or lieut.-colonel possessing

five gold Peninsular medals, should be appointed a Knight Commander of the order.

At this period, Colonel Burgoyne had received but four gold medals; the fifth, to which he was entitled, and which he obtained within a month afterwards, having been delayed by a misunderstanding. At the time the appointments to the Bath were notified in the *Gazette*, Colonel Burgoyne was serving with the New Orleans expedition, and on his return to England, had the mortification of finding himself excluded from the 2nd class, although possessing the same qualifications which had entitled others to the appointment.[1] No one doubted that the error would be repaired, and the military authorities were anxious to rectify the mistake; but an unexpected obstacle intervened. The gold medal had been given after every general action and siege to all generals and staff officers, officers commanding regiments, commanding officers of Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, captains of artillery commanding field batteries, and captains of engineers acting as directors at a siege, or attached to a division of the army. Under such an arrangement, it is obvious that the number of officers who would obtain the distinction of K.C.B. would be very numerous, and the Prince Regent, who gave his sanction to the proceeding before he was aware of its full effect, subsequently expressed his strong disapprobation of the measure, and issued an order that in future no officer under the rank of general should obtain this grade, and that of those who had already received it, no one under the rank of general officer should wear the star.

Colonel Burgoyne made no appeal on this occasion in his own person, but it was impossible that such a

[1] He had been congratulated by many of his friends upon this occasion, and several of his letters of this date were addressed to Lieut.-Colonel Sir John Burgoyne, K.C.B.

flagrant wrong should not be brought to the notice of the commander-in-chief; and Sir Henry Torrens, then private secretary to the Duke of York, sent for him, and explained that it was the imperative determination of the Prince Regent that no officer under the rank of major-general should in future be appointed to the grade of Commander of the Bath; but that his case was acknowledged to be so hard that he was commissioned to offer him the honour of knighthood, as a temporary substitute.

Colonel Burgoyne, after some reflection, and having first ascertained that he might do so without failing in respect to the Prince Regent, declined the proffered honour of a civil knighthood; his chief reason for this determination being the strong feeling which pervaded his own corps, that they were treated with less than justice in the distribution of the honour of the Bath, the corps of Royal Engineers being the only combatant branch of the military service which had never received a superior appointment in the order to that of Companion; and he felt that, by accepting a civil knighthood on this occasion, when every officer of other branches with the same qualifications was appointed a Knight Commander of the Bath, he lowered in his own person the consideration due to his corps. How deeply his feelings were wounded on this occasion, may be conceived by his answer to Sir George Naylor, the genealogist of the Bath, who had written to him for a statement of his military services, for registration at the College of Arms:

Headquarters, Army in France,
Cambray, July 26, 1816.

SIR,

I beg leave to enclose a bill for the amount of the fees due to you on my appointment as a Companion of the Order of the Bath.

With respect to a statement of my military services, I should beg leave to decline having them registered, and should wish that as little notice as is possible be taken of my name on this occasion.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your very obedient servant,
J. F. BURGOYNE,
Lieut.-Colonel Royal Engineers.

He never wore the badge of Companion of the Bath, nor did he ever include it among the honours bestowed upon him in his statements of services.

A natural diffidence of character rendered him averse to ask for favours; but in the following year, having advanced a larger sum to a friend in the Artillery than he could well afford, he found himself in such pecuniary difficulties, that he mustered up sufficient courage to apply for a good-service pension.

From Lieut-Colonel BURGOYNE, R.E., *to the* Duke of WELLINGTON.

Cambray, January 24, 1817.

MY LORD,

Having the greatest fear of being thought presuming, it is only by the repeated advice of many of my friends, that I venture to throw myself on your Grace's consideration on an occasion of great interest to me.

Having served through the whole of the campaigns of the Peninsula (except that of Vimiera), including all the sieges, and being by accident in command at some of the most arduous of them, as well as during the Salamanca campaign, I venture to solicit your Grace's kind intercession (without which, we are given to understand no application or claim will be of avail,) that I may be granted a pension.

It is understood that every commanding engineer at a successful siege is considered to have such a claim, and by the fall of Sir Richard Fletcher, I became the commanding officer at the taking of San Sebastian, and subsequently of its castle,

besides serving in the same capacity at the reduction of the forts at Salamanca, and of the Retiro.

I am inclined to hope that your Grace will look indulgently upon this application, as I am the senior surviving officer of Engineers, who served at the various sieges in the Peninsula; for which, and for the campaigns, no such mark of favour has been granted by the Board of Ordnance to any officer of the corps since Sir Richard Fletcher, as have been so liberally and deservedly bestowed upon the Artillery.

I am under too many obligations to your Grace to repine, even should the present application not meet with the success I hope for, but shall ever remain,

Your Grace's most devoted and obedient humble servant,

J. F. BURGOYNE,
Lieut.-Colonel Royal Engineers.

Attached to the rough copy of this letter is a memorandum of his services, to the following effect:

Blockade of Malta, 1800;
Storm of the Lines of Alexandria, 1807;
Commanding Engineer—successful.
Siege of Rosetta, 1807;
Commanding Engineer.
Siege of Badajoz, 1811;
Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, 1812;
Siege of Badajoz, 1812;
Siege of Salamanca, Fort St. Vincent, 1812;
Commanding Engineer—successful.
Attack of the Fort of the Retiro, Madrid, 1812;
Commanding Engineer—successful.
Siege of Burgos;
Commanding Engineer.
Siege of St. Sebastian;
Commanding Engineer at the latter part, by Sir R. Fletcher's death—successful.
Blockade of Bayonne, 1814;
Attack on New Orleans, 1815;
Commanding Engineer.

Siege of Fort Bowyer, Gulf of Mexico, 1815;
Commanding Engineer—successful.

Busaco Salamanca Vittoria Nivelle Nive	General actions.
Passage of Douro Salamonde Elbodon Canizal Aldea de Ponte Bidassoa Battles before Bayonne Passage of Adour &c., &c.,	Partial.

I was deaf five years from effects of the Corunna retreat. Have been eight times mentioned in published despatches, and have received, at Lord Wellington's recommendation, five medals, two steps of brevet rank, and the Order of the Tower and Sword.[1]

In 1816, was offered to be knighted, through General Torrens, and declined it.

J. F. B.

On the 21st of February, 1817, the Earl of Mulgrave, Master-General of the Ordnance, notified to the Duke of Wellington, that being "most desirous of attending to his Grace's recommendation of meritorious services performed under his command, he will, on the ground of such recommendation, grant the pension of ten shillings *per diem* to Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne for his distinguished services."

This was the only reward of a personal nature which he received, and for that, it will be seen, he was forced

[1] It will be seen he omits all mention of the Companionship of the Bath.—Ed.

to make a special application. His two steps of brevet rank had become merged into a regimental lieutenant-colonelcy in 1814; the medals were given to all officers who were qualified by their rank—the decoration of the Bath he had laid on one side, as already explained. He had therefore little to point to as recompense for his services when he returned to England in 1818; but it was not in his nature to make complaints, and a naturally buoyant and sanguine temperament gave him hopes of better fortune in future years. But whether from a feeling that he had been badly treated, or from some other motive, he appears to have lost at this time all his interest in his past campaigns. During his service in the Peninsula, he had made copious notes of the military proceedings, and his friend, Lieut.-Colonel Squire, R.E., who died in Spain in 1812, had left him by will all his military correspondence. From this it would appear as if he had been collecting materials for the purpose of writing a history of the war in Spain and Portugal, and had subsequently renounced the intention. Whatever the cause may have been, it is certain that shortly after his return to England, he handed all his notes and journals to Sir John Jones, by whom they were used in compiling the well-known 'History of the Sieges of Spain.'

Sir John Jones, writing to him a few years afterwards, says, "We do not either of us seem born to be overloaded with personal honours. You will, I think, in the long run, have justice done to you, and come in for something; another war will bring officers all to the proper level." This prediction was fulfilled, but it speaks little for the discrimination with which honours are conferred for military services, that Burgoyne, by far the ablest military engineer of his day, was allowed to pass un-

noticed into civil life; and that forty more years of arduous and responsible duties were exacted from him, crowned by services of a peculiarly valuable and conspicuous character, at the greatest siege of modern times, before he obtained the same honours which had been bestowed at this period upon two of his comrades—officers doubtless of merit, but whose services in the field would bear no comparison with his own, and to both of whom he stood at the time actually superior in army rank.[1]

The adoption of a military career at all times involves a more abrupt severance of home ties, and a more sudden plunge from boyhood into man's estate than attend those graduated stages leading to the less active professions; but making full allowance for such circumstances, what a contrast must have presented itself to young Burgoyne's early friends and companions, between the shy boy of sixteen, noted only for his silent reserved manner and somewhat shabby attire, and the bronzed soldier who now reappeared among them after the lapse of fifteen years, a military engineer with an established reputation, his breast decorated with the honourable and in those days rare emblems of many valiant achievements, and his opinions listened to as those of one who had taken a prominent part in the great drama which may be said to have changed the social and political condition of Europe!

During those fifteen years, the young soldier had served wherever England had an enemy to meet, or a

[1] Sir Howard Elphinstone, R.E., created a baronet in 1814, at the close of the Peninsular war, and Sir Carmichael Smith, R.E., created a baronet in 1815, after the battle of Waterloo. In 1831, Sir John Jones, R.E., another junior officer of his own corps, was likewise created a baronet for his military services.—Ed.

great military object to attain. He had taken an active, and often a leading part in twelve sieges or blockades; had shared in five general actions, and in eight or nine partial engagements. He had acquired the friendship and esteem of every general under whom he had served, and the confidence of the first captain of the age. Bred to arms from his youth, and possessed of a naturally good intelligence, his military judgment had become so corrected by a long experience and a close study of his profession, as to be deferred to on more than one occasion, by so great a commander as Wellington himself.[1]

Such was the man who, having just declined the proffered honour of a civil knighthood as an inappropriate reward for his military services, now returned to the scenes of his youth, and was welcomed by friends and comrades who had known him only as an orphan boy, without birth or connections, dependent upon the bounty of others for the commonest necessaries of his everyday existence. An attempt to convey the impression caused by this contrast was made in a serio-comic poem[2] written at this time by the Rev. Edward Hornby, a cousin of

[1] As an instance of this, I may mention a fact told me by Major-General Matson, who was adjutant of Royal Engineers at headquarters during the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. The English army had entered the Pyrenees, and having become enveloped in the thick mists common in those mountains in the autumn, no information could be obtained of the movements of the French. The day was fast declining, and it was necessary to encamp the army for the night; and Lord Wellington, being uneasy at the want of information of the enemy's movements, was discussing the positions to be taken up by the different divisions, with Graham, Hill, and other generals, when he suddenly turned round and said, "Where is Burgoyne? I should like to have Burgoyne's opinion before deciding;" and Lieutenant Matson was sent to fetch him. "I remember it well," he added, "on account of the trouble and anxiety it gave me to find him."

[2] 'Childhood.' A poem by the Rev. E. T. Hornby, M.A., privately printed.

Lord Derby, and one who had known Burgoyne from his early childhood:

"Mark now the form erect, the martial air,
Of that brave soldier who attracts the fair!
His sunburnt cheek and sinewy frame disclose
A man long trained to battle, toil, and blows;
And the fixed, eager looks of all around
Speak him late landed on his native ground.
With knowledge clear, with plain unvarnished speech,
He draws the ambuscade, or mounts the breach;
Tells tales of blood to raise a friend's renown,
And only fears lest aught should hint his own.
His soul of honour high, his tranquil mien
Of modest worth, most pleased, when most unseen.
His patient zeal, his cool and manly sense,
And his mild eye's impressive eloquence:
Can this be he, the pale, the puny boy,
Whom all conspired to buffet and annoy—
His only fame, that he profusely fed,
And seldom owned a hat to hide his head?"

CHATHAM—PORTUGAL—PORTSMOUTH.
1818 TO 1839.

FROM the date of his arrival in England, in November, 1818, up to July, 1821, Colonel Burgoyne remained unemployed, and the only record of his life during this interval is contained in the journals of his sporting expeditions to Scotland. In September, 1819, whilst staying with Captain English, Royal Engineers, at Fort George, he made the acquaintance of his future wife, Charlotte Rose, daughter of Colonel Rose, of Holme. His journal of this date, gives an account of his first introduction to her.

September 2nd, 1819. (Fort George.) Prince Leopold visited the fort, on his way from Inverness to Gordon Castle. Public breakfast at the governor's (Colonel Moir); introduced to the Prince; met Colonel Rose of Holme, and family, at English's; invited to Holme.

—— *3rd*. (Holme.) Accompanied Captain English on a visit to Holme, where we were received by Colonel and Mrs. Rose, who, with two grown-up daughters, keep a most agreeable and hospitable establishment in an excellent house lately renewed, about seven miles south of Fort George. Colonel Rose inherited Holme, and having been some years in India, in the Company's cavalry, returned a few years back, with money enough to make it very comfortable. He is an excellent man; Mrs. Rose a very superior, good, and kind woman; and the two daughters interesting, clever, and well educated.

—— *4th*. (Holme.) Colonel Rose has 9000 acres of moors

about three miles from his house. Made an excursion on them in spite of a very high wind and some rain; the birds were exceedingly wild, and I only killed two brace and a half of grouse. On my return, I found that English had been obliged to return suddenly to Fort George, in consequence of news of the death of his wife's father, and has thus left me as if dropped from the clouds, alone in the house of strangers to whom I have been barely introduced, which, with others than such good people as the Holme family, would be very awkward.

Under these circumstances, Colonel Burgoyne's intimacy with the family made rapid progress, and finally resulted in his marriage, in January, 1821, with Charlotte, the youngest daughter of Colonel Rose.

Among the numerous congratulations on his marriage, his friend Captain Head[1] sent him the following lines:

"How strangely do Cupid's vagaries prevail!
What wonders his powers disclose!
When a votary he sends, by the Inverness mail,
In December, to seek for a Rose!"

Another friend presented him with a parody on a well-known song:

"Rose! rose! pretty sweet Rose!
What gave you that pretty sweet Rose?
Merit and valour, and honour and blows,
They gave me this pretty sweet Rose."

But his warmest letter of congratulation came from his old friend Boothby, who, since the loss of his leg at Talavera, had taken orders, and was now leading the life of a retired country clergyman, in Lincolnshire.

"Sutterton, Spalding, March 11, 1821.

"From the bottom of my heart, my very dear friend, do I wish you happiness, and that marriage may confer upon you all those blessings for which your heart and understanding are formed. In congratulating *you*, I rest upon a confidence in your sober judgment and discriminating good taste; but in

[1] Now the Right Hon. Sir Francis Bond Head.

congratulating *her*, she might well, if she wanted confirmation, receive my words as no idle sanction of her warmest expectations. You and I, my dear Burgoyne, have lived together in brotherly union, and the fancy which your good-nature and modest superiority of intellect kindled in my mind, you lost no opportunity of increased intimacy to improve into an affection tinctured even with veneration. I do not think it agreeable to receive such broad declarations, and therefore I do not believe you ever knew how much I felt your friendship to be a source of instruction and universal improvement. But on this occasion, I cannot forbear stating it as the ground of my persuasion that your bride is amongst the most fortunate of women.

"I am quite ready and predisposed to like and admire the object of your choice. Pray then come here—it *is* out of the way—but what is a few more miles, or a little humbler entertainment, compared with the welcome of a real old friend? I wish, without depriving the corps of Engineers of its best officer, you had just such a retreat as this, close to us; for there does not live the man whom I would rather choose to sit down beside, after the buffets of an active life. Then do come and see us, my dear friend, while non-employment gives you leisure.

"I beg you will present me to Mrs. Burgoyne as one of your oldest and most attached friends—and believe me, dear old Gos,

"Ever most affectionately yours,

"CHARLES BOOTHBY."

"P.S.—Now you are married, you must not be suffered to neglect your interests as you have done. You must assert your claims with your friend the Duke of Wellington; done in your frank and quiet way, it will please him, and do you justice. I was very angry with you for being jockeyed by the Knight of St. Ferdinand;[1] I have a great kindness for him, but I think he should have felt that he was jostling his betters. Pray write and tell me if we shall have the least chance of seeing you. God bless you."

[1] Sir Charles Smith, of the Royal Engineers, who had been lately appointed king's aide-de-camp.—ED.

On the 24th of July, 1821, Colonel Burgoyne was appointed Commanding Engineer of the Medway District, and he joined at Chatham two days afterwards. Here he passed the six years following his marriage, in the discharge of the ordinary peace duties of his corps. This interval was signalised by the vigorous administration of the Duke of Wellington as Master-General of the Ordnance, and the transfer of the duties connected with the construction and repair of barracks from the old Barrack Department to the Royal Engineers. On this subject, Colonel Burgoyne was consulted, both by Sir Henry Hardinge, the secretary to the Ordnance, and by Sir Ulysses Burgh, private secretary to the Duke of Wellington. On the 3rd of April, 1823, he writes to the latter officer:

My dear Burgh,

With respect to the subject on which you requested me to send you some memoranda, I can only give you at present a few of my own private ideas, formed on a very cursory view, without feeling quite certain whether these even bear on the points on which you were particularly desirous of being informed.

The observations I was enabled to make on the late inquiry into a specific charge against Mr. ——, did not enable me to understand the entire mode of conducting the works of the Barrack Department; but I could see enough to feel convinced that the system was a bad one. The accounts are all mixed up together, in a manner which renders it impossible to separate the expense of any one job from that of the whole mass of work, and which consequently prevents investigation into any specific abuse that may be suspected or pointed out.

The clerk of works and contractor arrange everything between them, without any control, except that very general one that can be exercised by the surveyor from London; if they combine together, they may therefore defraud government to a great extent, and if the surveyor (if that is his title) at all

connives at their proceedings, the facilities are of course very much increased.

Now the engineer establishment (at this place for instance) consists, besides myself, of a subaltern officer, a clerk of works, an office clerk, an overseer, and a foreman of each trade, each taking an active part, and being a mutual check upon the others.

All extensive or distinct work that can be done by measurement, is executed by the contractor; the subaltern officer attends at the measurement, and the books of measurements are preserved, and can be referred to at any time. All the little jobbing services are executed by a small establishment of artificers and labourers, kept up for that purpose. Each foreman keeps a book of the daily distribution of every person, and one of the application of every article employed in his line, with various other arrangements that tend to check irregularities, with which however it is needless now to trouble you.

I used formerly to consider such establishments for superintendence and check as are usually kept up in the Ordnance Departments, to be needlessly large and expensive; but I now feel convinced that, even with our small expenditure, there is not any real extravagance in the system, and still less with reference to more extensive works. I do not mean to say that some little abuses may not take place; but I think they can only exist to a small extent, and must be carried on with great risk.

In the Barrack Department the barrack-master is a cipher, as far as regards the works; there are no overseers, no foremen, the contractor's people must necessarily be employed both for day and measurement work, which are jumbled up or separated, at the discretion of the clerk of works, *after the work is done.* He is the only check on the contractor, and however honest he may be, it is impossible for him alone to inspect and see justice done to government; and moreover, at this place, besides all the work going on (to the amount, as I am told, of £2000 in a year), the same clerk of works has also to attend to Maidstone and Sheerness.

At the time this letter was written, he was acting as president of a committee of investigation into the

Barrack Establishment and its duties, at Woolwich. This committee, which was appointed, in the first instance, to report upon certain charges brought against an officer of the department, subsequently received instructions to enlarge the scope of their inquiries; and the ultimate result was the abolition of the old Barrack Department, and the transfer of all the duties connected with the repairs and construction of barracks, to the Royal Engineers. On the 24th of January, 1825, the secretary to the Board of Ordnance writes to Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne, "I have it in command to acquaint you that the Board concur generally with what is stated in the report, and highly approve of the manner in which the committee have proceeded, and the clearness with which the result of their labours has been communicated."

A letter written in 1826, to Lord FitzRoy Somerset, shows how early he had foreseen the full importance of Paixhans' invention of shell guns:

"Chatham, February 3, 1826.

My dear Lord FitzRoy,

I should not address you at a moment when you must be so much occupied with preparations for your northern expedition, but that the subject on which I am about to write will require no immediate attention, nor indeed any but what you may feel inclined voluntarily to give it.

My object is to bring to the notice of the Duke, if it has not been done before, a new species of artillery proposed in France by a Colonel Paixhans, which has been treated with great respect by the authorities there, experiments carried on at considerable expense, and a favourable report made, as shown in the accompanying pamphlet, which (exclusive of the notes) will not take half an hour to read. The idea is simply, a *gun* to throw large shells. At present, mortars are useless for horizontal fire, or at low angles; howitzers want force and accuracy, and guns only fire very small shells.

M. Paixhans proposes a piece of the weight of a twenty-four-

pounder, to throw shells of seven and eight inches diameter, with the force and accuracy of shot; one of the weight of a forty-eight-pounder to throw ten-inch shells, and so in proportion. The effect of such weapons against shipping, for which it is chiefly proposed, would certainly be tremendous, and the plan is to arm steam-vessels with a few of largest dimensions. In 1819, he published his idea in a large quarto volume, wherein he entered into details, and proposed plans for removing all the difficulties that would appear probable; and the present pamphlet would seem to say that it had in fact been brought to succeed to a great degree. I am the less inclined to lose the chance of this reaching you before your Lordship's departure, because you may at Petersburg have an opportunity perhaps of seeing a piece, the effects of which M. Paixhans frequently mentions as a groundwork for some of his reasonings; he calls it the "Licorne russe," and it is, as I understand it, a lengthened and heavy howitzer, which he describes as superior to anything of that nature in any other service.

If the Duke has already ever had his attention pointed to the subject, pray do not plague him with my superfluous renewal of it, and begging your Lordship to excuse the trouble I am giving yourself, believe me ever,

My dear Lord FitzRoy,

Yours faithfully and obliged,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

In 1826, the question of the succession to the crown of Portugal occupied the attention of Europe. Don Pedro, on whom the crown had devolved on the death of John VI., unwilling to leave the Brazils, had abdicated the Portuguese throne, in favour of his daughter Donna Maria. A strong party in Portugal being favourable to the claims of Don Miguel, brother to Don Pedro, and being supported by the Spanish government, an English force was despatched to the Tagus, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir William Clinton, in order to prevent any interposition by the Spaniards in the

internal affairs of Portugal. On the 12th of December, Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne received orders to prepare for service as commanding engineer with this expedition. In a private letter of the same date, Lord FitzRoy Somerset states that the master-general (the Duke of Wellington) highly approved of his having been selected for this duty.

His letters from Portugal are so full of pleasant description and anecdote, that it is to be regretted that the limits of the present work will not admit of the insertion of more than a few extracts from them:

December, 1826.[1]

December 20th.[1] Eleven A.M. I will begin a letter, to send it when I may. We have now passed one night on board, and a famous crowd there is—twenty-two in the admiral's cabin, who gives up everything, to rough it like the rest. My luggage was last seen *strewed along* the Portsmouth road, where the van conveying it broke down; we are now going off with a fresh breeze, without it. Gosset however will forward it, and I have plenty of necessaries for the voyage. Only think of Sir John Burgoyne[2] making his appearance on deck at eight o'clock this cold raw morning! He came from town, and six miles out to sea in a wherry to see us. What a good fellow! I begged him to send you a line to say he had seen us off. We are meeting the *Gloucester*, that sailed from Sheerness with the Grenadier Guards, and we are now three line of battle ships, full of troops—the *Wellesley*, *Melville*, and *Gloucester*. On board the *Wellesley* are Admiral Sir Thomas Hardy, Captain Falcon, R.N., General Sir William Clinton, and Sir Henry Bouverie (and wife), and their staff, Sir Evan McGregor Murray, Sir Charles Broke Vere, Commissary-General Bisset, Colonels Hare, Burgoyne, Moir, &c. The 3rd Guards are on board, including Colonel Bowater and Charles Hornby.

[1] All the letters which follow are to his wife, when not otherwise specified. —Ed.

[2] The late Sir John Montagu Burgoyne, Bart., of Sutton, Bedfordshire.

December 22nd. The wind died away in the night, and it is now dead calm, and one of the finest days possible. This kind of journal is all very pretty during this idle time at sea; by-and-by I shall have to snatch at moments as I can. During this period of leisure, I have been turning in my mind the state of our finances, and am really quite in despair about them. I find that *I* shall be in a wretched way. I care little about luxuries and conveniences, but I do regret exceedingly that I shall not be able to keep up the efficiency and respectability of my station. I ought to entertain to breakfast and dinner two, or at least one of the officers, as my staff; this however, I must start by declaring frankly, I cannot do. A point however of more importance is, that I shall not be able to mount myself properly. To enable me to be constantly with the general commanding, and in the midst of things, I ought to have at least two or three good horses for my own riding, otherwise I must be in the background.

—— *26th.* We are enjoying fine weather and a fair wind, and living sumptuously. The admiral is a most liberal fellow, and gives us claret and champagne daily. Among the host on board (about 1300 souls) are two subordinate commissaries: one a dry-looking old fellow, the other a very handsome fresh-looking lad of about sixteen, smartly dressed in a green coat. The middies call one of these gentlemen *Green Forage*, the other *Dry Forage!*

Lisbon, 1827.

January 10th. (Lisbon.) This morning, all the generals, staff, commanding officers, and heads of departments, &c., were presented to the Princess Regent at the beautiful Palace of Ajuda. She is a small, young-looking woman, not at all handsome, but with a good-humoured, lively, and sensible look. She had a largish deep crimson coloured turban on, and a cloak over her, under which was a ribbon of two or three colours, over one shoulder and across her breast. She appeared to be in a common morning dress, and we made our bow and retired, after which the general and the minister, Sir William A'Court (with whom I dine to-day), remained with her for about half an hour.

—— *13th.* I attended yesterday morning a sitting of the House of Peers; the proceedings were very respectable and

dignified. Since confidence is more established, and I have mixed more with the people, I have altered my opinion with regard to the more general feeling. I now conceive it, at Lisbon at least, to be more constitutional than otherwise—our presence has certainly done much for the cause—the rebels are said to be in full retreat, and it seems hardly to be expected that we can be required to act. At the same time, our preparations to march are continued, and it is probable that we shall move forward to a certain extent, till the rebels are entirely disposed of.

Lisbon, January 26.

The general has signified his intention of despatching me about the 30th or 31st to Elvas, to endeavour to ascertain what the Spaniards are about on that frontier, to remain there a short time, and communicate with him. Colonel Mair is performing that service in the north. I shall be in the south, and the troops in a central position in the rear; he esteems that he will be ready to await in security whatever may be the result of the present apparent unsettled state of Spanish politics, they will never dare to come to an open rupture with us, unsupported by France; should they be forced into it by the violence of the Apostolic party, which they really seem hardly able to control, they will probably suffer severely, we shall remain in Portugal on the defensive, or rather in observation; they have neither power nor means to attack, and the force of opinion must take its course. Portugal, by our aid, appears settled: Spain, very far from it, and I look upon it, would in case of hostilities be speedily revolutionised, which will make us the triumphant party in both countries. A few months I think must settle it one way or other, for they can never remain in the present feverish state. Spain being once quieted with regard to this country, our business becomes that of easy and simple occupation. It would undoubtedly be very unwise to leave this country for at least a twelvemonth.

The governor of Elvas is the head of the corps of Engineers, the General Mann of Portugal, and is said to be a very good man and well disposed. I expect the trip to be an agreeable one. I take my horses and all my own establishment.

Two evenings ago, I went with Wells to a small party at the

house of a leading lawyer. We were ushered into a long room, not well lighted, and found the ladies seated along the wall on one side, and the gentlemen on the side opposite; at one end of the room was a small piano, at which a person playing would front the company; at the other end in one corner a card table, and no other furniture (as a Portuguese expressed himself the other day, "the climate is our furniture.") Tea and cakes were handed round. A gentleman of the party then sat down to the piano and played beautifully, another sang very well, but with a poor voice; they were both professional men. A young lady of the house (frightfully plain) sang and danced uncommonly well; her voice was powerful enough to fill a theatre. After some music they made up a quadrille; a young man (brother to a rich peer, the Conde de Ponte, himself a cavalry officer,) sat down to the piano, and hammered out a set of quadrilles with great spirit and good execution for the purpose. They were played from memory, and of his own arranging. He called out the figures as he went on; among others 'God save the King' was made a quadrille of, and to my astonishment did not appear to answer ill. We went to the party before eight, and went home before twelve. We have been also more than once to the house of Lieut.-Colonel Eusebio Candido F. P. Furtado, of the Engineers, an old campaigning acquaintance of the last wars. He is a violent constitutionalist, and sees company on Thursdays and Saturdays. We dine with him on Sunday, but mean to reduce this violent intimacy. He has made himself obnoxious to a great many people by his peculiar opinions and manner; and there is a party, headed by D. Lucia Furtado (the mistress of the house, and mother of children of twenty years of age), who usually sit down to play, and *very high.* I lost a couple of pounds there one night, and they seemed astonished at my *sang-froid* in not borrowing of them to continue, when I had lost all in my pocket. He was a good officer, but wishes me to press the general to procure him certain employments, for which he is certainly quite equal; but he wishes me to press the general more than I am inclined to do, and on a principle that I am sure I will not enter into, namely, that such and such men who are in those employments are dangerous political characters, and not to be trusted. I have told him determinedly

that I could not understand nor enter into the political feelings of individuals among the parties in this country; that we must judge them by their actions, and take for granted, till we find the contrary, that every one employed by the government is employed worthily.

I paid a visit this morning to the lady of Matheos Pereira. She was sitting on a sofa, wrapped up in a shawl, her hair *en papillottes*, listening to a young lady taking a lesson on a grand piano from another lady, a professed teacher. I sat down, and listened to a moderate performance, and turning my head round towards the young learner, I perceived her to be a perfect negress, of about twelve years of age. The *senhora* told me, that having no children (which she never ceases to regret), she had adopted this girl from an infant, and kept her about her person as a pet. The mother was her *blanchisseuse* (it sounds odd when talking of a black woman, and I don't know why,) at Brazil; she had given her her liberty, and adopted her child. The young girl is now a kind of pet *femme de chambre*, to whom she says she is determined to give a good education; it may be of service to the "*pauvre enfant*," when she herself shall have departed this life.

I cannot perceive that the Portuguese ladies in general have any employment, except those whose circumstances oblige them to enter into household details. Among the few I have met with in the mornings, I see no books, nor work, nor any appearance of occupation. They seem to sit with their hands before them, wrapped up in their shawls, and to converse with anybody who will do them the favour to come and sit with them. It is very common however with strangers to treat as general what is only occasional, and I may be mistaken.

January 21.

I have just received yours of the 2nd of January. I fear your anxiety for letters would not be satisfied for some time after, as we only landed here on the 1st. Everything appears to me as peaceable as can be. Sir William A'Court and Mr. Canning have hit the thing off here to a nicety. Our presence has been attended with full effect, and we cannot certainly say that any unnecessarily large means have been employed for the purpose.

The Spaniards appear confounded. They dare not attempt anything without the support of the French, who have neither interest nor inclination to give it them. They (the Spaniards), however, to look after themselves, and afraid probably of retaliation from this country, are assembling their little corps of observation on the frontiers; the Portuguese government however seem satisfied with establishing themselves and repelling the insult offered them, without thinking of recriminating and widening the breach. The Spanish refugee troops are subsisted and taken care of, but are not armed, nor put in the way of making irruptions into their own country.

We are about to establish the floating bridges of Punhete, Abrantes and Villa Velha, and to post ourselves in a central position at Leyria and Thomar. We shall then be in a military attitude in the field, with communications open in every direction to the front, and can look boldly forward, and say, "Come on, if you dare." I cannot at all say what headquarters will do, but I hope sincerely they will return to Lisbon.

January 30.

I attended a review yesterday of the Guards, cavalry and artillery, in presence of the Princess Regent. I never saw the British troops look to greater advantage, which is saying a great deal. I meet with several old campaigning acquaintances among the Portuguese officers, without remembering their names; among others, I yesterday found one at the review in the person of Colonel Valdes, a person of whom there has been much talk lately, in consequence of commanding the first post (Bragança) attacked by the rebels. A great deal depended upon their first reception: a defection there might have led to a general desertion of the constitutional cause. My friend was firm to his party, and though he was soon reduced and made prisoner, with his garrison, for want of means, yet he treated the invaders as enemies, and thereby taught others to do so.

February 2.

I have had a busy day of it, in arranging everything for my departure to-morrow, and besides my private arrangements, I had to attend on our ambassador, the general, and the Portugese minister of war. I am going armed with all sorts of

authorities from the Portuguse ministers. My route will be by Abrantes and Portalegre to Elvas—not the direct road; for the general wishes me to examine the state of the floating bridges that are said to be preparing over the Zezere and Tagus; nearly 180 miles, with my own horses, and all my baggage, will take some time—in this country *surtout*. ——, a young man you may remember with the cavalry at Maidstone, is to accompany me. He is a fine young man, and came out with strong recommendations to the general to employ him, who has no place open, and sends him with me to get him off his hands for the present.

I dined yesterday with the general, and to-day with Señor Bandeira, Visconde de Ponte Covo, the master of his house; a man enormously rich, and who gave one of the most sumptuous entertainments, for plate, china, glass, and cheer, &c., that I ever saw. There were present twenty-six at table; among them the ambassador, admiral, general, minister of foreign affairs, a bishop, the minister of the Home Department, and several peers, &c. My mission, when at Elvas, is to spy into what the Spaniards are about on the frontier, and to ascertain the means they may be collecting to enter Portugal, if so inclined. Should anything worthy of it be ascertained, I am to communicate direct to Mr. Lamb, our minister at Madrid; but I expect that their means will turn out to be very trifling.

Elvas, February 13, 1827.

Your questions about *assassinations* really sound amusing, while among a people who are, with all their faults, I think, the mildest and best humoured in the world; and I hope my former letters will have done them the justice to have given you that impression. *Désagréments* we meet with enough, from the customs and poverty of the people, but in no instance even the slightest rudeness. It is quite gratifying to witness how they press about me, rejoice to find I can make myself understood pretty well in Portuguese, recall old scenes, inquire after former acquaintances, and always speak with affection and respect of their remembrance of the British troops in the Peninsular war. It was only yesterday I called on the *corregedor* (principal magistrate of a district); he asked me particularly after Sir John and Lady

Browne, having known them intimately when *juiz de fora* of Evora, where Sir John commanded a cavalry depôt, as he does now at Maidstone. This morning, a brigadier-general called on me and inquired after Captain Jones[1]—they had been prisoners together at St. Sebastian. The French offered Jones money for his bills, but did not pay the Portuguese officer the same compliment. Jones however shared his purse with him, and he says rendered him a great service, which he shall never forget. These are kinds of recollections that have been frequently brought to my notice. We experience however abundance of *désagréments*, as I said before, in our course. I will give you an idea of a day's progress, and it may be taken as a sample of the whole. We start perhaps at nine o'clock, I on the brown horse, who has on, in addition to what you have been accustomed to see, a halter under the bridle, and holsters, pistol, and cloak, in front of the saddle. My equipment, in addition to my usual dress (blue frock-coat, sword, and sash), consists of my cocked hat in an oilskin case, a pair of galoshes over my boots, and dark blue overalls over my trousers (you see I take care of myself), a small oilskin case, containing a sketching and memorandum books, &c., suspended by a strap over one shoulder, and my spy-glass over the other—(this latter I have recently put into my portmanteau, as I never used it). José attends me on the big chestnut horse, carrying also his cloak and my saddle-bags. ——, nearly similarly equipped, rides one of his fine horses, and his English groom the other; our baggage perhaps has preceded us half an hour. We trot gently over the good roads, of which in our present route we have had a fair proportion, and make the best of our way over the steep rocky or stony hills, or wet muddy or heavy sandy places. About one o'clock, we begin to tire a little, and inquire of a peasant how far it is to —— "*One league*" (about four miles). We push on, and in about half an hour, again inquire of another man, as we don't see the place, how far it is. "*Two leagues,*" adding, by way of consolation, that they are very short ones. In the course of our ride, five minutes after being told that it is a direct high road which it is impossible to mistake, we meet two, each of

[1] Afterwards Sir Harry Jones, commanding the Royal Engineers, in the Crimea.

them bearing at precisely the same angle from the direction in which we were previously going; in place of a finger-post will be a cross, to encourage you, I presume, to pray that you may take the right one—in a wild barren country, or in the midst of a wood. We take one at a venture. If we are lucky, after going a mile, we meet a traveller, perhaps. "*Vamos bem para* ——?" (Are we going right for ——?) "*No, senhor!* I come from ——, which is certainly in a different direction, and it appears to me that you should have kept more to your left," at the same time repeating over and over again that he does not know the road precisely, being from a different part of the country, for fear we should assume a very usual act of military authority, and take him with us for a guide. At length both man and beast get somewhat jaded, and the last four or five miles, to us, not knowing the country, seem interminable. About three o'clock, we reach our destination, a village or small town, and proceed at once to the house of the *juiz;* he is out of the way. We make our way to that of the *scrivão* (clerk), followed by all the little dirty boys of the place: he is not to be found; but in a short time the hubbub brings to light one of the men of authority. We are bowed and scraped into his room, and after some delays in compliments, questions, and considering where he shall send us, we are provided with written orders on the houses which are to give us quarters. One has no stable, another no room to put us into. We return to the *juiz;* he makes apologies, gives us other billets, and sends one of his understrappers to enforce them. He precedes us into the house, and we hear him in loud and furious contest with the lady of the mansion, about receiving us: "Hers is not the only house in the town; why are we sent there? The house is large, but has not the requisites and conveniences we require," &c. At last the noise ceases, and we are desired to walk in and be seated. I endeavour to put the lady in good humour; tell her we shall give as little trouble as we possibly can; declare that it is an inconvenience to all parties, this kind of intrusion, but that she must be aware there is no remedy. She is all politeness, and declares her only regret to be that she has not the means of providing for our *senhorias* as we ought to be, and really does everything she can to assist us. Between four and five, we get possession of the stable and

the *sala*, the first and largest room in the house, with three windows opening up to the ceiling, and as many doors; not an attempt at glass in the former (a luxury indeed I have not met with since I left Lisbon), and neither shutters nor doors closing above four-fifths of their apertures. José goes about to buy something for our dinners, or begins in the kitchen to prepare what we may have brought. The baggage by this time makes its appearance; it is unloaded and put into some dirty lock-up hole near the entrance, to be ready for next morning's march, while the muleteers tell us their adventures—how they got over such or such a difficult piece of ground, how they missed their way as we did, &c. The beasts are put into the stable, and the men go out to look for forage. The weather is bitter cold, and we return to our apartment. It is furnished with six or eight very old leather high-backed chairs, and an ancient table against the wall, having carved woodwork almost to the ground, so as totally to exclude any intrusion of your knees, and which, if attempted to be moved, will probably leave a leg or two behind; the whole covered with dust and dirt. In some little room off this are two rotten old bedsteads, with very suspicious looking beds, no curtains, but each covered with a fine damask crimson silk coverlid, the only covering besides the sheet. This we remedy by applying our cloaks, coats, and dressing-gowns, and sleeping in our stockings and drawers, both for security and warmth. It is now getting dark; the muleteers return with empty sacks; the straw is very dear; there is no barley in the place, only Indian corn, and that neither horses nor mules will eat. "*Não importa;*" you must get plenty of straw, whatever it cost, and give them a little Indian corn. If they won't eat it, they must go without; necessity will perhaps bring them to it by degrees. We seat ourselves in our cloaks in the kitchen chimney (which is very large, and not filled up with a grate as in England), and converse with the people of the house. At seven or eight, we get some dinner. It consists universally of a fowl, a thick kind of dried sausage they make for the purpose, and a piece of fat bacon (without any lean), dressed somewhat between stewing and boiling, with a little rice in it; after which, some Dutch cheese we carried with us, a bottle of the wine with which my Lisbon landlord loaded me, and frequently

a few apples and walnuts, presented by the lady of the house. My beasts are very imperfectly taken care of after the long day's march of the men. The muleteers sleep in their blankets in the stable, and provide their own mess for themselves, while José and ——'s man get some little assistance occasionally from the remains of our dinner, and get the best accommodation they can from the people of the house, which is frequently nothing. We all retire to rest, and are awoke occasionally by a whinnying and kicking in the stable, which is just under our beds. The beasts are very crowded, with no bars or partitions of separation, and have taken to friendships and antipathies; the brown and chestnut are quite allies, but can neither of them, particularly the latter, bear the mules or white horse, whom they bully and treat very ill, while the poor Branco and mules are very peaceable and amicable. In the morning, I take out a little tea and sugar, in pieces of paper, and we get some tea made in things of the house, while, after feeding and a *little* cleaning of the horses, the baggage is loaded and again starts, leaving the horses to be saddled by José, after he has prepared the breakfast, which is tolerably good—of tea (without milk), bread-and-butter, and half a dozen eggs (between us). Thus end the twenty-four hours, and if I had known it would have taken so long in telling, I should never have commenced it.

Abrantes, February 27.

On the morning we proposed to quit Elvas it rained a perfect torrent. At eleven it cleared a little, and we both started. We shook hands, and —— turned to the west—I to the north.

I am sorry to confess I did not feel, as I ought to have done perhaps, much troubled (but this is all between ourselves). He was sadly insipid, and with all the selfishness possessed by ninety-nine out of a hundred of mankind, and which is so completely laid open under such close intimacy as we necessarily were subject to. He may very likely give me a worse character, and, perhaps, with more justice. I have at times since, for *minutes*, regretted his absence, while for *hours* I have rejoiced at it. I can now occasionally collect my thoughts, and commune with myself, which I could never do before. Solitary confinement is a bad punishment; but to be chained inseparably, like

the convicts in some of these countries, to another culprit, is infinitely worse, and terrific in the extreme. There is but one exception, namely, the voluntary connection between man and woman; and there, if both behave properly, the tie cannot be too close. They alone are truly attached in every sense. But I am running into a curious kind of sermon, and write great nonsense to you as it comes uppermost, so it must e'en go.

I completed my journey to this place in the time I proposed, in spite of the weather, which was, great part of the time, very bad indeed. I have some days rode for five or six hours over an elevated barren plain, covered with gum cistus, broom, furze, &c., without meeting a house, tree, or fence, in a continued drenching rain and high wind in my face. At the end of my journey, I have shaken my feet out of my wooden stirrups (I would not at the time have taken ten guineas for them), dismounted, stripped off my hood, cloak, hat, and overalls, and turned out of my outer casing without a rag that was even damp about me. This I look upon as a great triumph over the elements, and I doubt if there is another man in the army who could do as much. At the same time, I was sorry for my men; but there is no remedy, and I give them every means and opportunity to make themselves as comfortable as they can be; and I believe they suffer much less than others of the same class of life.

Here I am in high fortune; the regular governor (who has returned to the garrison since I passed it before), General Azevedo, has made me his guest. I have a comfortable room in the house next door, and dine and breakfast with him. After the first day's dinner, we adjourned to the theatre, which a company of strollers have established in a barn next door. The audience very soon called for the 'Constitutional Hymn,' which was played by the orchestra, consisting of one clarionet and one bassoon. I had put on my red coat, seeing the governor was in full trim, and was shown up in the post of honour in the stage box with him, the ladies being opposite. When the curtain drew up, the principal actress entered with a paper in her hand. Everybody stood up, and the governor called out with a loud voice, "*Viva o nosso rey, Don Pedro Quarto!*" which was received with applause, waving of handkerchiefs, and shouts of "*Viva!*

Viva!" He then called out, "*Viva a Liberal Constituição!*"—applause and vivas. "*Viva sua Alteza a Infanta Regente!*"—vivas. "*Viva os nossos fieis e generosos alliados a nação Britannica!*"—great applause and vivas. The lady then sang some verses out of her paper, to the tune of the hymn. They are accustomed in singing this song to apply new words to it, frequently extempore, and in *our* presence always introduce the British nation, as generously coming forward to support their Constitution. Still they don't appear in earnest, nor half determined enough about it. They think the opposite party so strong, and they seem to have so much doubt about the event; whereas it appears to me if they worked energetically at it, the Constitution might be completely and firmly established. But I have some doubts that their wavering will ruin the cause. The governor, of course, supports the existing government. They play and sing the hymn in his house; but still the family is certainly not Constitutional. Their leading principle and desire, however, is at all events, if possible, to avoid troubles and violent risings of the people by any party; and they express themselves, as many Portuguese do, as under great obligations to the British for saving them, by the arrival of our little force, from what they think would have been inevitable otherwise.

Coïmbra, March 4.

I am at length once more back to headquarters, and among my own people. Altogether the trip has been far from disagreeable (compared to remaining with the army), although I have had a great deal of roughing it, which —— writes to his friends here to say I am rather fond of. In fact, I daresay, by blustering and bullying the people, as well as by working the servants more, I could have made myself more comfortable; but I preferred rather taking things as they came, and making myself contented. The principal features of our situation, personally considered, were great good humour and civility on the part of the people with whom we had dealings; and in reverse, a degree of dirt in their habitations and manners in the country villages, beyond anything you can conceive. The walls, the furniture, linen, &c. (the latter, however, less frequently), covered with dust and positive dirt, and the floors in such a

state that, if anything by accident falls down, you whisk it up and commence cleaning it as you would anything that falls into the kennel. You feel, in short, as much inclined to scrape and wipe your feet in going *out* of a house, as you would in coming *in*. This part was really annoying. The fare, which was poor enough, did not cause me much uneasiness. I can remember times when the worst mode I have lately been living in would have been considered luxurious. With respect to public affairs, since I have been on the frontier of Spain, I can better understand the French minister's policy in so *handsomely* seconding our views in Portugal. He saw that we were determined to support the government of this country, and he saw well that if France opposed it, a war of opinion would be the consequence all over the Peninsula between us; in which case, the ultra Royalists, with France, would not have a chance with the Constitutionalists, supported by England. It is therefore an excellent compromise he has made, to give up Portugal in order to endeavour to secure Spain. The whole of Spain is represented to be infinitely more Constitutional now than it ever was before. They do not rise, because they want support against the power of France; but I firmly believe that if we were to give the word of encouragement, the power of Ferdinand would be upset in a twinkling, from one end of the kingdom to the other.

Coïmbra, March 14.

The general sent for me to-day, and asked me if I could go off again to-morrow morning to the country I have recently left (the Alentejo), to report to him again what the Spaniards may be about on that frontier, as reports have been brought to him that they are now collecting more troops there, and moving them more towards the border of Portugal. There is even a letter come to him from Abrantes (but it does not appear to be quite certain), saying that they have entered Portugal. If so, war is decided, and I should have no fear of the result in this country, whether their troops desert and join us, or whether they adhere to their present government and give fight; but I doubt the fact of their openly breaking the peace. The intention of the general is to put his army, without much show of movement, into a way to be marched readily to the eastward, to the

Alentejo or the Beira Baira (about Castello Branco), the side they seem to threaten. I am going to Portalegre, a city about thirty miles to the north of Elvas, to communicate to him from thence all the intelligence I can collect. The general's son and aide-de-camp, Captain Clinton, is to accompany me, to see the country. He is a fine, good-humoured young man, and one whose manner I like, as far as I know him. The general is remarkably civil, and always begs me not to have these young men with me, if they will hamper or be disagreeable to me; but I could not think of confessing such a thing to him, or fighting off anything of the kind that he seemed to wish. We shall be on our travels, therefore, again to-morrow morning.

Portalegre, March 25.

Five letters in three days is too much, and it is a pity they had not been better divided; or why did you not, like old General Kemmis with his batch of newspapers, lay them by, and break a seal in regular order at intervals? The weather is now quite hot, and the country nearly in its prettiest state; the orange and lemon trees in full fruit, and the thorn (May) in full blossom; the gum cistus is in flower, and ranunculuses in every cottage window. The iris is a very common weed here, and the oleander grows in abundance, wild, along the streams.

The principal man in this place is Jorge d'Avillez. He is a very superior character, and has a large estate in this neighbourhood, but has injured his fortune by his patriotic exertions in the Peninsular war, when he raised a regiment, the 1st Caçadores, at his own expense. He is forty-two years of age, tall, handsome, clever and energetic, and full of fine principles on constitutional liberty. He commanded the regiment he raised, throughout the war, as a very young man, with distinction, and was in great favour as a soldier with Marshal Beresford and all our officers. He got to the rank of lieutenant-general, and went to Brazil, where he displeased the present emperor, then prince, by refusing to join him against his father, but bringing the Portuguese army under his command back to Europe, according to the orders of the old king. At the time the first constitution was overturned by Don Miguel, he was at the last moment given the command of the troops at Lisbon by the

Cortes; by his firmness he saved that city from disorder and plunder, by preventing the people rising, under pretence of showing their loyalty. For this he was tried by a court-martial: half the members voted for his being executed, the other half that he deserved great credit. The result was, his confinement, first, in prison, then in a distant obscure town, and lastly, for very many months, in a small country-house of his own in the mountains, and being deprived of his rank. He is now at liberty, but his rank has not been restored yet; he has however, he says, a conscience that tells him he never did an act but what he believes was for the good of his country, and the many sacrifices he has made are convincing proof of his sincerity. He is much less loquacious and full of compliments, and of a more serious manner, than most of his countrymen. He had a little touch of gout in the knee, and I found him the other morning, sitting on a bench with his leg up, in his great entrance-room, reading a Portuguese manuscript tragedy out aloud to himself with great energy, and so absorbed with it that it was a little time before he perceived me. He put me in mind of some meritorious old Roman general in disgrace. He has been very civil, but more with the frank manner of an English gentleman, than with the formal excess of attention of a Portuguese. We had a dinner with him on the day after our arrival, and so good, that I am sorry he has not since repeated the invitation, for José is a wretched caterer and cook. He led us a most beautiful ride one day over this mountain, the scenery of which is, I think, as fine as Cintra, and on the same evening, sent us a present of a *buck*, which had been shot by one of his servants. The fellow came into the room with it on his shoulders, while we were at tea, and throwing it on the ground, said, "There's a present from Jorge d'Avillez." The beast had just been shot through the heart; it appeared almost alive; the eyes had not lost their brightness, and the body was still warm. When I thanked him for it next morning, I told him I had put by the horns, to which I should have two knives affixed in England, and keep them, as a memorial of him. He said, "Oh! if you like that sort of thing, I can give you something else of the kind," and produced a pair of large wild boar's tusks, which I have now. Having heard me say that I was very anxious to have a *chasse* of the

wild boar, he has got one up, which we are to attend to-morrow. The brigadier-general (Bento da França) is the guest of Senhor Jorge, and seems to be a very good fellow too; he is married to a very pretty little Brazilian woman. The Spaniards, whom I am sent to watch, are as yet pretty quiet on this frontier. At the beginning of the month, they certainly made movements that indicated hostility, which it was confidently rumoured was decided upon; in the middle of the month, such intention was said to have been given up, and though since then no new offensive appearances have been perceived, still, among the Spanish soldiery there is a persuasion that Portugal will be invaded early in April. I have very little expectation of such an event, but I wish it was so. We should be a little pressed at first, but I feel very confident we should come out of it well.

Elvas, March 31, 1827.

My letters recently have, I believe, been rather warlike: this will be very pacific. The measures of the Spaniards within the last few days, seem to intimate the expectation of an amicable arrangement. Early in this month, their preparations looked very like an irruption into Portugal. They took up a very threatening attitude, were drawing troops from different quarters to increase the army in front of this province, and commenced actively recruiting for a much larger force; and I felt a little elevated at the thought of finding myself in a situation to be in the midst of everything. Since the middle of the month, however, these measures have been gradually dying away, and now the recruiting is ordered to be suspended, a few of the troops dispersed, the cavalry sent to green forage; and a great civil authority in Badajoz declares that the negotiations that have been going on between Spain, England, and Portugal are likely to terminate most amicably. Should that be the case, the question is, what will be done with our little army? The feelings in Portugal are now very much tranquillised, and the country cleared of open rebellion; for both of which the confidence created by our presence has been of essential aid. But they cannot safely spare us yet. We are still the only rope that holds them together. There is a great jealousy of each other in power. No Portuguese is a great man among them till

he is in disgrace, and it is rather peculiar to the nation that they prefer delegating authority to a foreigner. The government wants firmness, and the whole Constitutional party confidence. They are in agony to preserve the system; but I think they doubt the legitimacy of the right Don Pedro has assumed, and are inclined, I believe, in their hearts, to think that the *right* to power lays with his brother Miguel, since the other became Emperor of Brazil; nor are they old enough in free action to cut the knot, as we did with regard to James II. and William III., by declaring, in spite of the legitimacy of the question, the one worthy, and the other unworthy, of the station. In the meantime, Constitutional ideas are creeping into every bosom. That cause may be checked, but nothing now can stop it, either in Portugal or Spain. Many of the speeches in the chambers are eloquent and sensible, and they are read all over the country with the greatest avidity; that of itself must open people's eyes to the disgrace and weakness of such a government as they have been used to, and as some would again impose upon them.

Portalegre, April 6.

Our weather continues fine and clear, attended by heat equal to your July. With the summer come its evils, in the shape of fleas, &c. I am fortunately not very susceptible of their attacks; poor Clinton sadly so; he spies them out in all directions, and can't sleep at nights for them. This country wants but two things, for which they have great advantages, and in which they are very deficient, to make it delightful, namely, good roads and cleanliness. It is out of the conception of a person who has never left England, how far the good people of Portugal are behindhand in these points; the worst you can ever have experienced is not at all to compare with it. My friend will be very glad to get back to headquarters; he is not at all depressed in spirits, but it is a great change from his father's good house and table, with nothing to do but to pet his horses and take his morning's ride. The first three days completely knocked up one of his fine English horses, which was left almost in a dying state at Abrantes, and the others have been in a very tender state since. Nor has he the satisfaction of thinking he is of any use; there is not work for both of us, and

he is literally *following me.* I endeavour to give him indirect consolation, by treating it as travelling about the country under advantageous circumstances.

We came two very long days' journeys, and towards the end of the second, my friend became a little tired, and with that a little cross. He has no respect whatever for the poor Portuguese; he is young, and because they have not precisely the same feelings and manners as Englishmen, he deems them a set of wretches unworthy of any consideration. We met a troop of about a dozen donkeys returning home from their daily labour, independent and loose, in the usual manner, and driven by two men. These animals are like sheep in being slow to get out of your way; my friend, on a tall English horse, trotted slap through them, sent one reeling off to the left, and knocked another on the right down on his side, and went his way without further notice. The men looked round after him as if giving him a *blessing,* but by the time they had come on another hundred yards, their anger, if they had any, had so far evaporated that in passing me, they took off their hats as usual. I could not refrain from giving them the customary "*Viva*" with more than usual cordiality. I had often preached to him how much it was, politically as well as morally, a duty to bear with these people, and treat them at least with civility—that it was but a small return for their almost universal kindness to us, and particularly due to a meekness that puts us in no risk of retaliation, and had really flattered myself that I had almost made a convert; but the effort has been too much, and he cannot now suppress his prejudiced, and, as I think, unjust, contempt of the nation. He would willingly set them all down as cowards, but that I can overwhelm him with chapter and verse on that score.

April 6.

Maria da Madre de Dios and the rest of her family have received us as usual with the greatest kindness and hospitality. I am just come home from them; she has been playing the pianoforte, and an officer of engineers the guitar, beautifully, and two little urchins of girls, of five or six years old, dancing with an ease and air quite amusing. The freedom of manners of these people arises from climate; nine months of the year

they live in public, scarcely a door or window of a house ever shut in the day time, and anybody comes in or out at pleasure; there is no such thing as privacy. It is quite usual for acquaintances to call while the family, with or without company, are at dinner, and to sit down at the table or by it, conversing the whole time of the meal without eating or drinking, though always, for form's sake, invited.

Headquarters, Leyria, April 21.

You will have been quite tired, I fear, of my long-winded adventures; they will cease now I am once more fixed at headquarters. I am quartered in an excellent house, where I have for my own accommodation however only one back room. The quartermaster-general made a complaint to the authorities on this account, but I settled the affair by declaring myself satisfied, which I deem the best policy, considering that my room is comfortable (for this country), that my servants and horses are well put up, and that the people in other respects are very civil, and willing to give me anything. An additional room, tacked to being on bad terms with them, would be but a bad exchange; added to which, this billeting system is a sad grievance on the unfortunate families, as you may easily conceive, and I do not like to bully them out of *all* their comforts.

24*th April.* The general returned on the 22nd, and I dined with him yesterday to keep the king's birthday, in company with all the heads of departments, among whom was the chaplain who was shipwrecked and *lost his wife* about six or seven weeks ago; he certainly did not talk, but he looked very placid, and seemed much more comfortable than I should have expected. I can hear nothing of our future destinies; the general seemed rather indifferent upon the subject of the ground near Abrantes for encamping, therefore I conclude the measure not likely to take place very immediately. He rather surprised me by telling me that in a letter to Lord Bathurst, he had mentioned that he had reason to be satisfied with what I had done on my missions. Poor Lord Bathurst will hardly have the opening of the letter. We have just been put into some state of suspense by the last mail having brought papers just up to the 14th, which give an account of all the great Tory men going out, without acquaint-

ing us with how they are to be replaced. I cannot regret any but the Duke of Wellington, and him I am very sorry to lose, both on public and private account. With all his hardness, we can scarcely expect any substitute to do more good to the service, and I can have little reason to expect any one more ready to adopt my personal views and interests. If Lord FitzRoy and Sir H. Hardinge go out of the Ordnance also, I shall be at once cast among strangers, and instead of being what I consider a favoured man, have to take my chance with the crowd.

The house I reside in belongs to the eldest of a set of young children, whose guardian uncle lives with them, and takes care of the property. They are orphans, six or seven in number, all boys, and *apparently* all of about the same age, between five and eight. They seem to be well spoiled. The house is large, and as they commence their gambols, I hear a noise like distant thunder, which gradually increases to the sound and sensation of a smart shock of an earthquake; and as their lungs are not half loud enough for their purposes, they have just been very happily provided with a drum, pair of cymbals, and a trumpet, and I am sorry to say they seem to have a decided taste for military music; but it is surprising to what extent the Portuguese men and women are deprived of sensitive nerves. A little cur who jumps up every now and then in the principal sitting-room with a shrill yelping bark, is very usual, and remonstrated with in a tone almost of admiration, and half a dozen dogs barking for five or ten minutes after your horse's heels, which I have seen make some of our people curse and swear, and almost frantic, is a matter of perfect indifference to them. This disposition saves them from much wear and tear of temper, and I have determined to adopt it as much as I can, and have really succeeded to a great degree, by considering that in many instances it is no *positive* evil; and accordingly I am frequently laughing, while others are spluttering with rage.

I have no public news whatever to give you. I am more confirmed in my opinion that the Spaniards have no present intention of acting offensively, by what the general told me of their having complained of a position on the Zezere, which they had assumed that we had taken up. The fact was not so; and if it had been, it was surely harmless enough at that distance

from the frontier, and would have been decidedly defensive, so much so that, as a real warlike measure, I had expressed great hopes that we should not do anything having so much the appearance of timidity or caution.

The Apostolicals, however, do not seem inclined to remain quiet, and if they should be allowed to get the upper hand, they are capable of taking the most wild and violent steps. On the contrary, if Ferdinand is forced by their outrages to adopt the Liberal party, it would tend very much to quiet the Peninsula, and make our presence here less necessary. I am somewhat inclined to believe, from recent measures, that the Portuguese government is playing false; they are so lukewarm as Constitutionalists, and so tender of the opposite party. If they are faithless, perhaps one of the best systems of policy they could adopt, at the same time that it would be the most mischievous to us, is, what I cannot help rather suspecting them of, to embroil us with some of the Portuguese. It would not matter much with what party, so that we should lose the high ground on which we at present stand with all. If we are once the acknowledged enemies of one party, we shall no longer be of half the service we are at present. They talk of little disturbances at Lisbon, or the fear of them, brought about by a breach of faith in the government not paying the workmen and people employed for public services—that the marines have been landed, and that some detachments for the army have been requested to be retained for the present, to keep things quiet. If so, I look upon it as a direct plot against us, and I hope the general will not do their dirty work for them. If by their own misconduct they bring about insurrections, let them put them down themselves. They have now no foreign enemy to fear; and if they cannot keep up their own Constitution, it is not our business to be its dry nurse, and whip the bad humours out of it.

Monforte, May 23.

By some bungling, your letters of the 18th and 26th of April only reached me two days ago; nor should I have got them so soon, but that José Ferreira (my muleteer and a capital fellow), seeing my impatience, made his journey of eighty-four miles in two days, without warning me of his intention. I can assure

you, this is good going in this country, and with some luggage to carry, and is a satisfactory proof that both himself and his mule are *game*. My late companion is a gentlemanlike man, but I sent him away to Abrantes, because I did not feel that his presence was wanted officially, and because it is a great weight to have a man with one, who is not happy in his position. His impatience at the dissimilarity (and what I can agree with him to be *generally*, the inferiority,) of the ideas and manners of the Portuguese to ours (though seldom breaking out openly,) used to vex me, and keep himself in a fever. *My* maxim is not only to conform, but to endeavour to get over, the dislike to habits differing from our own, and at all events, to bear with patience and nonchalance what we cannot remedy. The general feelings of our people, however, I am sorry to say, are not to be so controlled, and therefore there are but few of them adapted to be sent adrift into the country. The general writes to me that he wished his son to have remained with me, and I have insinuated to him in reply and in confidence, and I hope without hurting his feelings, why I thought anything like a fixed residence among these people would not conduce to the young man's comfort, although when moving about, the cause was overwhelmed by the excitement of a variety of intercourse and scenes; but that if he pleases, I shall be truly happy that he should join me again,—which I shall be, as far as emanates from a sincere desire to comply with any wish of the general's.

I am here buried in the midst of pure country Portuguese society, living in the house of the principal man in the place, Francisco Antonio Chichorro—a good-natured fat *fidalgo*, of thirty-two years of age, and moreover a *morgado*, that is, heir by entail to an extensive landed property. His father is living, but resides constantly on another property in a distant part of the country, with some mystery attached to him—either mad or a bad character, or studying his own pleasure by such a separation. His mother lives in the house here—I may well say lives in it, for she has not been out for these two years, with no physical impediment, but, as she explains it, she has no desire to go out, since her husband is absent, and she has lost her two grown up daughters. She is about sixty years of age, appears out of her private apartments wrapped up in a shawl,

at dinner and tea time, and is treated with formal respect by her son, and everybody who visits at those hours. She is very religious, has mass performed regularly in the chapel in the house, conforms rigidly in her own person to the eternal fast days, and makes her little nephew after dinner jabber over a long prayer, with his hands closed before him, till at the finale he makes rapidly with his thumb three signs of the cross, one across the forehead, then over the whole face, and lastly across the chest. Francisco Antonio has never been married, nor does he ever expect to be, though he feels some compunction at interrupting the regular succession from father to son, that has gone on for I don't know how many generations. I was first billeted on his house, but he has since then always particularly requested that I would come as a friend, which I have been induced to do from the unusual appearance of sincerity in his manner. He is a very kind-hearted man, as I have occasion of witnessing every day. One sample will suffice. The only other constant inmate of the house is an old retired captain of militia, named Rocha. I asked if he was a relation, but the *fidalgo* told me, not at all; but that after serving fifty years in the line and militia, he had a retirement amounting to about £12 a year, and that, "poor fellow," he would starve if he had not taken him into the house!—something on the principle of Captain ——, who married a woman because, poor thing, who else would, if he had not? Old Rocha has a little imaginary employment, in keeping some trifling accounts of the farm people, and is treated with as much attention as any occasional visitor. The next most habitual guest is the *padre capellan*, or chaplain to the house, who attends regularly for mass and all religious exercises requiring the priest, as well as at every meal that he pleases, which is pretty constantly. He is dressed in an old brown cloak, and a very coarse blue cloth coat and waistcoat, under which peeps his black vest, with a narrow strip of what ought to be *white* linen round the neck part. He is a very small thin man, with one eye, and the face of a goat, very dirty, and of so few words that with that and his appearance, he may almost be taken for an idiot. What he wants in tongue, however, he makes up in exercise of jaw, for I think I never saw an animal eat so voraciously, and, good heavens!

such mixtures! I have seen salt fish, cream cheese, custard, and dressed salad, all on his plate at once. On this point, however, I must say that, by residence abroad, I have become a convert to many a strange mixture myself—peas, spinach, &c., dressed with sugar, you have witnessed my approval of, and I have now found out that cheese with the dessert is a very proper arrangement, for that it is extremely good with fruit, and particularly with oranges.

I breakfast in my own room, and am independent till the family dinner hour, at *half-past two*. The table is plentifully covered, and even on fast days, with abundance of meat, for heretics, and such lax Catholics as choose to take advantage of the dispensation allowed by certain bishops of dioceses, of which this is one. The cooking is rather greasy and luscious, but there are always some dishes plain, savoury, and good; I can however eat of nearly all. The wine is the pure juice of the grape, without much flavour, but what it has is good, with little or no brandy in it, and without a particle of acidity. About 4 P.M. (that is, early in the day), I find myself strolling about the village, in that muddled state that usually follows the only substantial meal in the twenty-four hours. The natives then usually lie down, and take a nap for only a quarter or half an hour, which I imagine relieves them; I would willingly do the same, but am fearful of running into a habit that may hereafter be inconvenient. These mid-day repasts are a great interruption to business, and as they vary (in all classes) from twelve o'clock to four, you can never call upon a man between those hours without a chance of finding him at dinner; even in shops, from twelve to three, it is a chance if you can get served.

In the afternoon, I either take a ride or a walk, or lounge down to the *fidalgo's* kitchen and fruit garden, in a valley about half a mile off, and listen to the nightingales, which I was mistaken in thinking had finished their song. The *morgado* takes the entire direction of his extensive farm, and is usually seen, morning and evening, lounging about the court-yard of the house, giving his orders. He has a small room on the ground floor, looking into it, where he transacts any business requiring pen and ink; adjoining it, and looking also

into the yard, is another small apartment, in which are the Portuguese newspapers and a gigantic backgammon board, at which he and accidental visitors occasionally sit down. They play very quick, and, I believe, well, and dislike boxes, almost always throwing the dice out of their hands.

At eight, we are summoned to tea, and find the old lady in the drawing-room, with the tea-things and urn before her. At this time, all the persons of the village *having the entrée*, are accustomed to attend. As they come into the room, they walk up to the table, make her a bow, mumble something complimentary about her health, take their seats round the room, and talk politics, and news of the village and the world in general. Among the party (usually consisting of from six to a dozen people) are the *juiz de fora*, an old major of militia, (the picture of General D'Arcy), the doctor (who is a Spaniard), &c. The latter has resided here eighteen years, and, like all the rest of his countrymen, will not condescend to speak Portuguese. He is not quite so bad as the one at Brussels, who complained that he had lived there twenty years, and the people did not understand him yet; for here they are understood, and the Portuguese very good-naturedly mix up as much Spanish as they can in conversing with them.

The Spanish doctor, notwithstanding, is a very useful member in the society; they have great faith in him professionally, and he is a good-tempered man, talks a great deal, plays at backgammon, &c. Sweetmeats and cakes are served at tea, to which buttered toast has been added for my benefit, on perceiving that I did not take supper. The tea-table is removed, and a card-table replaces it, at which a party sit down to play at *voltarette;* the old lady, without playing herself, takes part with one of the players (commonly the Spanish doctor), helps to sort his hand, and occasionally gives her advice. Between ten and eleven I leave them, and retire to my room to read or write, and go to bed. At eleven they sup, which meal I may perhaps find it convenient to attend, on any occasion of going any distance and returning late. And thus you have the history of a day.

I am rather superbly attended here, General Caula having attached a corporal and two other dragoons to be at my disposition while in his province; I brought another with me

from headquarters, but his horse is unserviceable from sore back. The weather has become beautiful and very warm; they are beginning here to cut the rye; the barley and wheat will follow in close succession. The season has been hitherto most favourable.

I have bought the crop of a field of green barley for £1 5*s*. It is tolerably thick, contains about 1300 square yards, and will give my five beasts as much as they can eat for about ten days; my men go and cut it as required. It is economical, the trouble of a daily bargain is saved, and I feel an interest in going to look how my *landed estate* goes on.

There are many peculiar fancies, habits, and customs in this as in all other countries, not to be reduced to system, nor even to be accounted for; and yet I don't think it quite charitable to set the whole nation down as beasts and fools, even on occasions that are attended with inconvenience to us; as, if we look round, even in England, and shake off a little prejudice, we could surely find many a reasonable grievance for foreigners. One of their very innocent fancies I only perceived the other day: if you neglect to put the spoon into the cup when you have had enough tea, you will find a great deal of explanation necessary to avoid being drenched. The whole nation are indolent and want exertion, compared with the more northern tribes, probably from effect of climate, and because their wants are easily supplied. It is with respect to servants that this character comes most home to *our* feelings. They have an extraordinary want of system; they never do anything till it is immediately necessary; one's clothes, boots, &c., are thrown dirty about the room, and cleaned individually only when called for. The tables and furniture remain for months covered with dust, and only rubbed down article by article, as required to be used. But what strikes one at first with most dismay, is the mode of serving a meal. You come in after the dinner hour, and are grumbling to find not an item of preparation made, when your man tells you dinner is quite ready. He goes out, and the first thing he brings in is a dish of hot meat, fish, or what not; he looks round for a situation to deposit his load, which, for want of better, is frequently the ground; he then runs out, and asks the people of the house for a tablecloth, knife and

fork, &c. One thing has to be got from a locked-up chest, another from some cupboard, &c. Just as he is putting the knife and fork, tumbler, or other article on the table, he perceives it to be dirty, even to *his* idea. Away he goes off, begs for a cloth, and sets to work to clean it; by degrees you get what is needful, and under the circumstances, in less time than you had expected. This is a common picture, as I have repeatedly experienced in travelling, although not common in fixed residences, where they must be bewitched to go on in the same way; it is however the spirit of the people, and will show itself where they are taken unawares. With *us*, they are brought by degrees more or less to a modification of this system, according to the exertion of the master and the genius of the servant, but after the most manifest improvements, you find, by the remarks you overhear, that "such is the taste of *este gente*" (these people), meaning the English, and not at all that they are sensible of any advantage gained. We give so little encouragement, that we are quite free from the liberties the servants are accustomed to take with their masters and their friends. While serving at table, they laugh aloud at all the jokes, make their remarks, and will enter into a kind of badinage with the company, without any compunction. One of them yesterday came into the room, and overlooked a game at backgammon, and at the end, pointed out with a loud laugh where one of the parties (either intentionally or not) had cheated by a false move. The Portuguese have one horrible habit, for which I can make no manner of excuse for them, which is, the giving live animals and birds to the children to torment. They appear to have no feeling but for their own species. It is a sign, I believe, of a want of cultivated civilisation, and I think many of your namby-pamby philanthropists and enthusiasts might employ themselves to much practical good in the relief of a great deal of misery, by preaching so as to make themselves heard in these countries against this evil.

To Lord FitzRoy Somerset.

Monforte, Alentejo,
June 6, 1827.

My dear Lord FitzRoy,

I have again and again to thank you for your good offices. It is very natural that I should regret exceedingly the loss of so many personal friends from the Ordnance Office as have recently resigned; but I am sure I may trust my own feelings, when I say that I regret their loss infinitely more on public grounds. The good the duke was effecting in the multifarious business of the Ordnance was invaluable; and I can assure you that your Lordship's and Hardinge's efforts to support him have been most highly appreciated. *I* have never witnessed anything like such an administration of our affairs, and I am truly sorry that causes totally unconnected with that peculiar service should occasion your absence from the office—an absence, however, which I fervently hope may be only temporary, even although, I must confess, early bias, with gratitude and veneration for those who brought me up, have made me in politics (as far as I have any) a Whig.

Among the observations I have made in the close intercourse I have had with the Portuguese recently, I have been surprised at the little mention they make of the duke, and considered them very ungrateful. I very soon found out the heinous offence he had committed, in not having taken leave of the Portuguese troops when they quitted the army in 1814. This is a ceremony so important with them, that when I am not kindly treated at a billet (which, God knows, is but seldom.) I show my displeasure, and I know it is felt, by omitting that ceremony. I laugh at them on the subject of the duke, and remind them of the great things he did for them and for us all. "That is all very true," they say, "but he never thanked the Portuguese army."

With regard to the said Portuguese army, many of the regiments are well appointed, and look soldier-like; but, I am sorry to say, the discipline infused into them by Marshal Beresford is dying away like the wick of a candle; a flash or two occasionally looks like a revival, but it is not the less gradually dying out. The fact is, that such an extent of discipline is a strain upon

the dispositions of the people. The British officers (in every regiment, till 1820,) kept them up to a state that the Portuguese officers without them are unequal to. The soldiers are now getting beyond their management. The soldiers it is who have given the signal of the part the regiments were to take, in the great conflict of opinions for or against the Constitution. They have sometimes carried off the whole body of their officers, *nolens volens*, but I have heard of no instance of the officers making a spirited and successful effort to check them in their career. The late meeting at Elvas, which lasted nearly twenty-four hours, might have been suppressed in one, if the officers had acted with energy.

Affairs in Spain, as far as we know anything of them, are tranquil. We are told, and I believe with truth, that the Constitutional party is very numerous and increasing, and that they are anxiously looking out for support to show themselves. Sarsfield has his disposable army of the Tagus still in front of this province, about Caceres chiefly. There is an affected mystery in their operations, that keeps this frontier in a state of alarm, particularly at this moment, when the people are getting in their crops, which are peculiarly fine; but the real object I have no doubt to be, to add strength to their cause in the pending negotiations, by a display of positive ready force on their own side, and of weakness on that of the Portuguese, by the disorders which that very attitude tends to create in this country. This manœuvre, I trust, will have no weight whatever; it certainly deserves none with respect to our little British auxiliary force. Now it has been engaged in the cause, it cannot well be withdrawn. It has had amazing weight in tranquillising Portugal, and is still looked up to by all parties, almost as a charm against commotions, which will assuredly very soon recommence after our departure. It may be said, What is that to us?—let them arrange their own affairs. But the original cause that brought us here will remain; the Spaniards would as assuredly renew their active assistance to the rebel party, in spite of any security that can be given by that government, even though given in good faith; for there are parties there too strong for the government to control.

We are personally, as you may well suppose, all much inter-

ested, in one way or the other, in the event, and anxious to be made acquainted with the result of the negotiations.

Believe me to remain, my dear Lord FitzRoy, whether you should be either in or out of office, equally

Your obliged and faithful servant,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

Monforte, June 12.

Your mind will be too much absorbed in your approaching move, to attend to any of my stories from hence. I will only add one little anecdote. I was tempted the other evening to take a few stewed peas at the supper-table, and observing the old lady to eat very heartily of some beef-steaks, I remarked that I thought it was a fast-day. I knew very well the explanation of the matter, but I wished to have it direct from herself, who is most scrupulously religious, and she accordingly told me it was past twelve o'clock (which it was, by five minutes). Last night, I heard her mumbling in despair on being caught unawares over her cards at twelve o'clock, not having supped, and this being a fast day, the supper was necessarily after that hour a meagre one. I thought this very absurd, acting by the letter and not the spirit of the institutions, till I recollected having frequently witnessed parallel circumstances *chez nous*, with regard to dancing, playing at cards, &c., on a Saturday night, and so I found it must be very good sense.

Poor Wells would be ready enough to take to this kind of duty that I am upon, and frequently hinted to me that he thought it would be more appropriate; but the general has chosen to continue to employ me in it, and I have found it much more interesting than idling about headquarters. When you come out, such employment will be matter of service only, and not of inclination; but even then I must not, either directly or indirectly, shirk it, but persevere in making public duty the first object in life; and as an encouraging reflection for *you*, who knows but some day it may meet with reward, even far beyond what it merits?

Nothing very particular has occurred to my notice since I

last wrote. I am getting on very successfully at the new (to me) game of *voltarette*, and play at backgammon with the Spanish doctor also, with very tolerable equality of fortune, considering that I am but a novice at that also. A few days ago, a litter of eight young wolves of about a fortnight or three weeks old, was discovered in a hole under the roots of an oak tree, within a mile of this place; they were fine chubby-looking little innocents, but, poor things, would suffer all the penalties of deeply implicated and convicted felons.

The day before yesterday, I accompanied my patron, Señor Francisco Antonio, to the fair, or rather bullock-market, of Cabeça de Vide, about ten miles from hence. It was held on an open common adjoining the town, and very much exposed to the sun, which is now very powerful. The only remarkable circumstance that struck me was our taking possession of the interior of a little chapel (that stands in the middle of the common), and which is evidently in regular employment for the service. Here we seated ourselves on the steps at the foot of the altar, ate our cold meat with some other farmer friends whom the *fidalgo* invited to join, took our cigars, &c., and, in short, showed no signs of reverence, except (and that might be as much for convenience) not putting on our hats in the place. But even in this house, where the chapel is fitted up with scrupulous nicety, and where I frequently catch the old lady, Donna Antonia, on her knees with her face to the altar, for it opens into the dining-room—even in that very chapel they keep their cups and saucers and china plates in a cupboard, which the servants are constantly running in and out to procure.

I enclose a letter I have received from Lord FitzRoy, and one from Ellicombe, on the subject of the Portsmouth station. You may perhaps think me fickle, but I hope not unkind, when I tell you, that in spite of what I mentioned to you in my last, I have accepted the offer of that station. I really think that, under the circumstances, and put in the way it has been to me, it would have been highly inconsiderate to have refused it. I have the greatest desire to conform to your wishes, and should in this case, so far as taking no lead or active part in such a change of station; but, considering that I have every reason to believe it to be much superior in point of emolument (a most

important feature under our circumstances), and that the Duke of Wellington and Lord FitzRoy have taken the trouble to interfere, I might in many ways have had cause all my life to regret having slighted the offer; and if we had time to consult, I have no doubt that your prepossession in favour of Chatham would have given way to these reasons. I cannot promise to myself that, either in society or the duties, it will be more agreeable to me than Chatham, but if it should enable me to live respectably on my income, I would forego every other advantage.

Elvas, June 30, 1827.

My last letter was written when rather under a cloud; the prospect however brightened the very day after, for I then had information that Sarsfield's army was breaking up. I hurried over here to get an early confirmation of the news, which this morning has brought me, so far, that I have acquainted the general with my intention of returning to Abrantes by the 8th, to receive his further directions, which I have no doubt will be, in a few days after, to return to Lisbon.

The next most interesting point in your letter is ——'s want of sentiment, and the *naïveté* with which she proposed nurse as a substitute, in case of our death. I don't think at all the worse of her for it—rather the contrary; for at her age, sentiment would have been hypocrisy; it is not natural, but comes to us by education and encouragement, till it is in time fixed (and sometimes a great deal too much of it) like a second nature. It arises from selfishness. We hope to create towards ourselves feelings that we strive to encourage in our own minds towards others. The only mode ever attempted for implanting compassion and good feeling in children, is to make them fancy themselves in the situation of the sufferers. The greatest savages knock their parents on the head when they are incapable of work, in which they show pure unsophisticated nature; the Spaniards and Portuguese, the least civilised tribes perhaps in Europe, have no mercy upon any animals that it is not their *interest* to be kind to; and in England we are furious against every kind of cruelty except—*what tends to our own enjoyment. I* think fishing and hunting very cruel, and others feel for the poor wounded birds on the moors; the ladies inveigh against all

these barbarities, but have no objection to any extent of cruelty towards the horses in their carriage, provided it is kept decently somewhat out of view. Maria's reported direction of "Drive fast, post-boy, but don't whip your horses," is rather too honest an expression of this amount of sentiment.

The Spaniards in this neighbourhood have been playing a game which could be well retaliated upon them. With their own house quite covered with glass, they should be cautious to be the first to throw stones; if the general were to bring up a brigade of British troops to this frontier, the effect would be, I have no doubt, to set all Spanish Estremadura in a blaze; but they would not be Spaniards if they did not shut their eyes to all the mischief that could be done to themselves; and this makes it very difficult to foresee their future measures, for their minds are not constructed like those of other nations. The only way to study their character, even at this day, is by reading 'Don Quixote.'

Lisbon, July 28.

I reached Lisbon on the night of the 21st, and found the climate very much improved from that of the Alentejo; there the heat was suffocating, here there has always been a fine air which makes the heat supportable; the last two days have been rather warmer than usual, but still nothing like what I have been used to. It is also infinitely more healthy here; my two principal servants have come down with bad intermittent fevers. I was not complimented upon my looks when I returned, being thin and weak, but I understood my own state, and believe it to have been much better than the more robust appearance I now put on from more liberal diet; what I wanted in muscular strength, I more than made up for in comfortable, healthy, internal feeling.

The general is very kind and complimentary; he made it a point to introduce me particularly to the Conde de Villa Flor, the star at present of the Portuguese generals, and a great Constitutionalist. On Monday I dined with Sir William Clinton, on Tuesday with the ambassador, Sir William A'Court, and on Wednesday with the Conde de Villa Flor, where I met some of the highest society in Lisbon. The specimen of the nobility, both male and female, was very good; the house, entertain-

ment, and society, very *distingué*, mixed with the same appearance of pride that one meets with in other countries. As my introduction was purely a military one, I have left my cards at the house next day, and there the acquaintance will drop.

Abrantes, July 17, 1827.

The Portuguese are in a very perturbed state of mind just now; many of them in great expectation of the arrival of Don Miguel; he becomes twenty-five years of age in October, when, by the *Charta*, he ought to assume the regency; but as there are terms connected with the Constitution which he has not complied with, there are doubts about how far he has a right to assume the power. His appearance however in the country, if he is bold enough to take such a step, would blow up the Constitution, *if we are to be neutral.* The government has been going on so timidly, and the Chambers play so small a figure, that the Constitutionalists are depressed, the army is dissatisfied and infected, and things look worse now than when the Spaniards threatened, and we had a public motive for supporting the government. Either prince, however, Pedro or Miguel, showing himself in the country, would give, I think, a great turn to affairs in his favour; but I look upon Portugal as at the mercy of the first of them who comes.

From the Earl of DERBY *to* Lieut.-Colonel BURGOYNE, *Portugal.*

"Knowsley, July 15, 1827.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"On receiving your letter, I took the earliest opportunity of communicating your wish to Lord Holland, respecting a plan which you thought might be in his possession, and I have received his answer, the purport of which I now forward to you; and if the plan which he informs me is in his possession is what you want, and you will tell me in what manner I can best succeed in getting it copied or reduced, so as to meet your wishes, it will give me the greatest pleasure to apply again to Lord Holland for leave to take such copy. He assures me how happy it would make him to assist you, both on your own

account, and that of your father. I enclose his last letter to me upon the subject.

"Let me now thank you very much for your letter, containing so much information of the most interesting nature, upon the present state of affairs, which you have had so good an opportunity of investigating. I have no communication with persons in office which enables me to form any opinion as to the line of conduct they mean to pursue, or how far they will find it expedient to continue our present military establishment in Portugal, but it seems to *me* that the expense we are incurring does not seem likely to secure any permanent advantage, either to our allies or ourselves, and therefore I shall not be sorry should our force be withdrawn; but I speak merely as an individual, totally unacquainted with the grounds upon which our leaders regulate their conduct. We have been at this place over three weeks, and I find all here going on much to my satisfaction. Some alterations have taken place, both in the house and gardens, which I shall have great pleasure in showing you whenever you get home. I mean to go to-morrow to Preston Races, but don't expect a good meeting, and my three horses are so indifferent, that I have no chance of winning anything.

"I had hoped, on hearing that you were to have Portsmouth, that it was not only an honourable but a profitable appointment. I trust, however, it will lead to something better. We are told that Lord Anglesey goes to Ireland in the autumn, and the Duke of Gordon is talked of as his successor in the Ordnance. How far this might suit you I don't know. All here desire to be remembered to you most affectionately, and I remain, dear Burgoyne,

"Ever most truly yours,
"DERBY."

Lisbon, March 13, 1823.[1]

As soon as you appeared to have gone off in full force, I returned home, and went to the opera. Great change of scene was there. I sat myself down solitary in the post of honour,

[1] Colonel Burgoyne's letters cease during the period his wife spent with him at Lisbon, and recommence at her departure for England.—ED.

and could have moralised over the footstool that once or twice disagreeably obstructed my feet, and I thought what a much happier seat it had been to another, than ever it would be to me. The opera did not commence till half-past seven, and then the first piece was the ballet of 'Moses,' succeeded by the second act of 'Adrian.' The performance was over by eleven.

March 14.

This morning, General Caula sent for me to beg that I would ascertain from Sir William Clinton, whether he was aware of his name being in a long list of proscribed persons—having understood that the ambassador and even some of our officers had seen the list. The general could give him no information of the kind, but I have offered every service in my power, should he feel himself in difficulty. I have made the same offer to Gama Lobo. The state of alarm here is terrible; they say that things are going on so rapidly that the acts are like those of madmen, and there is full expectation of a severe and extensive persecution. It is thought that immediate open rebellion would be the consequence, but that people are afraid of want of support, because no individual act has been done but by authority of the Charter, although it is evident from the whole together what the intention is. The parties who think themselves marked (and exceedingly numerous they are) are desirous to keep out of the way for a month or two, when they deem the crisis must be over. We have not yet heard of any arrests having positively taken place yet, but I did hear that police officers had been last night in search of some of the most known officers, who were fortunately not to be found. The Regent was to have gone on a sporting excursion to Villa Viçosa (near Elvas), where it was supposed he would have met Chaves and his collection of some thousand rebels, and have returned to Lisbon in triumph; but that measure appears to be deferred, possibly in consequence of the stopping our embarkation. Yesterday the council of state was assembled, and this morning, by order of the Regent, the Chambers are dissolved, by virtue of an article of the Charter, which states that the executive may dissolve the Chambers at any time, when necessary for the salvation of the state. The Portuguese troops are kept

in their barracks, constantly in readiness to take to their arms. The plan seems to be to *suppose* a deep conspiracy on the part of the Constitutionalists as a plea for all these violent measures. Villa Real dined yesterday with the general, to meet Sir F. Lamb; he is said to be quite *abattu*, and likely immediately to resign or be turned out. It is reported that Quintella refused to supply the palace with money, but that the Conde de Povoa (Sampaio) was more compliant. Things have got to such a state that *our* people are all very warlike, and quite inclined to expect to have a fight, but when or how it is to be brought about, no one pretends to say. At present there is an awful tranquillity in this place, but I should not at all wonder at an explosion taking place at any hour, and the result then will probably depend upon the part the Portuguese troops, when called on, shall take.

I dine with the general, that is, at his table, to-day (he is still on his sofa, not worse, but not much better, because he fidgets himself); he has been talking to me yesterday and this morning, about my taking up Captain Batty's quarters in Bandeira's house, but his good-nature leads him to propose, and even wish for, things that he cannot make up his mind to carry completely into effect. It would be a most agreeable arrangement for me, as it would necessarily imply my living with him. One of the refugees however had the apartment last night, and there will probably be still further calls for it on that score.

March 15.

The party consisted of Sir H. and Lady Bouverie, Sir T. Arbuthnot, their respective staffs, Colonel Mair, and Don Thomas Mascarenhas (one of the displaced colonels, who has taken refuge in the house, where he seems to propose to remain). The Fronteiras and Villa Flors are now on board the *Admiral*, to sail in the packet that conveys this, with various other persons, among whom is perhaps a leading deputy, about whom I have been interesting myself in making inquiries, and shall, if he desires it, put him on board this evening. It has been given out that some regiments would be disarmed. The 8th Caçadores vowed they would not submit, and this morning half of them have been sent off to Setuval: by dispersing, they expect to get

the better of them. Yesterday the Austrian minister visited the general, and in answer to the usual question, "What do you think of all this?" said that he did not perceive that any power had been exceeded beyond what was given by the Charter —thus refusing *his* disapprobation.

Lisbon, March 17, 1828.

Public affairs and violences appear to be at a stand since the dissolution of the Chambers, and the dispersion of the regiments supposed to be most attached to Don Pedro and the Charter. There appears to be but one step now unfulfilled, and that I presume there is some hesitation about. The *on dits* are, that for the sum of £400, Sir Fred. Lamb was put in possession of a proclamation, calling upon the country to support the new government against the domineering rule of Great Britain, and in favour of Don Miguel, &c.; that he showed it to his Highness, and asked for explanations, which were not forthcoming; that the old queen rushed into the room, to deny on her son's part any knowledge of the transaction; that the ambassador declared he had nothing to do with her Majesty, but that his business was with the Prince Regent; that the matter being laid before the other foreign ministers, they requested a delay in embarking our troops, esteeming that unless the present measures were put a stop to, the peace of Europe might be disturbed—all which was the immediate cause of sending off the *George IV.* in such a hurry. The bands of the regiments are publicly ordered to play no *hymnos* but 'O Portuguez,' viz., that of many years back; and we imagine that Don Pedro will be more hurt at the rejection of his music (for the 'Constitutional Hymn' is his imperial Majesty's own composition) than at the upsetting his Charter and crown. *En revanche*, I heard a Portuguese in a coffee-house declare, that in his private house, he never allowed the pianoforte to be touched without a repetition of the 'Hymno Constituiçonal,' which is heard likewise bellowed out in the midnight orgies of the Guard's Club, and constantly played by their drums and fifes, at the Campo d'Ourique and Val de Pereira Barracks, for the edification of crowds who assemble to hear it. One surmise of yesterday was that the recent horrible murder of the old woman in Montagu Place, the author of which has not been discovered,

was probably done by Don Miguel during his visit in London, just—to keep his hand in! An address has been given out to the soldiers, warning them of attempts understood to be made to shake their loyalty, and expressing a confidence of their being unavailing, from the experience of their attachment in 1823.

The Regent has been driving in a phaeton with his elder sister; on meeting British officers, he is said studiously to turn his head away, while Donna Isabella returns their salute with a gracious acknowledgment.

Lisbon, March 29, 1828.

Our affairs are coming once more to a finale: the army is again embarking. The admiral remains with the *Spartiate*, *Pyramus*, and *Falcon*, and retains Forts St. Julien and the Bugio. Howarth remains with him, to the great gratification of his military ardour, which has stirred up within him the most lively scenes of bloody fights and desperate defence. Sir William Clinton and staff go in the *Windsor Castle*. Captain Clinton and myself take our passage in the little *Lyra*, which is to sail as a kind of *avant-courier*, as soon as the embarkation is complete and all ready for a start, which we expect will be about the 3rd of April.

The Don goes on steadily in his work of regeneration; a great many officers were displaced yesterday to make room for his old friends of 1823. The Spanish refugee soldiers and officers (including D. Anna de Camara's friend) were taken up two days ago, in the middle of the night, embarked in boats, and carried some way up the Tagus, professedly to get them out of the way of intriguers here. A few have escaped and taken refuge among our officers.

The Constitutionalists continue in the greatest alarm, in consequence of our going, and would, if they could, all fly the country; but that is I think excess of timidity, and shows a great want of firmness. A party of Coïmbra students, acting the Constitutionalists *exaltés*, have waylaid and murdered some unarmed members of a deputation to congratulate the Don. Their high political enthusiasm did not go so far (if we may believe the account published) as to lead them to forget to take the watches and purses from the victims. They can hardly expect mercy, and in this case it will not be deserved. They

say that the prince has made express application to the king to remove Sir F. Lamb; that is probable enough.

There is a story going of your friend Count ——, that he sold his horse, when he went away, to three different persons, being paid by each.

* * * * * *

In February, 1828, Colonel Burgoyne had received orders to return to England, and assume the command of the Engineer department at Portsmouth; but the English Minister in Portugal having detained the troops for some time longer, owing to the violent measures of Don Miguel, he did not reach England till the 11th of April. There is little worth noting in his life while he held this appointment of commanding engineer at Portsmouth. In 1830, he was successful in adjusting a difference between Lord Porchester and Mr. Fleming, the member for the county. Lord Porchester had been offended by some observations made by Mr. Fleming in an electioneering address, and requested Colonel Burgoyne to act as his friend, and call for an explanation. The latter wrote to Mr. Fleming, and after pointing out the passages in the address which had caused pain to Lord Porchester, expressed a conviction that Mr. Fleming could not have intended to say anything personally offensive to him; and this conciliatory communication having been met in the same manner, the affair was made up without further difficulty. Apparently, from a general opinion formed among his friends, of his coolness and good sense, reference was frequently made to him in such matters. On another occasion, two officers having quarrelled, they each applied to him to act as their friend. Colonel Burgoyne accepted the double office, after making both promise to be bound by his decision, and in this way was enabled to avert a duel.

Extract from Journal. 1831.

January 1*st*, 1831. Arrived at Edinburgh to give evidence in the Dundonnell cause. Dined with Colonel and Lady Elizabeth Thackeray at Merchiston House.

—— 2*nd*. To Scotch church, to hear Dr. Gordon, the celebrated preacher.

—— 3*rd*. Dined with Mr. Gibson Craig at Riscarton, six miles west of Edinburgh; met there Mrs. Hay M'Kenzie, his daughter, and others of his family, and a Count Lubienski, a young Pole of great talent, only son of one of the leading patriots at Warsaw.

—— 4*th*. Attended lectures by Professor Leslie on natural philosophy, by Wilson the poet on moral philosophy, and by Dr. Chalmers on divinity.

—— 5*th*. Visited the gas-works, and attended another lecture of Dr. Chalmers, and consultation at Mr. Roy's on the subject of the Dundonnell cause.

—— 6*th*. Gave my evidence in court,[1] and remained there afterwards.

—— 8*th*. Dundonnell cause concluded by a verdict against Mr. Roy, &c. Mr. Minchin, solicitor, from Portsmouth, who had accompanied me to Edinburgh, received from Messrs. Gibson, Craig, & Co., for me, £50, which he paid me for my expenses to and from Edinburgh and Portsmouth.

—— 23*rd*, *Sunday*. Left Edinburgh, per London mail, outside, at 8 A.M. At 7 or 8 P.M. overturned on Morpeth bridge, and had a very narrow escape from being thrown into the river from a height of twenty or thirty feet, which happened to a man sitting beside me. He was taken out, apparently not much hurt.

February 16*th*. Went to Brighton, having been informed that, as commanding engineer of the district, it was expected that I should pay my respects to the king there. Dined with Colonel Downman, R.A., aide-de-camp to the king.

—— 17*th*. Had a long interview with his Majesty, who was desirous of consulting me upon the defences of Portsmouth, and the protection of Brighton by a sea battery and the

[1] Colonel Burgoyne's evidence related to the sanity of one of the parties in the cause.

construction of additional barracks. Dined at the palace; party of forty-two present.

February 18th. Had another interview with the king, and gave him some memoranda, according to his commands, on the points adverted to the preceding day. Dined again at the Pavilion; a party of forty. Among the company on the two days were the Duke of Sussex, Princess Augusta, Princess of Hesse Homburg, Prince Leopold, Duke and Duchess of Bedford and Ladies Russell, Marquess and Marchioness of Ely, Lord and Lady Chichester, Lord Fife, Mrs. Fitzherbert, Lord Valletort, Lord William Russell, Lord John Townshend, Sir Frederic Lamb, Count and Countess Munster, Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Stanhope, Mrs. Fox, Sir Augustus d'Este, Sir William Houston, Sir W. Waller, Sir Colin Campbell, General Wheatley, Sir Andrew Barnard, Sir Frederic Watson, Colonel Prott, Hanoverian minister, &c.

With these interviews with William IV. his military career closes for many years. On the 15th of April following, he received a letter from Mr. Stanley, then secretary for Ireland, and the grandson of his original benefactor, which opened an entirely new phase in his existence.

From The Right Hon. EDWARD STANLEY,[1] *to* Colonel BURGOYNE.

"Whitehall Yard, April 15, 1831.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"It is some time since you and I have had any communication, and I now write to you in the strictest confidence on a subject, to me of no little interest. I do not know whether you are aware that measures are in progress for appointing a board, consisting of a president and four commissioners, to superintend the application of £500,000, by way of loan for public works in Ireland. The board, however, will be permanent, inasmuch as the sums repaid are intended to be reinvested in a similar manner; and independently of this continued employment, it is proposed to put under the control of this board the existing Board of Inland Navigation, which has

[1] Afterwards 14th Earl of Derby, and prime minister.

the control of the post roads of Ireland, and the Board of Public Works in Dublin; so that we shall furnish abundant occupation for our commissioners. The salaries proposed are from £800 to £1000 per annum for the president, and £500 each for the junior members—whether with or without a house (other than for the business of the offices) I cannot say. Now my object in writing to you is to ascertain from you, whether the situation of president of this board, for which it is extremely desirable to have an Engineer officer, and for which I should personally prefer you to any other person I can think of, would be acceptable to you, or whether it would be worth your while to take it; because, though I cannot positively say I have it to give, the disposal of it being in the Treasury, I am sure my recommendation would, in your case especially, be attended to. Your friend Gosset will be very glad to have you in Dublin; we have both looked to you in many of our plans for Ireland. Let me know what you think of this, and whether I shall send you more specific information, to make up your mind.

"If the situation should not suit you, perhaps you could name some officer of Engineers whom you could completely rely on, and to whom it might be an object. Determined honesty, and decision to check all *jobbing* (no very easy task in Ireland), are the first requisites.

"Let me hear from you soon, and believe me,

"My dear Burgoyne,

"Ever most sincerely yours,

"E. G. Stanley."

To the Right Hon. Edward Stanley.

My Dear Stanley,

I will not occupy your time by telling you to the full extent how much gratified, and how grateful I feel, for your recollection of me; you can judge, and I trust will give me credit for more on that head than I shall attempt to express.

As far as my personal interests are concerned, I took but little time to decide that your offer is one that I should be very

wrong in declining. The appointment would be to me a rising in the world, and that I feel as strong a desire to do as any man.

By your account of the situation, I should at present probably not be a gainer in point of income; for Portsmouth has always been a favoured place for the commanding engineer,[1] and I have by some means become a pet in the corps, and have long had the best of everything in our service offered to me; still *your* appointment is more honourable and more permanent, and my only hesitation would now arise from some scruples as to capability to fill the office properly. I must however pluck up a little confidence for the occasion, and trust to entering with a good heart, for a proper execution of the duties, many of which will be new to me. I take for granted that I should retain my commission, and with it, as in other cases of military officers in employ, my regimental pay.

The employment being for the government service, and very analogous to the civil duties of the Engineers, there could be nothing unreasonable in my retaining my commission in the corps.

I consider the whole matter perfectly confidential till I shall hear further from you on the subject; but should you still be inclined to recommend it, you would of course approve of my applying to the master-general of the Ordnance and Sir Alexander Bryce (inspector-general of fortifications) for their sanction, or perhaps you would think it right to mention it to the former yourself. If you desire to see me in town, I can run up at any time without inconvenience. In the meantime, whether I enter upon this office or not, or whatever may be the result, I must always feel grateful for your good intentions.

My dear Stanley,

Yours ever very faithfully and obliged,

J. F. Burgoyne.

The alacrity with which Colonel Burgoyne resigned a lucrative military post for a civil appointment with a lower salary, is partly to be explained by the neglect with which his military services had been treated. At

[1] At this time the commanding engineer at Portsmouth received the rent for the grass of the fortifications, averaging £600 a year.

this period, two junior officers of Engineers had superseded him in army rank, through their nomination as king's aides-de-camp, and the vicious system which gives a step of rank with the appointment. One of these officers, Sir John Jones, who had served under him as major of brigade in the campaign of 1812, when he was acting as commanding engineer with the English army in the field, was likewise created a baronet in September of this year, for his military services;[1] and these circumstances appeared fatal to his prospects of succeeding to the only post which the custom of the service allows to be held by an officer of Engineers, with the rank of general, viz., that of inspector-general of fortifications. It is not surprising therefore, that under such circumstances, he himself should have been ready to renounce his military prospects, and commence an entirely new career in civil life. But what can be said of a system which thus lost, apparently for ever, the stored-up experience of such a man as Burgoyne—a system which, by shutting out all hope of military employment to officers above the rank of colonel, dooms to a life of inaction a large class of men, at the age when they can render most service to their country.[2]

[1] The ostensible reason given for the bestowal of a baronetcy upon Sir John Jones, was his employment in a confidential mission relative to the Belgian fortresses. This averted any invidious comparisons between his services and those of other officers of the corps. As a matter of fact, Sir John Jones had not served in the field after the campaign of 1812, a wound received at Burgos having incapacitated him from further employment.

[2] Sir Henry Hardinge, who had known Burgoyne well in the Peninsula, and had been struck with the injustice with which he had been treated in 1815, made an effort about this time to obtain for him the Hanoverian Order, and for this purpose, wrote to him to send him an account of his military services. He was unsuccessful in obtaining for him even this much maligned distinction.

BOARD OF WORKS—IRELAND.

1831 TO 1845.

THE Board of Public Works in Ireland, was established pursuant to the Act of 1 & 2 William IV. c. 33.

The object of the Act of Parliament was to concentrate into one office the duties of several boards connected with public works in Ireland, many of which were managed by unpaid and irresponsible commissioners, and to place the whole under a well organised and responsible body. The new board met for the first time, on the 2nd of November, 1831, constituted as follows:

Colonel Burgoyne, C.B., Chairman,
Mr. Brook Ottley,
Mr. John Radcliff,
} Commissioners.

Upon the completion of their establishment they took up the duties of five former boards, which had been previously in existence, viz.:

1. Loans from Consolidated Fund.
2. Inland Navigation, and Roads and Canals.
3. Dublin Board of Works.
4. Kingstown Harbour.
5. Dunmore Harbour.

To these duties were afterwards added, by successive Acts of Parliament, framed between the years 1831 and 1844, the superintendence of the harbours of Howth and

Donaghadee; district lunatic asylums; Shannon navigation; fisheries of Ireland; appointments of county surveyors under the Grand Jury Act, and the Drainage Commission.

A memorandum left behind by Colonel Burgoyne, gives the comparative expense of the establishments under the new and old system, as follows:

Establishment of Board of Public Works.	Annual Expense. £	s.	d.	Establishment of former Boards.	Annual Expense. £	s.	d.
3 commissioners	2200	0	0	33 commissioners, 26 of whom unpaid	3417	8	6
1 secretary	500	0	0	5 secretaries, one of whom unpaid	1193	9	3½
1 solicitor, paid by fees	..			3 solicitors, one with salary, besides fees	200	0	0
3 office clerks, 1 accountant, and 2 account clerks	954	1	8	7 clerks and accountants	892	9	2
1 architect and engineer, 2 clerks, drawing and writing	987	4	0	3 architects and engineers, 1 principal overseer, 3 drawing and copying clerks, and measurer	1929	13	10½
Kingstown Harbour: 1 resident engineer, allowance for pay clerk	350	0	0	Kingstown Harbour: 1 directing engineer, 2 resident ditto, 1 storekeeper ditto	1419	18	5
Dunmore Harbour: 1 resident engineer, allowance for pay clerk	189	16	0	Dunmore Harbour: 1 directing engineer, 1 resident ditto, 1 pay clerk	423	0	0
4 messengers, porters, and office keepers	140	11	4	7 messengers, porters, and office keepers	258	13	4
	£5321	13	0	Total, old establishments	9734	12	7
				Total, new ditto	5321	13	0
					4412	19	7
Exclusive of saving in fuel, furniture, and many contingent expenses necessarily reduced by consolidation of offices.				Add rent, taxes, &c., on 3 offices	328	7	2
				Total saving	£4741	6	9

It will thus be seen that the immediate effect, in point of economy, was a saving of nearly one half in cost of establishment, besides the reduction in the number of offices.

The principal duty of the new board, and which in fact had led to its establishment, was the management of loans to public works. Their predecessors in this branch of their duties had consisted of a body of unpaid commissioners, acting under all the disadvantages of a vicious organisation; their meetings were few and short, the attendance optional, and therefore fluctuating; and the business fell almost entirely under the guidance of

the secretary or other paid official. The establishment of a permanent board at once removed most of these defects, and afforded security that the money advanced for public objects was properly expended; the same individuals were on constant duty, and were selected from a presumed knowledge of the matters to be brought before them.

Shortly after his arrival in Dublin, Colonel Burgoyne published in the form of a pamphlet, his 'Letters on the State of Ireland.' They shared the fate of all anonymous pamphlets, and attracted little if any notice; but it is impossible to read them at the present time, without being struck with the liberal spirit and comprehensive views of the author. In his denunciation of the Irish Church establishment, and his proposal to make the process of ejectment by landlords more difficult, he foreshadowed in these pages, the two great measures for the pacification of Ireland, which he lived to see accomplished forty years afterwards. His friend Major Head writes to him on the 5th of February, 1832: "I sent for your pamphlet, and have just finished it. I am very much pleased with it, but wish you had written a bigger book, and had published it with your name; for I think your unprejudiced view of the subject, and your name, would have made your book generally read, and that it would have done a great deal of good among English people; whereas, under its present title, it is not likely to be generally read. You must not be affronted at my saying this; for I remember Murray, the publisher, once saying to me, '*Sir, an angel from Heaven could not sell a pamphlet!*'"

The first question of importance which engaged the attention of the new board, was the state of the Shannon

River. Colonel Burgoyne's first reports on this subject had led to the appointment of a Treasury Commission, consisting of himself, Captain Mudge, R.N., and Mr. Thomas Rhodes, C.E., with instructions to enter fully into the question of the improvement of the navigation. The great capabilities of this noble river as a navigable communication through the heart of Ireland, its neglected state, and the opening afforded for great improvement by moderate means, were so plainly demonstrated by the reports and surveys of this commission, that a select committee of the House of Commons sat upon the subject in 1833; and upon the subsequent motion of Lord Kerry (the late Marquis of Lansdowne), proposing an address to the Crown, to carry out the measures recommended by the committee, letters patent were issued in the year 1837, addressed to Colonel Burgoyne, C.B., Colonel Harry D. Jones, R.E., and Richard Griffiths, Esq., appointing them permanent "Commissioners for the Improvement of the Navigation of the Shannon." This commission made five elaborate reports, which were printed and laid before both Houses of Parliament, and the works proposed by them were subsequently carried out by the same body.

Colonel Burgoyne had been installed little more than a year in his new office, when he lost the influential support of the chief secretary, by the removal of Mr. Stanley to the Colonial Office. In reply to a letter written by Colonel Burgoyne on this occasion, Mr. Stanley writes:

"Colonial Office, April 6, 1833.

"My Dear Burgoyne,

"Your letter of the 4th has gratified me much, by the regret which you and others express at my removal. While I was writing this sentence, Sir J. Hobhouse was announced, and you may be sure I did not lose the opportunity of giving him the

strongest recommendation in your favour. Not, as I told him, that he can probably do anything for you, but that he may be prepared to consider you as one on whose ability, labour, honesty, and discretion he may most implicitly and entirely rely. I should very much regret your leaving your post for the present. I offered you the situation because I thought you better qualified for the duties of it than any one I knew, and though you have now put matters *en train*, the business will for some time yet require a steady hand, more especially if the new Grand Jury Bill should pass, which will give to your board a great latitude in recommending persons as local surveyors and engineers. I know *you* would not job such appointments. For my own part, I should at all times be glad to promote your interest, by finding you more agreeable employment elsewhere, and I hope you will never be unnecessarily scrupulous in applying, if anything should turn up in your line.

"I go down to my election on Monday. I hope and believe all will be quiet.

"Ever yours sincerely,

"E. G. STANLEY."

In the latter part of this year, the Commissioners for consolidating the Civil Departments of the Army, of which the late Duke of Richmond was President, addressed a series of questions to Colonel Burgoyne. His answers to these questions are worth publishing, as the subject may still be said to be unsettled, and will probably provoke much discussion in the future.

To Sir JOHN BISSET, Secretary to the Commissioners for inquiring into the Practicability of consolidating the Civil Branches of the Army.

Office of Public Works,
Dublin, February 16, 1834.

SIR,

I do not feel quite sure whether I have caught the precise meaning of the question accompanying your letter of the 10th instant, in assuming that it implies the grafting in of the whole of the duties (military as well as civil) of the Ordnance

under the new board, without any more interference with the commander-in-chief than at present.

I am under rather a peculiar embarrassment in answering generally the questions of the commissioners, from holding an opinion which affects the whole matter, and may probably be at variance with their better judgment.

The point to which I allude is a general objection I entertain to the system of management by boards. I conceive them to be more expensive, dilatory and inefficient than any departments under other systems, without a proper degree of responsibility, and producing a probability of a want of steady and uniform principles of proceeding.

I think them particularly inapplicable to a department like the Ordnance, which comprehends so great a variety of business, where every branch requires its peculiar apprenticeship.

I am not prepared to give instances of inconvenience to the service arising from this cause, but I am satisfied in my own mind of the correctness of the position.

* * * * * *

The question of a consolidation of all the civil branches of the army, consistent with the preservation of a proper and efficient system for the military duties and functions of the Ordnance, is one of much difficulty. I hope I may be excused if I exceed the limits of the matters submitted to me, in venturing an opinion that this object might be effected to the most advantage and economy, by carrying the principle of consolidation to a much greater extent; for which purpose I would propose uniting in one person the offices of Secretary of War, Commander-in-Chief, and Master-General of the Ordnance, under the title of "Secretary of State for the War Department," or as he would be more appropriately styled on the Continent, *Minister of War.*

This officer must necessarily be an influential member of one of the Houses of Parliament, and if possible, should be selected from those who had served with reputation in the army, such as at the present time the Duke of Wellington, the Duke of Richmond, Sir George Murray, or Sir Henry Hardinge.

But as occasions may occur when such a combination of

qualifications may not be found, connected also with the requisite political bias, there appears to be no great objection to the appointment of a civilian to the office, as is frequently (indeed generally) the case with regard to the navy.[1]

Such a charge given to one individual would in the first instance shock many prejudices, but I am myself satisfied that they are but *prejudices*. There is one only to which I would advert, which is very prevalent, and of injurious tendency in many military arrangements. I allude to that rigid adherence to seniority after a certain rank, which would exclude officers from selections that are assumed to be inconsistent with their standing in the service, however notorious their individual claims and qualifications. A junior major-general, for instance, being placed at the head of an army, would be a measure repugnant to much of the present state of feeling; but it is evident that the danger of *abuse* in the nominations can be the only real argument opposed to it, and that the strict observance of precedence in such appointments must have the effect of acknowledging a limited, and possibly a superannuated or inefficient list, from which to make a selection. I can see no force in the arguments which would probably be brought forward against

[1] To prevent any misunderstanding of Sir John's views, it may be as well to remind the reader that at this date a king was on the throne who was *de facto* as well as *de jure* commander-in-chief of the army. Sir John attached great importance to the maintenance of the office of commander-in-chief during the life-time of a female sovereign; and in 1860, in returning thanks for the army at the Trinity House dinner, he said: "I think I may claim for the army the full respect of every branch of the community, high and low. I have never heard any objection made to the increase of the army, except that of expense. Your Royal Highness has adverted to the cost of the army. I rather think we may congratulate ourselves that it is so costly, because it is by that cost, in a great measure, that we are made so efficient. In former times the cost was not the objection that was made. The objection then arose from a dread, and perhaps a legitimate dread, of the great increase of what was called a standing army giving too much power to the crown. Circumstances at the present day are altered very much; but one thing I think I can say with regard to the army, that it would be most unsatisfactory to their feelings and their pride if, by any foolish reasoning, the honourable distinction and advance of the army were to pass into any other hand than that of the sovereign."

this proposed system, though to enter upon them in this paper would be going to too great a length.

* * * * * *

"Such a consolidation as above proposed would be said to give too much power and patronage to an individual."

To this I would answer that there are many officers of Government who have much more. The army and military Ordnance patronage is not absolute, like others, but a selection must be made from a limited list, who all have *claims*—which much diminishes the influence to be obtained from it. The military power and influence could never in England be dangerous to the state. But little would be added to that at present possessed by the commander-in-chief. The House of Commons hold the purse strings, and become a perfect check; the under-secretary, who would have the immediate superintendence of the civil branches, would be another, and the variety of political feelings in the army itself—all render such a fear chimerical.

"The military chief should be free from political attachment to party."

The thing is impossible, and is unnecessary; it is impossible, with the strongest political bias, to confine promotion in any degree among a political party. Who could have stronger political partiality than the Duke of Wellington or Lord Hill? But no instance can be shown of such a feeling prejudicing the claims of the most Liberal officer.

I would have no permanent boards, but a general commanding (or call him adjutant-general, to admit of greater latitude of selection), quartermaster-general, director-general of artillery, inspector-general of fortifications, to regulate the military concerns, with such occasional assistance from temporary boards as may be necessary, and an under-secretary (member of the House of Commons preferable), to have the immediate arrangement of the civil branches, with a chief clerk at the head of each. Thus every department in detail, civil and military, would be managed by persons understanding their business.

J. F. B.

In the autumn of this year, Colonel Burgoyne lost his greatest friend in the person of Lord Derby, his original benefactor and guardian, who died at Knowsley on the 20th of October, 1834. In reply to a letter of condolence written by him on this occasion, his son and successor, the thirteenth earl, writes to him:

"Knowsley, November 13, 1834.

"If I have not earlier thanked you, my dear Burgoyne, for the very kind note I received from you on the 4th inst., you will not, I am sure, attribute it to any want of regard for yourself, or any doubt of the real sincerity of the feelings it expresses for the memory of my dearest father; but you will easily feel that my time is a good deal more occupied than it used to be, and in a great degree with subjects almost entirely new to me; but as I begin now a little more to see my way, I cannot suffer the letter of so old a friend to remain any longer unnoticed. But now that I do so, I must complain of one part of it which does not seem to do justice to me and to those who are still left around me, any more than I believe it does to what I consider your own real feelings. You do not surely mean to give it as your opinion that the loss of one, however dearly cherished a friend, is to weaken the cords that have united us with others before, or that you have hitherto regarded us who are left *only* as adjuncts of him who is now taken away, and that we have no substantive place in your regard or friendship. I had hoped you would have thought otherwise, and that the very feeling of our common sorrow (even more than a common joy could do) would give us rather an additional claim upon you; and I will still continue so to think, and therefore will deny that you have any right to say as you do (or rather your letter does) that the 'tie is broken' with scenes which I trust you will often visit with pleasure, though to some of their associations, I allow, can none of us again recur without very mixed feelings. * * * Pray remember me kindly to Mrs. Burgoyne, and remember, that though I may have changed my name I hope I have not my nature, and that I am, at least *as* much as ever, still

"Your very sincere friend,

"DERBY."

I now come to the most important of the many questions relating to Ireland, with which his name has been connected, viz., the Irish Railway Commission of 1837.

From the infancy of railways Colonel Burgoyne had been strongly impressed by the impolicy of permitting all the leading communications of the country to fall into the hands of joint-stock companies, and for the next three or four years of his life, he bent all his energies to retain the railways of Ireland in the hands of the state. In the session of 1836, the Marquis of Lansdowne proposed an address to the King in the House of Lords, begging him to "appoint persons of competent authority, to consider and report upon the principal lines of communication in Ireland, with reference to the comparative advantages and facilities they afford for the construction of railways, and that with a view to ascertain the best lines between any of the principal places in Ireland which it may be advisable to connect by railways, and for the working of which, joint-stock companies may be willing hereafter to apply to Parliament."

In pursuance of this resolution, a commission was issued on the 20th of October, 1836, addressed to Mr. Drummond, the Irish under-secretary, Colonel Burgoyne, C.B., Mr. Peter Barlow, professor of mathematics at the R.M. Academy at Woolwich, and Mr. (afterwards Sir Richard) Griffith, the eminent geologist. On the accession of the present Queen, the commission was renewed, and on the suggestion of Sir John Burgoyne, the last sentence, relating to joint-stock companies, was omitted from their instructions.

Mr. McLennan, in his life of Mr. Drummond, has entered so fully into the history of this commission, that it is not necessary to go over the same ground. It may be as well to mention, however, that the papers on this

subject, left behind by Sir John Burgoyne, show that his share in originating the commission and in the recommendations of the report, have been very much underestimated by Mr. McLennan. It will be seen, from the following correspondence, that the idea of enlarging the scope of the inquiry to the extent it subsequently assumed, and the final instructions to the committee, proceeded from Colonel Burgoyne. The original intention of the government had been that he should have been the chairman; but on subsequent consideration, it appeared probable that the recommendations of the commission would tend to give greatly increased importance and powers to the Board of Works, and it was thought advisable that the chairman should be free from the imputation of being biassed by any personal or departmental interests.

To the LORD LIEUTENANT.[1]

Office of Public Works,
Dublin, September 28, 1836.

MY LORD,

In compliance with your Excellency's desire, I proceed to a few suggestions on the subject of a commission for inquiry into the various matters connected with a railway system for Ireland.

Since the Chancellor of the Exchequer consulted me a short time since on the nomination of persons to be appointed to act with myself in conducting such an inquiry, I have had time, upon further reflection, to feel that it would be desirable to give to a commission having under their consideration matters of such great importance, a superior character to that which was at first contemplated by the government.

The formation of railroads appears likely to supersede in very important particulars all other modes of internal communication, and will no doubt eventually extend very generally over the British empire.

Hitherto these undertakings have originated solely with a

[1] The Marquess of Normanby.

view to private advantage and speculation, referring to partial and limited objects, without regard to that union of purpose and system, so desirable in a matter certain of immense future extension, and so applicable to a vast economy of means and to the furtherance of public convenience.

The evils likely to arise from such proceedings are well known, and the parliamentary committees, the only existing check upon them, have manifestly found themselves incompetent, from the want of the necessary information, to apply the remedy.

Ireland being as yet untouched by any measure of the kind that could interfere with a general arrangement, government has very judiciously determined to take the initiative, and to procure at once the information on which Parliament may be enabled to form a correct judgment on the propriety of such undertakings as may be brought before it. It might have been difficult to have prevented altogether in England the inconvenience arising from unconnected enterprises; but in Ireland, where the space and general business are so limited, and the features of the country so peculiar, it is apprehended that one general system, tending to the greatest possible public benefit, might be successfully applied to the resources of the country.

Some modification of such a system might eventually be considered advisable, but such might be made without injury to the general result.

The prevailing opinion, that all projects of railways should be referred to the consideration of the proposed commission, for the purpose of their reporting on their comparative merits, or on those of contending lines, appears to me to be founded on a very imperfect view of the general purposes of utility to which it may be applied. Such a commission might be somewhat better organised, and might be enabled to procure better information for the decision of such points than the parliamentary committees; but it would still have many of the most important of the same difficulties to contend with. The same litigation, and consequently enormous expenses, would be incurred, and their investigations would still be confined to the partial and paltry considerations of local advantages, instead of an extended view to the general interest of the whole country.

I would therefore suggest that the functions of the commission should embrace a previous review of the best lines that could be undertaken for the general public benefit, and that, instead of waiting to receive the unconnected projects which might be submitted by the several parties, it should be empowered to lay down a system to which those parties might be required to conform, or to show good cause for their deviation from it. Such a system would include, by means of united trunk lines, the greatest possible extent of accommodation with the smallest outlay, and with the least interference with private property; it would contemplate, not solely the communication with distant towns or districts, however important in themselves, but would connect with that desideratum the consideration of the best modes of further extension to the more remote parts of the kingdom, so that whatever was done, however detached in the details, might all tend to the development of one general plan.

The matters for the consideration of such a commission would be of deep importance. I would therefore propose the nomination to it of persons of higher consideration than might be deemed necessary for the direction of ordinary engineer operations. I would take the liberty of suggesting that Mr. Drummond, the under secretary, who has intimated his readiness to be employed on the occasion, would be highly eligible on every account. He feels very great interest in the subject, possesses acquirements admirably adapted to the direction of the researches and the arrangement of the results, and could act, in conjunction with others, without detriment to his official duties, as the exercise of his judgment would be required, rather than the occupation of his time. I quite coincide with Mr. Drummond in the opinion that it would be desirable to have the assistance of some person eminent in the sciences which bear upon the various operations connected with railways, provided he be at the same time habituated to practical views, and to the study of the application of theoretical knowledge to practical objects. Such a person he considers would be found in Mr. Barlow, professor of mathematics to the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, a gentleman who has made many discoveries and researches of great value, and has been extensively consulted

by engineers and others on various practical subjects, and especially on points connected with railways. The general introduction of this principle of locomotion is of such recent date, that many very important doubts and difficulties yet remain unsolved; and although it would not be the object of this commission to go into details, still some judgment and discrimination on those points of doubt must be applied to the most general decision on the regulation of the best system to be adopted for national advantages. On matters of such a nature Mr. Barlow's knowledge and practice would be more particularly beneficial.

Another name suggesting itself for such an inquiry is that of Mr. Griffith, who is at the head of the General Valuation of Ireland. He is intimately acquainted with the topography of the country and with its natural resources, and is possessed of considerable practical knowledge of surveying and engineering.

I would recommend in addition, Captain H. D. Jones, of the Royal Engineers, as a member of the commission, or perhaps as secretary. He is at present in Ireland, employed on the Shannon Commission, has acquired some knowledge of the country, is an intelligent steady man of business, and has sufficient practical experience of the kind of operations to be undertaken, to render him useful in the regulation of the general arrangements.

I beg leave to add on a separate sheet, a few heads of the instructions that might perhaps be given to the commission on the above principles, if approved, and including some matters of public interest connected in a degree with the same subject.

It may be right to mention, that it is utterly impossible that any report from this commission can be laid before the government in time to enable parties to go to Parliament with their measures for the ensuing session, under the Standing Orders of both Houses. On the other hand, I am strongly of opinion that no project for a railway from Dublin (the natural root of any general system) could pay, and consequently ought to be encouraged, unless founded on a well considered combined effort; more particularly when it is manifest, from the numerous schemes which have been proposed, that they would all meet with opposition from the other conflicting interests.

Although the commission could not be usefully prepared for this next session, it would be most desirable that they should commence their operations as early as possible; as a great deal must be accomplished, not only by them, but by the government and by other parties, in order to turn their investigations to proper advantage.

I have the honour to be
Your Excellency's most obedient humble servant,
J. F. BURGOYNE.

From the Right Hon. T. SPRING RICE *to* Colonel BURGOYNE.

"Mount Trenchard,
October 6, 1836.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"I prepared a minute, which I have sent over, appointing the railroad commissioners.

"The persons named will be: Colonel Burgoyne (chairman), T. Drummond, Professor Barlow (if he can be got), Mr. Griffith, and Captain Jones as secretary.

"I hope this will do. But it would not do to include the question of steam navigation and harbours.

"Yours always,
"T. SPRING RICE."

The first report of the commission was made in March, 1837, and the second and final report in July, 1838.

From a letter written by Professor Barlow, which is quoted by Mr. McLennan, it appears that the portions of the second report written by the different members were as follows:

In the first part of the report, chapters 1, 2, and 3, 'On the Distribution and Employment of the Population of Ireland,' 'Nature and Amount of the present Traffic,' 'Existing Public Conveyances,' were written by Mr. Drummond, from returns prepared for him by Lieutenant Harness, R.E., and the constabulary.

Chapter 4, 'On the Geology of Ireland,' was written by Mr. Griffith.

Chapter 5 (the most important of the report) was the joint production of Colonel Burgoyne and Mr. Griffith. It is headed, 'Selection and Description of certain Lines of Railway which, from a consideration of the various Circumstances above enumerated, appear best calculated to prove beneficial to Ireland, and to afford the greatest Return on the Capital expended.'

The second part of the report 'On the Mechanical Principles of Railways, Cost of Construction and Maintaining, &c.," was written by Professor Barlow.

In Part III. the first two chapters on 'Steam Navigation' were written by Professor Barlow.

The third chapter, 'On the Projects proposed for effecting the most rapid Communication between London and Dublin,' was written by Colonel Burgoyne, from information collected for him by Mr. Vignoles, C.E.

The second section of this part, 'On the Present Condition of the Population of Ireland,' according to Professor Barlow, was written by Mr. Drummond; but parts of it bear so close a resemblance to the 'Letters on the State of Ireland,' published by Colonel Burgoyne in 1831, that it was probably written originally by the latter, and brought to its present shape by Mr. Drummond.

Chapter II. of this part, 'On the Influence of Railways in developing the Resources of a Country,' was written by Colonel Burgoyne and Professor Barlow; but Mr. Drummond wishing some difference in the arrangement, he recast it, and, retaining the facts, gave it the form in which it appears in the report.

It would be hardly an exaggeration to say that the

report, taken as a whole, was perhaps the most able document ever presented to Parliament, and it is certain that if the principles inculcated in it had been adopted, all the subsequent embarrassment of the railroad system in Ireland would have been averted.

The report, however, was no sooner in the hands of the public, than it was assailed on every side. The railway mania was then at its height; unrestricted competition was the fashion of the day; an active and influential body were interested in the large parliamentary and engineering expenses which sprang from this system, and nearly every newspaper and review had articles adverse to the propositions of the commissioners. On the subject of the sweeping censures passed upon their recommendations, Sir John Burgoyne has left the following notes amongst his papers:

The principal accusation was, that the commissioners have proclaimed to the world that railroads in Ireland will not pay above 3½ or 4 per cent dividend. It is not argued that their opinion is not well founded, but that by its being promulgated, capitalists from England will not enter into the concern; and this argument, if not direct, has been held by implication, even by statesmen—by Sir Robert Peel, Mr. O'Connell, Lord Clements, &c.

Surely it is not only unjust and illiberal, but bad policy towards Ireland itself, to encourage or even allow capitalists to enter into unprofitable concerns, and particularly when, by a judicious application, capital may be *favourably* expended. A certain immediate effect may be produced, but a want of confidence would be the result, which would eventually be most injurious, and such as Ireland is now suffering from, arising from similar proceedings; so much so, as to create doubts against entering upon the most legitimate undertaking.

It will be perceived that this censure is quite incompatible with another which has been passed upon us, viz., that of

jobbing, to put all these railroads into the hands of favoured individuals.

It is objected that the commissioners have proclaimed that *no railroads* in Ireland would pay more than the 3½ or 4 per cent. profit. But that is not the case. They state that such a *general* system as they propose and recommend would probably do no more at first, but that partial lines would; and they object to those partial lines, because, by leaving out the least profitable connecting portions, there would be no prospect of the latter ever being undertaken, and the country then left with a few short unconnected lines; that is, the public in general injured, to indulge a few parties in favourable speculations; and counteracting such proceedings is called the mischief of interfering with private enterprise.

J. F. B.

The Bill brought before the House of Commons by Lord Morpeth in the session of 1839, in order to carry out the recommendations of the commission, authorised the government to issue Exchequer bills for constructing railways in Ireland; the revenue from the railways, after the discharge of current expenses, to be devoted to pay 3½ per cent. interest, and 1½ per cent. sinking fund in discharge of the principal; any deficiency in net revenue to be charged on the county rate. It was proposed to commence with an appropriation of £2,556,000 for a railway from Dublin and Cork, and to place the whole under the management of the Board of Public Works for Ireland.

The objections made in Parliament by Sir Robert Peel and others, were to the effect that the execution of Irish railways by the state would be a violation of the principles on which the prosperity and enterprise of a commercial country depended; that the commissioners' report, although a very able one, did not justify government interference; that it would be unfair in government to enter into an unjust competition with private enterprise; that

they had no more right to employ the public money in such schemes than in the erection of cotton mills, &c.

Notwithstanding the opposition encountered by the measure, the government obtained a majority for it in the House of Commons; but a political crisis intervened, and the bill made no further progress.

A letter written by Sir Robert Peel to Mr. Drummond, who had sent him a copy of the report, will show the reasons which actuated that statesman in his opposition to the views of the commission. His mind appears to have been dominated by a fixed idea of the impolicy of discouraging private enterprise; and thus the interests of the community at large were sacrificed in favour of a system which consigned an absolute monopoly over the means of conveyance, to the hands of parties having no interest in the matter beyond their own pecuniary profit.

"Whitehall, March 8, 1839.

"SIR,

"I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th inst. on the subject of railways in Ireland.

"I regret to find in it a confirmation of my apprehensions that calculations of profit and loss, made by government officers (but which can be much better made at the suggestion of commercial enterprise and private speculation), would have a tendency to discourage the application of capital upon the principles on which it is ordinarily employed.

"I cannot have a doubt that, were it not for the fatal effects of systematic and interested agitation, the hope of gain and the prospects of local improvement would induce the capitalists of this country, and the landed proprietors of Ireland (availing themselves of the experience in respect to railways acquired in England, and of the advances in mechanical skill), to complete railways under proper legislative regulations, on those several lines of communication in Ireland on which they are now required, or on which, by stimulating activity and industry, they are likely to become useful.

"I know no better test of what is required, or of what is likely to become useful, than the prospect of remuneration to the parties concerned in these undertakings, judged of by their own acuteness and searching inquiry. Whether it would be fitting for the government to make temporary advances to companies actually formed, on the security of the tolls and works, and private capital of the undertakers, is a different question from that which has been submitted to Parliament, and into which it is not necessary to enter at present.

"I have the honour to be, Sir,

"Your obedient servant,

"ROBERT PEEL."

Notwithstanding the failure of the commissioners' scheme of 1839, and Mr. Drummond's premature death, which took place in the following year, Sir John Burgoyne persevered in measures to retain the construction and control of the Irish railways in the hands of the state. A change was gradually taking place in the public mind, occasioned in some respects by the gross mismanagement of railway boards; and Parliament and the Board of Trade had commenced a struggle with the existing railway companies, to establish some control over them, for the protection of public interests.

Advantage was taken of these circumstances to reopen the question in Parliament in the session of 1841, and a Bill was brought in by Lord Morpeth for the making and maintaining of public railways in Ireland, by means of funds to be provided by certain capitalists named in the Act. The interest of the money at 4 per cent. was to be guaranteed by Parliament, in consideration of which guarantee the promoters agreed to give up all interference in the execution and supervision of the works, which were to be placed under the direction of commissioners named in the Act, viz., Major-General Sir John Fox Burgoyne, Richard Griffith, Esq., and Colonel

Harry D. Jones. All profits beyond 4 per cent. were to be divided between the capitalists who found the money, and the counties benefited by the railways. There was much that was ingenious in this proposal, of which the prime author was Mr. Vignoles, the late president of the Institution of Civil Engineers. Mr. Vignoles had been in consultation with Sir John Burgoyne respecting the bill; but when it came to be printed, the latter appears to have disapproved of many of its provisions, and expressed his dissent in a memorandum to the lord lieutenant. The objectionable clauses could probably have been amended in committee, but the Bill was never destined to reach this stage. A change of government took place, and the proposition fell to the ground, with all the other measures of Lord Melbourne's administration.

The following year, Sir John Burgoyne drew up a proposal himself for the construction of Irish railways, by which the counties benefited were to give the requisite security for the moneys advanced.

The original manuscript of this proposal in Sir John's handwriting, is endorsed by the secretary for Ireland, "In my humble judgment nothing can be more judicious." But it obtained no support from government, and when brought before Parliament by Mr. Fitz-Stephen French, the member for Roscommon, it was opposed by Sir Robert Peel, who reiterated his former objections to any interference with private enterprise.

It was now evident that so long as Sir Robert Peel remained in power, it would be useless to bring forward any measure calculated to give government any effective control over the construction and management of railways, and this was the last effort made by Sir John Burgoyne with this object. Before a change of adminis-

tration took place, he had relinquished his post at the Board of Public Works in Ireland, and his attention had become absorbed in the military affairs of the kingdom.

The result of the application in Ireland of Sir Robert Peel's principles was thus summed up in 1866, by Dr. Hancock, the head of the Statistical Department in Dublin:

"There are at present in Ireland three railways bankrupt or winding up, two at a stand-still, ten paying no dividend on the ordinary shares, six paying no dividend on preference stock, seven whose dividends are less than those paid on government bonds, six paying dividends less than that of commercial interest, and but one (the Dublin and Kingstown) the shares of which are above par. Of 1881 miles of railway constructed, 500 were wholly unremunerative, while 1215 miles yielded an average dividend of 3·8 per cent."

The reasoning contained in the Irish Railway Report of 1839 was therefore completely justified by the result, and it is impossible to recall all the circumstances connected with this question, without being deeply impressed with the statesmanlike ability of the men who, against such powerful influences, strove to establish a system of state railways in Ireland. These were undoubtedly Mr. Drummond and Sir John Burgoyne. The former died in 1840, on the very threshold of a distinguished career, and Sir John Burgoyne, with his usual modesty, in a letter quoted by Mr. McLennan, has attempted to bestow all the merit upon him; but in this he is contradicted by the evidence of his own documents.

How entirely public opinion has changed round to the views held by these officers of Engineers in 1839, may be gathered from an extract from a leading article in the *Times* of the 4th of December, 1871:

"The railway system of these countries was deliberately built up on the theory that private enterprise legitimately encouraged would create healthy competition, and that competition would provide most satisfactorily for the service of the travelling public and the carriage of goods. In practice, as we know, the theory of competition has lamentably broken down, and all the projects of amalgamation which are now so rife are nothing more than feeble, hesitating, and painful attempts to get back to a position which was deliberately abandoned in 1844. We cannot now repair the mischief which was wrought by the mistaken calculations of Sir Robert Peel. Millions of money have been wasted, public convenience has been set at nought, and all for the sake of giving free play to competition. What the public has gained, let a dispassionate majority of passengers and freighters be asked to say. What the companies have gained, the directors of those important enterprises which are now seeking peace and union have told us already."

Before ten years had elapsed, the Irish railways were in difficulties, and the proprietors and directors were memoralising government for assistance. Sir John Burgoyne had left Ireland, but was asked to support the prayer of the petitioners, and wrote in consequence, the letter to Lord John Russell which follows:

Memorandum on a Memorial for Government Aid towards certain Railways in Ireland. Submitted to Lord JOHN RUSSELL, *March*, 1849.

WHILE it is most essential that in Ireland in particular, all public expenditure and extensive undertakings should tend to the greatest progressive and ultimate improvement of the country, it appears that a system of railways has been commenced on a scale greatly exceeding the probable demands of the country for many years, and many of them on principles that will ever prevent their being very remunerative.

It was not for want of sufficient warning that this reckless course was pursued, for the Report of the Irish Railway Commissioners, in 1839, offered a complete guide for the principles that might be adopted with propriety, and every deviation which has been made from the recommendations of that report, to satisfy partial or temporary views, has been in error, as seems to be gradually showing itself in the results.

The immediate consequence however is, that the proprietary, after a considerable outlay, begin to open their eyes to the almost certain prospect of failure of many of the projects, as pecuniary speculations. Advances are withheld—shares are unsaleable—and the operations are likely to remain incomplete, and therefore all the previous expenditure lost, unless government, as the only resource, shall step forward to their aid.

Government would naturally feel averse to lend encouragement to the increase of these errors in policy, and would consequently, I presume, be very cautious in supporting any such undertakings *ab initio;* but the case is essentially altered when great progress has been made, which, without support, will be entirely interrupted.

This state of things must be dealt with as it at present stands, and the question will be, how far government ought to go, to avert the great evil of leaving these undertakings, faulty or not, useless, after the great expenditure that has already been incurred on them.

I apprehend that this may be considered now as a money question, and that government might with propriety make advances towards most of these railways, *where there appears to be reasonable security for a regular payment of a moderate rate of interest on the loans, and an ultimate prospect of a return of the principal by instalments*—government having in all cases a first lien on the profits.

Some other conditions would be required, as a check upon these advances being turned directly or indirectly to other objects than those contemplated by government.

Some of them are offered in the printed paper accompanying the memorial; and the whole, with the calculated security, might be well worked out by the Board of Public Works in Ireland.

Much misapprehension exists in England as to the results of

lending money for public works in Ireland—the impression being that no return is obtained.

Adverting to the period before the late overwhelming distress forced on exceptional courses, and paralysed many existing establishments which were previously doing well, such might have been more or less the case, as regarded loans made by authorities in London, and under their imperfect information; but an investigation into those made by the Board of Public Works in Ireland, under their regulations, and subject to their close examination on the spot, would show that there has been good security obtained, not only for the repayments, but for the policy and system of those undertakings to which support was given.

The memorialists state that they do not require to avoid a due research into these considerations, and therefore these advances are not to be coupled with absolute contributions.

J. F. B.

In order to complete the history of the Irish railways without interruption, it has been necessary to outstrip some of the events in Sir John Burgoyne's life. Lord Morpeth, the secretary for Ireland, writes to him on the 30th of September, 1837: 1837.

"My dear Burgoyne,

"Though it is not a pleasant subject to write about, I have long been anxious that your merits should be recognised by some addition to your inadequate salary, consistent with parliamentary jealousy on points of economy. The Chancellor of the Exchequer acquaints me, that he is not enabled at present to make the necessary arrangement for a permanent increase, which however I hope is only delayed till he returns to London, but he has sent over a minute that the payment of £500 to you, for your extra exertions and services on the Railway and Shannon commissions, should be introduced in the Estimates of the ensuing year. You must be already apprised that every point we wish to establish in life, must generally be won by degrees.

"Very sincerely yours,

"Morpeth."

Office of Public Works,
1837. MY DEAR LORD MORPETH, September 30, 1837.

It may "not be pleasant to you to *write*," but it is very much so to me to *read*, the good opinion and intentions of yourself and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in my favour.

I shall receive gratefully, and as a boon, whatever you may feel justified in bestowing, and shall, as in duty bound, ever pray, &c.

Your Lordship's much obliged,
J. F. BURGOYNE.

1838. The brevet of 1838, on the occasion of the coronation of the present sovereign, gave him the rank of major-general; and a tardy recognition of his military services was rendered at the same time, by his nomination as K.C.B., just twenty-four years after he had earned this distinction, according to the rules laid down in 1814.

1839. A letter written by Lord Monteagle, on relinquishing the office of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1839, shows the estimation in which his civil services in Ireland were held at this period by his immediate superiors:

"Tonbridge Wells,
"MY DEAR SIR, September 7, 1839.

"Very many thanks for your kind letter of the 4th. I can assure you that any pleasure which you can have felt at the mode in which the business of the Treasury has been carried on in relation to the Board of Works, has been mutual on my part. There are very few acts of my public life which I look back to with such unmixed satisfaction, as the formation of your establishment. I suggested the plan in the report of 1830, and drew up every word of your original bill myself. But the success of the measure we owe to the selection of one to be the head of the office, who entered into the discharge of his duties with a just conception of what those duties were, and with a *rational enthusiasm* that would enable him to overcome the many obstacles which stood in his way. All this you have done, and have besides won and *wore* (though not wore *out*) the confidence of all parties.

"My excellent friend and successor, Mr. Baring, to whom I rejoice to see that my former duties are confided, knows and values you justly, and I have a perfect conviction that you will find the change that has taken place in Downing Street, one which will be for the benefit of all parties, &c. 1839.

"Believe me,

"With sincere good wishes, esteem and regard,

"Always and faithfully yours,

"MONTEAGLE."

In this year, Sir John Burgoyne was elected an honorary member of the Institution of Civil Engineers; the letter announcing his election stating that "The council and Institution feel that this tribute of respect is most justly due to your eminent acquaintance with the public works of a sister country, and to the interest which you take in the pursuit of the civil engineers."

A letter from Mr. Moffatt, M.P., who had charge of the measure in Parliament, will show the interest taken by Sir John in Rowland Hill's project of the penny postage, and the assistance rendered by him in forwarding this measure: Penny postage.

"London, 28 Fenchurch Street,
April 27, 1839.

"SIR,

"You were good enough to transmit to London in March, 1838, the results of a series of elaborate calculations and practical observations upon the change in the existing system of postage taxation, as proposed by Rowland Hill. That document came into my possession, and unfortunately was mislaid by me until after the parliamentary committee had closed its labours, so that it could not be introduced in evidence.

"Chancing the other evening to be in the company of the Chancellor of the Exchequer when the conversation turned upon your merits and abilities as a public officer, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, by awarding you a very large modicum of approbation, gave me the opportunity of referring to the aforesaid document, which he was pleased to express an anxiety to see, consequently it is transmitted to him this evening.

Penny postage. 1839.

"It affords me much pleasure to render this act of tardy justice to a valuable communication. I am not altogether without hope that Government may originate some measure on the subject in the present session.

"Your faithful servant,

"GEO. MOFFATT."

"To Colonel BURGOYNE."

As early as March, 1838, Sir John Burgoyne had been engaged in strenuously seconding Mr. Hill's project for a reduced postage. A memorandum of this date, which he gave to Mr. Pierce Mahoney, the member for Kinsale, concludes as follows:

On the whole, there appear to be very strong reasons to conclude that, by such complete and effective reduction in the rate of postage, the service will be readily carried on, and the revenue be very far from suffering any diminution; but any attempt at a half measure by a partial reduction only, would most certainly fail. Lowering the postage by one half will not produce double the amount of intercourse. The same considerations very nearly will weigh to impede letter writing, and the same may be said of any moderate reduction that leaves the cost of letters a subject of consideration; but if the reduction be made to the full extent proposed, it is difficult not to anticipate the most successful result.

1840. On Mr. Drummond's death in 1840, Sir John Burgoyne was strongly advised by his friends in Dublin to apply for the vacant under-secretaryship. His letters from London to Lady Burgoyne give an account of his interviews on this subject with the prime minister and other members of the government:

United Service Club, London,
May 21, 1840.

* * * * * *

We reached London at half-past six, and at seven I was refused admittance at Morley's Hotel. The new servants did

not know me, and looking on my old great coat with great contempt, *believed* they were very full. So I retired, and found shelter and a good bed at my old lodgings, Mrs. Robertson's, in Jermyn Street. I fell in with Stovin at the breakfast-table this morning. We talked on the under-secretaryship. I mentioned that he had been named; he said nothing, but smiled, and from what followed, I assume that something of that kind might have been negotiating, but that it was entirely ended. He says it has been offered to Le Marchant, who has refused, but it is supposed coquets about it, and wished to be *asked* and pressed to take it, at which Stovin is highly indignant. He seemed rather surprised at my wishing for it, but afterwards to understand my reasons, and pressed me vehemently to go and call on Lord Normanby—not at his office in the afternoon hurry of business, but made me promise to go this instant to his house in Hill Street, which I am about to do, but I hardly expect that he will be plagued by seeing me.

Applies for the post of under-secretary of Ireland. 1840.

2 P.M. Well, I think I have been a very good boy. I have seen Lord Normanby and Lord Lansdowne. As well as I remember, you did not require me to go to Buckingham Palace to have an interview with the Queen! The two lords were perfectly civil and cordial, but of course did not commit themselves by any indiscreet avowals; but to a sanguine temperament, each made a remark that might encourage a *hope* that is sufficient to remove *despair* of success. To each, amidst other conversation, I intimated that I was, among I supposed very many others, a candidate; that government might have many subjects before them to influence their choice; but that if it did suit *their* views to select me, it would suit *mine* to be the man; that I mentioned it, as the matter seemed to be still pending. Lord Normanby's observation that gives a hope was, "Yes, I believe it is still pending." Lord Lansdowne said, "Ah! a number of names have been mentioned, and among others, yours; indeed, yours was one of the first that occurred to me."

3.30 P.M. I have just called at the Irish Office; saw Norman. I am to see Lord Melbourne on public works affairs to-morrow.

London, May 23, 1840.

Interview with Lord Melbourne. 1840.

I don't know what you will have made out from my very hasty scrawl of yesterday, but I will endeavour to detail more methodically what passed.

I called at the Treasury on public works business. After the first greetings I sat down, and he looked at me for about half a minute without saying anything, but as if contemplating what to say; then abruptly, "You had an interview with Lord Normanby yesterday?" "Yes." "And you still remain of the same wish to succeed to this appointment?" "Most decidedly. The fact is that I do not find it convenient or comfortable to reside in Ireland, and unless I have a greater stake there and a greater inducement to stay, I must endeavour to get some other position elsewhere. Government must have many considerations to influence them in selecting for the appointment, and therefore I can have no right to be surprised should they choose elsewhere." I also offered myself with great diffidence, particularly after such a man; but still if it did meet the views of Government to appoint me, it would be very acceptable to *me*, and I thought there would be no harm in notifying as much. "Most certainly not," he replied; "when do you go off for France?" "On Sunday." "Hem! I am sorry it is so soon, but I would not on any account express a wish that should induce you to stay for what may very likely end in nothing." I said that a few days more or less made very little difference to me, and that I would remain till Wednesday (the day of the next steamer), or till Sunday following, without deeming him in any way pledged by it or at all responsible. "Oh! Wednesday will be quite late enough." He talked then of some public works matters, and gave me some papers to report to him upon. In the first part of our interview he desired that I would not attach any consequence to his remarks or inquiries. He seemed desirous of feeling his way, and of having means of turning the matter in his mind, and gave me the impression that he had doubts and some balance to turn between me and others. He adverted in direct terms to the old obstacle, and said that "it certainly was an unreasonable cause to put forward, but there were doubts and difficulties about finding a proper substitute for me in my present situation." I said that there

was no difficulty; that even supposing the business had been suited peculiarly to me, that now it was much easier to fill; much that was of difficulty had become matter of routine, and our operations much limited. At the same time, I thought it was of very great consequence, whenever my place should be vacant by any cause, that it should be filled by an officer of Engineers. I pointed out why, for certain professional reasons, that was really a matter of consequence; and so the matter rests. My feeling is on the whole rather sanguine. I think that although far from being decided, he would not have gone so far as he did, unless his impression in my favour had rather predominated. Lord Normanby too must have said a good word for me. 1840.

The vacant post was given to the late Mr. Norman Macdonald, private secretary to Lord Morpeth, the chief secretary for Ireland. 1841.

In 1841 Sir John Burgoyne was chosen referee in the dispute between the postmaster-general and the Birmingham and Derby Railway Company, relative to the amount to be paid by the Post Office for the conveyance of the mails between those two places, the original arbitrators—the late Mr. Robert Stephenson, acting for the railway company, and Captain Harness, of the Royal Engineers, for the postmaster-general — having been unable to come to terms. Sir John's decision is dated Dublin, the 2nd of June, 1841. He awards by it £14 13*s*. 2*d*. per diem to be paid to the company.

In 1843 and 1844, the question of the security of Ireland against the popular commotions excited by O'Connell, was occupying the attention of ministers. In the latter year, Sir John Burgoyne sent a memorandum on the subject to Sir George Murray, the master-general of the Ordnance, which affords a good specimen of a very rare quality of his mind, viz., the power of grasping the strategical features of an extensive country, 1843–44.

Memorandum on defence of Ireland. 1844.

and I very much doubt whether any man has exceeded him in this capacity. It is believed that this is the first occasion in which it had been demonstrated that the great central plain of Ireland forms the key to its military occupation, and that the peculiar physical conformation of the country, consisting of a large central plain surrounded by a contour of hills, has been the cause of the facility with which it has been subjugated, and afterwards held, by a comparatively small body of men. His own words are:

Another important subject for consideration will be, what influence the general features of the country may have on the disposition of the troops to meet any contingency.

Some of these are particularly favourable for multiplying the powers of a small force, and for giving it with safety an extensive sphere of action.

Ireland may be described, in a military point of view, as consisting of a large tract of plain country, including the counties of Dublin, Kildare, King's, Queen's, part of Tipperary, Longford, Westmeath, Meath and Louth, &c., surrounded by a mountainous contour.

Dublin, the capital of the country, with its excellent ports, is in every respect most conveniently placed for a *débouché* from Great Britain into that central plain.

It follows, therefore, that the organised army of the constituted authorities may be at once placed in the concentrated and central position, which, by the character of the country, is best suited to such a force, from whence it can be brought to bear at will upon any part of the stronger natural holds that insurgents might occupy on the circumference; and thus, if the attempt was general, break their combinations, and master them in succession.

In this view, it would not seem to enter into the combination that any point on the extreme circumference should be provided with a large force.

It is not unlikely that this document had an im-

portant bearing on Sir John's future career. Sir George Murray, as is well known, had acted in the capacity of chief of the staff during the greater portion of the campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, and in that office had frequently been thrown into intercourse with Sir John Burgoyne. They had not met for years; but this memorandum again brought him to his recollection, and reminded him that, buried in a remote corner of the kingdom and absorbed in civil duties, was a man possessing military qualifications of no common order, and the ultimate result of this communication was a letter from Sir George in the following year, offering him the post of inspector-general of fortifications, likely soon to be vacant by the resignation of Sir Frederick Mulcaster.

Appointment as inspector-general of fortifications. 1844.

The following letter, written at this time, will show the sense entertained by his colleagues and superiors at the Treasury, of the loss of his services in Ireland:

From Mr. MULVANY, *Commissioner of Public Works.*

"22 Craven Street,
July 5, 1845.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"Rumours had reached me before now of your proposed change, but when the reality came from Sir T. Fremantle, I will fairly confess I was as unprepared as if no such rumours had been previously circulated. It is a severance I most deeply regret for my own sake; for yours I rejoice at anything that gives you pleasure and promotion, as I have no doubt this does, or you would not accept it. I sincerely trust that nothing of the disgust which might be created in your mind by the want of the full appreciation of all you have done for your office and Ireland, has or will have any weight with you in deciding upon the change. I have often thought the energies and power you brought to the subject, and the vast amount of good you effected, were not appreciated to the extent I wished to have seen; but when your removal is mooted, then is evidenced the real feelings of the country, and, with some paltry exceptions, they are those of unqualified regret, and a feeling of the loss

that will be sustained by it. Sir Thomas Fremantle, Lord St. Germans, and others, have been most loud and warm in their expressions of regret. As far as posterity is concerned, I feel that your name will go down with even greater honour as the chairman of the Board of Works than in any position almost which may be attained in a military capacity; and with a jealousy which gratitude prompts, I hoped to see you consummate the labours you so enthusiastically went through for the benefit of Ireland, and to see the day when they would be fully acknowledged. I fear without you we shall be as a rope of sand.

"Yours ever, most faithfully and gratefully,

"R. MULVANY."

NATIONAL DEFENCES. 1845 TO 1847.

WHEN Sir John Burgoyne assumed the duties of Inspector-General of Fortifications, in 1845, he had just completed his 63rd year; he had therefore passed, by three years, the age at which it has been since proposed to place all officers of the army and navy, on a compulsory retired list. It is a proof of unusual vigour of mind and body, that the period of his greatest usefulness to the state, and of the services by which he will be best known to posterity, commenced at this time, and continued for twenty-three years afterwards. It must be admitted, however, that his constitution was exceptionally hardy; no amount of labour, physical or mental, appeared to fatigue him permanently. At this period, he was still fond of field sports, was an excellent shot, and for many years afterwards would join in his favourite game of rackets. 1845.

His natural predilections were in favour of a military career, in which all the first part of his life had been spent. Circumstances had led to his subsequent employment for thirteen years in a civil post, and the consequence of this break in his service was, that he brought back to the exercise of the military profession all the feelings of ardour of a young officer making his début in the service, with the unusual accompaniments of an enlarged military experience and high military rank.

The result was shown in the energy with which he

threw himself into the duties of his new office, and which, added to great natural abilities, placed him at once in the foremost rank, as the military adviser of the successive administrations of the day.

Memorandum on naval defences. 1845.

The first question to which he directed his attention was, curiously enough, a naval one. His memorandum, dated November, 1845, is headed, "Observations on the probable effect of the modern Applications of Steam Power on Military and Naval Operations." It was principally directed against the proposal to fit out reduced hulls of men-of-war as floating steam batteries with small steam power (block-ships, as they were afterwards called). He points out all the disadvantages of such a measure very forcibly: their great draught of water; the great means in men and armaments which they would absorb, and which could not be spared; that they would entail a cost altogether out of proportion to their efficiency; and recommends, in place of them, a system of gun-boats. His views did not prevail; it will be found that his views rarely prevailed at the time they were enunciated: a penalty which all men must pay whose opinions are in advance of their period. The block-ships were constructed, and manned for many years at great expense, until their inefficiency became apparent to every one, and they were broken up at the end of the Crimean war.

1846. His service in the Peninsula had impressed him with the great waste of power entailed by the want of instruction of our troops in the use of the musket, and during the early part of 1846, he was engaged in making experiments into the range, accuracy, and penetration, of the old musket, with the view of promulgating more exact information respecting the weapon, and of obtaining

a better instruction in its use. It will scarcely be believed, that up to this period, even the range of the weapon was unknown, and the officers of Engineers at Chatham were employed in obtaining the ranges at different angles of elevation, by simultaneous observations of the splash of the ball on the Medway, taken by two theodolites. The object of these experiments was to show the military authorities that the range of the musket was far greater than was ordinarily supposed (at 4° of elevation, it was found to be 600 yards), and to propose to them a systematic instruction in its use. His memorandum on the subject was given to the master-general in June, 1846. It points out that the musket was indisputably the most important of all the modern arms in use, and yet less skill was attained in it than in any of the others; that the neglect of the weapon was common in all armies at that time, and that the one that should first effect a considerable improvement in its musketry fire, would possess advantages over others, far greater than had hitherto been considered possible in modern warfare. It recommends the acquirement of ranges, the regular instruction of the soldier in target practice, and in judging distances, by placing another body of men before him in the manner now practised. His words are, "Let two lines of any strength, drawn up in close order, face outwards, and march from each other any number of paces each may be directed; then face inwards, and guess their distance asunder." The memorandum was forwarded to the Horse Guards; but remained a dead letter until the general introduction of the rifle into the service, when circumstances forced the subject on the notice of ministers and the public, and its recommendations were eventually carried out by Lord Hardinge.

Experiments in musketry. 1846.

1846. It will be seen from Lord Anglesey's letter, that the military authorities were entirely in favour of Sir John's views; but as they involved expenditure for ranges and ammunition, they were powerless in the matter, without the concurrence of the executive government.

"Beaudesert, October 8, 1846.

"My dear General,

"I wrote some time ago to the Duke of Wellington, to have his opinion upon the paper you put into my hands respecting the use of our muskets, and the amended charge for them.

"I thought them quite reasonable and desirable, and I am glad to find that he agrees.

"It is particularly necessary that a reduction of powder should take place, and that accurate experiments should be made upon all the matters pointed out, and that a commencement should be made without delay.

"I wish all this to be set about under the proper authorities.

"Believe me, truly yours,

"To Major-General Sir John Burgoyne, K.C.B." "Anglesey."[1]

From Lieut.-General Lord Frederick FitzClarence[2] *to* Sir John Burgoyne.

"Portsmouth, December 6, 1846.

"My dear Sir John,

"Many thanks for the book and manuscript on ball firing. May I take a copy of it? I find it so excellent that I have been studying it ever since I received it, and had the 52nd out and gave them the directions contained in it, and the practice was extremely good. I had them in line with ten targets, one opposite each company, 130 yards, and by firing *not too low*, the execution was great; and from having the practice on the shingle, I could see the direction and fall of

[1] Master-general of the Ordnance.

[2] Commanding troops at Portsmouth.

most of the shots. I am sure, with your directions, which are so much more simple than the French (which I showed you), I shall be able to bring the firing to perfection, if I can be supported. I have taken one of your ideas, the getting the allowance other districts can't use, and I have written to Lord Fitzroy, begging him to help me, as this command enables the ball practice in every *varied* situation, even in line of two regiments to be practised. I am getting iron targets made, much larger than the regulation size, which will enable me to see the effect of the firing much better than with those now in use. 1846.

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Offer of appointment on Railway Board. 1846.

Sir John had hardly settled down to his new duties, when a letter from the prime minister proposed to transfer him to another post. It will be seen from the correspondence between this date and that of the Irish Relief Commission of the following year, that it has fallen to the lot of few men to have their services so much sought after as happened to Sir John Burgoyne during this period.

"Wimbledon, August 29, 1846.

"SIR,

"As your distinguished services in analogous posts point you out as a fit person to hold one of the salaried offices on the Railway Board, I propose to you to serve with Mr. Strutt[1] as president on that board.

"The intention is, that the two salaried members of the board should be permanent.

"I shall be obliged to you for an early answer.

"I remain, &c.,

"J. RUSSELL."

84, Pall Mall, September 2, 1846.

MY LORD,

I feel highly honoured by your Lordship's very flattering offer of an appointment to be one of the salaried officers on the railway board.

[1] The present Lord Belper.

1846. I am entirely at the disposition of her Majesty's government for any service it may please to require of me; but if your Lordship's letter is intended to afford me an option, without giving offence, I would respectfully represent that I should greatly regret abandoning the office I at present hold, for the new appointment.

I beg to remain, &c.,
J. F. Burgoyne.

"September 3, 1846.

"Sir,

"I am very sorry that you should decline an office where I think your services would be of great use to the public.

"Your experience and familiarity with these subjects will have brought you acquainted with men who are competent judges of the formation and engineering difficulties of railroads, without being themselves engaged in them.

"If you could mention two or three such persons to me, I would consider whether we might not choose one as a substitute for you.

"I remain, &c.,
"J. Russell."

84, Pall Mall, September 4, 1846.

My Lord,

The first paragraph of your Lordship's letter of yesterday implying a degree of disapprobation of my declining an office "where it was thought my services would be of great use to the public," I trust that I may be allowed to explain my motives in a few words.

It scarcely exceeds a twelvemonth since I was appointed to my present position of chief officer of the corps in which my professional life was passed; having been selected in a very flattering manner from a long list of officers of character and distinction, of whom many were my seniors.

I have since enjoyed, in a gratifying degree, the confidence of the late and present master-generals of the Ordnance, and have

every reason to believe that my exertions have been to their satisfaction. 1846.

Your Lordship will understand that it would be incurring considerable risk to give up so favourable a position, and where I am performing duties, as would appear, to the advantage of her Majesty's service, for a new and very arduous employment, which although perhaps of somewhat greater emolument, I cannot consider of higher station or importance, and in which I might possibly fail.

I repeat, however, that I am perfectly ready to enter upon the charge, if your Lordship still considers it expedient, and the master-general is willing to relieve me in my present office.

To enable your Lordship to make such arrangements as you think proper, I now proceed to comply with the other part of your letter by laying before you the names of "two or three men who are competent judges of the foundation and engineering difficulties of railroads, without being themselves engaged in them."

* * * * * *

Woburn Abbey, September 8, 1846.

"SIR,

"I can assure you I did not at all intend to blame you for declining the office I proposed to you. My regret at the loss of your services may have induced me to use a phrase which conveyed that meaning. I am sorry if it was so.

"I am much obliged to you for the information contained in the latter part of your letter. My only doubt is, whether the public will not expect to see persons of higher military or civil rank on the board. There is, however, still some time for consideration.

"I remain, &c.,

"J. RUSSELL."

In the latter part of this year, Sir John Burgoyne drew up the letter on the defenceless state of the country, which, from its ultimate consequences, will probably be

Letter on the defenceless state of the country. 1846.

considered the most important of his many productions on the same subject. The danger of invasion to which this country would be exposed, if at war with France, owing to the introduction of steam-power, had long occupied his attention, and on the 7th of November, 1846, he addressed to the master-general his 'Observations on the possible Results of a War with France under our present system of Military Preparation.'[1]

The military condition of England at this time, was thus described by Sir John: "There may be in Great Britain and Ireland, perhaps, 30,000 regular troops, including infantry and cavalry; of which at least from 20,000 to 25,000 must remain for the protection of Ireland and of garrisons, &c., leaving not more than 5000 to 10,000 men disposable to oppose the efforts of more than ten times their number. It is believed that there is not in the whole British islands, a sufficiency of field artillery for the equipment of an army of 20,000 men, without admitting of any reserve whatever. The amount of small arms is quite unequal to a state of war, and of minor stores there is a total deficiency.

"To add to this defective condition, we are all but absolutely without that useful auxiliary in defensive warfare, namely, fortresses. Our dockyards alone have a semblance of being fortified; but the works are so imperfect that not one of them is pronounced, in the formal reports of the engineers, to be secure against a *coup de main*."

Having thus shown that the country was completely defenceless if an enemy's army were once landed, he proceeds to discuss the possibility of such an event, and shows that with the difficulty then experienced in

[1] This paper is published *in extenso* in the 'Military Opinions of Sir John Burgoyne.' Bentley, 1859.

manning our fleets, and the naval conscription of the French, it was more than probable that we might not have the command of the Channel at the first outbreak of war. 1846

Considered in the light of an official memorandum, the most remarkable part of this paper is its argumentative character. The military experience of the writer would have given him the right, without undue presumption, of merely stating the facts and his own opinion; but knowing the natural reluctance of his countrymen to be influenced by didactic authority, however eminent, he preferred to deal with the question by the use of arguments only. And the result showed his foresight; for the letter of the Duke of Wellington, which was written in answer to this memorandum, enunciating strong opinions on the subject, without supporting them by the arguments which had been brought forward by Sir John, produced an effect on the public by no means commensurate with the character and position of the writer.

Sir John Burgoyne's paper appears to have attracted the notice of the authorities as soon as it was issued; for it was ordered to be printed and circulated, as a confidential document, among the members of the cabinet. The most important effect, however, produced by it, as the sequel showed, was the conversion to its views of Lord Palmerston, who, adopting all the arguments contained in it, drew up the statement which follows, for the consideration of the cabinet. It will surprise most readers to observe how early in the day that eminent statesman had recommended a loan for the construction of fortifications. It appears from a letter from Lord Anglesey to Sir John, that the latter assisted Lord Palmerston in drawing up this memorandum; and it is probably owing to this circumstance that I am enabled to produce the document.

"B. D.[1] November 29, 1846.

"My dear General,

"Lord Palmerston is anxious to be in possession of still more detailed information than that with which I lately furnished the cabinet, in respect to the fortifications of our dockyards, and I wish therefore you would call upon him, and send in your name. And I think that you should not confine yourself to that of the dockyards only, but also to the most vulnerable points—to the Downs, for instance, and to Liverpool and to Edinburgh, and a sad number of et ceteras.

"I shall be in London probably in the course of this week.

"Believe me, truly yours,

"Anglesey."

Report on the Defence of the Country, submitted to the Cabinet by Lord Palmerston. *17th December*, 1846.

Memorandum by Lord Palmerston. 1846.

"The defenceless state of the country seems urgently to require some effective remedy, and such remedy ought to be determined upon before Parliament meets.

"It may confidently be affirmed that neither England nor any other first-rate power ever stood in such a condition of comparative military weakness as that in which the United Kingdom (to say nothing of our foreign possessions) is now placed.

"There is close to our shores a nation of 34,000,000 of people, the leading portion of which, it cannot be denied, is animated with a feeling of deep hatred to England as a power. Our neighbours are kind, civil, and hospitable to us individually, but the French nation remembers the Nile, Trafalgar, the Peninsula, Waterloo, and St. Helena, and would gladly find an opportunity of taking revenge. The two countries have in every part of the globe, interests commercial and political, which are constantly clashing, and the conflict between which may at any time on a sudden give rise to some discussion of the most serious and embarrassing nature.

[1] These initials at the commencement of Lord Anglesey's letters stand for Beaudesert, the seat of the Marquis of Anglesey, in Staffordshire.—Ed.

"We ought to be able at all times to deal with such a neighbour on equal terms; but in order to do so, we ought to be on an equal footing, if not in our means of offence, at least in our means of defence; but that is not our condition. Memorandum by Lord Palmerston. 1846.

"In regard to naval force, France may be said to be for present purposes on a par with us. We have certainly a much larger number of line-of-battle ships in ordinary than she has, though some of ours might on examination be found not fit for service. But France has as many liners at sea as we have; she has the means of adding to that number to a certain extent as readily as we could, and she is probably as well provided, or nearly so, with war steamers.

"But in regard to her land forces, she has a war establishment in time of peace; she has an army of 350,000 men; from which, deducting 100,000, who for the present are employed in, or appropriated to her African possessions, there remain upwards of 200,000 men at home and for her colonial service, of which probably more than 100,000 would at any time be disposable at a fortnight's notice for any particular service, and specifically for an invasion of this country in the event of a war.

"In addition to this force, France has above 1,000,000 of men enrolled as National Guards, of whom probably from 200,000 to 300,000 are armed, clothed, equipped and trained. The National Guard of Paris and its suburban districts alone consists of 80,000 men, who all by turns do duty. The frontier of France, by land and by sea, is surrounded by strong fortifications at every vulnerable point, and Paris is secured in the same manner against any sudden attack.

"The military stores of all kinds in France are ample, and they are all deposited in places of strength capable of defence.

"Railways are constructing, by the friendly aid of British capital, which will soon give the French great additional facilities for the transport of men and stores.

"If a war were to break out between England and France, it is not at all impossible that France, though really inferior as a naval power, might, by her superior means of naval preparation, bring such a fleet into the British Channel in the first fortnight or three weeks after a rupture, as to be for the moment in very superior numerical force. Suppose France were to send eighteen

Memorandum by Lord Palmerston. 1846.

sail of the line with troops on board from the Mediterranean to the West Indies, in the first period of a war. England must either send an equal fleet, that is to say, what might at the time be almost her whole fleet, to save her West Indian colonies, or she must keep her fleet at home to protect her own shores. If the fleet remained at home we should lose the West Indies. If it went to rescue our colonies, the French fleet, getting intelligence of our movements by fast-going steamers, might double back to Europe by a different track, present itself in the Channel, and, for a fortnight at least, have entire command of the narrow seas. And if that state of things were to last for ten days or a fortnight, she might land any amount of force she chose upon our coast. There is no reason why she should not in such a case throw 100,000 men, with horses and guns, into this country.

"But without supposing such an extreme, though very possible case, it is quite plain that her great command of steamers fit for the conveyance of troops, would enable France to transport at once a force of from twenty to thirty thousand men, starting either from Cherbourg, or from that and other ports in the Channel, with orders to rendezvous at a given time, at a given place; that one single night would be sufficient for their passage, and that no naval precautions which our existing establishments would enable us to take could with certainty intercept their course, or prevent them from reaching our coast; and there is a vast extent of sandy beach on the south-eastern coast of England, where a landing could be most easily effected.

"The whole extent of that coast is bare of any efficient batteries to oppose a landing. But even if all the coast defences recommended by the Duke of Wellington were finished, armed, and manned, they would not prevent the landing of twenty or thirty thousand men.

"The example of the landing effected by 13,000 British troops in Egypt, on a beach defended by troops and a large park of artillery, shows what may be done by an attacking force.

"The coast batteries would protect us from local insult by a small force, and would occasion loss to an invader, however

strong; but would not prevent him from making his landing good. Memorandum by Lord Palmerston. 1846.

"But suppose 30,000 men landed on the coast, what have we to oppose them? I will not deal with the other possible case, of the landing of a much larger army, because that would manifestly be, if not the conquest of the country, at least its ruin as a power for a century to come. We should have to subscribe to any terms which France might please to dictate, and she would take care to make them humiliating and crippling enough.

"But supposing the smaller force of 30,000 men landed, what have we to oppose to them? Why, after leaving the necessary garrisons at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Sheerness, Pembroke, Dover Castle, and other ports which could not be left empty, the very utmost that we could bring into the field south of the Thames would not exceed 14,000 men, infantry and cavalry included, and that calculation assumes that all the guards, horse and foot, should be marched from London, that all the battalions and most of the depôts in England and Wales should be got together, leaving the duty of London and the interior, the guarding of stores, escorts, &c., to be performed by the enrolled pensioners and by the police.

"If 30,000 or 40,000 French troops were to land on the coast of Sussex, within a fortnight or a month after a rupture with France, it may be asserted without fear of contradiction that with our present means it would be impossible for us to prevent them from marching in a few days to London, either with or without a battle. And let any man picture to himself the state this country would be in, with London occupied by an enemy's army, the court and the government put to flight, the public departments in the hands of the enemy, the bank plundered, the merchants under contribution, the public stores destroyed, all the business of the country paralysed, Woolwich and Deptford, and probably Sheerness burned. Suppose at the same time a diversion made by a smaller force landed in Ireland to prevent any of the regular troops in that country from being sent over to England; and who would undertake to say that such a French force once landed in England, might not, besides other damage, destroy Portsmouth and Plymouth dockyards, burn

Memorandum by Lord Palmerston. 1846.

the ships in ordinary, and paralyse for years the naval resources of England. They would for a time be masters of the country, and it is difficult to say how and when a force could be collected sufficiently strong to compel them to surrender.

"What, then, are the means of preventing such a calamity? Why, a large number of armed men. Nothing but armed men can defend any country with certainty. France has troops enough on her seabord for an invasion; she has steam vessels enough to bring them over; one single night is enough for the passage, and one single day quite enough for the landing. Our navy on its peace establishment cannot be sure of preventing the passage; our coast batteries, if we had them, could not effectually prevent a landing. But we have not a gun anywhere mounted that could fire a single shot at a landing force.

"The most effectual measure for the defence of the country would be a very large increase of the regular army, an addition of at least 30,000 men to our home garrison, with a reserve besides, to be called out when an emergency arose. But this is impossible. The country would not bear the expense of so large a regular force in pay all the year round. Nor would the feelings and habits of the nation admit of the maintenance of such a standing army in time of peace. Any small increase of the regular army would be useful, but would not adequately provide against the dangers which have been adverted to.

"We have then no other resource but to have a reserve, which should be organised, and to a certain degree trained, in time of peace, but which should be permanently embodied only in time of war; which, by being assembled under arms in time of peace for only a short period in each year, should cost comparatively little; but which, by having been organised and trained to arms in time of peace, should be to a certain degree an efficient military force when called out and embodied in time of war, and which should be liable to be so called out at a ten days' or a fortnight's notice at the approach of danger. Some such force would be a necessary addition to the regular army, even if that army could be increased in peace by 30,000 men; but the smaller the practicable increase of the regular army the larger ought to be the army of reserve: 100,000 for Great Britain and 40,000 for Ireland would not be too much to

deter an enemy from attempting an invasion. These numbers would bear about the same proportion to the present amount of population in the two islands, which the militia quotas of 1802 did to the amount of population existing then. Memorandum by Lord Palmerston. 1846.

"Many persons think that it would be dangerous thus to train to arms a part of the people of Ireland; but it is probable that the known respect of the Irish for the obligation of an oath would prevail, and that the men sworn in would be faithful. But the measure might for the present be suspended in Ireland, and be applied only to Great Britain, or a smaller number of picked men might be enrolled in Ireland.

"There would be an advantage of making the army of reserve a militia. The name, character, and organisation of the militia are familiar and already provided for by law; there is already a militia staff, which was last year rendered efficient, and which would be ready for drilling the men.

"Some modifications of the present system might be made. A large infusion of half-pay officers would be desirable, and qualification by property might be dispensed with for the other officers.

"Some persons think that the revival of the ballot would be unpopular. Ballot might be postponed as a last resource, and voluntary enlistment might first be tried.

"Perhaps it might not be possible to complete the force by this means; but if a part only were raised, and the system of a militia in time of peace was fairly launched, a great point would be gained. If these regiments, having a sprinkling of half-pay officers in each, had been trained for twenty-eight days for two years successively, they would be perfectly fit to be embodied, and to be mixed up with regiments of the line to meet an invading enemy. And the knowledge that we had such a force available for such a purpose, would probably prevent any such attempt at an invasion from being made. But unless such militia had been so trained, it would, when embodied, be merely an armed and organised mob, totally useless in the field for the first six weeks or two months; that is to say, during the period of the greatest danger.

"This is a measure of the most urgent and vital importance. Till it is adopted this empire is existing only by sufferance, and

Memorandum by Lord Palmerston. 1846.

by the forbearance of other powers. And our weakness being better known to others than it is felt by ourselves, tends greatly to encourage foreign states to do things calculated to expose us either to war or to deep humiliation. Surely there can be no duty more urgently pressing upon a government than to place the country which it governs in a position to defend itself; and if any mischance were to happen, what possible excuse could be made for the ministers by whose apathy and neglect the country had been left without adequate means of defence?

"But the difficulty, it is said, lies in the finance part of the arrangement. There is no money for the militia. The disposable surplus is small, and will entirely be absorbed by the slight augmentation to be made in the naval expenses, and in the military establishments, and by the cost of new works for fortifying the dockyards.

"The additions to the naval and military establishments will probably not be great; but the expense of fortifying the dockyards will certainly be considerable.

"Much is doing in this respect, but much more requires to be done. Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Sheerness will soon be defended by batteries which will secure them against any front attack from the sea by ships of war.

"Pembroke is as yet wholly without any defence of the kind. But when these sea defences are finished, Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Sheerness, will all be assailable from the land side by a body of a few thousand men, disembarked in the immediate neighbourhood, and provided with artillery for firing into the dockyards. Each of our dockyards can be fired into from points at present undefended, without its being necessary for the assailing force to take possession of any of the works now in existence, or now in process of construction. This requires immediate remedy, and plans have been made for detached works which would rescue our dockyards from such attacks.

"To place our dockyards in security against a *coup de main* by sea or by land would probably require a million; but this is a matter of indispensable necessity.

"The progress of these works is watched attentively by the

French, who have had an Artillery and Engineer officer at Portsmouth, and at our other arsenals, for several weeks of late. Memorandum by Lord Palmerston. 1846.

"But Woolwich, the great deposit for our military stores, is wholly open and undefended, and from its position on low ground, commanded by neighbouring heights, it is incapable of being fortified. It is not fitting that our principal depôt for military stores for an army and fleet should be so placed; our stores ought to be in some position in the interior of the country, and capable in some degree of being defended.

"Our southern coast requires batteries to command landing-places, and to protect anchorages, such as the Downs; and some such defences are needed for the Mersey, and for the Firth of Forth, not against a serious invasion but against a predatory incursion.

"We require harbours, which, under the name of 'harbours of refuge,' should be fortified stations for ships of war employed for the defence of our commerce and of our coasts. We require some of these in the Channel Islands, as well as on the coast of England.

"All these works are essentially necessary to enable our soldiers and our sailors effectually to defend the country against an enemy; but the cost of these various works cannot in the aggregate be estimated at less than five or six millions, at least if the projected harbour at Dover is included. These works, however, would require several years for their completion, even if all the money were ready as soon as wanted; it would probably take five or six years or more to finish them. But the longer it would take to finish them the more urgent is the necessity for beginning them, and for carrying them rapidly on, because the greater the chance that the day when they are wanted may come before they are ready.

"There seems no chance, however, that means may be found out of the annual surplus income to carry on these works as rapidly as it would be physically possible to do so.

"But these works are in the nature of permanent improvements to the freehold, the charge of which may justly be thrown upon the inheritance, instead of being wholly defrayed by the tenant for life.

"Loans in time of peace for annual expenses are most objec-

Memorandum by Lord Palmerston. 1846.

tionable, but a loan for the purposes of this kind would be perfectly justifiable. The security which these works would afford would be enjoyed by those who are to come after us, and it is just that they should bear their share of the charge.

"The loan would only need to be realised by instalments, and it might be made in terminable annuities; and if our financial condition should hereafter improve, the whole of it might not be necessary. But the annual charge of the interest would be trifling compared with the benefit to be derived from the works.

"The result of such an arrangement would be, that these works would be pushed on as rapidly as they could physically be executed, and that money would be available out of the annual surplus of the revenue for organising and for training at least a considerable portion of the militia, without putting off for another year a measure of primary necessity, and which would, not in less than two or perhaps three years after it began to be in operation, become effectual for its purpose.

(Signed) "PALMERSTON."

About the same time that Sir John was in communication with Lord Palmerston on the subject of the defences of the country, he forwarded a copy of his memorandum to the Duke of Wellington. This drew from the Duke the famous letter which excited so much controversy on its publication in the following year. This letter has frequently appeared in print; but as it is only to be procured by searching the files of the newspapers of 1848, and a life of Sir John Burgoyne would not be complete without it, I have thought it best to reproduce it here.

"Strathfieldsaye,
January 9, 1847.

Duke of Wellington's letter. 1847.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

"Some days have elapsed, indeed a fortnight has, since I received your note, with a copy of your observations on the possible results of a war with France, under our present system of military preparation.

"You are aware that I have for years been sensible of the alteration produced in maritime warfare and operations by the application of steam to the propelling of ships at sea. This discovery immediately exposed all parts of the coasts of these islands, which a vessel could approach at all, to be approached at all times of tide, and in all seasons, by vessels so propelled, from all quarters. We are in fact assailable, and at least liable to insult, and to have contributions levied upon us, on all parts of our coast; that is, the coasts of these, including the Channel, Islands: which till this time, from the period of the Norman conquest, have never been successfully invaded. Duke of Wellington's letter. 1847.

"I have in vain endeavoured to awaken the attention of different administrations to this state of things; as well known to our neighbours, rivals in power at least, former adversaries and enemies, as it is to ourselves.

"I hope that your paper may be attended by more success than my representations have been.

"I have above in a few words represented our danger. We have no defence, or hope of chance of defence, excepting in our fleet.

"We hear a great deal of the spirit of the people of England —for which no man entertains higher respect than I do; but unorganised, without systematic subordination established and well understood, this spirit, opposed to the fire of musketry and cannon, and sabres and bayonets of disciplined troops, would only expose those animated by such spirit to confusion and destruction. Let any man only make the attempt to turn to some use this spirit in a case of partial local disturbance. The want of previous systematic organisation and subordination will prevent him even from communicating with more than his own menial servants and dependents; and while mobs are in movement through the country, the most powerful will find that he can scarcely move from his own door.

"It is perfectly true that as we stand at present, with our naval arsenals and dockyards not half garrisoned, 5000 men of all arms could not be put under arms if required for any service whatever, without leaving standing without relief all employed on any duty, not excepting even the guards over the palaces and the person of the sovereign.

Duke of Wellington's letter. 1847.

"I calculate that a declaration of war should properly find our home garrisons of the strength as follows (particularly considering that one of the most common accusations against this country is, that the practice has been to commence reprisals at sea simultaneously with a declaration of war, the order for the first of which must have been issued before the last can have been published). We ought to be with garrisons as follows at the moment war is declared:

"Channel Islands, besides the militia of each, well organized, trained and disciplined, 10,000 men. Plymouth, 10,000 men. Milford Haven, 5000 men. Cork, 10,000 men. Portsmouth, 10,000 men. Dover, 10,000 men. Sheerness, Chatham and the Thames, 10,000 men.

"I suppose that one half of the whole regular force of the country would be stationed in Ireland, which half would give the garrison for Cork. The remainder must be supplied from the half of the whole force at home stationed in Great Britain.

"The whole force employed at home, in Great Britain and Ireland, would not afford a sufficient number of men for the mere occupation and defence, on the breaking out of war, of the works constructed for the defence of the dockyards and naval arsenals, without leaving a single man disposable.

"The measure upon which I have earnestly entreated different administrations to decide—which is constitutional, and has been invariably adopted in time of peace for the last eighty years—is, to raise, embody, organise and discipline the militia, of the same numbers for each of the three kingdoms united as during the late war. This would give a mass of organised force amounting to about 150,000 men, which we might immediately set to work to discipline. This alone would enable us to re-establish the staff of our army. This, with an augmentation of the force of the regular army, which would not cost £400,000, would put the country on its legs in respect to personal force, and I would engage for its defence, old as I am. But as we stand now, and if it be true that the exertions of the fleet alone are not sufficient to provide for our defence, we are not safe for a week after the declaration of war.

"I am accustomed to the consideration of these questions, and have examined and reconnoitred over and over again the whole

coast from the North Foreland, by Dover, Folkestone, Beachy Head, Brighton, Arundel, to Selsey Bill, near Portsmouth, and I say that, excepting immediately under the fire of Dover Castle, there is not a spot on the coast on which infantry might not be thrown on shore at any time of tide, with any wind, and in any weather; and from which such body of infantry thrown on shore would not find within the distance of five miles a road into the interior of the country through the cliffs, practicable for the march of a body of troops. Duke of Wellington's letter. 1847.

"That in that space of coast, that is, between the North Foreland and Selsey Bill, there are not less than seven small harbours or mouths of rivers, each without defence, of which an enemy, having landed his infantry on the coast, might take possession, and therein land his cavalry and artillery of all calibre, and establish himself and his communication with France.

"The nearest part of the coast to the metropolis is undoubtedly the coast of Sussex, from the east and west sides of Beachy Head, and to Selsey Bill.

"There are not less than twelve great roads leading from Brighton upon London, and the French army must be much altered indeed since the time at which I was better acquainted with it, if there are not now belonging to it forty *chefs d'état-major général*, capable of sitting down and ordering the march to the coast of 40,000 men, their embarkation, with their horses and artillery, at the several French ports; their disembarkation at named points on the English coast, that of the cavalry and artillery in named ports or mouths of rivers; and the assembly at named points of the several columns; and the march of each of these, from stage to stage, to London.

"Let any man examine our maps and road books, consider of the matter, and judge for himself.

"I know of no mode of resistance, much less of protection, from this danger, excepting by an army in the field capable of meeting and contending with its formidable enemy, aided by all the means of fortification which experience in war and science can suggest.

"I shall be deemed foolhardy in engaging for the defence of the empire with an army composed of such a force of militia. I

Duke of Wellington's letter. 1847.

may be so; I confess it. I should infinitely prefer, and I should feel more confidence in, an army of regular troops; but *I know* that I shall not have these. I may have the others, and if an addition is made to the existing regular army allotted for home defence, of a force which will cost £400,000 a year, there would be a sufficient disciplined force in the field to enable him who should command to defend the country.

"This is my view of our danger and our resources.

"I was aware that our magazines and arsenals were very inadequately supplied with ordnance and carriages, arms, stores of all denominations, and ammunition.

"The deficiency has been occasioned in part by the sale of arms, and of every description of ordnance stores from time to time since the termination of the late war, in order to diminish the demand of supply to carry on the peace services of the Ordnance; in part by the conflagration of the arsenal which occurred in the Tower some years ago, and by the difficulty under which all governments in this country labour in prevailing upon Parliament in time of peace to take into consideration measures necessary for the safety of the country in time of war.

"The state of the ordnance, arms, ammunition, &c., in magazine is in part a question of expense, and perhaps, in some degree, one of time.

"I would recommend to have the alphabetical list of the stores examined by a committee, and made out in a form, as upon the enclosed half sheet of paper, by ascertaining what there was was in 1804, and what there is in store now of each article, and the difference between the two accounts.

"I have taken the year 1804 as the standard, as that was the year in which the invasion was threatened; it was previous to the employment of the armies in the Peninsula or North America. In short, as nearly as possible similar to the political circumstances in which we stand at this moment; excepting that we are now at peace with France. We were then at war.

"A fourth column would be the estimate of the expense of bringing the magazines to the state in which they were in 1804.

"With this information before him, the master-general could give the government accurate information of the wants of

ordnance, arms, ammunition, and stores in the magazines of the country. Duke of Wellington's Letter. 1847.

"You will see from what I have above written, that I have contemplated the danger to which you have referred. I have done so for years. I have drawn to it the attention of different administrations at different times.

"You will observe likewise that I have considered of the measures of prospective security, and of the mode and cost of their attainment; how such knowledge can be acquired. I have done more, I have looked at and considered these localities in great detail, and have made up my mind upon the details of their defence.

"These are questions to which my mind has not been unaccustomed. I have considered and provided for the defence, the successful defence, of the frontiers of many countries.

"You are the confidential head of the principal defensive department of the country. I will, if you and the master-general of the Ordnance choose, converse or otherwise communicate confidentially with you upon all the details of this subject—will inform you of all that I know, have seen, and think upon it; and what my notions are of the details of the defensive system to be adopted, and eventually carried into execution.

"I quite concur in all your views of the danger of our position, of the magnitude of the stake at issue.

"I am specially sensible of the certainty of failure, if we do not at an early moment attend to the measures necessary to be taken for our defence; and of the disgrace, the indelible disgrace, of such failure; putting out of view all the other unfortunate consequences, such as the loss of the political and social position of this country among the nations of Europe; of all its allies, in concert with, and in aid of whom, it has, in our own times, contended successfully in arms for its own honour and safety, and the independence and freedom of the world.

"Where did any man hear of allies of a country unable to defend itself?

"Views of economy of some, and I admit that the high views of national finance of others, induce them to postpone

Duke of Wellington's Letter. 1847.

those measures absolutely necessary for mere defence and safety under existing circumstances: forgetting altogether the common practice of successful armies, of *all* armies in modern times, imposing upon the conquered, enormous pecuniary contributions, as well as of other valuable and ornamental property.

"Look at the course pursued by France in Italy and Germany, and Russia.

"At Vienna repeatedly, at Berlin, at Moscow, the contributions levied, besides the subsistence, maintenance, clothing, and equipments of the army which made the conquest. Look at the conduct of the Allied army which invaded France, and had possession of Paris in 1815. Look at the account of the pecuniary sacrifices made upon that occasion under their different heads of contributions; payments for subsistence and maintenance of the invading armies, including clothing and other equipments; payment of old repudiated state debts; payment of debts due to individuals in war in the different countries of Europe; repayment for contributions levied; and movable and immovable property sold in the course of the Revolutionary War.

"But such an account cannot be made out against this country. No! But I believe that the means of making some demands would not be wanting. Are there no claims for a fleet at Toulon in 1793? None for debts left unpaid by British subjects in France, who escaped from confinement under cover of the invasion in 1814 by the Allied armies? Can any man pretend to limit the amount of the demand on account of *contribution de guerre?*

"Then look at the conditions of the treaties of peace of 1814, 1815.

"France, having been in possession of nearly every capital in Europe, and having levied contributions in each, and had in its possession or under its influence, the whole of Italy, and Germany, and Poland, is reduced to its territorial limits as they stood in the year 1792.

"Do we suppose that we should be allowed to keep, could we advance a pretension to keep, more than the islands composing the United Kingdom—ceding disgracefully the Channel Islands,

on which an invader had never established himself since the period of the Norman Conquest? Duke of Wellington's Letter. 1847.

"I am bordering upon seventy-seven years of age, passed in honour.

"I hope that the Almighty may protect me from being the witness of the tragedy, which I cannot persuade my contemporaries to take measures to avert.

"Believe me,

"Ever yours most sincerely,

"WELLINGTON."

IRISH RELIEF COMMISSION.

Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

SIR John Burgoyne's practical endeavours to improve the defensive condition of the country were interrupted at this juncture by the impending famine in Ireland. The Duke of Wellington's letter had hardly been placed in his hands, when Lord John Russell sent for him, and proposed that he should proceed to Ireland as president of a board to be formed for the administration of the funds voted by Parliament for the relief of the distress in that country.

The failure of the potato crop had suddenly deprived the great bulk of the Irish population of their staple food, and a famine appeared so imminent, that during the session of 1846, a large sum of money had been advanced by Parliament to alleviate the distress in the country by the purchase and distribution of food, and the employment of the population on public works. During the autumn of 1846, it became evident that the magnitude of the calamity had been underrated, and that the ordinary departments of the Irish government would be unequal to the emergency; it was therefore determined to send a special commission to Ireland, with enlarged powers, to be given them by an Act of Parliament, which was to be passed as an urgent measure at the commencement of the ensuing session.

Pursuant to these intentions, a letter dated the 28th of January, 1847, from the Home Secretary, Sir George

Grey, to the lord lieutenant, instructs the latter to constitute a board, of which Major-General Sir John Burgoyne was to be president, and the members were to consist of the under-secretary to the lord lieutenant (Thomas Redington, Esq.), the resident Poor Law commissioner (E. T. Twisleton, Esq.), the chairman of the Board of Works (Colonel H. D. Jones, R.E.), the inspector-general of the Constabulary (Colonel Duncan McGregor), and the head of the Commissariat Department in Ireland (Sir Randolph Routh). Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

A letter from Mr. Labouchere, the secretary for Ireland, shows the reasons which actuated the government in selecting Sir John Burgoyne for this employment, and their sense of the sacrifice of personal considerations which he made by accepting the commission.

"Irish Office, January 26, 1847.

"My dear Sir,

"I cannot help writing to you to say with how much pleasure I heard from Lord John Russell that you had consented to go to Ireland in the present distressing circumstances of that country. I am sure that your assistance to the lord lieutenant at this juncture will be productive of the best results, and your name will inspire more confidence and respect than that of any other man who could have been selected for the difficult task which you have undertaken. In common with every other member of the government, I am fully sensible of the obligations which both the country and we are under to you, for the sacrifice of personal comfort which you have made for the public good.

"I hope to have the pleasure of seeing you before your departure.

"Believe me, &c.,

"H. Labouchere."

The official letter from the Treasury to the Board of Ordnance, states that "Major-General Sir John Burgoyne's intimate knowledge of Ireland, and the confidence

Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

with which he is regarded in that country, have induced her Majesty's government to select him to be the head of a temporary commission about to be appointed for the adoption of further measures for the relief of the distress arising from the scarcity in that country;" and their lordships request "that the master-general and board will place Sir John Burgoyne's services at their disposal for such period as they may be indispensably required for the above-mentioned object."

In reply to this letter, the master-general states his concurrence in this arrangement, but "begs to express his anxiety that this officer may be allowed to return to his official duties at the Ordnance with as little delay as possible, as his services on very important matters are eminently required."

The Irish Relief Commission of 1847 is probably the most comprehensive measure to meet a great national calamity that has ever been set on foot. At the period of maximum distress, the Board distributed 2,920,792 rations daily in addition to 99,920, which were paid for. To carry out this extensive system of relief, the country was divided into 1826 districts, in each of which a local relief committee was elected, To these "electoral divisions," as they were termed, was attached a paid officer of the Board, who was styled the "inspecting officer," and in the selection of these, care was taken that they should not be in any way connected with the locality in which the relief was dispensed.

Notwithstanding these precautions, it was found impossible to prevent great abuses arising in the distribution of the food; and reference being made to some of these in the third report of the commissioners presented to Parliament, produced more than the usual amount of Irish invective and recrimination. In justification of

the report, I find the following notes, taken by Sir John from the statements made by the inspecting officers: Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

"At F——, several tenants of one of the Finance Committee, holding land and stock, and their last half year's rent paid, received rations, with his knowledge.

"At K——, the inspecting officer himself struck off 363 daily rations from the lists of one committee, and 260 from another. Among the former, the families of the coachman and gardener of a justice of the peace, and among the latter all the labourers of the vice-lieutenant of the county.

"At B——, the chairman of the Relief Committee directed provisions to be issued from the stores of the committee, for his own labourers.

"At L——, the chairman of the Finance Committee was charged with being concerned in a fraud (adulteration of corn) in a mill with which he was connected; in consequence of which he resigned, and is to be indicted before a court of law.

"At D——, a riot at the soup depot; the bread stolen, clerk knocked down, inspecting officer insulted, &c. The chairman of the committee at the head of the mob proclaiming that the provisions were bad; whereas the officer examined them, and found them perfectly good.

"At C——, a poor law guardian and one of the committee directed a watch to be kept over eleven bags of biscuit, for a night. The watch consisted of himself, his son, a brother, and a son-in-law, who in the morning voted themselves one bag of biscuit (112 lbs.) for their night's service."

In addition to these obstacles, it was considered necessary, in order to prevent the demoralisation of the labouring class, to employ the able-bodied men who received relief, on reproductive works; but the amount of positive reproductive labour which could be imposed upon a half-starved population, within a sufficiently easy distance of their dwellings, was very limited; and in default of this, gangs of men were employed on the improvement of the roads, and other work, the reproductiveness of

Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

which was far too indirect to be appreciated by the Irish landlords, whose lands would be taxed to repay the cost of these measures; and a loud outcry was raised against the commission on this ground.

Another and greater difficulty experienced by the commission, arose from the pressure put upon them by the English Treasury, to obtain some security for the repayment of the loan, by the imposition of new rates upon the country during this period of its greatest impoverishment. On the 22nd of May, Sir Charles Wood, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, writes to Lord Anglesey, who had been urging Sir John's return to the Ordnance Office:

"The enforcing of these rates is, I conceive, our best and only security for a due administration of the relief funds; and I should think our chance of success very much endangered, if Sir John left Dublin before the system of collecting the rates was fairly brought into exercise."

Sir John, however, was averse to levying rates in advance, as required by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and in reply to representations on the subject from the Treasury, wrote the following exhaustive and statesman-like remonstrance:

From Sir JOHN BURGOYNE *to* C. E. TREVELYAN Esq., Assistant Secretary to the Treasury.

Dublin, June 18, 1847.

MY DEAR SIR,

The views of the Chancellor of Exchequer, as intimated in your letter of the 15th, take us very much by surprise. They call for a different course of proceeding in many essential points from what we have adopted, or from what would have at all met the case for which the Temporary Relief Act was passed.

He seems to consider that we should have required the districts on the eastern side of Ireland to have advanced the funds at once for the support, under the Act, of the increase of

the destitute, or within a very short period, during which some small advances might have been made to them on loan. Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

This, however, was not to be done; the distress had gained a great height when we began our operations, while the poor law rating was still on the old system, of providing only for the support of those that could be contained in the poor house.

It was impossible that the guardians could be prepared at once to support *eight or ten times* that number, and without any previous warning.

This affected the east, or comparatively easy circumstanced districts, as well as the west, for in *all* there are great numbers of a cottier tenantry thrown into destitution by the failure of the potato; new rates therefore were necessarily to be levied, and on an extraordinary scale, to meet the emergency; and that could not be done in less than two or three months, nor even so soon, without creating the greatest confusion in connection with the then state of the levies.

Take Dublin itself: the poor-houses of its two unions are adapted for about 4000 paupers, while from the ordinary accumulation of wretched want (always most imperfectly provided for) and a great influx from the country, the relief lists of the city alone contain 30,000 *more*, now to be provided for; and the most urgent appeals were made to the commissioners in very early days by deputations and newspapers, to save the people from starvation, by expediting the relief afforded by the Act, and if it had not been done I can well believe, particularly from the subsequent rise of fever in the city, that we might have had Dublin itself figuring as a Skibbereen.

There is a great degree of distress to be provided for in the eastern side among the agricultural population, as well as in the interior and west; in some parts of Wicklow, for instance, there will be an enormous pressure, but the districts on this side are very unequally circumstanced.

There are some where, from previous good system, the absence of any negligent landlords, the immediate effect of public works, and the prominent exertions of some sensible man at the present moment, the pressure is very light; such is no doubt the case in Mr. More O'Ferrall's district, arising from some, or perhaps all, of these peculiar causes; but these are exceptions,

Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

and only show what might have been the case in many more situations, but are no indications whatever of what may be done with the whole now as we find them.

I fear you will find that it is a mistake to suppose that the new poor law "*will afford the means of saving people's lives.*"

In *many* districts in the west and interior, and perhaps some in the east, I think it will be impossible to collect rates that will for a few years save many even from starving; taking the time it must require to absorb the present amount of the distressed class in the districts where the property itself is ruinously depressed, I do not see how the appropriation of the entire even of the proceeds of the property can support their poverty.

There is one matter of essential importance to look to in time for all parts, which is, that to carry out the designs of the new poor law—of a direct provision for all during the period of extensive want that is still to succeed—it will be absolutely necessary that the funds should be *in advance*, and not to be raised in the lingering manner at present customary; otherwise you will have the same scenes of starvation overwhelming the land, even where there may be means, by a provident arrangement, of preventing it.

If I may be allowed to say so, I think you make your laws and argue in London, more on considerations of what might reasonably be expected, than what absolutely can be done in Ireland.

The effects of a five-shilling rate will be a collection from some individuals; neglect, with active and passive resistance, from the great mass, arising not so much from the objection to the principle, as from the severity of the effects of the payment in their depressed condition; while all the agricultural lower rate-payers will be totally without means to pay; nor will the produce of their small holdings, as now cultivated, improve the case, even after harvest, considering every other demand upon them for more immediate wants.

With regard to the question of grants, it is admitted that they must be made in aid of the loans on rates to the western country; but the present explanation of the Chancellor of Exchequer is that they should not have been given to the districts capable of self-support.

This in fact would be to exclude grants altogether in aid of

private local subscriptions, for it is only to relieve the rate-paying that any subscriptions are now entered into. Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

Where the levies therefore must be limited to such a *fixed amount* as it is considered can be raised, there can be no inducement to raise subscriptions, which are confined to the districts that would otherwise have the entire charge laid upon them.

A boon was therefore held out to local subscriptions as a matter of policy, in order to encourage a spirit of voluntary self-dependence, and as an incentive to the more strict administration of the funds, which would naturally follow an expenditure of money obtained from such a source.

And after all, the grants in aid of subscriptions have as yet amounted to only £6000 or £7000, in lieu of at least double, which would have been required as loans.

The sums to be provided on account of the measure will no doubt be very large; but considering that the advances actually paid to the committees up to this period (past the middle of June) does not exceed £500,000, they cannot be deemed to have been very much pressed forward.

As I cannot perceive that many of these views of the Chancellor of Exchequer can now be adopted without such an extreme alteration of system as will throw an entire discredit on all our operations, and in some measure reflect on the Treasury, as having been cognisant of them, as well as occasion sudden great distress where reliance has been placed on government advances; I can only take them as expressive of the disapprobation of the Treasury at the course we have pursued, which I greatly regret, and will willingly correct, as far as we still have the power.

In reply to this letter, the Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote on the 22nd of June, that no intention existed of casting any blame on the proceedings of the commission; but the government was blamed in the House of Commons for wanton expenditure, and the amount of rates collected in the better parts of Ireland was very trifling, and the ratio much less than that levied habitually in many parts of England.

In the meantime, the master-general of the Ordnance

Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

had been pressing the government to hasten Sir John's return to London, and the correspondence on this subject gives some insight into the immense amount of personal labour entailed upon the latter by the task he had undertaken:

"Ordnance Office, April 30, 1847.

"My dear General,

"I wrote to Lord John Russell to urge your early return. I inclose his answer. Mine to him is as follows: 'I willingly close with your proposition, but pray keep time.' Now, if they let you off in six weeks, it will do very well. In the meantime I shall wander out in the *Pearl*, which is just ready, and look about the Thames, and Medway, and Harwich, and sink piles for forts off Sheerness, and so forth; and then we will go together and look at the Channel Islands, *if they are still belonging to us*. I am truly sorry for poor Bessborough.

"Faithfully yours,

"Anglesey."

"Major-Gen. Sir John Burgoyne, &c."

"April 30, 1847.

"My dear Lord Anglesey,

"I am very sorry, but we really cannot spare Sir John Burgoyne at this moment. The loss of poor Bessborough makes Burgoyne's remaining in Ireland doubly necessary. You have excellent officers at your command. Choose the one in whom Burgoyne will have the greatest confidence, and let us keep him for six weeks longer.

"Ever yours,

"J. Russell."

"The Marquis of Anglesey."

Dublin, May 3, 1847.

My dear Lord Anglesey.

I am extremely obliged to you for the considerate view you take of my position. My first public duty is to the Ordnance; my tastes, propensities, and old and habitual pursuits lead the same way. I have also every possible inducement at the present time to cling to that service, while it

shall be carried on under your favourable and personally kind auspices. Nothing therefore would induce me to throw out the slightest hint to encourage my being detained here. And yet, I cannot help feeling that nothing could prevent very grave inconveniences from arising in this country, from my removal in the midst of this operation, but a long introduction into the business by whoever would replace me; and even then, shades of difference in principles between us would lead to great confusion, and to an appearance of instability of purpose which your experience of Ireland will lead you to understand would be caught at as objects for censure or animadversion. Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

From the composition of this commission, every other member being deeply charged with heavy departmental duties, I have necessarily all the details and correspondence upon me, the latter very extensive and multifarious, involving many nice matters of policy; and where cases are every day wrought out with an ingenuity, as if expressly to entrap me into some inconsistency, you may conceive the difficulty of all at once consigning such a business to another head.

I am, indeed, so sensible of this, that I dread being incapacitated by some accidental illness or circumstance, even for a day, not for fear of the business not being carried on well, but from risk of want of uniformity of purpose.

* * * * * *

Calamity still overruns the country, moderated in the east, but increasing in intensity as you go west. West Cork and Mayo are the worst.

With the means which have been expended, the sufferings of the people and the evils would have been experienced in a far less degree, were they not so perfectly helpless in assisting themselves. All those who are capable of working, are either so demoralised as to think of nothing but jobbing for self profit; or, if of better feelings, are intimidated, and without the energy necessary to oppose manfully the evil-doers.

These are the obstacles which prevent my commission from working satisfactorily. We form general rules on sound principles, and they bring before me daily numerous exceptional cases which require peculiar treatment, that militates against a good permanent system, and then complain loudly that we will

Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

not regulate for some temporary convenience, by implanting a lasting abuse on the country. Our great battle now is to maintain our determined resistance to giving relief from a general public fund in aid of wages. They ask us, what is a man with a large family to do with sixpence or eightpence per day wages? without at all calling into question the propriety of giving more wages, or of making any local charitable arrangement in favour of large families. Everything is to be done by the public, and if possible by government, and our regulations are to leave openings for every species of abuse and demoralisation.

Yours, &c.,
J. F. BURGOYNE.

A few weeks later, Sir John Burgoyne himself appears to have considered that his presence might be spared in Dublin, and to have made some representations on the subject, but a letter from Mr. Trevelyan, of the 30th of July, says:

"The Chancellor of the Exchequer and myself entertain at present in the strongest manner the view expressed in my separate letter of this date, and in a previous letter, about your remaining for a time longer at Dublin, and Lord John Russell, although anxious, as we also are, that you should return as soon as you possibly can, is quite persuaded and of the same mind. It is natural that your fellow-commissioners should think that they could do themselves what has to be done, and so most likely they would; but the view which impresses itself so strongly on us is, that this is a very critical period in Ireland; that there is likely to be a severe pressure; that any mistake now could not easily be corrected; and that we want the *safety* and *security* for the public interests which your presence there affords. This is the view entertained here according to the present position of affairs in Ireland; but things may, of course, so turn out as to alter our views."

The allusion in this letter to the critical nature of the period, referred to the necessity of shortly throwing on

their own resources the 3,000,000 of people who were receiving relief. The period for the termination of advances from the English Treasury had been absolutely fixed by the Act of Parliament for the end of September. By that time it was calculated that the new crops would be gathered, and care had been taken to place as much land as possible under tillage during the spring and summer of 1847, large quantities of grain having been imported for that purpose. Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

During the summer, the correspondence from the Treasury became more and more urgent upon this subject. In answer to a letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John writes:

Dublin, June 26, 1847.

DEAR SIR,

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 22nd, and am most anxious to carry out to the fullest extent all your views.

When your suggestions are for proceedings *prospectively*, we can readily adopt them; but when they refer to bygone transactions, or to matters that it is too late to correct, I have only to explain our motives as an excuse.

I am doing everything I can to check our expenditure, by withholding, or more generally reducing, the supplies, on the appearance of irregularities; but I quite agree that it will be most advisable to discontinue the operations under this Temporary Relief Act as early as possible.

We are now issuing a general warning to committees to be prepared to close their issues and accounts on the 15th of August (before which they ought to be reduced), from which time the country must look to the working of the new law for the provision of their poor.

This will have the effect of rousing them to a sense of their position, on which I believe they reflect very little; but we still have to attend to great demands, because it is impossible that the poor law commissioners and guardians can be then prepared to take charge of the vast number of really destitute

Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

that will still exceed what can be taken into the houses; these numbers, consisting not alone of those who are reduced by the loss of the potato, but all that class which used to be supported by alms, now generally discontinued, partly in consequence of the reduced means of *all* classes, and partly from the legal provision having been so extended.

I believe that in the history of the world there never was so large a measure of relief afforded under so general a calamity as that which we are now carrying out.

I know of no other mode by which such an evil could have been arrested, but at the same time, it has led certainly to a continued demoralisation among the people. They have been encouraged by it to look more than ever to public support, as an easy refuge from any degree of want, and as a means of adding to whatever other resources they may have available.

We receive numerous remonstrances against the hardships suffered by "the poor famishing people"; and to show the exaggerated sentiments entertained by some people, and the mischief they must create, I may mention that a few days ago we had a remonstrance from a Roman Catholic bishop and a number of his clergy, against the practice of submitting the poor people to the "*degradation* of receiving cooked food."

There was another priest with me yesterday, descanting upon the cruelty of not consulting the "feelings and wishes of *the poor people*," and he was greatly shocked by my declaring, that however I might commiserate their condition, and though I would give them a moderate allowance of good and wholesome food, I would, as a matter of public principle, make it in every other respects, by tests, &c., as little agreeable to them as possible, so that they should have an inducement to try to obtain a livelihood by other means.

I have submitted to Mr. Trevelyan, at different times, many discouraging prospects. I fear they are correct, but I do not put them forward from an unhappy disposition to descant on disagreeable subjects, but as matters for consultation or opinions of others, and in order to be prepared for events and consequences.

Dear Sir, &c.,

J. F. Burgoyne.

Between the Irish landlords and priests on one side, and the English Treasury on the other, Sir John had a hard time of it; but on the whole, the government appeared satisfied with the proceedings of the commission. On the 9th of July the Chancellor of the Exchequer writes to him: Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

"I don't regret your expressions a bit. It would indeed be hard if you were not to show the immense difficulties against which you have to struggle, and which for the most part you have surmounted.

"I made a statement yesterday of the operations of the season, and I cannot say how much I feel that for the main part of their success we are indebted to your judgment and exertions."

On the 12th of October, the Relief Commissioners delivered their seventh and last report, and shortly afterwards Sir John returned to his duties at the Ordnance Office.

In acknowledging this report, the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury state that—

"It has become their gratifying duty to express to the Relief Commissioners, the approbation with which their conduct in the execution of the important duties entrusted to them has been regarded by her Majesty's government, and to congratulate them on the success which has attended their efforts.

"This result is principally due to the patient industry and never-failing sagacity of Sir John Burgoyne, who was specially appointed to this duty as chairman of the commission; and it is greatly to his honour that he did not suffer himself to be discouraged by the formidable difficulties which attended the commencement of the undertaking, and that no untoward circumstance occurred during its progress which could be justly attributed to want of foresight and good management on the part of the commission."

His work upon this commission was by far the most irksome and laborious of the many duties performed by

Irish Relief Commission. 1847.

him for the government. The members of his family who were with him in Dublin at this time, inform me that he never returned from his office until the hour named for a late dinner, and worked for many hours afterwards at night. His health was giving way under the strain, and Sir Philip Crampton, the eminent physician and surgeon of Ireland, remonstrated strongly with him upon his habit of protracting his labours to so late an hour, impressing upon him that, at his age (he was then sixty-five), it would assuredly shorten his life. After the expiration of this commission, he followed Sir Philip Crampton's advice so far as to give up all mental work at night, and to this cause, amongst others, may perhaps be attributed his exceptional longevity.

The view taken in Ireland, of the emergency at the period of Sir John's appointment to the Relief Commission, may be gathered from an extract from a letter from an influential landowner in the west of Ireland, addressed to Mr. Radcliff, a member of the Board of Works in Dublin:

"I have heard with pleasure of the arrival of Sir John Burgoyne, who I trust will be able to put the country in a better state than it is at present. His selection by the government at such a crisis, is perhaps the greatest compliment paid to any man, and if he weathers the storm, he will be looked upon as the greatest man of the day."

The storm was weathered; but as often happens when the danger is over, the helmsman was forgotten. No public acknowledgment of Sir John Burgoyne's services on this occasion was made by the government, and although they were profuse in their expressions of gratitude in private, his only reward was a sum of money granted by the Treasury, to cover the expenses incurred by him while residing in the Irish capital.

NATIONAL DEFENCES. 1848 TO 1854.

NEITHER Sir John's memorandum of 1846, nor Lord Palmerston's representations to the cabinet, based upon it, had produced any effect, and the estimates of 1847 were framed upon the old footing. On his return to his office in the autumn of 1847, Sir John made another attempt to open the eyes of the government to the defenceless state of the kingdom. His memorandum of this date reiterates the arguments used in his former paper, but enters more at length into the possibilities of a descent upon England. He states:

"We must recollect that by the power of steamers, a movement of vessels can be combined from every French port in the Channel, between Cherbourg and Dunkerque, to any part of our coast between Portsmouth and Ramsgate; that it might be reached by all, within two or three hours of the same time; and that the longest distance to run would not require more than twenty-four hours at the utmost. That this distance affords the resources and places of assembly of Dunkerque, Calais, Boulogne, Havre, and all the means afforded by the river Seine, the great harbour and roadstead of Cherbourg, besides Dieppe, St. Valéry, and other intervening smaller ports.

"The first force brought over, would require to be sufficiently strong to maintain its ground till the same vessels could return with more troops; which second and the succeeding reinforcements would be almost entirely from the nearest ports, and would arrive by every tide. The first force, under our present circumstances, need not exceed 25,000 men; probably 20,000

National Defences, 1848.

would suffice, and from that time, every tide would bring 10,000 or 12,000 more.

"Every small steamer would carry, or tow, at least 1000 men; a large steamer, more than double the number. Besides the larger ships, every coaster of 40 or 50 tons burden would convey 100; and every fishing-boat of the ordinary size, on the coast, probably 20 soldiers.

"If they have not, at the present time, at all the ports above mentioned, the necessary floating power, there could be no difficulty in collecting it; or even, to make the operation more secure, double or treble the quantity.

"Immediately a war shall be declared, or the probability of one become imminent, numerous steamers will be established at these Channel ports as privateers; they will be readily purchased and collected in a very short time, from America, from European states, and even from England itself. And there can be no doubt that the French government would immediately collect flotillas armed, as well as transport, to threaten invasion, if not to carry it into execution; so that we cannot but suppose that they will be amply provided in a very short time for the actual transport of a very large force to our shores.

"In 1804, Bonaparte collected in the one port of Boulogne, a flotilla equal to the conveyance of 40,000 men to England at once. It was necessary at that period to make the effort from one port, in order to ensure a simultaneous arrival. The case is different now, and as regards the absolute power of approach, it can be made perfectly from many."

That his views of the extent of transport possessed by the French were correct, was shown afterwards by the facts collected by the late Sir Luke Smithett, the superintendent of packets at Dover. This officer was employed a few years later, when fears of invasion were more rife, to report upon this subject. After enumerating the great number of fishing boats and coasters, called *chasse-marées*, in the harbours of the Channel, he continues:

"Independent of all these, I cannot lose sight of the vast number of flat-bottomed vessels called *balandres* on the canal,

navigating between Dunkerque, Lille, St. Omer, Guisnes, &c., communicating with the principal towns of France and Belgium, to the harbour of Calais. These vessels vary from 100 to 150 feet in length, and from 12 ft. to 15 ft. in breadth, and convey from 150 to 200 tons of goods. Many of them have capacity for carrying a regiment of infantry *under cover*, and could in fine weather be towed across the Channel in a short space of time (say four or five hours). They would draw only about three feet of water so loaded. Almost any number of these vessels can be got together in a few days, and I believe them to be by far the most important means available for such a purpose since the introduction of steam. National Defences. 1848.

"I think I may venture to state that a steam-vessel of a hundred horse-power would tow at least twelve of the Calais class of fishing-boats six knots per hour; and the same power, if properly applied, would in most cases tow 400 tons of any other craft at the same speed."

On the same day that Sir John submitted his memorandum to the master-general, viz., the 4th of January, 1848, the Duke of Wellington's letter to him of the previous year, appeared in the pages of the *Morning Chronicle*.

The precise motive of the duke in having addressed this letter to Sir John Burgoyne, is not apparent at first sight. Such expressions as, "I am bordering upon seventy-seven years of age passed in honour—I hope that the Almighty may protect me from being the witness of the tragedy which I cannot persuade my contemporaries to take measures to avert," clearly indicate that the duke did not consider it an official document. At the same time, it was something more than a private letter. Its purport referred entirely to a subject of great public interest, at that time occupying the attention of the government; and contrary to the duke's usual habit, the letter was written on large paper, and had been copied out by a clerk or secretary in a large bold hand, before it

Publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter. 1848.

was forwarded to its destination. The duke was aware that Sir John's memorandum had been circulated among the members of the government; and taking all these circumstances into account, there can hardly be a doubt that he intended the letter to be used by Sir John in support of his representations; in fact, to be privately circulated among the members of the government and other persons of influence.

On the 21st of December, 1847, Sir John Burgoyne, in a private letter, gives an account of the position of the question, which shows that the letter had been extensively circulated at that date, and that the ministers intended to quote the duke's authority in support of the measures to be proposed by them in the forthcoming session, for the improvement of the national defences.

Pall Mall, December 21, 1847.

The customary anxiety has been experienced to come early to an understanding of the sentiments and qualities of the members of the new Parliament. Sir James Graham says, that having been for some time home secretary, he has acquired an eye for a *rogue*, and he thinks he can discover more than usual in the present House.

After the recess, Lord John is to advert to the defences of the country, which are to be largely discussed. A party, headed by Cobden, are to treat it as twaddle, and as an attempt to run the country into a prodigious and unnecessary expense. They will assert that the Duke of Wellington is in his dotage; that the French have no adequate naval means, while we shall sweep the seas; that so large a force as is necessary could not be embarked and conveyed across the Channel, &c. I must prepare some arguments to show up the fallacies.

* * * * * *

On the 4th of January, he writes:

The *Morning Chronicle* of yesterday had another letter from "P." about the duke's letter, and speaking in complimentary

terms of *me;* and this day's *Chronicle* has the *whole letter* in large type. I hope I shall not be supposed to have let it out. Publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter.

January 5, 1848. 1848.

The *Morning Chronicle* of this day exonerates me from being the means, directly or indirectly, of its being able to give the whole of the duke's letter.

To the Marquis of Anglesey.

84, Pall Mall, January 4, 1848.

My dear Lord Anglesey,

On *public* account, I cannot regret, nor, as I hope, does the duke himself, that scraps of his letter to me were promulgated, as it has started a discussion which I trust will put an end to our long sleep in fancied security.

It is probable that on the turn taken by public opinion during the next six or eight months, the fate of England may depend; it is very essential therefore that the real state of the case should be fairly understood, at least by the government, members of Parliament, and others, on whom a decision will depend.

Many vague ideas are afloat on causes of security to us, that require to be analysed; I have endeavoured to take up the most prominent, and show their real force in the paper which I now enclose.

Regarding the navy, there is a very interesting publication, of which a second edition has been very recently brought out, called 'The Past and Future of the British Navy,' by Captain the Hon. E. Plunkett, R.N., which everybody should read who thinks of the national defence or the honour of the country. If his statements are correct, it is a fearful view of our system of organisation: if not correct, it would be interesting to know to what extent that is the case.

I should like very much to see the documents connected with the projects of 1745 and 1746, and how far they differ from my speculations in the enclosed.

Your Lordship's faithful servant,

J. F. Burgoyne.

Publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter. 1848.

From Lady Shelley.[1]

"36, Berkeley Square, January 5.

"Dear Sir John Burgoyne,

"I cannot refuse myself the pleasure of congratulating you on the publicity now given to the state of the defences of the country, and to claim your thanks for my co-operation, and for having borne the brunt of the duke's displeasure at his letter having been "shown about." He, however, listened to my representations as to the policy of public opinion assisting the authorities in bringing forward the plans for defence, and returned his letter to me, which he had desired to see, authorising me to keep it, and leaving the use of it to my discretion.

"On the other side I have written a list of those to whom I had lent it at the first meeting of Parliament, and I have the satisfaction of knowing that Lord Ellesmere has received the duke's approval of his letter, and Lord John Russell has also written to thank him for its 'opportune appearance, which will prove a great assistance to the government.'

"Sir John continues a sad invalid, and never leaves his fireside.

"Yours very truly,

"F. Shelley.

"Lord Ellesmere.	Lord Aylmer.
Lord Colchester.	Lord Beaumont.
Duke of Rutland.	Marquis of Douro.
Earl of Hardwicke.	Colonel Cator.
Lord Stanley.	Lord Gage.
Sir Augustus Clifford.	

"And many others; these the most influential."

From Sir John Burgoyne *to* Lady Shelley.

Fulham, January 6, 1848.

My dear Lady Shelley,

Whatever good may result from the publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter, you have no reason to congratulate

[1] Frances Lady Shelley, wife of Sir John Shelley, of Maresfield.

me on the occasion, for I feel that I have lost caste by it with the public, and what is more unpleasant, with the duke. Publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter. 1848.

I have good reason to believe that he deems it an indiscretion, if not a breach of confidence, that I should have allowed it to be so promulgated, and I feel that I have now sacrificed his offer of future confidential communication, that would have been so gratifying to me, and indirectly, as I hoped, advantageous to the country.

The document being communicated to such persons as those you name could only be attended with good, but I doubt the advantage of its going before the public generally. At all events, the government had it in their possession, and it was not becoming in me to appear to assume a discretion of being the means of allowing it to be published.

My dear Lady Shelley,

Yours faithfully,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

From the Marquis of ANGLESEY *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

B. D., January 9, 1848.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

"I send both your papers. You are quite right. Have an eye on the press, which is greatly misleading the public mind, by encouraging the idea that we are unattackable.

"Did you read the impertinent tirade of yesterday's *Times* upon the duke's letter to you? I never saw so poor and weak an article in that generally able but mischievous paper.

"There is a letter in the *Globe* of yesterday, said to be written by Admiral Bowles. There is nothing new in it, but it is fair enough.

"Plunkett's I read long ago, and thought it very good.

"The having got rid of Abd-el-Kader is a great *coup* for France. It will give 50,000 additional scoundrels to molest us and our possessions with, who, if successful, would do incalculable damage here, or whose total destruction would be a happy riddance for those who sent them.

"In the meantime we have no arms, no powder, and what is worse than all, no men.

Publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter. 1848.

"That (notwithstanding all that is said) there is plenty of money, I have not the least doubt, but then the fools who possess it will rather run the risk of total loss than pay a comparative trifle for total security. Strange infatuation!

"The loan of a few millions, and a respite for eighteen months, and then I really think it would be of service to *all* parties that the attempt should be made.

"Our people would be all the better for a little taste of the horrors of war, and our troublesome neighbours would richly deserve the beating that I think we could give them.

"Unless called up, I do not intend to be in London before the 22nd.

"I remain, &c.,

"ANGLESEY."

Although no one will regret at the present time that the duke's letter eventually saw the light, its publication in January, 1848, was premature and unfortunate. The English people had been nursed in illusions wrought by their former successes in the great war against Napoleon, and the changes gradually creeping over the conditions of warfare were unmarked by all save a few thoughtful statesmen and soldiers. To the ordinary Englishman, the notion of a French army landing in this country appeared preposterous, and the leviathan of the press, which so ably represents the average intellect of the nation, took the line which was to be expected under the circumstances.

A falling revenue, and an annual deficit in the Treasury, rendered an increase of expenditure at this time extremely embarrassing to ministers, and unpalatable to all parties in the House of Commons. The Manchester economists were thus masters of the situation, and the exalted statesmanship of that party may be illustrated by an extract from one of their principal organs in the press:

"The plan of Sir John Burgoyne, developed by him in that pamphlet privately circulated, which contained the Duke of

Wellington's letter, insisted on having three fortified ports, Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Dover, with at least 10,000 men in each, so as with railroad communication to bring 30,000 men together to oppose an invading force. As the present state of our army does not admit of the muster of even 5000 men for any such purpose, of course there must thus be 25,000 or 30,000 men added to the army.

Publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter. 1848.

"Now we begin by saying that this is absolutely impossible. The people of this country are taxed to the very limit of what they will bear in peaceful times—nay, beyond the limit. And as to raising taxes to pay 30,000 more men to meet such imaginary danger as Lord Ellesmere conjures up, we can only say that the hopes of Parliament voting any such sum are quite as vain as the fears of the French. They are mere moonshine, the one and the other."

The cheap publications of the day treated the subject in this way:

"How soon would the rail, the coach, and the steamship tell the bold descendants of the sea-king to gird on their swords, if a foreign foe should dare to plant his foot on British soil. Invasion! It is a joke. Invasion! Open the map of England, and show the spot, from the North Foreland to the Land's End, where an army of 100,000 men, could not be gathered in twenty-four hours. How many hours would it require to empty the arsenals of Woolwich upon Southampton, or Brighton, or Hastings, or Folkestone, with a coast-line uninterruptedly communicating with London as a common centre? No, no! The first pulsation of the electro-telegraph that proclaimed a hostile fleet in the Channel would have an answering movement from the Admiralty that would make the island throb to its remotest extremities. Invade a country that could collect the sturdiest of its population upon any given point within eight and forty hours, and provide them with all the materials of war in half the same time! The thing is too ludicrous. The colliers of Northumberland could be whirled from the north to the south by the fuel that their sturdy hands

Publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter.

have brought to the surface, and they alone would be a host to sweep the aggressor from our earth."[1]

1848. Mr. Cobden, in his free-trade speech at Manchester, of the same year, thus alludes to the duke's letter:

"Now I am sure that everyone of those men has shared with me the shock which my feelings sustained, when, within one short twelvemonth almost after we had announced ourselves as free-traders to the world, we are startled with the announcement that we are going to increase our warlike armaments. I ask what is the explanation of this? Probably we may find it in the Duke of Wellington's letter, in his private efforts, which he announces he has made with the government, and in the correspondence which he has had with Lord John Russell. We may attribute this then to the Duke of Wellington and his letter, and his persevering efforts. I do not profess to have the veneration which some men entertain for successful warriors [Hear!]; but is there among the most ardent admirers of the duke one man, possessing the ordinary feelings of humanity, who would not wish that that letter had never been written, or never published? His Grace has passed the extremest probable duration of human existence, and we may say, almost without a figure of speech, that he is tottering on the verge of the grave. Is it not a most lamentable spectacle, that that hand which is no longer capable of wielding a sword, should devote its still remaining feeble strength to the penning of a letter—and that letter may possibly be the last public letter which he may address to his fellow-countrymen—which is more calculated than anything, in the present day, to create evil passions and animosities in the breasts of two great and neighbouring nations? [Great applause.] Would it not have been fitter employment for him to have been seen preaching forgiveness and oblivion of the past, rather than in reviving recollections of Toulon, and Paris, and Waterloo, and, in fact, doing everything to *invite* a brave people to retaliatory measures to retrieve themselves from past disasters and in-

[1] 'The Land we Live in,' by Charles Knight.

juries? Would it not have been a more glorious object to contemplate, had he poured oil into those wounds which are now almost healed, rather than have thus applied the cautery, reopening those wounds, and leaving to another generation the task of repairing the mischief which he has perpetrated? [Applause.] I leave here the subject of the duke's letter. When I first read it, and came to its conclusion, where he says, 'I am in my seventy-seventh year,' I said, 'That explains it all, and excuses it.' [Hear! hear! and great applause.]"

Publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter. 1848.

It will be seen by Lord Anglesey's letter of the 11th February, that the duke was at first rather pleased than otherwise by the publication of his letter; but when its reception by the public showed that it was considered by a large majority to bear evidence of enfeebled powers of mind, his *amour-propre* was offended, and his indignation knew no bounds. Lord John Russell was authorized by him to state in the House of Commons, that "nothing could have given him greater pain than the publication of sentiments which he had expressed confidentially to a brother officer," and the duke himself, as commander-in-chief, called upon Sir John officially, for an explanation of the circumstances which led to the publication of the letter.

From Sir John Burgoyne *to* Lord FitzRoy Somerset.

84, Pall Mall, January 21, 1848.

My Lord,

In compliance with the desire of his Grace the Duke of Wellington, that I should explain the circumstances under which his letter to me, of the 9th January 1847, was published in the *Morning Chronicle*, I beg to inform you that the dangerous state of the country with regard to its gradually declining military establishments, had been long a subject to me of reflection and conversation, and having committed some of my ideas to paper, I submitted them to the master-general of the Ordnance, who communicated them with his own observations to several of the cabinet ministers.

Publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter. 1848.

Having had subsequently a long interview with Lord Palmerston, in which the matter was discussed, I thought it a duty to make his Grace acquainted with the opinions contained in the paper, which might or might not be in concurrence with those formed by his superior judgment and authority.

The duke's letter, which has so unhappily come to light, was a commentary on the subject; and containing a dissertation of great general interest, and not connected with any official proceedings, I did not consider it in the light of ordinary official confidential communications, while I entirely acknowledge that I had no right whatever (as I certainly had no wish) to allow it to be published without the sanction of his Grace.

I gave a copy, of course, to the master-general, and his lordship communicated it to the cabinet ministers.

It would also hardly be expected that I should lock up in my desk such a paper, not being deemed by me of that official confidence that requires absolute secresy; and feeling deeply impressed with the consciousness that it was most desirable that the true state of the case should be extensively understood, I showed copies of the duke's letter in confidence to some persons of distinction, and to several military friends, but always with an express injunction that it should not find its way into print by their means, and this was kept for a twelvemonth.

Allusion having been made to the part taken by some ladies, I have to inform you that I have been in the habit of obtaining the assistance of my wife and a daughter, to make copies of reports, &c., from my first rough drafts, and occasionally of other documents, and the former lent a copy of this letter to Lady Shelley, through whose means I believe it gained publicity; for in a letter which I received from her, she seemed almost to avow it, although, when she found I was greatly hurt by the circumstances, she has been inclined to deny it.

I have no other clue whatever to understand how the occurrence took place. I deeply regret it, and the more so, as it has proved so displeasing to his Grace.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. F. Burgoyne.

The following extracts from the letter written by the duke to Lord FitzRoy Somerset, in answer to the foregoing, will give an idea of the anger and mortification he felt at the way in which his letter had been received by the public:

Publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter. 1848.

"I recollect Sir John Burgoyne having been present at more than one discussion upon the possibility that the subject of the defence of the country might come under discussion in either or both Houses of Parliament; upon all and each of which occasions I declared my opinion that the proposition for an augmentation of the forces, which was the object in view, must, according to the usual practice, originate in a speech from the throne, or message from the Queen. That it would be most inconvenient and might be attended by great disadvantages to have such a proposition made by any member of Parliament, excepting a minister; that the object was to convince her Majesty's servants of the dangers attending delays; and that if that were attained, the rest would follow.

"He must now see the want of foundation for the expectation that the statements in that letter would make any impression on the public.

"He must now be aware of the talk, and see that in the populous towns, and wherever the voice of the demagogue can be heard, the intensity of the danger is used as an argument to avoid incurring any expense.

"In the meantime, the whole world, friends and enemies, have been informed, in the greatest detail, of the exact amount of the danger, and of the resource in prospect; and that from the very best authority."

From the Duke of WELLINGTON *to* Lady SHELLEY.

"Strathfieldsaye,
"MY DEAR LADY SHELLEY, January 23, 1848.

"Notwithstanding the delight with which you and the ladies and gentlemen, your friends, have circulated, and at last published, my confidential letter of January 1847, upon the defence of the country, the course which you have taken has been most distressing, painful, and grievous to me, on account of the

Publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter. 1848.

injury which such publication is calculated to do to the country. You have constituted yourself a sort of authority upon this subject, and it is in that character I address you these few lines.

"Sir John Burgoyne has sent me two letters addressed by you to him, one of the 5th, and the other of the 6th January, 1848.

"In the first you express that you have the satisfaction of knowing that Lord Ellesmere had received the duke's approval of his letter. I request you, as an act of justice to a gentleman, a soldier, and a faithful servant of the crown, to state what you really *know* on this subject.

"I *know* that I have neither seen, written to, nor communicated by message with Lord Ellesmere since he wrote the letter in question. I am afraid you have inserted in this letter that you had a *knowledge*, which you had not, which you could not have, because the fact did not exist and is not true.

"You will excuse me for being very urgent upon this subject, because it is very important to me, as a gentleman and a faithful servant of the crown, that I should not be suspected of being concerned in the scandalous, disgraceful, and grievous mischief done to the public interests by the circulation and publication in the newspapers of a confidential letter upon the state of the defences of the country written by the commander-in-chief to the officer at the head of the Engineer Department, in answer to a communication from that officer, marked confidential, or that I have ever had a wish, or even an idea, of enforcing by clamour a consideration or discussion of the subject in Parliament.

"My views were always very different; they were, by facts and reasoning to convince the minds of those who desire, and can with regularity originate, such discussions, and who must be responsible for the consequences.

"Believe me, ever your Ladyship's

"Most obedient humble servant,

"WELLINGTON."

From the Marquis of ANGLESEY *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"February 11, 1848.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

"The Portsmouth papers and plan have been returned from the Duke of Wellington. I have given them to General

Fanshawe, and when you reach your office here, we will close the question. In the meantime I send you his Grace's private note and memo.; you will see by the former that he is evidently still very sore upon the subject of the publication. Publication of the Duke of Wellington's letter. 1848.

"'Still' (by-the-by) is not the proper word, for I am certain that at first he laughed at it, and was far from disagreeing with me when I said that I thought his opinion upon the matter would be most beneficial, by opening the eyes of our people to the dangerous position of the country.

"Bring the paper back with you, as I have no copy.

"Truly yours,

"ANGLESEY."

On the 18th of February, 1848, Lord John Russell made a statement to the House of Commons on the subject of the defences of the country, and proposed, in accordance with the advice of the Duke of Wellington, to reorganise the militia, and make a slight increase in the regular forces. To meet the increased charges rendered requisite by this step, and to cover the deficiency in the ordinary revenue, it was proposed to make a considerable addition to the income tax, raising it from sevenpence to one shilling in the pound. The proposal met with little favour from any portion of the House, and was loudly denounced by the Radical party.

While the measure was still under discussion, the change of government in France occurred, and ministers took advantage of this circumstance to withdraw their budget. The economists were now triumphant, and obtained a committee of the House to inquire into the naval and military expenditure. Upon the recommendations of this committee, further reductions were made upon the already meagre estimates of 1847–48, and the Queen's speech of 1849 contained the announcement, "*the present aspect of affairs has enabled me to make large reductions on the estimates of last year.*"

The government of the day had now been solemnly

National defences. 1848.

warned by their responsible military advisers that the country was not safe from a great disaster, should war unfortunately break out with France; yet, yielding to the arrogant and bullying tone assumed by the Manchester party, no steps whatever had been taken to place it in a better state of defence. It would be difficult to find anywhere a more striking illustration of the parsimony inherent in a democratic form of government, or the feebleness of an aristocratic administration, based on the support of demagogues.

The Chartist demonstration of the spring of 1848 was the next public event of importance. Sir John Burgoyne wrote for the government on this occasion his notes on the 'Defence of large Towns against popular Insurrections,' which have been already published.[1] They are remarkable for the same quality which has been already noted in his memoir on the 'Defence of Ireland,' viz., his power of generalising in military matters. He points out that the great strategical line to occupy in London is the Thames and parks, by which the insurgents would be divided into two, and all the public establishments combined in one circuit. Disturbances being feared at the same time in Dublin, the late Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Smith, of the Royal Engineers, had been sent to that city to assist in the preparations for its defence, and was in communication with Sir John Burgoyne on the subject. A letter written by Sir Charles during this mission, illustrates the confusion in the military departments before the amalgamation of the offices of the Horse Guards and Ordnance.

"Bilton Hotel, Dublin,
April 30, 1848.

"My dear Sir John,

"I am most grateful for your obliging letter, and in the sound judgment of the opinions expressed therein it would be

[1] In the 'Military Opinions of Sir John Burgoyne.'

impossible to do otherwise than concur. Following your view with regard to the location of the additional troops brought into the Dublin district, that Linen Hall seems to be a frightful blot, as well as an expensive expedient, both as regards past and future outlay. Yesterday, affairs took a pacific turn, when Sir Edward Blakeney was desired by the lord lieutenant to remove from view some of those grotesque appearances of warlike preparation about the Castle, that might well cast a shade of ridicule over the proceedings of persons connected with a force so formidable as that which we have in hand. Earlier in the week I had an interview with Mr. Redington, with the concurrence of Sir Edward, for the purpose (if possible) of bringing matters and things to book, and upon the memoranda that he (Mr. Redington) made, I am told that Lord Clarendon wishes to see me. Sufficient, however, transpired to convince me that the outward demonstrations of Castle feeling were intended to be anti-alarm, and that the opinion I expressed in my last note to you, of more having been done in the alarmist line than was necessary on the part of the military authorities, seemed fully to be entertained. Mr. Redington did not estimate the number of organised persons ready to take arms in a hostile movement at more than 800. There is a gentleman here of the name of Kennedy, who says that he was once an officer of Engineers; under the sanction, as I am told, of Lord Clarendon, he has taken great pains in marking on the large plan of Dublin all those houses and points that ought to be occupied, in the event of an outbreak, so as to give the loyal citizens that hold of the town which might in a great measure counteract the efforts to the same effect on the part of insurgents, that may be considered the most dangerous. He professes also (but I do not believe him) to have already carried out his organisation to the full extent for occupying all those points, and of guarding the seventeen main approaches from the country, to which it would be inconsistent with the duke's views to detach military pickets. Captain Kennedy was sent to me with all his projects. I went through them attentively, when I satisfied myself that what he had done on paper was all to the good; and as he has worked hard in obtaining important statistical information, I have recommended that the lord lieutenant should assign to

Defence measures in Dublin. 1848.

Defence measures in Dublin. 1848.

him some ostensible character, whereby his organisation might be completed in a recognised shape. I have refused all invitations, excepting one to the lord lieutenant, so as to keep myself wholly aloof from any intercourse, save such as it is my duty legitimately to hold; but I should be guilty of deception if I did not, thus early, express to you the suspicion that my coming here will be unattended by beneficial results. On the military side, I am evidently looked upon as a spy; and every opposition, through the adjutant-general, has been made to the status that it was the order of the master-general for me to have. You must submit to be bored with a detail of all that has occurred subsequently to the despatch of my official letter, pointing out the blunder of Sir John Macdonald, and the pertinacious adherence of the deputy adjutant-general to the very letter of the order received from the Horse Guards. Anxious to avoid everything that could appear like controversy, and, above all, to say or do anything that could possibly be unpleasant to Sir Edward, I waited on him privately with my instructions (copies of which I thought he had previously received), pointing out, at the same time, that the usage of the service, in every command in which I had served, was that the instructions of a secretary of state, of the master-general of the Ordnance, and of the lords of the Treasury, when communicated through their officers, were invariably given effect to by the general orders of such command, and I thereupon solicited that the instructions of the master-general in my case might be attended to. Sir Edward said nothing could be more clear or satisfactory than they were, and with his concurrence I sent them to the deputy adjutant-general, from whom they came back with thanks for the perusal. Here matters rested for a couple of days, when I received a letter from Colonel Cochrane, alluding to one received by him from Colonel Vavasour, and stating that, as I had been named commanding Royal Engineer by the general order of 22nd instant, all future communications *must be signed by me*, thus formally removing Vavasour, and imposing a local charge on me. The same good feeling that influenced me in the first instance, deterred me from going near Sir Edward; but yesterday we happened to meet, when conversation took a turn that forced me to state that I had received

an order, professing to be written by his direction, that I could neither acknowledge nor obey, without frustrating the wishes and orders of the Duke of Wellington in respect of Prince George; because as the Queen's commission superseded the authority even of the duke, if he assigned me a local charge, I must, by virtue of that commission, assume the command of the Dublin district, which he (Sir Edward) knew was not intended. I then said, and he assented, that Colonel Cochrane's letter should stand as a dead one. Thus, until the matter be set right from London, I remain here as a nonentity. It surely is time that these officials should be instructed in the respect that is due to the orders of one of her Majesty's ministers; and the matter proves that the Horse Guards is not the best school for acquiring a knowledge of the duties of a foreign command. Pardon, my dear Sir John, this infliction on your patience by a pen which will hardly carry me through those expressions of esteem and respect with which I remain

Defence measures in Dublin. 1848.

"Your ever faithful servant,
"C. F. SMITH."

The following characteristic letter is from the pen of the conqueror of Scinde:

"2, Cumberland Street,
July 23, 1848.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I hear that your assistant fortification master at the academy is likely to become vacant, and I have asked Lord Anglesey to give it to Lieutenant Koe, of the Engineers, if he be fitting, and that there is no injustice to any one else. Can you, on the same conditions, give Frank Koe a lift? If you can, you will oblige

Letter from Sir Charles Napier.

"Yours faithfully,
"C. J. NAPIER.

"To-morrow is 24th July, the anniversary of our fight at the Coa—thirty-eight years ago! Jupiter Ammon! how time flies! It seems but yesterday when you took me through the mines of Fort Concepcion; yet men, *now fathers*, were *then* unborn; and the young imps come and dine with a man, and tell him, "*My grand-pa served with you, sir*, WHEN *he was*

YOUNG!"—rot 'em, I could knock their brains out! They give one the blue devils for a week. Nice work going on in Ireland; this really gives a man the blue devils."

In the latter part of this year, Lord Morpeth asked him in the following complimentary terms to form one of a consolidated commission of sewers:

"Office of Woods,
"MY DEAR SIR JOHN, September 25, 1848

"We are going to issue a consolidated commission of sewers for the whole Metropolitan District, and as we wish it to be composed of the most eminent practical ability of the day I hope you will not refuse to be named one of its members. Among other things, it has some jurisdiction over roads, and I know that you have already shed considerable light upon that subject, as, indeed, there are not many upon which you have not.

"Very faithfully yours,
"MORPETH."

It is not my intention to include official minutes of Sir John Burgoyne in this work, but a memorandum sent about this time by him to Lord Anglesey, on the subject of the maintenance of Hong Kong, affords so good a specimen of the vigour of his style, and radical difference of his views from those of the Liberal administration of the day on military matters, that I have quoted it in full in the Appendix.[1]

National defences, 1850.

Undaunted by his previous ill success, Sir John again brought the subject of the defenceless condition of the country under the notice of the government, in the following year. In May 1850 he handed to the master-general of the Ordnance his observations 'On the Military Condition of Great Britain.' This pamphlet is in some respects a more valuable document than the former one of 1846; it contains an interesting dissertation on the possibilities of war between civilised states,

[1] Appendix, No. I.

and the uses of a standing army. Referring to the debates in the House of Commons, he says, "the very object of armed forces appears to be gradually diminishing from sight; the troops seem to be considered merely as a reserved police for the preservation of internal tranquillity at home and abroad." He then proceeds to make use of the argument, since so much employed, that they must be considered in the light of an insurance against a possible disaster. National defences, 1850.

"In ordinary life," he says, "we are not neglectful of providing a security for our own property and interests. We spend enormous sums in insuring our ships, our houses, and even our haystacks, from the casualties to which they are liable; in our fences and palings, our shutters, locks, bolts, and bars, we *fortify* our fields and houses; and we maintain our *troops* of porters, watchmen, and police, all of which are nothing more than means of *defence*; while, at the same time, we refuse every necessary protection for the whole empire, at a percentage cost which would be insignificant compared to what we thus judiciously apply to each of our private possessions."

His description of what a standing army for Great Britain should be has been quoted since, in the discussions respecting our reserve forces.

"We require an army that shall be comparatively inexpensive in ordinary times, without the incubus of a heavy dead weight, and which shall, in fact, be absorbed in the mass of the population, and latent, until an emergency shall call for its appearance, when, however, it should be found in immediate and full readiness for vigorous and effective action."

He sums up by saying, that "the military condition of Great Britain, as regards its very existence as a nation, is now absolutely awful."

National defences. 1850.

This paper, like the former one of 1846, was printed and circulated by the Treasury, but appears to have produced no effect on ministers. Reduction in military expenditure was still the order of the day; the Inter-

1851.

national Exhibition of 1851, which followed shortly afterwards, was hailed as the forerunner of universal concord and peace, and the newspapers of the day went into ecstasies on the subject of Mr. Cobden's public introduction to the great duke, attaching an extraordinary significance to the fact of their shaking hands with each other, in the nave of the great building in Hyde Park. Sir John Burgoyne at this time stood alone in continuing to force the unpalatable truth upon the English government.

To Viscount Hardinge.

87, Pall Mall, May 12, 1851.

My dear Lord Hardinge,

The few words you said to me the other day, have revived in my mind impressions on a subject (our national state of defence) on which I never can cease to feel a most intense interest, and in which I have taken a great deal of trouble to no purpose, or rather, to worse than no purpose, as regards my own interests and character; for I have no doubt been considered a great bore by those on whom I have obtruded my ideas, and in the case of the Duke of Wellington, I have unconsciously offended him irrevocably.

Towards the end of 1846, I wrote a paper, which was submitted to the master-general of the Ordnance, and by him to the government, a copy of which I sent to the duke, to which he replied in a celebrated letter, which, after being a twelvemonth in my possession, and only shown to a few friends, at length found its way to the newspapers, to the duke's great annoyance.

Last year I ventured on another disquisition on the subject, which the master-general submitted to Lord Palmerston, who, after many months, returned it with a remark that "there was

much truth in it." Subsequently, I drew up another version of it, which I enclose, on the chance of your being inclined to run it over, whenever you may have half an hour's leisure, after which I will request of you to return it, as I have no other copy. National defence. 1851.

I feel so earnest on this subject, and so utterly surprised at the apathy on it of the country in general, standing as it does on the brink of a frightful precipice, that I should be persuaded that I was troubled with a monomonia, but that I find such minds as those of the Duke of Wellington, Lord Anglesey, yourself, and some others that I greatly respect, under the same impressions.

The melancholy thing is, the indifference of our statesmen on the question. I can understand such men as Cobden risking the safety of the empire to the prosecution in extreme of their favourite subjects of political agitation; but that a government can incur such responsibility, simply because the feeling of the House of Commons is against military expenditure, can only be accounted for by their really not being able, or rather willing, to inquire into the danger. Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston have a glimmer of it; but neither of them so forcibly as to induce them to insist boldly on a remedy. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is thoroughly in the dark, and in conning over the estimates, seems to wonder what on earth we can want with barracks, or stores, or arms, or ammunition, or still less fortifications; while Lord Grey is running a muck with regard to the maintenance of the colonies, which will occasion our having some, of excessive value, swept away from us, during the first two or three months of any short war. Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, I look upon as doomed, whenever the United States think they have a favourable opportunity of opening their mouths to swallow them up. The Mauritius and Hong Kong are perfectly helpless on the first war with the French, who are, in the East, zealously working at their preparations at Bourbon and Mazotta (in the Mozambique). Even Ceylon would be in jeopardy: his lordship has all but avowed that we have no business at Corfu; and every year I expect orders to reduce our exertions for the preservation of Gibraltar and Malta.

Even the secretary at war, whose position should lead to a

National defences. 1851.

degree of knowledge on the subject, raises cheers, and satisfies people's minds by his announcements that "the army never was in a more perfect state than at present," by which he means *for its numbers*, but without regret that the ambiguous expression should be assumed to denote that it is equal in force to the wants of the country,

When a Hume or Cobden proposes some very outrageous measure of sudden reduction (which they subsequently manage to carry out by degrees), government will ostentatiously declare that it cannot consent to crippling the necessary military means of the country, which is received with cheers and large majorities, while the mischief is already done; and this temporising is giving the highest sanction to the prevailing delusion.

While we are thus progressively falling into imbecility and decay, the French are most energetic in their preparations against *us*, however they may economise in other matters. They have within the last three months passed a resolution for an expenditure of £275,000 for *sea* defences for Cherbourg—avowedly for the chance of collision with England; and two or three voices that ventured to oppose were at once silenced by a popular outcry that they were traitors. There is no mistaking this general feeling of preparing for war with England, which is constantly in action in France.

Yours very faithfully,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

From Viscount HARDINGE *to* Sir JOHN BURGOYNE.

"South Park, Penshurst.

"MY DEAR BURGOYNE,

"I entirely concur with you that we are incurring a very serious risk by the defenceless state of our naval and military preparations.

"For the navy, their hands are tied until war be actually declared, and even then we are involved in the uncertainty of whether impressment will furnish what we want; and if it does, we shall have our ships manned with untrained gunners, whilst our opponent has 40,000 trained men ready to step on board.

"We must in the nature of things be slow in manning our advanced ships and our war steamers. The enemy, acting on the notoriety of our weakness, will be secret, sudden, and treacherous. If the enemy have ten days' command in the Channel, he may land 150,000 men. A strong reserve of able seamen, trained to naval gunnery, is indispensable. National defences. 1851.

"The advanced ships *alone* require 8600 marines: we have 5300. The deficiency of 3000 only relates to sailing vessels. The war steamers and the large packets, say 150 ships, have not a gunner, even if their present crews volunteered, with their stokers and engineers. All these steamers have 32-pounder shell guns appropriated to them; one-third are abroad on passage, two-thirds require serious alterations before their guns can be received and ammunition put into the ship's magazine, which does not exist, being fitted for passengers and not for war. I am very anxious on the naval part of the question, and as to our army, the first thing is to embody 70,000 militia. It would take three months to enrol them. If a landing were to be attempted to-morrow, we have not 20,000 infantry available.

"I am most anxious not to be quoted, but I concur heartily in all you say.

"Can you run down here on Saturday next and stay Monday? I can then have the advantage of talking to you confidentially. In my position I avoid any public interference.

"My dear Burgoyne, very sincerely yours,

"HARDINGE."

In 1851, Sir John Burgoyne's attention was principally directed to the question of an improved fire arm for the infantry; his position as a juror of the military section of the Great Exhibition having afforded him opportunities of studying the latest improvements of other nations in this direction. In the latter part of the year, he drew Lord Anglesey's attention to the valuable properties of the Swiss small-bore rifle, and in the early part of 1852, he sent to Lord Hardinge, who had succeeded Lord Anglesey as master-general of the Ordnance, a paper urging the importance of systematic experiments Improvement of fire arms. 1851–52.

with small arms, with a view of obtaining a weapon superior to the Minié rifle. It is too long and technical for insertion here in full; but the preamble gives an interesting sketch of the history of the question up to that period, and the concluding observations on the advantages of a lighter ball are applicable to the present state of the question.[1]

On the proposition of Lord Hardinge, Mr. Whitworth was subsequently employed by the Board of Ordnance to make researches into the best form of bullet and rifling. These, on their completion three or four years afterwards, led to the extensive changes in the rifle which have since been introduced into every small arm manufactured; but the recommendation of Sir John Burgoyne to reduce the weight of the bullet not having been attended to at this time, has thrown back the introduction of a small-bore weapon into the service nearly twenty years; and up to the present time no weapon carrying a bullet lighter than that of the old smooth-bore musket, has been served out to the infantry of our army.

It will be seen from Lord Anglesey's letter, that he agreed with Sir John in the advisability of reducing the weight of the bullet; but the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hardinge appear to have considered the retention of the heavy bullet as a *sine quâ non*.

From the Marquis of ANGLESEY.

"Beaudesert, December 23, 1851.

Letter on the Swiss rifle. 1852.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

"Your letter just received brings me the first notice of the Swiss arm. It increases the sad dilemma in which we are. We are almost without spare arms, and when we had hoped that we had at least decided upon the best construction with which to replenish our stores, out comes a new project which professes very greatly to improve upon the small arm lately decided upon.

[1] See Appendix, No. II.

"With our niggardly Treasury (or rather, House of Commons,) it is impossible to keep pace with all the hostile powers with which we *may* have, and probably *shall* have to do; but the curious and really distressing fact is, that even with the pitiful sum allotted for this year's supply of money for small arms, we actually cannot expend it. This is almost incredible; it is however true. The gunmakers will not contract. What then are we to do? Must we trust to our labourers and to pitchforks? for we have neither soldiers nor muskets. I have been set upon getting a grant to enable this *all-powerful* nation (as it is called, but which I consider the most helpless one amongst even the second-class powers,) to form a great establishment for the manufacture of our own arms, but I doubt that being granted; we must therefore endeavour to get them from Liège or elsewhere, as we can. What a state for England to be in! And I see no prospect of amendment. Letter on the Swiss rifle. 1852.

"There is much in what you describe of the Swiss rifle which is very desirable, but there is much which will, I am sure, be considered objectionable.

"The smallness and lightness of the ball will be decidedly vetoed by our great oracle. I do not concur in this, and I do think that it would be an immense advantage in reducing the weight, as well of the musket as of the ammunition; and the carrying 100 rounds instead of 60 is most desirable.

"The more simple construction of the bullet would be also advantageous, and I have never reconciled myself to the complexity of the cap of the Minié article. The difficulty however of ramming down, although represented to be small, is very objectionable in quick firing, and is sure to very much unsteady the men's hands.

"I have more to say upon these matters; but I must defer them. The best thing will be to get a Swiss musket, complete in all its parts, and there can surely be no difficulty about that. I will inquire if anything can be got, from Lord Vernon, but I do not know him personally.

"Do put Sir Thomas Hastings upon this scent, and see if anything can be discovered by the end of our holidays.

"Truly yours,

"ANGLESEY."

Nomination to G. C. B. 1852.

On the 31st of March of this year, a letter from the Duke of Wellington acquainted Sir John that the secretary of state for war had, upon the duke's recommendation, submitted to the Queen his appointment to be a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath, of which her Majesty had been graciously pleased to approve.

Sir John wrote a letter of thanks to the duke in return, but resolved to withstand the payment of the heavy fees which were then due upon this appointment. The correspondence which follows, will show the difficulties he encountered, owing to the vested interests involved; but he was eventually successful, the Treasury paying the fees for him two years afterwards. In consequence of the resistance made by him on this occasion, this unjust tax has not been levied on any subsequent appointments.

From Sir JOHN BURGOYNE *to* Lord FITZROY SOMERSET.

Ordnance Office,
April 5, 1852.

MY DEAR LORD FITZROY,

I ought to apologise for having delayed an instant in formally and unequivocally expressing my deep sense of gratitude to his Grace the Duke of Wellington for the high honour of his recommendation to her Majesty to confer on me the distinction of Grand Cross of the Bath.

I felt, however, a little embarrassed on account of a step I was about to take with regard to it, but which has really nothing to do with the obligation I must feel for the favour conferred upon me by his Grace. I therefore enclose my formal letter of sincere acknowledgment.

I have made a representation to the master-general, as my immediate commanding officer, on the subject of the heavy fees that are attached to this promotion.

With a family, and very moderate means, after a service of fifty-four years, and at the age of seventy, that is, when approaching the termination probably of my professional and natural life, I feel strongly persuaded that as a matter of moral

duty, I ought to forego this great honour, attended as it is by an outlay of some hundreds of pounds (equal in amount to *some years* of my widow's future pension), if it can be done without implying the slightest degree of disrespect for so signal a mark of her Majesty's most gracious favour, or for those who have honoured me by their recommendations; to be guilty of which, no consideration on earth should induce me. Nomination to G. C. B. 1852.

Your Lordship may conceive what a sacrifice this will be to my reasonable pride and ambition; but I consider that it is one that I should not shrink from under the circumstances.

I remain, &c.,

J. F. Burgoyne.

To Colonel *the* Honourable Charles Phipps.

Ordnance Office, Pall Mall,
April 19, 1852.

My dear Colonel,

Would you be kind enough to lay my case before his Royal Highness Prince Albert, as Great Master of the Order of the Bath, or advise me how I could most respectfully do so?

Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer on me the high honour of a Grand Cross of the Bath, the fees for which are to a poor military man very considerable.

When the intention was first notified to me, I made a representation to the master-general of the Ordnance, that at my period of life, towards the close of my professional and natural career, with a family and very moderate means, I felt it to be a moral duty to decline the honour, on account of the fees (great as would be the wound to my feeling of pride and ambition), if it could be done without implying the slightest mark of disrespect to her Majesty, rather than which, I would incur any sacrifice.

Before Lord Hardinge had time to act on my representation, the promotion appeared in the *Gazette*. His lordship, however, applied to the secretary of state to have my case humbly represented to her Majesty's gracious consideration.

Sir John Pakington, however, seemed to feel that he could do no more than simply bear to her Majesty a desire on my part to resign so distinguished an honour; to which, without reserve

Nomination to G.C.B. 1852.

or explanation, I could not submit, as it would make me guilty of a degree of apparent disrespect that would be utterly opposed to my entire devotion for her royal person.

I have therefore requested of him to submit my humble request to be allowed to resign the dignity, and at the same time to lay before her Majesty my reasons for so doing.

Still, however, fearful of some misapprehension, I am very desirous that the case should be fully explained to his Royal Highness, that the amount of the fees on the particular class of Grand Cross are so heavy that, if it can be allowed me, I would not voluntarily incur them, although the decision deprived me of so high a distinction; but my most anxious object is that his Royal Highness should be aware that I have been, and still am, desirous above all of not being wanting, even in appearance, of the most ardent devotion, respect, and gratitude, for the mark of her Majesty's most gracious favour.

Sir John Pakington intimates to me that my proceeding is entirely without precedent, but in point of fact, the *case* is so.

General officers and admirals have, in several instances, successfully resisted the payment of these fees on account of their being so grievous; but it is believed that by some more recent regulation they can now be enforced, as on the occasion of the very latest promotions, two officers of the highest distinction were legally advised to pay them.

It appears, therefore, that henceforward there will be no resource for those who may be unable to incur such expenses without very great inconvenience (which it may be presumed will be very frequent with old military and naval officers), but to be driven to the degrading position of being compelled to decline an honour that in other respects would be so highly coveted.

I may also add, that it was the expressed intention of his late Majesty King William IV. that these fees should be abolished, or greatly reduced.

My dear Colonel,

Yours very faithfully,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

To Colonel *the* Honourable C. PHIPPS.

Ordnance Office, Pall Mall, 1852.
April 20, 1852.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

With reference to my letter to you of yesterday, I have now to add that I have seen Lord FitzRoy Somerset this morning, in consequence of a communication which he had received from Sir John Pakington; and the result is, that as it would appear that some embarrassment would arise from endeavouring to undo what is so far advanced, and that such a circumstance would draw forth comments in the newspapers, and possibly unbecoming discussions, I have decided upon submitting to the consequences without further resistance, and I propose to give in my name to attend the forthcoming installation. Nomination to G.C.B.

At the same time, I shall hope that not only means will be taken for remedying the grievous penalty of such heavy fees, as a consequence of attaining a most enviable distinction (which sooner or later I feel satisfied must be done, as regards military and naval officers), but that it may be so immediate as to afford relief to myself and the others in the present promotion, many if not all of whom feel as I do on the subject.

Yours faithfully,

J. F. BURGOYNE.

"Buckingham Palace,
April 21, 1852.

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I was detained upon other business so late here yesterday, that I found it impossible to answer your notes.

"The subject upon which you write is one that has occupied the Prince's frequent and anxious attention, and his Royal Highness fully feels the hardship of the position in which you, and probably many others, are placed.

"The subject, however, is one surrounded by many difficulties. These fees are paid partly to the officers of the order, and partly to members of her Majesty's household.

"In the first instance, the officers of the Order receive these fees, the only remuneration for their services, under patents; they have a vested right in them, and I am not aware of any power to take this property from them; for even an Act of

1852. Nomination to G.C.B.

Parliament would award them compensation, which must be raised by taxation upon the country generally.

"With regard to the second case, the members of the royal household, they also hold these fees as vested rights, which it would be impossible to take from the possessors; but her Majesty has felt so strongly upon the subject, that last year the Queen established a regulation, that in all future appointments or promotions in the royal establishment, the receipt of all fees should be abolished, and thus, by degrees, this portion, a very large one, of the evil will be done away with.

"At present, all fees payable to members of her Majesty's household are paid into a fee fund, from which those persons *only* who held *their present* offices before the new regulation, are paid what is due to them, calculated upon an average of the five years prior to the alteration, and I hope that by this alteration something may already have been deducted from the gross amount of fees payable to the royal household.

"I have sent to obtain correct information how this is, and will communicate with you again.

"With respect to your own case, I can assure you that it has excited the sincerest sympathy upon the part of the Queen and the Prince. That one of the most distinguished officers of the most distinguished service in the British army should have been forced to entertain the painful idea of declining the highest military honour that his sovereign can confer, on account of the expense attending it, is very grievous; but the above statement will, I think, convince you of the great difficulties in the way of rectifying the evil.

"Very sincerely yours,

"C. B. PHIPPS."

"MY DEAR SIR JOHN,

"I am happy to hear, on inquiring at the Lord Chamberlain's office, that no fees payable to the royal household have been demanded or received from any military G. C. B. for many years past. Her Majesty has, under these circumstances, ordered that these fees may be abolished.

"Sincerely yours,

"C. B. PHIPPS."

The duke's communication to him of the 31st of March, on the subject of the Grand Cross of the Bath, was the first and the last he received from him since the publication of his letter in 1848; on the 18th of November of the same year, Sir John followed his remains to their last resting-place at St. Paul's. Among the foreign generals who represented their respective sovereigns at the funeral, was Prince Gortchakoff, who subsequently commanded the Russian forces in the Crimea. The prince was anxious to make the acquaintance of Sir John Burgoyne, and an interview was arranged between them by the secretary to the Russian legation, who writes on the 16th of November: 1852.

Interview with Prince Gortchakoff.

"Novembre 16, 1852.

"J'ai regretté bien vivement de ne pas vous avoir rencontré ni à votre bureau ni chez moi, lorsque vous avez eu la bonté de me laisser votre billet en date d'hier.

"Le prince Gortchakoff, général en chef (full general), qui se trouve ici pour assister, comme officier supérieur de l'armée russe, aux funérailles du duc de Wellington, désire beaucoup faire votre connaissance personnelle.

"Le prince Gortchakoff est un de nos officiers généraux des plus distingués. Il a fait les campagnes de Turquie, de Pologne et de Hongrie, sans parler des guerres de 1812, 1814 et 1815. Il a été chef d'état-major des armées actives, et je crois officier de génie et d'état-major au début de sa carrière.

"Vous le trouverez un militaire de premier rang. Il est particulièrement désireux de vous trouver, et de causer avec vous des objets qui intéressent l'art militaire.

"Je vous écris ce billet pour vous demander une entrevue. Veuillez choisir le jour et l'heure où le prince Gortchakoff pourrait vous trouver à votre bureau sans vous déranger: avant ou après le 18 novembre, selon votre convenance. Depuis midi, toute heure convient au prince Gortchakoff. Il désire particulièrement aller vous voir chez vous ou à votre bureau, mais il désire surtout vous épargner la peine de lui faire une visite, afin de ne pas vous faire perdre votre temps précieux.

1852. Interview with Prince Gortchakoff.

"En conséquence, je vous prie de me faire savoir l'heure et le jour qui vous convient pour que je puisse vous présenter le général prince Gortchakoff à votre bureau à Pall Mall.

"Il demeure à Mivart's hotel, Lower Brook street."

The prince spent some time with Sir John at his office in Pall Mall. Of all the improbable conjunctures of human affairs, it would have been difficult at this time to have named one more unlikely to occur, than that these two generals, already far advanced in life, should have been opposed to each other two years afterwards, in a deadly strife, on one of the remotest shores of Europe. The impression of the prince left on the mind of Sir John by this interview, was that he was an able man, but one whose ability rather took the form of astuteness than breadth of view. He was in the habit of styling him "that sly old fox, Gortchakoff."

National defences.

Notwithstanding all Sir John's efforts, the interval from 1847 to 1851 had showed a steady reduction of the military estimates. After the latter year, he obtained the powerful advocacy of the press, owing to the invectives passed by the newspapers on the *coup d'état*, and the loud and almost unanimous proclamation at the same time of our defenceless condition.

In the session of 1852, Lord John Russell announced the determination of ministers to "improve the defences of the country, so as to render invasion impossible"; and on the 16th of February, he produced the Militia Bill, which proved fatal to his government.[1]

[1] In a memorandum given to Lord Hardinge in May, 1852, Sir John Burgoyne recommends that every encouragement should be given by government to the formation of local volunteers. It is believed that this is the first instance since the French war, in which a responsible public official recommended this species of force. In an article on 'Militia and Volunteers,' written by Sir John, for the 'United Service Magazine,' of March, 1853, he reiterates the arguments used in this memorandum, in favour of enrolling and arming bodies of volunteers for local service.

Lord Derby's ministry, which followed, brought in another Militia Bill, which subsequently became law. It added 80,000 militia to the available strength of the country; and the regular army was augmented at the same time by 3000 regular infantry, 2000 artillery, and 1000 horses, or six field batteries; but even with this addition, it was calculated that 35,000 infantry and 40,000 militia, would be the utmost force available to meet an emergency. Such as it was, however, England now possessed the nucleus of a force which was capable of augmentation; and Sir John's next efforts were directed to convince the government that much was still required, before the aggregate of regiments forming the British army could be considered an effective force for the field. 1852. National defences.

He had already adverted to this point in his pamphlet of 1846, where he says:

"The French have also a permanent organisation for the field, of all the necessary departments attendant upon armies, which, in the British service, have to be created by slow degrees, at every war, until a continued campaign under very able direction, and that alone, brings them into an efficient state.

"It may be supposed that the lessons acquired in the Peninsula must be now retained; but that is not the case. Some departments were broken up altogether after the peace, others were shorn of their campaigning equipments; so that little remains to the good, but the reminiscences of the surviving officers, after an interval of thirty years, and a few scattered details in military publications; there is, therefore, great reason to fear that they would for some time be in a very inefficient state."

In a memorandum given to the master-general in January, 1853, he goes more at length into the subject, and points out that there is no organised system of transport for an army in this country, nor even approved

1852. National defences.

patterns for carts, harness, &c. He finishes, by recommending the "establishment of an efficient commissariat and transport for a single division, with samples of every article, and full instructions for the duties of the department, so as to serve as models for after extension."

No army has power to reform itself, or to initiate improvements in its organisation; and with an apathetic administration, all Sir John's efforts in this direction proved unavailing. With the exception of the assembly of a division under canvas, at Chobham, no attempt was made to supply the deficiencies he had pointed out. These troops never ventured a day's march from their encampment; their transport was hired by the day, and the supplies they required were delivered on the spot by London contractors. Such was the state of preparation of the English army, when a European contest was forced upon the country in the following year.

After this description of the pertinacity with which Sir John continued to urge unpopular views of army reform upon ministers, the reader will be surprised at the following character of him, which appeared in a letter to the *Times*, during the calamitous winter of the Crimean war:

"We are reduced to our present straits simply and solely because Sir John, at the head of a large party of veterans, has, during the forty years of peace, resisted every improvement in military science as a personal insult to their superior knowledge and experience, and they have, in consequence of their position, been able to keep things pretty much as they were at the end of the last war.

"Sir John Burgoyne is pre-eminently what in official parlance is termed 'a safe man'; he never troubled the minister for money to make scientific experiments, or to improve the education of engineers or artillerymen.

"For every inventor he had a bucket of cold water, administered in the blandest manner possible. He possessed, above all

men, the art of keeping things smooth and quiet in Pall Mall, and rose in favour and in fortune accordingly."

By the light of the present day, this reads like irony; yet for one who knew the facts, thousands probably accepted this version as true.

Commissions and committees. 1848–54.

Besides the Irish Relief Commission, which from its importance demanded a separate notice, Sir John Burgoyne was employed on the following commissions and committees during the interval between his appointment as inspector-general of fortifications and the Crimean war.

A letter marked "secret and confidential," from the Secretary to the Admiralty, of 12th October, 1846, requests him, in conjunction with Sir Thomas Hastings, to select an artillery officer, and enter upon an inquiry, as prayed by the Earl of Dundonald in his petition to the House of Lords, into the merits of his plan for speedily and effectually dismantling and destroying forts and fleets. He is further requested to enter into this inquiry in such a manner as may fully put to the test the merits of the said plan, so as to provide that the secret of the Earl of Dundonald shall not be divulged.

In July, 1854, Lord Dundonald again brought his project under the notice of the government, and offered, by its means, to destroy the Russian fortress of Cronstadt, if the Baltic fleet were placed at his disposal for the purpose. Sir James Graham, in reply, asks him if he is willing, in strict confidence, to lay his whole plan before Sir Byam Martin, Sir William Parker, and Admiral Berkeley; and he adds, "If you do not object to this measure, or to any of the naval officers whom I have named, I should be disposed to add Sir John Burgoyne, the head of the Engineers, on whose judgment I place great reliance." Lord Dundonald acquiesced in this proposal. I am not able to give any further particulars

Commissions and committees. 1848–54.

respecting the inquiry; but it may be presumed that the plan was considered worthless or impracticable, as no attempt was subsequently made to put it in execution.

In April, 1848, Sir John was appointed a member of a royal commission to superintend the completion of the new palace of Westminster, of which Earl de Grey was president.

In September of the same year, he was requested by Lord Morpeth to form one of a royal commission of sewers for the whole metropolis. This commission was renewed in 1851, and again in 1852, with a considerable change of members on both occasions, but Sir John Burgoyne continued throughout to serve upon it.

In March, 1849, he was requested to proceed to Scotland, and to report to the Treasury upon the damage done there by floods occasioned by the Caledonian Canal.

Later on in the same year, he was directed to make an inquiry into the state of Westminster Bridge, as regarded the necessity for immediate reconstruction; and he submitted a report to the government, the suggestions in which were afterwards acted upon.

In 1850, Sir John Burgoyne devised a scheme for obtaining uniform meteorological observations from all parts of the world from officers of Royal Engineers at foreign stations, the object being to obtain some data towards the elucidation of the physical laws which govern the circulation of the atmosphere. His plans were worked out in detail by Captain, now Sir Henry James, R.E., and the sanction of the master-general of the Ordnance and the Treasury was subsequently given for the supply of the requisite instruments to nineteen foreign stations, situated in the four quarters of the globe. Early in the following year, he was in correspondence with the Foreign Office with reference to a proposal which he had

made, that a uniform system of recording meteorological observations should be established between the United States and ourselves. This idea was subsequently extended into a project for an international conference, embracing all the European states, which met at Brussels shortly afterwards. Captain James, R.E., attended this conference on behalf of England, and the ultimate result of these efforts was the establishment of the existing department, under the Board of Trade, for the collection and publication of meteorological observations. Commissions and committees. 1848–54.

In August, 1850, he became a member of a Treasury commission on a proposal for an Irish transatlantic packet station, of which Earl Granville was chairman.

In June, 1852, he was appointed member of a very confidential committee to investigate Captain Warner's inventions—the invisible shell, long range, &c.

In June, 1854, he was president of a committee to decide upon the scale of the Ordnance Survey, and in the following month he served on another committee, of which Lord Vrottesley was president, upon the system of contouring on the Ordnance Survey.

In the same year, he was appointed member of a royal commission upon Army Promotion.

It will be seen by the foregoing list that, in addition to Sir John's permanent duties at the Ordnance and on the Commission of Sewers, he was, on an average, a member of two other commissions in each of the years above mentioned. In many of them the researches extended over a lengthened period; and in nearly all, the chairmen availed themselves of Sir John's serviceable pen to draw up the reports. In fact, his reputation, both as a military and civil engineer, as well as his acknowledged administrative talents, led at this time to an enormous amount of extra unpaid work being thrown

Commissions and committees. 1848–54.

upon him. From this he never flinched, but it may be doubted whether it is either just or politic in government, to extort so much gratuitous work from its permanent officials. Much of the labour performed by him would have been very largely remunerated in the civil branches of the profession. In Sir John's case, this absence of all payment for onerous duties quite beyond the province of his office was peculiarly hard, for he was in receipt only of the pay of a major-general on the Staff, whereupon to maintain a prominent position, and a residence in London. He was thus in some pecuniary embarrassment, which was much aggravated when in 1854, he accepted the Duke of Newcastle's offer to proceed to the seat of war, without any stipulation as to emolument. He was then seventy-two years of age, and the offices in which he had insured his life, protected themselves against the risks of war and climate by the imposition of extra premiums, larger than his modest income could well bear. Sir John Burgoyne was deaf to every other consideration but the calls of duty, although the thought of the very precarious position in which, in the event of his death in the East, his family would have been left, must have cost the old soldier many a sleepless night, and increased greatly the anxieties of his overworked brain.

END OF VOL. I.

LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

00022995

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 18 July, 2018